

## ABSTRACT

1960-1975 is a period of particular significance in Turkish-American relations. The tone and contents of President L.B. Johnson's letter to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü on Turkey's involvement in the Cyprus dispute in June 1964 forced the Turks to make a fundamental reappraisal of their relationship with the United States. This thesis examines the nature of the developing relationship between Turkey and the United States throughout the whole period and sets it within both a theoretical and a historical context. Seeing it as a valuable case study of a small power - superpower alliance, it traces it from a time of almost automatic Turkish support for the United States to one of greater independence and flexibility and improved relations with the Soviet bloc and Third World.

After an introductory chapter, Chapter II sets out the theoretical explanations offered by alliance, patron-client, dependency and influence theories. Chapter III examines the foreign policy-making structures and determinants in both the USA and Turkey. Chapter IV constitutes a detailed analysis of military relations between the two countries with special emphasis on Turkish efforts to have a more independent policy and on the evaluation of the alliance by both sides. Chapter V explains Turkey's involvement in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the U.S. bargaining with the USSR over the Jupiter missiles belonging to Turkey. In Chapters VI and VII events of the Cyprus question in 1960-75 are examined from the point of their impact on U.S.-Turkish relations. Chapter VIII gives a detailed account of the U.S.-Turkish controversy over the alleged contribution of Turkish opium to the U.S. drug abuse problem. In the final chapter, the conclusion is reached that the U.S.-Turkish relationship in 1960-1975 was not simply a patron-client relationship but presented a more complicated case.

# **TURKEY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES 1960-1975**

by

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Dedicated to my wife and children



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## PREFACE

The year 1964, in which Turkey received the famous Johnson letter, is rightly considered by many scholars as a turning point in Turkish foreign policy. Until that time foreign policy discussion among Turkish politicians and public opinion was very rare, if not absent totally, and was far from criticising the official line. In spite of strong disagreements over other matters, Turkish political parties and groups had formed an undeclared consensus on the state's foreign policy decisions and actions, seeing this attitude as a national duty. The new constitution in 1960 prepared the ground for public discussions by providing all political groups with means to voice their ideas. But one had to wait until 1964 to see widespread criticism of foreign policy.

Starting in the last ten days of December 1963, Greek Cypriot atrocities against the Turkish Cypriots attracted the close attention of Turkish people and led them to pressurise their government to intervene in Cyprus militarily. The failure of the Turkish government to intervene in Cyprus apparently because of U.S. pressures, including the Johnson letter with its serious threats, caused widespread criticisms and demonstrations against the United States in Turkey. Subsequently, in the second half of the 1960s, all aspects of U.S.-Turkish relations and Turkish foreign policy became the main subjects of public discussion, overshadowing disputes over internal matters. Turkey's alliance with NATO and its military relations with the USA were particularly questioned by leftist circles and the press and some went so far to suggest withdrawal from NATO. In this atmosphere Turkish rulers, too, felt the need to make some changes in foreign policy by improving relations with the Eastern bloc and the Third World and being more careful in dealings with the United States. As a part of their new

approach, they took some actions in the military field, which could displease the Americans.

The importance of these developments, which are still frequently cited by Turkish politicians and scholars, for Turkey's foreign policy inspired me to study them in detail. I particularly wanted to analyse views of different political groups including ruling elites on Turkey's relations with the United States to see the effect of public discussions on Turkey's official foreign policy line and to question the real character of changes in Turkish foreign policy. In the meantime, to study U.S.-Turkish relations in this period from the point of small-big state relationships in the light of theoretical considerations emerged as an attractive option. This necessitated the inclusion of Turkey's involvement in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in the research in order to see the state of the U.S.-Turkish alliance prior to the uneasy 1964-1975 period. The subject did not attract public discussion at that time and has not been studied by Turkish scholars but it was at least as important as the Cyprus question and the Johnson letter for Turkey's security and its relations with the USA. I thought it would be an important contribution to the understanding of Turkish foreign policy and U.S.-Turkish relations to study all aspects of this event in the light of recent revelations.

The cooperation in the military field still constitutes the basis of the U.S.-Turkish relationship. I wanted to study it in a wider perspective by giving the reasons for its establishment and continuity, noting what it was like in the 1950s and mentioning recent developments to complete the picture. Apart from analysing the events of the U.S.-Turkish military alliance in 1960-75, including important actions of the Turkish government to gain more initiative in this area and the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey in 1975, I also aimed to give the evaluation of the alliance by both sides by analysing the NATO discussion in Turkish politics in the 1960s, giving figures on military and economic transactions and explaining Turkey's strategic importance for the USA.

The Cyprus question was of course the factor that had the most important impact on relations between Turkey and the United States in the period under review. In spite of the existence of many studies on various aspects of the issue, it would be a new contribution to comprehend the implications of the Cyprus

problem for the U.S.-Turkish alliance. However, to do this within the limits of two chapters posed a problem. The original study of this matter was itself of the length of a whole thesis. To conform to the length limitations of a thesis, the treatment of this subject therefore had to concentrate on the Cyprus policies of the United States and Turkey and the effect of these policies on their relationship.

The opium issue in the 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s is generally considered a side issue in the Turkish-American relationship. The only aspects which are normally mentioned on the subject are the U.S. dislike for the Demirel government because of its failure to ban opium cultivation, the prohibition of opium by the Erim government as an act to please the Americans and the resumption of opium production by the Ecevit government as act of independence. However, in the course of the study, I realised that the issue was very complicated, had many aspects concerning internal and foreign policies and public opinions of both states and became a serious matter at certain times even threatening the alliance between the two countries. I aimed to give a detailed analysis of the matter from the point of view of both sides, which had not been done before.

I should also note that I studied all events of the 1960-75 U.S.-Turkish relationship to see how far Turkey was influenced by the United States and how far the United States was able to affect Turkish actions on these incidents. A seminar which I prepared for this purpose proved useful in the detailed study of these subjects.

At the beginning of the research my aim was to visit both the USA and Turkey to collect primary material and to have interviews with U.S. and Turkish officials who were involved in the events studied by the thesis. Unfortunately, the visit to the USA could not be realised because of financial problems. Nevertheless, available primary U.S. sources were obtained through the Inter-Library Loan service. The visit to Turkey was fruitful in collecting primary sources but was not as successful as I would have wished in talking with Turkish statesmen. However, I did manage to have interviews with two former Turkish foreign ministers, one former MP and diplomat and two prominent Turkish academics and columnists. Attempts to talk to other Turkish statesmen failed because of their busy schedules, or unwillingness and unresponsiveness. The Turkish Presidency

and the Turkish Foreign Ministry were kind in suggesting and supplying sources, which are unfortunately secondary. One sorrowful event which was also a loss for the research was the sickness and later death of İ. Sabri Çağlayangil, who served as foreign minister between 1965 and 1971 and in 1975. I also tried to obtain views of former U.S. and Turkish statesmen by sending interview letters to them. Failure to contact some of them and lack of response from others was frustrating.

Apart from these difficulties I made the maximum use of available primary sources to produce a solid thesis. I hope my research will cast light on future studies on the subject made with the benefit of additional primary sources when they are declassified.

## ABBREVIATIONS

AID.....	Agency for International Development
BNDD.....	Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
CENTO.....	Central Treaty Organization
CIA.....	Central Intelligence Agency
CSTD.....	Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi
DBB.....	Dışışleri Bakanlıđı Belleteni
JP.....	Justice Party
JUSMMAT.	Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
MMTD.....	Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi
MLF.....	Multilateral Force
NATO.....	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC.....	National Security Council
NSP.....	National Salvation Party
RPP.....	Republican People's Party
TUSLOG....	The United States Logistics Group
UNFICYP .	United Nations Force in Cyprus

## TURKISH PRONUNCIATION

c is pronounced as j in “jar”.

ç is pronounced as ch in “charm”.

g has always a hard pronunciation as g in “get”.

ğ is not pronounced but lengthens the preceding vowel.

İ, ı is pronounced approximately as u in “measure”.

İ̇, ı̇ is pronounced as i in “is”.

j is pronounced as s in “measure”.

ö is pronounced as eu in French “deux”.

ş is pronounced as sh in “shop”.

ü is pronounced as u in French “une”.



# Chapter I

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Significance of the Study

When the United States and Turkey established alliance relations immediately after the Second World War, foreign policies of both countries were experiencing a radical change. As the most powerful state in the world, the United States had decided to give up its traditional isolationist policy and to undertake global responsibilities. The main aim of U.S. policy after that moment was to confront and contain the Soviet Union and its bloc. The alliance with Turkey was a part of this new U.S. approach. By aligning with the USA, Turkey, too, abandoned her traditional neutralist policy, which had prevented her from establishing alliances, especially with big powers. Her main concern was to be a part of the Western world. In 1994, in the aftermath of the cold-war period, the alliance between the United States and Turkey still constitutes an important aspect of their foreign policies. This alliance is significant in today's world politics because it influences events in important regions such as the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, and Central Asia, including Russia and former Soviet republics.

This study attempts to explain the basis of this important relationship and the factors affecting it. In order to gain a thorough understanding of the relationship between Turkey and the United States today it is necessary to know why the two countries chose to establish their alliance and to continue it in spite of internal and international changes that adversely affected their relationship. The relationship is studied within the context of Turkey's westernization policy, its need for foreign aid to develop its economy and for military assistance to ensure its security, its sensitivity to foreign influences and interventions, its insistence on its national causes, its importance for U.S. global and regional interests and strategies, the character of the international regime, and alliance perceptions and special internal conditions of both states. Foreign policy-making structure and factors and determinants of foreign policies in both the United States and Turkey are also examined.



The period of our study (1960-1975) holds a particular importance. After experiencing a perfect honeymoon period in the 1950s, the durability, strength and cohesion of the U.S.-Turkish alliance were tested by severe problems between 1960 and 1975. Looking at these problems will provide insights into the current relationship.

In 1960 the Turkish Republic experienced its first military coup and saw a radical change in its political system. Encouraged by military officers removing a rightist government and by the more pluralist and pro-freedom constitution of 1960, leftist groups launched an all-out campaign to increase their influence in domestic politics and to this end from 1964 they attacked Turkey's relations with the USA and NATO. The bargaining over Turkey's Jupiter missiles by the United States with the Soviet Union during the Cuban crisis of October 1962 occurred without public criticism and damage to the U.S.-Turkish relationship largely because of public ignorance of the incident. However, when the U.S. response to the Cyprus question, which emerged in December 1963 as a serious matter, was perceived by Turkish rulers and people as anti-Turkish, the domestic politics of Turkey after that time were dominated by criticism of the United States and Turkey's contacts with the Americans. Military relations were particularly targeted to the extent that the Turkish government had to force the U.S. administration to review bilateral agreements signed since 1947 and that Turkey had to take some actions in the military field that would not please the Americans. Such developments can be seen in relations between two states at any time. Studying these past experiences will help academics and politicians assess current problems in perspective and enable them to suggest solutions with a clearer awareness of the likely consequences.

In the 1960s the most important accusation made by Turkish leftists and believed by many others was that U.S.-Turkish contacts acquired the character of a patron-client relationship. It was widely propagated that Turkey was dependent on the USA in almost every field and was under the heavy influence of the United States in its decisions and actions. Similar claims can be heard frequently in big-small state relations. For instance, in today's Turkey Islamists have voiced almost the same kinds of opinion. Our study questions whether or not leftists' claims in the 1960s reflected the truth and hopes to give clues for the understanding of current and future events.

In this context, one important thing which the thesis tries to explain is the characteristics and different aspects of a big-small state relationship. Turkish-American relations in the 1960-1975 period present a good case to analyse how an alliance between a relatively small state and a superpower works. The transactions between the USA and Turkey and the features of both states appear to reflect many aspects of the patron-client relationship. The Turkish position during the Cuban missile crisis; U.S. president Johnson's letter to the Turkish prime minister, which included heavy threats to force Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus; considerable U.S. economic and military aid to Turkey; the equipping of the Turkish army with U.S. weapons; U.S. pressures on Turkey to force her to ban opium production; and the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey, aiming to change its Cyprus policy can all lead one to the conclusion that as a small state Turkey fell victim to U.S. influence in this period. However, one can easily show evidence for the opposite claim: Turkey's improving relations with Eastern bloc and Third World countries; Turkish support for the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict; some Turkish actions in the military arena such as not allowing U-2 flights from Turkish territory, reviewing bilateral agreements with the USA, not allowing the use of U.S. bases for non-NATO purposes, and changing the duty status formula applied to U.S. personnel in Turkey; not banning opium production and later resuming it after it was banned by a non-party government; and Turkish intervention in Cyprus all point in the other direction.

By studying individual examples in this context, the thesis tries to provide answers to the following important questions:

- (a) In a small-big state relationship which side gets more benefits?
- (b) To what extent can a big state influence and change foreign policies, decisions and actions of its small ally and force her to act in a certain way?
- (c) To what extent can a big state influence national causes and internal policies of its small ally?
- (d) How does a big state get involved in matters concerning its small ally and how does it react when actions of this ally seem to damage its global and national interests? To what extent can a big state punish its small ally in these cases?

(e) What are the difficulties faced by a small state in its relations with its bigger ally? For instance, how can its survival be put under threat because of its alliance relations with a big partner and how can its interests be bargained by its big ally with other powers?

(f) How does a small state act when it faces threats and pressures from its big ally?

(g) To what extent does heavy dependence on a big power restrict the freedom of decision and action of a small state?

(h) How could a small state be influenced or threatened by a big power if it did not have alliance relations with this state?

(i) How does a small state's determination on one national issue make her reject influences and threats of its big ally?

(j) How do public consensus and pressures in one issue affect the attitude of the small state's rulers in their dealings with a big power in this issue?

(k) What is the effect upon the views, decisions and actions of the rulers of a small state who are proud of its independence when they suspect it is being treated as a satellite?

(l) How does a small state's regime affect its relations with its big ally?

(m) How and why does a small state follow the lead of its big ally in international events even without thinking its own interests?

(n) What are the alternatives for a small state when it is cornered or deserted by its big ally? For example, can it opt for neutrality or change sides?

(o) To what extent can a small state have a flexible foreign policy and improve its relations with enemy and other powers while having alliance relations with a big power at the same time?

(p) To what extent can a small state take a major action in spite of opposition from its big ally?

(q) How does the overall international climate (bipolarity, multipolarity, tense confrontation, detente, etc.) affect relations between a small and big state?

(r) What factors restrict decisions and actions of both sides of a big-small state relationship? For example, how do mutual interests and the need each felt for the other affect one side's decision to influence the other or reject the influence of the other?

In addition to the answers to these questions, analysis of changes in Turkey's foreign policy in the period of our study will contribute to an understanding of Turkish foreign policy past, present and future, and will also give clues that will help an assessment of the characteristics and prospects of small states' foreign policies in general. In the 1965-1975 period, it appeared that Turkish rulers tried to pursue a more independent foreign policy, remaining outside the influence of the United States and the NATO alliance. A study of the reasons for these efforts and the extent of their success will contribute to the current knowledge of the subject.

The thesis will also show how important internal conditions of a state are in determining its foreign policy decisions and its relations with other states. In the context of our study the following examples can be cited:

(a) The role of Turkish leftists and the press in opening foreign policy discussion in Turkey for the first time and in forcing rulers to reconsider foreign policy.

(b) The effect of Turkish public opinion on Turkey's Cyprus policy and its dealings with the USA on this issue.

(c) The role of electoral concerns in the Turkish government's rejection of the U.S. demand to prohibit opium cultivation.

(d) The effect of public opinion on Turkish rulers' efforts to make changes in military relations with the United States.

(e) The impact of Turkey's traditional westernisation policy on its relations with the USA.

(f) The extent to which having a military regime influenced Turkey's receptiveness to U.S. demands.

(g) The effect of the U.S. Congress and the power competition between the Congress and the administration on U.S. policies toward the Cyprus question, Turkey's opium production and U.S.-Turkish military relations.

(h) The impact of Greek-American lobby groups in the United States on the Johnson letter and the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey.

(i) The role of the U.S. public's preoccupation with the drug abuse problem in getting the U.S. government to put pressure on Turkey to prohibit opium production.

The thesis provides a uniquely comprehensive analysis of U.S.-Turkish relations between 1960 and 1975. Turkey's involvement in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 is studied in the light of most recent revelations in great detail. The fact that Turkey's survival was put under great threat during the crisis because of her alliance relations with the United States and that U.S. rulers bargained the missiles belonging to Turkey without informing her cannot be forgotten by Turkish authorities as a serious lesson which will guide their future dealings with the Americans.

Military contacts are still the basis of the U.S.-Turkish relationship and the conditioning and amount of U.S. military assistance to Turkey continue to be a problem between the two countries. The signing of a general military co-operation agreement arises as a serious matter in relations at regular intervals. This thesis examines different aspects of U.S.-Turkish military contacts and by also noting both the previous and more recent developments it clarifies the nature of today's U.S.-Turkish alliance. Its exposition of the ideas of defenders and critics of Turkey's alliance with the USA and NATO in the 1960s is of relevance to the current evaluation of this alliance.

The Cyprus problem, too, is a continuing problem of both Turkish foreign policy and U.S.-Turkish relations. It is still a national cause for Turkey considerably influenced by public opinion and the United States still tries to find ways to affect Turkey's Cyprus policies. Looking at the roots of the problem and analysing U.S. and Turkish attitudes and interactions on the matter in a historical perspective will certainly help an understanding of the present situation, its future prospects

and its impact on the U.S.-Turkish alliance. Any proposed solutions to the problem need to be made in the light of this knowledge. U.S. President Johnson's letter in 1964 is a good example of a diplomatic mistake which alienated the recipient state considerably and caused changes in its foreign policy. It is still frequently cited by Turkish politicians and scholars in the course of discussing foreign policy and Turkish-American relations. The U.S. arms embargo against Turkey in 1975, which was aimed at forcing Turkish rulers to make concessions in Cyprus, is also fresh in Turkish minds, reminding them how the United States can try to punish their country and how the U.S. Congress can affect relations between the two states.

The opium question was short-lived and ceased to be a problem after 1974. However, its implications are still alive. It demonstrates how internal public pressures can lead the U.S. administration to pressurise its close ally and how easily Turkey can attract the antagonism of American people and Congress. It also shows how open pressures on Turkey, forcing her to act in a certain way, can provoke a severe response.

## **1.2 Purpose of the Study**

The aims of the study are implicit in the preceding section. The chief aim is to examine the characteristics of the U.S.-Turkish alliance in the 1960-1975 period and show whether Turkey was a satellite of the United States and whether U.S.-Turkish relations fitted the pattern of a small-big or a patron-client relationship. It examines individual examples in this context.

Secondly, the study analyses events of the U.S.-Turkish relations in the 1960-1975 period in order to reflect their true character and reveal unknown aspects. It aims to give comprehensive knowledge of these events with their causes and consequences and their impact upon the U.S.-Turkish alliance.

Another intention is to explain changes in the direction of Turkish foreign policy. It explores the character of these changes, why they occurred, and questions how successful they were. To this end, the study analyses the ideas of anti-American critics and the attempts of the Turkish government to implement a more independent policy staying outside U.S. influence.

The study seeks to explain factors affecting U.S.-Turkish relations and reasons for the continuity of the U.S.-Turkish alliance. To achieve this it includes a discussion of determinants and formal policy-making structure of foreign policies in Turkey and the USA.

A further important objective of this research is to discover the true reasons, motives and aims behind U.S. attitudes toward Turkey in different incidents. In other words, to examine whether U.S. rulers had biased opinions about Turkey while pressuring her or whether their attitude was more or less objective. Similarly, an attempt is made to find out true intention of Turkish rulers in their apparently anti-American actions related to changes in Turkish foreign policy.

### 1.3 Scope and Focus of the Study

The thesis covers all political and military contacts between the United States and Turkey in the 1960-1975 period. It also mentions events before 1960 and after 1975 to explain the roots of problems and subsequent developments. The economic aspect is briefly touched upon when it is thought to be useful in understanding relations, though the fact that the two nations' trading patterns reveal their economies to be more complementary than competitive means that economic factors were less important than military and political considerations in shaping their relationship.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Between 1960 and 1975 Turkey generally exported agricultural products and imported manufactured industrial materials. Turkey's major exports included cotton, tobacco, hazelnuts, raisins, minerals (including chromium), textiles, food beverages and industrial products, while her major imports were non-electric machinery, iron and steel products, means of transport (including motor vehicles), crude oil and petroleum products, electrical machinery, rubber and plastics products, agriculture-based processed products, cereal (including wheat) and textiles. On the other hand, the United States was one of the leading powers in the export of manufactured goods though manufactures also occupied the most important place in her imports. Major U.S. exports were machinery, automobiles and parts, aircraft and parts, iron and steel products, chemicals, electrical, construction and agricultural machinery, fuels, wheat, etc. The USA imported mainly machinery, transport equipment, petroleum products, forest products, iron and steel products, chemicals, coffee, etc. Trade relations between the USA and Turkey in the 1960-75 period fit these trade patterns and demonstrate that the US-Turkish trade was complementary rather than competitive. While Turkey exported to the USA mainly agricultural products (tobacco, fruits, vegetables, nuts, some raw minerals and metals, animal products, textile and cereals), U.S. exports to Turkey included mainly manufactured goods (non-electric and electrical machinery, road vehicles and other transport equipment, wheat, chemicals, petroleum and products, metal manufactures, iron and steel, textiles and rubber products). Although in this period both Turkey and the USA exported wheat and textiles, Turkey's exports of these products were not large enough to pose any problems to their relationship. For more detailed information on Turkish-US trade see Appendix I.



In Chapter II, which discusses the relevant theories, arguments on the patron-client relationship, dependency and influence are mostly related to actual issues in Turkish-American relations between 1960 and 1975. The arguments in this chapter determine the treatment of topics dealt with in detail in later chapters. The theoretical framework established in this chapter can be used in the analysis of present relationships as well as the relationship during the period of our study.

Similarly, the consideration in Chapter III of factors influencing foreign policies of Turkey and the USA assists understanding of the current as well as the 1960-1975 situation.

In the discussion of U.S.-Turkish military relations a detailed picture is given of the relationship from its establishment up to the 1980s and where necessary to complete the picture brief reference is made to the current situation. The general basis of the relationship and the factors that influence it are also considered.

Turkey's involvement in the Cuban missile crisis is studied in great detail to reach correct conclusions. Daily and even hourly developments are given where necessary, though to keep the account within bounds summaries are provided of certain stages, and to present a clear picture the history from 1959 to 1963 of the Jupiter missiles, which caused Turkey's involvement in the crisis, is explained briefly.

The Cyprus issue, which placed enormous strains on the alliance, is covered in chapters VI and VII. Incidents of the Cyprus problem in the 1960-1975 period which have direct implications for the U.S.-Turkish relationship are summarised and more attention is directed to the Cyprus policies of the two countries and the impact of the matter on dealings between them and their foreign policies.

The chapter on the opium problem provides a brief background from the beginning of the century, describes developments between 1969 and 1974 in great detail and summarises its aftermath until the 1980s in order to present the matter in perspective. The need to give both sides' opinions objectively determined the length of this chapter.

The focus of the study is of course the examination of ideas mentioned in the theoretical chapter and their application to the events in the U.S.-Turkish

relationship in the concerned period. The examination of alleged U.S. influences on Turkey in these events can be given as the main focus of the thesis.

## 1.4 Methodology

As a first step to begin the study, I reviewed the literature, acquired a detailed knowledge of historical events which are related to the study directly or indirectly, and became familiar with important personalities who were involved in the concerned events and with foreign policy-making processes both in the United States and Turkey. In these early stages of the research, I also gained familiarity with the theoretical considerations. In this way, the information that should be sought during the fieldwork and the sources that should be obtained for the research became clear. In order to find the answer to the main question of the study, that is whether Turkey was a satellite of the United States, Turkish newspapers, magazines and parliamentary records were searched and some Turkish statesmen were interviewed during the fieldwork. Subsequently a seminar study, titled *Was Turkey a Tool of the U.S. Policy*, was prepared in the light of the data which the fieldwork provided and this paper became the guide of the research in its later stages. Other sources, including the American ones, were obtained and used during the detailed study of each chapter's subjects. In this stage, the problems were reconsidered and the relevance or otherwise of the theories to what had actually happened was examined. Finally, conclusions were drawn and the aspects that deserve future study when documents become available were noted.

Since the period of our study covers very recent events many of the relevant documents, particularly the official records, are still classified by both sides and consequently not available for inspection. Nevertheless, every effort has been made to consult all primary sources that are available, to gain further insights by interviews and correspondence with influential people who were personally involved in the events concerned and to supplement this with recourse to extensive secondary sources and the considered views of scholars and commentators who have reflected at length upon various aspects of this subject.

First of all, almost all published and declassified primary documents concerning U.S.-Turkish relations in the 1960-1975 period were used during the course of

the research. These primary sources include public statements of governments, foreign ministries and other interested ministries; agreements between Turkey and the United States; joint communiques announced at the end of official talks between the two states; statements of officials of both sides; memoirs of statesmen; parliamentary discussions in Turkey and congressional hearings in the United States; bulletins of foreign ministries; interviews with former Turkish foreign ministers, etc.

The author's interviews with former Turkish foreign ministers Osman Olcay and Ü. Haluk Bayülken, former Turkish MP and diplomat Kamran İnan, Turkish academic Seyfi Taşhan and retired Turkish academic and columnist Fahir Armaoğlu were helpful in clarifying some events of Turkish-American relations and understanding characteristics of Turkish foreign policy.

In order to get the whole picture of the Turkish side on U.S.-Turkish relations the author spent great amount of time going through all issues of major Turkish newspapers and magazines and records of Turkish parliamentary discussions in the period of 1960-1975. The Durham University Library and the Turkish Grand National Assembly Library provided means for this effort. Duygu Sezer's book, *Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika*, too, was useful in pointing to other articles in numerous Turkish newspapers. Newspapers and magazines had the additional merit of giving the general atmosphere of Turkish domestic politics at that time and providing official statements and news of U.S.-Turkish contacts. Articles by Turkish statesmen, academics, politicians and columnists in these papers reflected the opinion of the Turkish government, opposition and public. Records of parliamentary discussion undoubtedly provide a good contemporary evaluation by the government and opposition of the U.S.-Turkish alliance and its associated events.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry's bulletin, the semi-official Turkish magazine, *Foreign Policy*, and official books on the visits of Turkish Presidents and Prime Minister to the USA and on the opium question provided for the thesis official documents, records of events, and statements and articles by Turkish officials. The book by Nihat Erim, who was the Turkish representative in the Geneva talks of July-August 1964, provided a first-hand account of Cyprus events. Series of articles and books by Metin Toker, the son-in-law of Turkish prime minister İsmet İnönü,

too, were useful in conveying information on different topics, including the Cuban missile crisis and the Cyprus question. Haluk Ulman, who joined the Geneva conferences in July and August 1974 as a member of the Turkish delegation, gave the account of these conferences from the Turkish point of view. Books and articles by other Turkish and Turkish Cypriot officials including Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash supplied official documents and the viewpoint of the Turkish side on the Cyprus question. The author made a detailed use of books of Turkish political leaders and party and government programs in preparing the section on foreign policy-making structure of Turkey. M. Tamkoç's book, *the Warrior Diplomats*, and the thesis of J.E. Sowerwine, too, were helpful in this subject. Turkish Prime Minister Demirel's long press conference in February 1970 greatly assisted the study of U.S.-Turkish bilateral military agreements. The author also benefited from books by retired Turkish admiral Sezai Orkunt and Senator Haydar Tunçkanat as these included opinions of Turkish military officers and official documents of U.S.-Turkish military relations. The Turkish Finance Ministry's book was used in preparing the tables of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey.

On the American side, hearings in the U.S. Congress provided a detailed account of views of U.S. congressmen and officials on the opium question, U.S.-Turkish military relations, the arms embargo and the Cyprus problem. Reports prepared by the Library of Congress servicemen for committees of the U.S. Congress clarified the U.S. position and gave detailed information in various subjects including U.S. bases and facilities in Turkey, Turkey's strategic importance for the USA, the Cyprus question, and the arms embargo. Memoirs by some U.S. statesmen supplied first-hand accounts of some events: Truman's memoirs on the Truman doctrine, George Ball's memoirs on the Cuban missile crisis and on the Cyprus question in 1964, Henry Kissinger's memoirs on the Cyprus crisis in 1974 and Jimmy Carter's memoirs on the foreign policy-making structure of the United States. The memoirs of Robert Kennedy, U.S. Attorney-General in 1962 and brother of President Kennedy, were used in the chapter studying the Cuban missile crisis and due attention was paid to the memoirs attributed to Soviet Premier Khrushchev. Books and articles by former U.S. ambassadors, James W. Spain, George McGhee and Monteagle Stearns, too, contributed to the study. Documents provided by U.S. and British sources before 1960 were used in the explanation of military relations in the 1950s. The author also made the use of U.S. public laws concerning

Turkish-American relations. Figures of assistance to Turkey were obtained from the book published by the U.S. Agency for International Development. On the Cuban missile crisis, the author benefited from books of former U.S. officials who were actively involved in the crisis as close aides of the President and saw the classified documents. Some declassified documents, White House Tapes, were also obtained by the author. U.S. official Harvey R. Wellman's article was particularly useful in presenting the U.S. government's position on the opium question. Books and articles of former U.S. officials and U.S. experts on Turkey such as George Harris, Ferenc A. Vali, Dankwart A. Rustow, Richard C. Company, etc., too, helped the author in analysing U.S.-Turkish relations.

Some third-party sources were also used for our research. *Middle East Record* provided summaries of events and voting patterns in the United Nations. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* were helpful in tracking down international incidents concerning U.S.-Turkish relations. *International Organisation* was used for the record of U.N. discussions on the Cyprus question. *The Journal of Defense and Diplomacy*, Jane's books on weapons and SIPRI's book supplied figures for Turkey's military equipment supplied by the United States. The correspondence between the Turkish and Soviet premiers, Khrushchev and Gürsel, and between U.S. President Johnson and Turkish P.M. İnönü were obtained from *Middle Eastern Affairs* and *Middle East Journal*. Memoirs of Greek statesmen, Andreas Papandreou and Dimitri S. Bitsios, cast useful light on the Cyprus question from the point of U.S.-Turkish relations. The author also benefited from the thesis of M. Allan Turner on the opium problem between the USA and Turkey. Finally, he also consulted numerous secondary sources.

## 1.5 Outline of the Study

Chapter II examines the U.S.-Turkish alliance in the light of alliance theories by pointing to reasons for the establishment and continuity of this alliance and factors affecting its general situation and its cohesion. U.S. and Turkish perceptions of their alliance are also considered in this section. By using theoretical studies on these subjects the chapter then questions whether U.S.-Turkish contacts gained the character of a patron-client relationship and whether Turkey was dependent on the USA in different areas. Finally, the chapter examines the U.S. influence on

Turkey and mentions some minor events of U.S.-Turkish relations between 1960 and 1975 in this context.

Chapter III provides the framework and background of subjects examined in the following chapters by explaining determinants, factors and policy-making structure of U.S. and Turkish foreign policies in the light of historical incidents.

Chapter IV analyses all events and problems of U.S.-Turkish military relations from the establishment of the U.S.-Turkish alliance in 1947 to the lifting of the arms embargo in 1978 and mentions some important developments after 1978. It explains how and why this alliance was formed and then developed in the 1950s. After shortly mentioning developments of the Turkish junta period, the chapter examines the importance of the Johnson letter in 1964 for the U.S.-Turkish military alliance. Then, the Turkish government's initiatives to make some changes in military relations with the USA, influenced by widespread public criticism, are considered at length. Views of Turkish critics who defended and those who criticised Turkey's alliance with the USA and NATO are analysed in the following section and then military relations of the 1970s including the arms embargo are briefly described. Finally, the chapter gives figures on military and economic assistance and military equipment which Turkey received from the USA and analyses Turkey's strategic importance for Washington, including U.S. bases and facilities on its territory and its position vis-a-vis the Middle East.

Chapter V constitutes a detailed examination of Turkey's involvement in the Cuban missile crisis because of the U.S.-supplied Jupiter missiles on her territory. First, it explains why and how the Jupiters were stationed in Turkey over a long period of time and became the subject of U.S. attempts to remove them. Then, it mentions the role of these missiles in the Soviet move to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba. After giving a detailed account of discussions among U.S. officials during the crisis on the possibility of trading the Jupiters with Soviet missiles in Cuba and citing the Soviet proposal on this, the chapter describes how Turkey came to be a first target of a nuclear war whose outbreak became highly possible. Then, it explains how the United States made a secret deal with the Soviets on the Jupiters to end the crisis. In the final section, the chapter gives Turkey's attitude during

the crisis and analyses implications of the Cuban crisis and the removal of the Jupiters for Turkey.

Chapter VI, which describes developments of the Cyprus question between 1960 and 1965, starts with explaining how the USA was involved in the matter and worked to station NATO soldiers on Cyprus. In this context, it gives the account of George Ball's visit to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and U.S. pressures on Turkey to prevent its intervention in Cyprus. After mentioning the U.S. attitude during the U.N. Security Council discussions on the Cyprus question in March 1964, the Chapter explains how President Johnson tried to prevent a Turkish intervention in Cyprus by sending his famous letter to the Turkish prime minister in June 1964 and later tried to mediate between Greece and Turkey on the matter by talking to the Turkish and Greek prime ministers in Washington. The following sections provide information on the Geneva talks between Turkish and Greek delegation in July-August 1964, mediated by Johnson's special envoy Acheson, the August 1964 Cyprus crisis and U.S. and Turkish policies and interests on the Cyprus question.

Chapter VII focuses on the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in July and August 1974 from the point of U.S.-Turkish relations and the subsequent U.S. arms embargo against Turkey. It starts with explaining the U.S. role in Greek-Turkish secret talks on the Cyprus question between 1965 and 1974 and in ending the November 1967 Cyprus crisis and then mentions Cyprus policies of the USA and Turkey in the 1967-1974 period. Subsequently, the chapter analyses the Cyprus coup and the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus by focusing on U.S. role in and U.S. attitude toward these events. U.S. reactions to Turkish actions during this critical period are particularly emphasised in this context. Finally, the chapter analyses the arms embargo imposed by the U.S. Congress on Turkey in detail with its causes, consequences and implications.

Chapter VIII is a detailed account of U.S.-Turkish controversy over the opium production of Turkey mainly between 1969 and 1974. Firstly, it summarises the history of the problem until 1969 and then explains views of U.S. officials on Turkey's opium production and their efforts and pressures on Turkish rulers to achieve the prohibition of opium cultivation in Turkey. After describing Turkish rulers' views on the problem, their efforts to prevent illegal opium production and

trafficking and the reasons of their failure to ban it completely, the chapter analyses the Turkish opium ban in 1971 with its reasons and implementation. Finally, the chapter examines the U.S.-Turkish controversy surrounding the resumption of Turkish poppy production in 1974 by mentioning the views of Turkish authorities and the reaction of the U.S. administration and Congress and summarises the aftermath of the problem.

The final chapter of the thesis contains a general evaluation of U.S.-Turkish relations between 1960 and 1975 and a summary of the findings of the research including validity of the theories mentioned in Chapter II, explains its own contribution to scholarly understanding of the subjects and points to aspects that would repay further study.



## Chapter II

### THEORETICAL STUDY OF U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS

The aim of this chapter is to examine theoretical explanations of Turkish-American relations between 1960 and 1975. It first gives the reasons for the establishment of the U.S.-Turkish alliance, which came to the existence with the Truman doctrine in 1947 and was formalised with Turkey's entry into NATO in 1952. Secondly, the chapter illuminates factors affecting the alliance in general and its cohesion specifically, and then gives the U.S. and Turkish perceptions of their alliance. Thirdly, it tries to answer the three questions which constitute the core of the thesis itself: 1- Was the U.S.-Turkish relationship an example of patron-client relationship? 2- Was Turkey heavily dependent on the USA? 3- Was Turkey influenced by the USA in its decisions and actions? Finally, the chapter studies the examples of U.S. influence on Turkey (U.S. influence on the Turkish economy, U.S. intervention in Turkish internal politics, Turkish recognition of China, and the appointment of Komer as U.S. ambassador to Turkey), leaving the analysis of other examples to the other chapters (Turkish dependence on the USA militarily, implications of the Cuban missile crisis for U.S. influence on Turkish security, U.S. influence on Turkey's Cyprus and opium policies).

#### 2.1 Reasons for Alliance Formation

Turkey decided to establish an alliance with the United States for three main reasons: to protect its security, to obtain military and economic aid and to strengthen its Western-style state structure. The reason which made U.S. rulers enter into alliance relations with Turkey was Turkey's strategic importance for U.S. interests in the Middle East and for its global policy of containing the Soviet Union.

##### 2.1.1 Security

In the opinion of many scholars a common external threat to the security of countries is the primary source of alliances. Two states, A and B, form a military

alliance since they have a similar perception of a common threat and they want to deter that threat by combining their military resources in the event of an external military aggression. In a more particular case, if power A fears that power C harbours aggressive designs against her and if she feels herself weaker than power C, she seeks an alliance with a more powerful state B who will help her maintain her security and strengthen her power. Weaker members of the international system who confront a major security threat often rely on the guarantee of a powerful alliance and external aid of a powerful allied state because they cannot obtain security by use of their own capabilities.<sup>2</sup> By making an alliance with a lesser state, a strong power aims to prevent its adversary from gaining resources of the lesser state<sup>3</sup> and advancing its influence towards strategic places.

The main factor which brought the United States and Turkey together within an alliance was the Soviet threat to the security of Turkey. The Russians have always been a potential threat and enemy for the Turks since the rivalry and fighting began between the empires of the Ottomans and the Russians. The traditional Russian desire to reach warm waters through the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits and the possibility of Russian invasion of eastern Anatolia have constituted a nightmare for the Turks for centuries.<sup>4</sup> In the post-war period, when the Soviet Union abolished the Treaty of Friendship of 1925 between the two countries, wanted the revision of the Montreaux Convention of 1936 on the Turkish Straits to the advantage of the Black Sea countries and made some territorial demands in eastern Anatolia, Turkey immediately began to seek the military and diplomatic support of the United States and became willing to pay any price to secure its involvement in the Western alliance which emerged as a counter force against the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup> Although the immediate Russian military threat seemed to have disappeared after October 1947 and the new leadership of the Soviet Union launched some peace

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<sup>2</sup> R.L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, pp.24, 25, 29, 49, 50, 118, G. Liska, *Alliances and the Third World*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968, pp.26, 27, M. Haudel, *Weak States in the International System*, London: Frank Cass, 1981, p.121, R. Rothstein, **"On the Problems of Being Small and Poor"** in W.C. Olson et al.(eds.), *The Theory and Practice of International Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1983, p.36.

<sup>3</sup> O.R. Holsti, P.T. Hoppman and J.D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances*, New York: Wiley and sons Inc., 1973, p.97.

<sup>4</sup> The author's interview with former Turkish foreign minister Ü. Haluk Bayülken.

<sup>5</sup> K.H. Karpat(ed.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, pp.1-2.

initiatives towards Turkey after 1953, Turkish policy-makers continued to see the Soviet Union as the major potential threat to Turkey and therefore insisted on preserving close ties with NATO and the United States.<sup>6</sup>

In the post-World War II period, American rulers came to see Turkey as an important part of their global policy of containing Soviet expansion and decided to extend military and economic aid to her to block “the Soviet aggression.” They believed that without strong U.S. support Turkey might be transferred by the Soviet Union to a springboard for political and military expansion into the Near and Middle East where the United States had important interests.<sup>7</sup>

One important problem for weak states is the ambiguity of outside support in the event of facing an external aggression. History shows that outside support for weak states does not come or arrives late or is given only in expectation of future benefits.<sup>8</sup> Lesser powers also fear that great powers may reach an agreement at their expense.<sup>9</sup> In the 1960s there was a great deal of discussion among Turkish politicians regarding the genuineness of the U.S. and NATO guarantee for Turkish security.<sup>10</sup> Turks also suspected that U.S.-Soviet agreements on some issues would increase the Soviet threat to Turkey.<sup>11</sup>

### 2.1.2 Assistance Need

Economic and military needs force a lesser power to seek an alliance with a greater power.<sup>12</sup> To strengthen their developing economy and to fulfil their plans of economic construction and development, lesser powers need economic aid from developed countries and in many cases to secure economic aid of these powers they join military alliances established by them. A state that lacks sufficient capacity to build her own sophisticated weaponry and defence system necessary to deter external threats may choose to join in an alliance to get weapons easily.

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<sup>6</sup> M. Gönlübol, “NATO, USA and Turkey” in *ibid.*, pp.47, 49.

<sup>7</sup> G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p.21.

<sup>8</sup> Rothstein, 1968, *op.cit.*, p.24.

<sup>9</sup> Handel, *op.cit.*, p.179.

<sup>10</sup> See the section on the NATO discussion in Turkish politics in Chapter IV.

<sup>11</sup> See the section on detente in Chapter IV.

<sup>12</sup> Holsti et al., *op. cit.*, p.13, George Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968, p.14.

Turkey's need for military and economic assistance and America's response to it played an important part in the Turkish-American alliance. Although Turkey did not join the Second World War until the last minute and did not suffer war damage, her economy in the post-war period was very weak. After the Democrat Party came to power, promising more wealth for the people by pursuing an economic policy giving more weight to the private sector, Turkey's economic aid needs increased considerably. The new government had based its ambitious economic plans and projects on the availability of vast foreign economic aid and investment.<sup>13</sup> During the war Turkey's military expenditures were very high because she had kept her troops deployed throughout the war. In the post-war period Turkey's security worries derived from the Soviet pressure impelled her to keep her army at its existing size and to modernise it. Turks' desire to join NATO and the Western world and their exaggeration of the Soviet threat were considerably motivated by their desire for economic and military aid from the United States. In the 1947-1974 period the United States was the main source of Turkey's military and economic aid<sup>14</sup> but U.S. aid fell short of meeting Turkish expectations and this cast a shadow on relations.

### 2.1.3 Strategic Reasons

When a lesser state needs an alliance with a great power, she often prefers a geographically remoter one.<sup>15</sup> However, an alliance with a distant great power could prove less reliable because it might be more difficult to agree on a common response to local conflicts and distance might mean a less certain military commitment in case of attack; the weak state might be overwhelmed in the interval between an attack and the arrival of aid.<sup>16</sup> To overcome these disadvantages the weak state sometimes urges the great power to station troops and maintain bases on its territory and thus tries to obtain automatic intervention of the great power.<sup>17</sup> A lesser state's closeness to a threatening great power and her geographic location

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<sup>13</sup> L. Tansky, *U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries, A Comparative Study of India, Turkey, and the U.A.R.*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967, pp.39, 46.

<sup>14</sup> See the tables of U.S. aid to Turkey and military equipment of the Turkish army in Chapter IV.

<sup>15</sup> Olson et al.(eds.), op. cit., p.220, Holsti et al., op. cit., p.13.

<sup>16</sup> Rothstein, 1968. op.cit., p.118, Handel, op.cit., p.128.

<sup>17</sup> Handel. op.cit., p.126.

and strategic importance also affect the decision of that state in making an alliance with a different great power. If a smaller state is very close to a great power and it is in the way of natural expansion of that power, she seeks the alliance of a more powerful state to balance the regional great power.<sup>18</sup> The important strategic location of a small power vis-a-vis the powerful enemy state is an important reason for a great power to extend her alliance to that small state.

Turkey had a very long frontier with the Soviet Union, the leader of the Warsaw Pact, and she was within the zone of Soviet natural influence and expansion. Turkey, therefore, felt it necessary to continue its alliance with the United States not because the USA was remote from Turkey but because it was the only country that could balance the Soviet Union's power.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the remoteness of the United States to Turkey had no major influence on the decision of the Turks to choose the USA as an ally. Turks were happy with the presence of U.S. troops and facilities in their territories, thinking that it would secure automatic U.S. help in the event of an aggression. When the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in February 1975, the Turkish government did not stop the U.S. bases from functioning immediately because it believed that their presence was to Turkey's advantage. Turkish rulers always claimed that because of her strategic importance to major great powers Turkey could not afford to stay outside the Western alliance.<sup>20</sup> Turkey's geographical location was an important factor in the minds of US decision-makers: Turkey adjoined the Soviet Union and also the Middle East region; it constituted a natural barrier between the two regions; its straits and relatively large army and base facilities on its territory were valuable assets for the West; so it was particularly important to keep Turkey in the Western camp.<sup>21</sup>

#### 2.1.4 Ideology

Many scholars consider a common or similar ideology of secondary importance in making an alliance after security needs.<sup>22</sup> Ideology plays relatively less part in

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<sup>18</sup> Rothstein. 1968, op.cit., p.121.

<sup>19</sup> Gönübol in Karpat(ed.), op. cit., p.47.

<sup>20</sup> President Cevdet Sunay's speech in the White House in 1967, *Amerika'da Onbir Gün*, Ankara: Yarı Yayınları, 1967, p.26.

<sup>21</sup> See the section on Turkey's strategic importance in Chapter IV.

<sup>22</sup> Olson et al.(eds.), op. cit., p.220. Holsti et al., op. cit., p.30.

making or breaking an alliance. However, alliances established by powers who have identical or similar ideological and cultural values are more durable and effective. They bring about more co-operation and fewer problems.<sup>23</sup> States are likely to prefer making alliances with partners with whom they share common institutions, social and political values.<sup>24</sup>

Turkish leadership has always claimed that Turkey is a democratic and secular country sharing common values with the Western world.<sup>25</sup> The Turks clearly assigned more importance to the ideological dimension and expected their alliance with the USA and NATO would help them maintain better relations with the West and pursue westernization policies at home whereas American rulers were more interested in U.S. national interests.<sup>26</sup> In the aftermath of World War II, ruling elites in Turkey held almost the same views as the American administration with regard to political and economic systems and shared their political and ideological perceptions. In general, however, Turkish and American nations differed in many aspects such as culture, religion and democratic experience.<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, although ideological differences caused some resentment against the United States among the Turkish nation, this did not affect the general direction of Turkish-American relations.

#### 2.1.5 Internal Reasons

States also enter into alliances in order to ensure domestic stability<sup>28</sup> and to cover failures in domestic politics. Obtaining political, economic and military support of a powerful and internationally respected alliance strengthens the government's position vis-a-vis its potential and actual enemies and increases its prestige in the eyes of the people. One motive of a small state in aligning with a great power might be to achieve an increase in its status internally and internationally

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<sup>23</sup> Holsti et al., op. cit., pp.54, 265, 268, Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, op. cit., p.90.

<sup>24</sup> Holsti et al., op. cit., p.12.

<sup>25</sup> President Sunay's speech in the White House, *Amerika'da Onbir Gün*, op.cit., p.18.

<sup>26</sup> See the section on U.S. and Turkish perceptions of the alliance in this chapter.

<sup>27</sup> In the words of former U.S. ambassador to Greece, M. Stearns, "we shared [with Turkey] a security threat more than we shared political values, economic interests, or a common historical experience." M. Stearns, *Entangled Allies, U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, p.21.

<sup>28</sup> Liska, *Alliances*, op.cit., p.28.

by enjoying the great power's reputation.<sup>29</sup> Sometimes for a weak state to find a patron is to find a scapegoat that can be blamed for domestic failures.<sup>30</sup>

Turkish rulers saw their alliance with the West as an insurance of Turkey's political and democratic process and as a proof of Turkey's greatness as a "civilised" Western country. Economic and military aid of the West were one of their main sources of strength. When they faced economic and political crises at home Turkish ruling elites looked at the West as their saviour, expecting aid and statements supporting their regime. Economic failures and foreign policy failures, especially on the Cyprus question, were attributed to the West's negative attitude. Allegedly in June 1964 Prime Minister İnönü sought U.S. disapproval for Turkish intervention in Cyprus in order to save his government's prestige by blaming the USA for non-intervention.<sup>31</sup>

#### 2.1.6 Neutrality Option

Generally small states are advised not to enter into an alliance with a more powerful state because of possible grave dangers. Machiavelli wrote: "a prince ought never to make common cause with one more powerful than himself, unless necessity forces him to it." Egyptian leader Nasser rephrased the idea as follows: "an alliance between a big and small power is an alliance between the wolf and the sheep, and it is bound to end with the wolf devouring the sheep."<sup>32</sup> However, to pursue neutrality and non-alignment a small state must meet certain criteria: it "must not be so potentially powerful as to threaten to shift the balance if incorporated by one side; the citizens of the small state must be willing to withdraw from world affairs...[;] the small state must be strategically irrelevant and politically nonprovocative";<sup>33</sup> and it must not be under the threat of a great power.<sup>34</sup> Turkish politicians did not see non-alignment as a viable alternative because of the Soviet threat, Turkey's strategic importance and shortage of national resources.

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p.29, Handel, op.cit., p.148.

<sup>30</sup> Handel, op.cit., p.148.

<sup>31</sup> See the section on the Johnson letter in Chapter VI.

<sup>32</sup> Rothstein, 1968, op.cit., p.117.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p.32.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p.247, Handel, op.cit., p.121.

## 2.2 Factors Affecting Alliances

### 2.2.1 Costs-Benefits

An alliance relationship brings some costs and problems as well as benefits. States have to consider advantages and disadvantages of making an alliance with a state or a group of states before deciding to join it and subsequently they should from time to time reconsider their positions within this alliance in the light of recent developments. Haas defines an alliance as “a relationship in which a formal agreement specifies the rights and obligations of the members of alliance.”<sup>35</sup> States aim to maximise their rights and to minimise their obligations when they join an alliance or at least they try to balance rights and obligations. If a state feels that the balance of costs and benefits within the alliance favours the other side, it seeks means to keep the balance or as the last resort it leaves the alliance.

The US-Turkish alliance was criticised by some Turkish politicians and scholars since they saw it as a one-sided alliance. The major Turkish opposition party and leftist radicals claimed that the USA benefited from the alliance much more than Turkey did. At the end of the 1960s, even leaders of the governmental party were affected by this opinion. Public discussion on the costs and dangers of Turkey's alliance with the USA forced Turkish leaders to reconsider it and to take some initiatives to change the state of relations between the two countries.<sup>36</sup>

Some costs and dangers of an alliance, which were also mentioned by the Turkish critics of Turkey's alliance with the USA and NATO, are as follows:<sup>37</sup> The alliance may expose the state to the retaliation of a neighbouring or remote great power by provoking her.<sup>38</sup> The small state, as the weakest link in the alliance, may become the preliminary target of an enemy attack.<sup>39</sup> It may face new and unexpected threats by small allies of the enemy power<sup>40</sup> and may become involved

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<sup>35</sup> E.B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. p.13.

<sup>36</sup> See the section on Turkish efforts to gain more independence in its military relations with the USA in Chapter IV.

<sup>37</sup> For views of the Turks in this regard see the section on the NATO discussion in Turkish politics in Chapter IV.

<sup>38</sup> Rothstein, op.cit., pp.44, 48.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp.61-62, 120-121, 123.

<sup>40</sup> Liska, *Alliances*. op.cit., p.28.



in the conflicts of the great power, for which it is unprepared, or which it might disapprove.<sup>41</sup> If there are bases of a great power on its territory, the small state might find itself on the target list of another power.<sup>42</sup> The alliance might weaken the state's integrity by forcing it to dissipate its strength<sup>43</sup> and bring for it high defence budgets, increased costs of communications, and bigger military bureaucracy.<sup>44</sup> Finally, the alliance also might cause the state some loss of independence, status, prestige and influence.<sup>45</sup>

The reasons for alliance formation, which were mentioned above, constitute benefits of the alliance. Additionally, the alliance might help a state influence policies of its allies in a favourable direction and prevent allies from following adventurist policies.<sup>46</sup> A multilateral alliance seems to offer more benefits: it provides more deterrence and defence, a precise commitment, political and material support of more states, more bargaining, more compromise and thus more opportunity for the small state to advance its own views. The possibility that the alliance will become a tool of one great power is diminished. It may cost less in terms of external pressure and domestic discontent.<sup>47</sup> Although Turkey's military arrangements were mainly with the United States, Turkish rulers emphasised the multilateral character of NATO and made comparisons with the position of other members while defending Turkey's alliance with NATO. They argued that being a member of NATO provided the opportunity to influence U.S. policies and decreased the possibility of a U.S. armed action or intervention against Turkey.<sup>48</sup>

### 2.2.2 Goals of Members

Goals and interests of states in making an alliance affect their relations with their allies. Some scholars regard parallel interests, not necessarily common or

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<sup>41</sup> Handel. op.cit., p.129, Rothstein, op.cit., p.44.

<sup>42</sup> Handel. op.cit., p.129.

<sup>43</sup> Rothstein, op.cit., p.44.

<sup>44</sup> E.N. Botsas, "the U.S. Cyprus Turkey Greece Tetragon...", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol.16, No.2, Fall 1988, p.252.

<sup>45</sup> Rothstein, op.cit., pp.47, 259.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., pp.49-50.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., pp.124-126, 260.

<sup>48</sup> The author's interview with former Turkish foreign ministers Ü. Haluk Bayülken and Osman Olcay, who drew attention to U.S. actions against certain other nations at various times.

identical ones, as one of the foundations of an alliance.<sup>49</sup> States with considerably different expectations from an alliance are less likely to be compatible alliance partners.<sup>50</sup> If the members of an alliance have limited clear and unambiguous purposes, their alliance becomes more durable and stable.<sup>51</sup>

Although at the start the United States and Turkey had a common interest, to block the expansion of Soviet influence, each tended to use the alliance for its own interests. The Turks believed that they were helping American national interests and therefore they had the right to expect from the Americans support for Turkish national interests even when those interests were outside the US-Turkish alliance.<sup>52</sup> The Turkish leadership considered the American actions, particularly in the Cyprus question, primarily in terms of Turkey's own interests, ignoring the American interests such as keeping good relations with Greece. On the other hand, the United States seemed not to accept that Turkey could have national interests outside the NATO alliance which were not compatible with the U.S. global strategy<sup>53</sup> and that she could have another enemy apart from the Soviet Union.

### 2.2.3 Strength and Size of Members

In an alliance between a small state and a big power, differences are more likely to arise.<sup>54</sup> If the strength and size of two powers are markedly unequal, these powers usually face many problems in their alliance since their perception of world events and their purposes in the international arena are very different.<sup>55</sup> The weaker state naturally fears that its physical, political and cultural identity will be violated by its more powerful ally.<sup>56</sup> It is always suspicious that its big ally will use various means to increase its influence over it or that the larger state will try

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<sup>49</sup> Olson et al., *The Theory and...*, op. cit., pp.220, 221, Rothstein, op.cit., p.56.

<sup>50</sup> Holsti et al., op. cit. p.23.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp.57, 263.

<sup>52</sup> R.C. Campany, *Turkey and the United States*, New York: Praeger, 1986, pp.80, 82.

<sup>53</sup> Stearns, op.cit., p.16.

<sup>54</sup> In the theoretical analysis of relationships between powers, 'size' is often used as a synonym for strength, strong powers being described as 'big' and weak ones as 'small'.

<sup>55</sup> H.A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1965, p.226, Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, op.cit., p.57.

<sup>56</sup> Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, op.cit., p.13.

to intervene in its internal affairs and to penetrate its domestic politics. There is a general belief that big powers use alliance partnership to increase their influence on the members of the alliance since its allies are linked to the alliance in so many ways.<sup>57</sup> When the big power helps its smaller ally with a considerable amount of economic and military aid, the suspicion is always there that the smaller country becomes the client or satellite of the big power.<sup>58</sup> Some scholars, however, argue that in an alliance the bigger power does not necessarily gain all the advantages, but sometimes the lesser power has more influence on the bigger one in fulfilling its desires.<sup>59</sup> The stronger state may feel itself obliged to transfer wealth or other resources to the weaker and to prevent the weaker from collapse to maintain its prestige in the eyes of the enemy camp.<sup>60</sup>

The United States and Turkey are unequal powers in strength and size. The USA is the most powerful state in the world, whereas Turkey is a developing country which needs external aid for its security and economy. At the same time, the Turks are very proud of their history, identity and potential capacity. They claim equal status with developed powers, including NATO members, and refuse to accept any foreign domination in their country.<sup>61</sup> Foreign influence and interference are always an important concern for the Turks, since they do not forget the memories of the old capitulations and Western influence on the Ottoman Empire. In the 1960s the propaganda of the Turkish leftist radicals portrayed Turkey as a puppet of the United States and put this view across repeatedly to Turkish public opinion, particularly when the USA seemed to take a negative action in the Cyprus dispute. As a fact, Turkish ability to influence the USA for its own interests stayed very weak, while the USA had a relatively free hand to affect Turkey in regional and international events.

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<sup>57</sup> Campany, op. cit., p.7, Olson et al., op.cit., pp.28, 222. Raymond Aron, **"The Quest for a Philosophy of Foreign Affairs"** in S. Hoffmann(ed.), *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc. 1960. p.87. Rothstein, op.cit., pp.121-124.

<sup>58</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.204.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p.205. Campany, op. cit., p.6. S. Hoffmann, **"The Diplomatic-Strategic Chess-board"** in Olson et al.(eds.), op. cit., pp.32-33. Handel, op.cit., pp.129, 131.

<sup>60</sup> Rothstein, op.cit., p.120.

<sup>61</sup> Campany, op. cit., p.81.

It should also be noted that alliances are affected by domestic political structure and events of member countries. Domestic support for the alliance strengthens it considerably. The U.S.-Turkish alliance came under the influence of domestic political situations in both countries, especially on the Cyprus and opium questions.

## 2.3 Cohesion of Alliance

Partners of an alliance try to maintain the cohesion of the alliance as long as they benefit from it. The cohesion of the alliance is strengthened by the continuing external common threat and it is weakened by the reduction of the common threat.<sup>62</sup> Consultation, compromise and strong commitment are important factors in keeping cohesion of an alliance. In the case of an uncertain commitment, the great power might assume that the small has agreed to do whatever is in the interest of the strong whereas the small power's domestic politics may be consumed by a heated debate over the nature of its commitment to the great power, the latter's intention to help and the possibility of withdrawing the commitment.<sup>63</sup> Extensive consultations between two allies are likely to increase their solidarity and cohesion.<sup>64</sup> Big powers tend to wish to be consulted by their smaller allies if any important internal, regional or international events seem to have importance for the alliance.<sup>65</sup>

The cohesion of the Turkish-American alliance partly depended on the seriousness of the Soviet threat to Turkey and the Western camp. When the Soviet threat seemed reduced, Turkey and the USA pursued more independent policies outside their alliance. Lack of consultation between the two allies caused some problems. The Turkish authorities complained that the USA did not inform them about some American activities related to the American bases in Turkey, they also resented the unilateral withdrawal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The United States criticised the Turkish leadership for their intention of landing in Cyprus without the knowledge of the USA.

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid., pp.5-6. Holsti et al., op. cit., pp.17. 88.

<sup>63</sup> Rothstein, op.cit., p.119.

<sup>64</sup> Campany, op. cit., p.5. Holsti et al., op. cit., p.16.

<sup>65</sup> Liska, *Nations*, op.cit., p.74.

Alliance cohesion also depends on the character of the international system. It declines as tension, conflict and potential threat are reduced in the international arena.<sup>66</sup> In a bipolar system, "the greater the inter-alliance conflict, the greater the intra-alliance cohesion; conversely, the greater the inter-alliance detente, the less the intra-alliance cohesion."<sup>67</sup> In the period of detente, smaller powers within alliances feel more free to improve their relations with states from the enemy camp.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, if the polarity of the international system is very tight, the cohesion of alliances in the two camps is stronger. When the polarity is reduced, cohesion decreases.<sup>69</sup> As long as more great powers emerge in the international arena, cohesion is reduced in favour of smaller powers.

The United States and Turkey had more cordial and close relations in the 1950s, when the East-West conflict was more tense. In the second half of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s when detente was a more dominant tendency in the international system, Turkey felt that she could improve her relations with the Eastern bloc and Third World countries despite her alliance with the USA and NATO. The emergence of China and France as dissidents in the main power blocs emboldened Turkish authorities to pursue a more independent policy. At the same time, Turkey's importance seemed diminished in the eyes of Americans in the detente period, and the American administration became less anxious to continue aid to Turkey.

The Turkish-American alliance between 1959 and 1975 is a typical example of the bipolar world alliances. In the cold war period in which the world was divided into two enemy camps, the state of the relationship between the superpowers affected the condition of the US-Turkish alliance. The model of the position of a smaller state within one of the ideological camps and management of intra-bloc problems by its super power is relevant. It is, however, necessary to look at the special internal and international conditions of the two countries such as geographical location, historical heritage, cultural and political identity, foreign policy making process, traditional state policy, effect of public opinion, etc.

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<sup>66</sup> Holsti et al., *op. cit.*, p.58.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p.92.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p.97.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p.93.

## 2.4 U.S. and Turkish Perceptions of Their Alliance

### 2.4.1 Turkish Perception

The Turks viewed their alliance with the United States in the light of their long-pursued efforts of Westernization, attributing a great importance to it in the way of becoming an integral part of the Western world. In their opinion, Turkey had to continue its alliance with America because this policy not only helped to fulfil her national interests, but more importantly it represented a relationship between two states which shared the same ideology and moral principles.<sup>70</sup> In his visit to Washington in June 1964 immediately after receiving President Johnson's disappointing letter, Turkish P.M. İnönü said that "we, the Turks, believe that friendship between states relies not on temporary interests but on common moral principles."<sup>71</sup> Turkish President Cevdet Sunay expressed his belief that close friendship and alliance between Turkey and the USA was a consequence of their shared moral principles and aims such as the love of freedom and democracy.<sup>72</sup> As an example of how far ideological thinking affected the minds of Turkish politicians, the speech of Turkish MP Gökhan Evliyaoğlu may be cited. In an atmosphere of great public criticism directed toward the Western states because of their attitudes on the Cyprus question, Evliyaoğlu claimed that Turkey did not have the right to criticise the West because she failed to become a part of this world and to reach its level of democracy.<sup>73</sup>

This approach of Turkish politicians to the alliance with America led them to be too anxious to fulfil requirements of this alliance without any hesitation. At almost every opportunity they proudly expressed their loyalty to the alliance.<sup>74</sup> But they felt badly let down when this loyalty did not appear to be reciprocated.

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<sup>70</sup> It is ironic that as late as the spring of 1974, Turkey still had not joined the European bureau of the U.S. State Department but she remained the responsibility of State's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Stearns, op.cit., p.8.

<sup>71</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 23.6.1964, p.7.

<sup>72</sup> *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, April 1967, pp.48, 49.

<sup>73</sup> *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (MMTD)*, term 1, sess.3, vol.30, p.295.

<sup>74</sup> Prime Minister İ. İnönü, *MMTD*, term 1, sess.2, vol.16, pp.570-571, İ. İnönü, *ibid.*, term 3, sess.1, vol.2, p.290, Foreign Minister F. C. Erkin, *Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi (CSTD)*, term 1, sess.4, vol.24-3, p.1017, the Turkish junta's announcement of loyalty to NATO and CENTO, *Cumhuriyet*, 27.5.1960, p.1.

In their eyes, for instance, Turkey was right in her policy toward the Cyprus question, therefore, she should be supported by the Western states. The feeling of not getting enough in return for fulfilling alliance responsibilities really made the Turks angry.

#### 2.4.2 U.S. Perception

For the Americans, the Turkish-American relationship meant the protection of mutual economic and military interests rather than ideological closeness. In their eyes, both sides had to give something in order to get some gains, meaning that the alliance was a classic alliance relationship between two states who aimed at maximising their gains by establishing an alliance. This also meant restriction of independence of the two states to a reasonable extent. As former U.S. official Harris expressed it: "The virtually complete independence in terms of military and economic self-sufficiency that is often urged by Turkish critics of the United States is clearly impossible."<sup>75</sup> The American perception of the alliance did not include a romantic relationship forcing the two sides to support each other in every event regardless their practical national interests.

In their dealings with the Turks the Americans expressed the importance of having the same ideological principles. As President Johnson said in his speech of welcome to Turkish President Sunay on 3 April 1967: "There is special close friendship between Turkey and the United States, which can be understood only by free people believing in a strong brotherhood relationship."<sup>76</sup> However, it was America's strategic interests in that part of the world that were of prime concern to the Americans.<sup>77</sup> The Americans did not oppose the undemocratic military regime in Turkey, which came to power on 27 May 1960; they extended recognition to it three days after the military coup and promised more economic and military aid. The most important thing for the Americans was Turkey's continuing membership in NATO and CENTO, helping the protection of Western interests in the Near and Middle East.

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<sup>75</sup> Harris, op.cit., pp.204-205.

<sup>76</sup> *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, April 1967, p.47, *Amerika'da Onbir Gün*, op.cit., pp.15-16.

<sup>77</sup> Stearns, op.cit., p.21.

## 2.5 Patron-Client State Relationship, Dependency and Influence

### 2.5.1 Patron-Client State Relationship

To determine whether a patron-client relationship is the appropriate model for Turkish-American relations it is first necessary to examine whether Turkey is a weak (small) state which can easily be made a client. Characteristics of weak states are summarised by Handel as follows:<sup>78</sup> **Population:** Very small. Turkey had a large population in comparison with the population of weak states. Standing at 36.16 million in 1973 it was larger than the population of many middle powers. **Area:** Very small. Turkey's area, too, is relatively big. (780 thousand sq. km.) **Economy:** 1- GNP is small in absolute terms. Turkey's GNP per capita was very small even among weak states. (340 dollars in 1973) However, its total GNP was relatively high among weak states. (12.16 billion dollars in 1973.) 2- Little or no heavy industry. Turkey generally lacked large heavy industry. Its crude steel production (1.312 thousand metric tons in 1971), energy production (11.01 million metric tons equiv. of coal), and energy consumption (18.65 metric tons equiv. of coal in 1971) were very low in comparison with middle and great powers. 3- High degree of specialisation in a narrow range of products. Turkey largely exported agricultural products and specialised in a few industrial products such as textiles. 4- Small domestic market, hence high dependency on foreign markets for imports and exports. Turkey's domestic market was relatively large but it was still dependent on exports and imports to strengthen its economy. Its dependence on "high-tech" technological products was considerable. 5- High dependence on foreign capital.

**Military:** 1- Cannot defend itself against external threats by its own strength; high or total dependence on external help. Turkey was not too weak to defend itself against small and middle regional powers but it needed US and NATO protection against the Soviet threat. 2- Total (or very high) dependence on weapon acquisition in foreign countries. Almost all Turkey's weaponry came from the West, especially

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<sup>78</sup> Handel, *Weak States*, op.cit., pp.52-53. See also ibid., pp.36, 41-45, Rothstein, op.cit., p.29. The information in paragraph 2.5.1 is based on the 1973 figures. It should be noted that Turkey's situation is not static and there have been dramatic changes in some of the characteristics since World War II. Handel divides states into four categories; great, middle, weak (including Turkey), and mini; and gives figures on the military and economic capabilities of states. Handel, op.cit., pp.15-17, 25-26, 32-35, 49.



from the USA. 3- A high proportion of strength always mobilised or at its disposal; longer-range war potential very low. Turkey kept a very big army but lacked modern weaponry.

**The International System:** 1- Limited scope of interests (usually to neighbouring and regional areas). 2- Little or no influence on the balance of power (or the nature of the system). 3- Mainly passive and reactive in foreign policy. 4- Tends to minimise risks, especially vis-a-vis the great powers. 5- Can be penetrated relatively easily. 6- Strong support for international law and norms of international organisations. Turkey had regional interests rather than global ones but it had the potential to influence big power relations because of its strategic importance. She continued to be a member of NATO in spite of the displeasure of the other superpower but tried not to provoke the Soviet Union especially in the 1960s and 1970s. Turkey allowed the stationing of U.S. experts on its territory but it is hard to prove that it was deeply penetrated. Turkish leaders always announced support for international law and international organisations but did not hesitate to criticise them when they seemed to be unfair in dealing with Turkish interests.

As a conclusion it might be said that Turkey can be considered a small power especially in comparison with European middle powers. But its level among small states should be very high. Holbraad puts Turkey's place as the eighth-strongest small state of Europe though she qualified as a middle power among Asian states according to his criteria.<sup>79</sup> Handel mentions that Annette Baker Fox calls Turkey a small state but Vital, Barston and Kuznets do not even consider her as a member of this category because she has a population of over 30 million. In Handel's opinion Turkey quite clearly falls short of the middle powers in terms of her overall capabilities.<sup>80</sup>

Characteristics of the patron-client state relationship, which are mentioned by scholars, are as follows:<sup>81</sup> 1- There must be a sizeable difference between the

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<sup>79</sup> C. Holbraad, *Middle Powers in International Politics*, London: MacMillan Press, 1984, pp.85-86, 89.

<sup>80</sup> Handel, op.cit., pp.31-33.

<sup>81</sup> C.C. Shoemaker and J. Spanier, *Patron-Client State Relationships*, New York: Praeger, 1984, pp.13-15, 18-22, Handel, op.cit., pp.132-137, B.E. Moon, "Consensus or Compliance? Foreign Policy Change and External Dependence", *Interna-*

military capabilities of the two states. The bargaining power of the patron is greater than that of the client because of the resources it has. 2- The client plays an important role in patron (superpower) competition. Its position is determined by the availability of other patrons who can render the client the same protection and material support, the mobility of the clients between alternative patrons and the degree to which the patron is dependent on the client's services. 3- The patron and the client are closely tied to each other for a recognisable period of time. On almost every issue the client follows the patron's lead either to get immediate positive rewards or to accumulate goodwill and credit for the future. Sometimes it is asked to do so, more frequently the client knows what is expected of it by the patron and adjusts its policy accordingly. In the patron-client relationship coercion, manipulation and authority exist implicitly in the background but are not always necessarily dominant. 4- Security transactions from the patron to the client are more prominent in the relationship. At a low level of threat to the client, other goals such as economic development, regional leadership, and international prestige may gain importance. Arms transfers are a powerful tool of influence for the patron. 5- Elites of the client state absorb the patron's perceptions of the world through foreign or domestic education. 6- The patron's goals in continuing the relationship are more complicated: Ideological goals (demands for changes in the client's political, economic and social structure), international solidarity (voting cohesion in the United Nations, signing of international agreements, visits between senior statesmen, client announcements of international support for the patron), strategic goals (demands for bases).

1- Military capabilities of the United States were clearly much greater than those of Turkey. Since the USA was the main military and economic aid supplier of Turkey, she had more bargaining power. However, Turkey's strategic importance gave her rulers the capability to affect U.S. decisions in some issues. (U.S. unwillingness to take forceful action against Turkey on the Cyprus question can be cited as an example.) 2- Turkey played quite an important role in superpower competition with its geographical location controlling vital outlets of the Soviet Union. The United States attributed importance to keeping Turkey in the Western camp. Western European powers were potentially alternative of patrons for

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*tional Organisation*, vol.39, No.2, Spring 1985, pp.308-309.

Turkey's security and economy but Turkish rulers believed that they could not get from anywhere else the protection and material support which they obtained from the USA. U.S. officials, too, did not consider leaving Turkey, believing that Turkey's services for the USA were important. This situation practically decreased the mobility of both sides between different alternatives. 3- Turkey and the United States were closely tied to each other between 1947 and 1975 though this closeness was more dominant in the 1950s. Especially in the 1950s and in the first half of the 1960s, Turkey closely followed the lead of the USA in the international arena though the USA did not always demand her support. Turkish leaders proudly acted in this way, seeing it as a requirement of the Western alliance. From 1965, they acted more independently, taking some actions against the U.S. stance (supporting the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict is one example). The United States did not use direct pressures against Turkish rulers. The Johnson letter in 1964, which forced the Turks not to intervene in Cyprus and the U.S. Congress's decision to impose an arms embargo on Turkey were exceptions in this regard and they caused a deterioration in the two countries' relations. Indirect U.S. pressures forced Turkish rulers to prohibit opium cultivation in 1971 but three years later the Ecevit government reversed the decision in spite of strong U.S. protests.

4- U.S. military assistance to Turkey was prominent in their relationship. The Turks valued it very highly, but in the detente period they paid more attention to economic development and accepted the aid of the Soviet Union for this purpose. They even risked the loss of U.S. aid with their policies on Cyprus and opium. U.S. Congress tried to influence Turkish policies by using the leverage of military and economic assistance, (the U.S. administration generally opposed the Congress pressures but in some cases such as opium they were privately happy about it.) but it was not able to change Turkish attitudes dramatically. 5- Turkish elites acquired the same perceptions of the world as U.S. rulers through foreign and mostly domestic education but they always announced that it was their choice to adopt Western values. 6- The United States obviously wanted Turkey to adopt a democratic system, capitalist economy and Western social structure. But it is hard to claim that U.S. officials forced the Turks in this regard because Turkish rulers themselves chose this way when they established their republic in 1923. U.S. rulers generally asked for Turkey's support when they faced international crises but this was not directed to achieving a continuous show of international solidarity. The

Turks themselves chose to vote with the USA in the United Nations, felt pleasure with the visits of U.S. statesmen and the U.S. Sixth Fleet and frequently announced support for the USA in international crises. The Turks were also happy with the U.S. use of bases on their territory. When Turkey voted with Third World countries on the Arab-Israeli conflict and colonial issues and when reduction of U.S. Sixth Fleet visits to Turkish ports were demanded because of public demonstrations, the United States did not protest against Turkey.

As a conclusion, it might be said that the U.S.-Turkish relationship bore some characteristics of the patron-client relationship but not enough to fit this categorisation. Especially after 1965 it cannot be said that Turkey followed U.S. policy step by step. Nevertheless, the United States was generally happy with the Turkish government's general attitude until July 1975 when the functioning of U.S. bases in Turkey was halted.

### 2.5.2 Dependency Theories

Dependency theories are mainly related to economic aspects of the patron-client state relationship. General characteristics of dependent countries are explained by scholars as follows:<sup>82</sup> The internal market of the dependent country is internationalised and its economy is incorporated into the global capitalist system. A large share of needs are supplied externally, a large share of markets are foreign and the ratio of foreign to domestic capital, technology, production facilities, etc. is high. Development of the economy is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy and by the attitude of multinational corporations. Domestic firms buy their equipment and other capital goods from outside. The national bourgeoisie are not completely abandoned by external powers but not given a full opportunity to develop. There is an alliance between local and international capital and the state, derived from mutual interests. In fact, the flows of trade and investment invoke the interests of the elites more than the masses. The dependent state is specialised in the export of a few products and its export

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<sup>82</sup> P. Evans, *Dependent Development*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, pp.26, 28, 31-32, 34-43. J.A. Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System...", *International Organisation*, vol.32, No.1, Winter 1978, pp.25-26, N.R. Richardson, "Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance", *the American Political Science Review*, vol.70, No.4, December 1976, pp.1099, 1100n, 1102, Handel, op.cit., pp.228-229, Moon, op.cit., pp.306, 308.

is heavily reliant upon few trading partners. Internally the following factors are prominent: lack of integration across economic sectors, shortage of large-scale industry based on mass-production, little investment in research and development, lack of responsiveness of production structures to increased or decreased demand, etc.

In a global world in which all national economies are dependent on each other, it is hard to find out which economy is dependent on which other economy. However, it should be noted that Turkey's situation generally fitted the characteristics of developing states' economies which are largely dependent on and under the influence of developed countries and multinational corporations. The United States was surely one of the major powers which affected the situation of world economies and which owned giant multinational corporations. It is obvious that U.S. rulers would try to maximise their economic gains and would care about interests of U.S. firms in their dealings with Turkey. However, it is hard to claim that the Turkish economy was totally dependent on the United States because Turkey also had important economic contacts with other Western powers, Middle Eastern and Eastern bloc countries and international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. It is also a fact that U.S. economic assistance to Turkey dramatically decreased at the end of the 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s whereas Turkey became the recipient of the largest economic assistance of the USSR outside Eastern bloc countries in the same period. To study complicated economic relations between countries and to reach a conclusion is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Some scholars' studies are directed to finding a correlation between the U.S. aid allocations to developing states and voting agreements of these states with the United States in the United Nations.<sup>83</sup> Witkoff, Richardson and Moon concluded that U.N. voting patterns of nations that were linked to the USA through substantial trade or aid were likely to resemble the voting of the USA, especially on cold war issues. Witkoff's study shows that Turkey's General Assembly roll-call relative agreement scores with the United States in 1963 was the highest among the U.N. members while its score in 1967 was still high but came fifteenth.<sup>84</sup> At

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<sup>83</sup> E.R. Witkoff, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study", *the American Political Science Review*, vol.67, No.3, September 1973, pp.868-888, Richardson, op.cit., pp.1098-1109, Moon, op.cit., pp.297-329.

<sup>84</sup> Witkoff, op.cit., pp.879-880.

the 15th session of the U.N. (1961) Turkey's voting coincidence with the USA was 75.1 percent of the total votes cast (109 of 145); in the 16th session this figure rose to 80.8 percent (101 of 125): (in cold war issues 33 of 37 in the 15th session, 20 of 22 in the 16th session; in issues of disarmament 7 of 8 and 28 of 34; in issues of colonialism 28 of 38 and 31 of 38; in the Arab-Israeli conflict 3 of 8 and 8 of 9.)<sup>85</sup> In 1967, in the fifth special, fifth emergency special and twenty-second sessions of the U.N. Turkey's voting coincidence with the USA was 30 out of 65 (in the Arab-Israeli conflict 3 of 15, in colonial issues 1 of 17, in cold war issues 19 of 19, in disarmament issues 5 of 5.)<sup>86</sup>

### 2.5.3 Influence

In his book Coulombis put forward some propositions of influence that could be applied to the U.S.-Turkish relationship:<sup>87</sup> 1- Potential influence increases as elites in A perceive a greater need to influence and elites in B perceive a need to accept A's influence. (After the World War II the USA came to the position of influencing other states as a result of its global policy. As proud and obstinate people Turks were frequently resistant to influence.) 2- The greater the convergence of ideological orientations and the greater the coincidence of threat perceptions among the elites in A and B, the greater the receptivity of A's influence by B. (Ideological closeness with Western powers made Turkish elites more receptive to U.S. influence especially in the 1950s. The Soviet threat gave more leverage to the USA to influence Turkish elites.) 3- The potential of A's influence in B is modified by A and B leaders' personalities and mentalities. (Johnson was more interventionist. B. Ecevit seemed less receptive to U.S. influence.) 4- The greater the dependency of B upon A for its economic stability and growth, the greater the potential of influence of A upon B. (Turkey's economic problems increased its receptivity to U.S. influence.)<sup>88</sup> 5- The greater the dependency of B upon A for sophisticated weaponry, the greater the potential for A's influence over B. (This was very much case for Turkey.) 6- The greater the dependency of B on any actors

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<sup>85</sup> *Middle East Record*, vol.2, 1961, pp.4, 7-13.

<sup>86</sup> *Middle East Record*, vol.3, 1967, pp.91-103.

<sup>87</sup> T.A. Coulombis, *the United States, Greece and Turkey*, New York: Praeger, 1983, pp.171-195. A stands for the USA and B for Turkey in the following explanations.

<sup>88</sup> The author's interview with former Turkish diplomat and MP Kamran İnan.

other than A for the importation of vital energy sources, the less the potential for A's influence over B. (After 1973 Turkey pursued more pro-Arab policies outside the U.S. influence because of its dependence on oil.)

7- High-quality diplomatic services maximise capability to transform potential influence into actual influence. (Turkish diplomacy's quality decreased the U.S. influence, especially on the Cyprus question.)<sup>89</sup> 8- A's potential of influence in B increases when B is ruled by military regimes. (Turkish military regimes were more responsive to U.S. requests<sup>90</sup> as was seen in the opium question. Anti-American leftist opposition was silenced during the military-backed governments.) 9- The potential influence of A over B is proportional to the degree of internal cohesiveness and foreign policy consensus within B. (Public consensus on the Cyprus question decreased Turkey's responsiveness to U.S. influence on the matter.) 10- A's potential influence in B is proportional to benign public attitudes in B regarding the image and reputation of A. (Turkish public anger against the USA on the Cyprus question decreased the U.S. leverage to influence Turkey.) 11- Perception in A with respect to the importance of the strategic location of B relate to the degree of influence A wishes to exert in B. (The USA did not put heavy pressure on Turkey after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus partly because of Turkey's strategic importance to her.) 12- A's influence over B is proportional to the number of powerful states and the level of tension in the international arena. (In the 1950s Turkey was more receptive to U.S. influence than in the detente years.)

It would be wrong to say that Turkey was under the constant influence of the United States in the 1960-1975 period, because this influence varied in accordance with the factors mentioned above. It might be generally said that U.S. influence in Turkey in the late 1940s was significant, but it gradually decreased until 1974.

## 2.6 Examples of U.S. Influence on Turkey

Many Turkish scholars and politicians believed that since the Truman Doctrine of 1947 Turkish foreign policy had been totally dependent on American policy-makers' desires and decisions. In their eyes, especially in the 1950s Turkey seemed

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<sup>89</sup> The author's interview with former Turkish foreign minister Ü. Haluk Bayülken.

<sup>90</sup> The author's interview with Kamran İnan.

to have no foreign policy interests outside her alliance with the West and she just followed her Western allies' decisions and actions. Feroz Ahmad claims that "throughout the fifties, Ankara pursued the foreign policy objectives set in Washington or London with conviction and without complaint."<sup>91</sup> F.A. Vali explains that Turks threw themselves into the arms of their rich friend, the USA, and tied themselves to the USA in many ways by signing bilateral agreements. In his opinion, "Turkey seemed to feel that... what the United States wanted should not be questioned."<sup>92</sup> Gönlübol makes his accusation much sharper: "Turkey found herself following the policies of the United States almost step by step both within and outside NATO, thus reducing herself to the position of a satellite."<sup>93</sup> Ahmet Ş. Esmer summarises Turkish foreign policy since the 1950s as follows:

[After joining NATO and being an ally of America] we signed numerous bilateral agreements with the United States and left our business in her hands. Our military is under the command of NATO, our bases are in the hands of the Americans, our security is dependent on America, our economic development is dependent on American aid. We saw it as our duty to support France, America and Britain in their dealings with the Algerian, Vietnam and Suez problems. We also felt it our responsibility to defend Western colonialism in the Bandung Conference of non-aligned countries. In the United Nations votings we look at the arm of American representative. We have not got the initiative in foreign policy.<sup>94</sup>

The United States was accused by Turkish critics of penetrating into every sector of Turkish life by using its economic and military aid, by providing American education to thousands of Turks and also by inserting a lot of U.S. experts into the Turkish military and civil service.<sup>95</sup> American Peace Corps volunteers, university lecturers and any kind of U.S. experts were regarded by leftists as U.S. agents collecting secret information on Turkey and influencing ruling elites. While describing U.S. control, Turkish Labour Party leader M.A. Aybar said: "Like God, America's eyes, ears and hands are everywhere in Turkey."<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> F. Ahmad, *the Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, London: the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977. p.395.

<sup>92</sup> F.A. Vali. *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, Baltimore: the John Hopkins Press, 1971. pp.356, 38. 71. 116.

<sup>93</sup> Gönlübol in Karpas(ed.). op.cit., p.22.

<sup>94</sup> A.Ş. Esmer. "Uyduluk Siyasetine Son", *Milliyet*, 24.12.1965.

<sup>95</sup> J.M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974, pp.80-82.

<sup>96</sup> "Dış Politikamız Nasıl Olmalıdır?", interview by Y. Çetiner, *Cumhuriyet*, 17.10.1964.



While the criticism of some authors reflected more or less the truth, accusations of leftists were much more exaggerated propaganda aiming at attracting the public's attention to their movement.

### 2.6.1 Economic Dependence

Turkish critics put forward the following claims on Turkey's economic dependence on the USA: American economic aid to Turkey was used mostly by pro-American Turkish economic elites, multinational and American companies to strengthen their position and helped them to exploit Turkey's economic resources and direct the Turkish economy. This was the Americans' intention as well.<sup>97</sup> The Turkish economy fell wholly under the influence of the American economy with American aid and foreign investment. American economic elites used Turkey's raw materials and labour force for their own interests and deliberately tried to prevent the development of the Turkish economy.<sup>98</sup> The consortium which was established by several countries to supply economic aid to Turkey<sup>99</sup> and the American aid agency, AID,<sup>100</sup> used their power to control and direct the Turkish economy and to intervene in Turkey's domestic politics. The United States used its aid to Turkey as a means of pressure to force Turkey to fulfil some American demands as was seen in the Cyprus and opium questions.<sup>101</sup>

### 2.6.2 U.S. Intervention in Turkish Politics

Some Turkish politicians and intellectuals, especially leftist ones, believed that the United States intervened in Turkey's internal politics by supporting rightist parties against leftist groups. The Republican People's Party leaders opposed the U.S. aid to Turkey in 1958<sup>102</sup> and the U.S.-Turkish agreement in 1959 be-

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<sup>97</sup> In *Cumhuriyet*: İ. Selçuk, "2000 Yılına Kadar", 9.8.1965, p.2, "Bayramlık", 12.4.1965, p.2, "Manzara-i Umumiye", 7.1.1966, p.2.

<sup>98</sup> İ. Selçuk, "NATO'ya Göbeğimizden Bağlıyız", *Cumhuriyet*, 5.11.1967, p.2, R. Özarda, *MMTD*, 29.4.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.36, p.105, B. Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1970, p.267, A. Kabaklı, "Faydası Ne?", *Tercüman*, 30.8.1964.

<sup>99</sup> İ. Selçuk, "Manzara-i Umumiye", *Cumhuriyet*, 7.1.1966, p.2.

<sup>100</sup> T.Z. Ekinçi and S. Aren, *MMTD*, 1.3.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.27, p.29, *ibid.*, 4.3.1968, p.158, R. Özarda, *ibid.*, 29.4.1969, term 2, sess.9, vol.36, p.104.

<sup>101</sup> For the author's opinion on the subject see the section on dependency theories in this chapter.

<sup>102</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1959-1960*, vol.12, p.16636.

cause they suspected that the USA was trying to save the Democrats from falling from power.<sup>103</sup> When the American Acheson plan on the Cyprus question was rejected by the Turkish government in August 1964 some rumours erupted in Turkey, claiming that the United States was looking for another prime minister in Turkey, who would accept American plans rejected by P.M. İnönü.<sup>104</sup> Metin Toker, İsmet İnönü's son-in-law, claimed that in August 1964 President Johnson sent General Porter to Turkey for this purpose. He reasoned that the CIA was aware of a radical change in Turkey's foreign policy and was trying to prevent it.<sup>105</sup> In January 1965, İnönü denied the rumours by saying: "I myself do not worry about it. America has given definite assurances in this subject."<sup>106</sup> However, the visit of U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare to the opposition leaders just before the parliamentary vote on 13 February 1965, which brought down the İnönü government, caused the accusation that he was giving orders to the leader of the Justice Party, Süleyman Demirel, to topple the government.<sup>107</sup> İnönü denied the claims again in his speech in Parliament on 1 March 1965: "I will not agree that a shadow be cast on an honest and serious person because of a bad coincidence. In sum, at the time we relinquished our official duties we were in complete and mutual confidence with the American government and its ambassador."<sup>108</sup> Ambassador Hare told Turkish journalists: "As decided a long time ago, I paid ceremonial visits to the leaders of the two opposition parties. At the same time, an unexpected political crisis came about in Turkey. There is no relation between the two events apart from chronological coincidence. We Americans who have interest in Turkey's development pursue the policy of keeping ourselves away from Turkey's internal politics. Internal politics is your business, not ours."<sup>109</sup>

After the Justice Party came to power in the elections of 1965 the left accused

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<sup>103</sup> Harris. *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., pp.69, 81, 83. It should be noted that some Democrat Party politicians subsequently claimed that the USA wanted the DP to fall in 1960.

<sup>104</sup> A. Kabaklı. "Zararlı Faaliyetler", *Tercüman*, 29.8.1964. "Başyazı", *Forum*, 1.9.1964, p.3.

<sup>105</sup> M. Toker. "İsmet Paşa ile 4 Buhranlı Yıl", *Milliyet*, 11.2.1969, p.5. See also A.H. Uzman and R.H. Dekmejian, "Changing Patterns in Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1959-1967", *ORBIS*, vol.11, Fall 1967, p.782.

<sup>106</sup> *Milliyet*, 8.1.1965.

<sup>107</sup> D. Avcıoğlu. "Asıl Muhalefet Şimdi Başlıyor", *Yön*, 19.2.1965, p.3.

<sup>108</sup> Harris. op.cit., p.132.

<sup>109</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 24.2.1965, p.1. *Milliyet*, 10.8.1965.

it of having received American support during the election campaigns, and claimed that America financially supported rightist groups against leftist ones and always wanted a rightist government in Turkey.<sup>110</sup> Republican MP Bülent Ecevit told his party's parliamentary caucus in June 1966 that America acted as if it was the ally of the JP, not Turkey, and that big American companies worked like partners of the JP.<sup>111</sup> He mentioned the CIA's activities in other countries, hinting that it could do same thing in Turkey:

In America it has been disclosed with what dirty games the CIA is involved affecting domestic politics in friendly and allied countries. It pours money into elections in order to bring those it wants into power and to unseat those it does not want... In order to prepare a pretext for smashing legal and democratic opposition, it has claimed that there was a great communist danger; or else in order to prepare justification for armed American intervention it has claimed that there was a danger of unarmed and indirect aggression and has organised demonstrations, sabotage and civil war.<sup>112</sup>

By mentioning the big increase in the number of rightist organisations, newspapers and magazines Ecevit hinted that their financial support had come from America.<sup>113</sup>

National Unionist Senator Haydar Tunçkanat claimed that he found a document consisting of correspondence between Turkish and American officials on preventing the increase of the left's power and supporting pro-American Turkish groups.<sup>114</sup> Turkish Labour Party MP Behice Boran wrote in her book that ruling elites and the United States had made every kind of effort to prevent the success of the Turkish socialist movement and its party.<sup>115</sup>

When U.S. Ambassador Parker Hart claimed in January 1966 that the United

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<sup>110</sup> İ. Selçuk, “Hayallerden Silkinmek”, *Cumhuriyet*, 22.6.1966, p.2, İ. Selçuk, “Bir İki, Üç Dört, Üstünü Ört”, *ibid.*, 17.12.1968, p.2, Harris, *op.cit.*, pp.136-137. Fahir Armaoğlu, retired Turkish academic and columnist, told the author that in the cold war period the United States always supported rightist rules, democratic or dictatorial. He argued that Turkey was not an exception in this regard and that the JP enjoyed the American support. Armaoğlu further claimed that the USA affected Turkish politics through different methods and that this was the fate of small countries. Seyfi Taşhan, Turkish academic, totally rejected these kinds of claims, seeing them as a part of the leftist campaign to break down U.S.-Turkish relations.

<sup>111</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 21.6.1966, p.7.

<sup>112</sup> Translated by Harris, *op.cit.*, p.136.

<sup>113</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 21.6.1966, p.7.

<sup>114</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 11.7.1966, p.1. Ulman and Dekmejian, *op.cit.*, p.782.

<sup>115</sup> Boran, *op.cit.*, p.211.

States never prevented the planned Turkish military intervention in Cyprus<sup>116</sup> while a heated debate was going on between rival Turkish political groups on whether the government should explain the content of the Johnson letter of June 1964; opposition groups attacked Hart, accusing him of joining an internal Turkish political debate on the side of the governmental party and acting like a high commissioner or prime minister of Turkey.<sup>117</sup> Some Turkish critics believed that the United States played a part in the Turkish military “coup by memorandum” on 12 March 1971.<sup>118</sup>

These unproven claims cannot be taken as facts since they were made by biased anti-American critics. Some of these critics such as Bülent Ecevit denied any foreign intervention in Turkish politics when they were in power. The only thing which can be said is that the United States wanted rightists to come into power in Turkey as she did in other countries because anti-communist rightists were more likely to pursue policies which would be compatible with U.S. interests. This does not necessitate direct U.S. intervention.

### 2.6.3 Recognition of China

Some Turkish critics claimed that Turkish rulers did not recognise communist China until 1971 merely to please their American friends though Americans neither made any open demand nor forced the Turkish government on this matter. It was argued that Turkey’s recognition of communist China would not be a radical one because some other NATO members such as Britain already recognised China and it would bring trade benefits.<sup>119</sup> In August 1971 Turkey suddenly decided to extend her official recognition to China after the American rulers initiated some actions to restore normal relations with the Chinese.<sup>120</sup> There was a speculation that the USA influenced the decision by putting pressure on Turkish rulers. Turkish Deputy

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<sup>116</sup> *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, January 1966, pp.37-38.

<sup>117</sup> In *Cumhuriyet*: E. Güresin, “Amerika’nın Eşef Verici Tutumu”, 5.1.1966, p.1, İ. Selçuk, “Amerikan Elçisine Açık Mektup”, 6.1.1966, p.2; “Amerikan Elçisinin Siyasi Komiser Edası”, *Forum*, 15.1.1966, p.6; H. Uysal, “Tehlikeli Alakalar”, *Akis*, 15.1.1966, p.5.

<sup>118</sup> See the section on U.S. efforts to eradicate Turkey’s opium production in Chapter VIII.

<sup>119</sup> *MMTD*, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, p.469, İ. Çamlı, “Yanlış Kavramlar ve Kalıplaşmış Yargılar”, *Cumhuriyet*, 17.4.1971, p.2.

<sup>120</sup> *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1971-1972*, vol.18, p.24794.

Prime Minister Sadi Koçuş denied it: "Our decision was taken strictly in the light of Turkish interests. No foreign country influenced or advised us while taking this decision."<sup>121</sup>

As Turkey's voting patterns in the United Nations showed, Turkey always followed the U.S. lead in cold-war matters even in the periods when she was not on good terms with her. The recognition of China by Turkey was one of the examples which fitted this trend. Turkish leaders waited until the U.S. initiative gave them the green light to extend recognition to a communist regime in a country where nationalist forces also claimed to represent the state. It is a classic example of Turkish lack of confidence in communist rulers. While they had some problems with the United States on some of their national interests, Turkish rulers did not want to fall in disagreement with the Americans in cold-war issues as well, which did not directly affect Turkish interests. The removal from İnönü's letter to Johnson in 1964 of the part criticising U.S. policy in Vietnam<sup>122</sup> strengthens this observation. Therefore, it might be said that Turkey wanted to please the United States with its policy on the recognition of China but its action cannot be presented only as an example of U.S. influence.

#### 2.6.4 The Komer Event

The appointment of Robert Komer as the American ambassador to Turkey at the end of 1968 was an event that was been frequently cited as an example of Turkey's dependence on the USA and of American dominance to the point where they felt no need to consider Turkish sensitivities. The appointment was strongly criticised by Turkish leftist groups on the ground that Komer, who had been involved in the American pacification programme in Vietnam, *was sent to Turkey to break the power of the leftist movement*. They claimed that Washington considered Turkey its backyard like Vietnam and therefore did not hesitate to appoint an ex-CIA agent as ambassador to Turkey. Some other Turkish critics argued that sending an ex-CIA agent to Turkey at a time when anti-Americanism was rife among Turkish people was a mistake. They were of the opinion that it would cause

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<sup>121</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 7.8.1971, p.1, Ahmad, op.cit., p.429n.

<sup>122</sup> The author's interview with former Turkish foreign minister Ü. Haluk Bayülken. The incident will be mentioned in the section on the Johnson letter in Chapter VI.

humiliation of the Turkish government and deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations. When Komer visited the Middle Eastern Technical University in Ankara on 9 January 1969, which was established with American financial aid, leftist students strongly protested against his visit and set fire to his car.<sup>123</sup> President Nixon's decision to replace Komer with William Handley in April 1969 was considered a response to the campaign of leftist groups. But it is more likely that the American action was actually aimed at easing the position of the Turkish government against public criticism.

The Komer event seems a propaganda action of leftists to stimulate public antagonism toward the United States. It is hard to expect the U.S. and Turkish governments to listen to demands of a small minority in such a matter. Since most diplomats are involved in intelligence matters somehow, being a member of the CIA could scarcely be an excuse to reject ambassadors.<sup>124</sup> Therefore U.S. insistence on sending Komer cannot be seen as an act of U.S. influence. If the Turkish government had wanted the withdrawal of Komer's appointment after public leftist protests on the subject, it would have seemed yielding to far leftists' pressures.

### 2.6.5 Rejection of U.S. Influence Accusations

Regardless of their political orientation, leftist or rightist, all Turkish authorities rejected the claim that Turkey was a satellite of the United States. Their denials were so frequent that one can easily ask why Turkish officials needed so many denials; these denials had the effect of increasing the suspicions of Turkey's dependence on America.<sup>125</sup> In his press conference in August 1962 Bülent Ecevit, who was then the minister of labour, firmly criticised actions of American trade unionist M. Thalmayer, who came to Turkey to support Turkish workers in their struggle against American companies. Ecevit said: "some people try to present the flow of foreign capital from our friendly allies to our country as colonialism

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<sup>123</sup> M.A. Birand et al., *12 Mart*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi. 1994, pp.151-152.

<sup>124</sup> The author's interview with Ümit Haluk Bayülken.

<sup>125</sup> P.M. Demirel's press conference, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, November 1966, pp.73, 75-76; Foreign Minister Çağlayangil's speech in Parliament, *MMTD*, term 2, sess.2, vol.11, p.127; Deputy Foreign Minister Faruk Sükan's speech in Parliament, *CSTD*, term 1, sess.6, vol.42, p.21; President Cevdet Sunay's Victory Day speech, *Cumhuriyet*, 31.8.1968, p.7; Foreign Minister Osman Olcay's speech in a private dinner, *ibid.*, 28.5.1971, p.7.

or imperialism. Mr Thalmayer seems to lead this propaganda campaign against an imaginary American colonialism... No Turkish government allows the foreign capital to turn into a form of colonialism."<sup>126</sup>

Some American politicians joined the defence of Turkey's independence in order to give the impression that the United States did not intend to violate Turkey's sovereignty for the sake of her own interests. At the dinner welcoming Turkish President Cevdet Sunay on 3 April 1967, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk said that Turkey and the United States were not allies who merely followed one another, but they were close friends and allies who independently tried to protect their national interests.<sup>127</sup> Ambassador Komer told Turkish daily *Milliyet*'s correspondent that the claim of Turkey's dependence on America was a myth made up by leftist propagandists. He claimed that in comparison with Turkey's position in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Turkey of 1969 was much more independent, much stronger and less dependent on others' help.<sup>128</sup> A high-ranking American officer in NATO in Paris said that Turkey acted independently within NATO by giving the example that Turkey rejected the implementation of NATO's Orient Express operation on its territory.<sup>129</sup> The apparent reason for the Turkish rejection was to avoid annoying the Middle Eastern countries at a time when some important events took place in the region.

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<sup>126</sup> *Cumhuriyet*. 27.8.1962, p.5.

<sup>127</sup> *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, April 1967, p.50, *Amerika'da Onbir Gün*, op.cit., p.10.

<sup>128</sup> *Milliyet*. 18.4.1969.

<sup>129</sup> *Cumhuriyet*. 26.11.1968, p.7.

## Chapter III

# FOREIGN POLICY FORMATION IN TURKEY AND USA

This chapter analyses the structure and determinants of Turkish and US. foreign policies between 1960 and 1975 in order to help the reader assess correctly events of the two countries' relations, which will be mentioned in the following chapters. It provides necessary information about factors and the formal framework that affected opinions, decisions and actions of policy-makers on both sides. It tries to illuminate the internal and international atmosphere in which relations of the two countries took place. In order to achieve this it mentions a number of preoccupation of each country that were not of primary concern to the other but nevertheless influenced the background against which their mutual relationships were conducted (for example the Vietnam war which was of enormous importance to the USA but not to Turkey).

### 3.1 Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy

#### 3.1.1 Independence and Security

The most important goal of Turkish foreign policy is to preserve Turkey's national independence and sovereignty and its territorial integrity.<sup>130</sup> Turks attribute much more importance to these aspects than other nations generally do, because they believe that their loss or limitation during the last centuries of the Ottoman Empire caused great damage to Turkish national interests. They know that economic, judicial and political privileges given by the Ottoman Empire to foreigners greatly limited the independence of the empire and damaged its economic life. They are also aware that foreign countries accelerated the collapse of the empire by intervening in its internal affairs in the name of protecting ethnic and religious

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<sup>130</sup> Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, Baltimore, London: John Hopkins Press, 1971, p.69. James E. Sowerwine, *Dynamics of Decision Making in Turkish Foreign Policy*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1987, p.14.



minorities. Especially in the first two and half decades of the new Turkish Republic, in order to ensure genuine independence and sovereignty Turkish leaders were reluctant to enter into alliance relations with other countries or give them economic privileges.<sup>131</sup> In the 1960s and 1970s Turkey's relations with the United States and NATO became subject to severe criticism on the ground that they violated Turkey's independence. Even today Turkish leaders always claim that their first priority in pursuing foreign policy is to avoid any kinds of acts which might damage Turkey's complete independence.

Turks are also very concerned about guaranteeing their national security. The belief that about 50 countries which were under Ottoman rule for centuries have hostile thoughts against Turkey has led Turkish rulers to assign great importance to security.<sup>132</sup> It was the national security concern which played the most important part in forcing Turks to seek the military alliance with the West after the Second World War, and it is mainly this same concern which has made Turkey chose to remain within the NATO pact despite changes in the international arena.

### 3.1.2 Moral Values

Another important goal of Turkish foreign policy is to achieve the long-lived dream of being recognised as an equal and respected member of the Western community of "civilised" nations with the assimilation of Turkish people into Western civilisation.<sup>133</sup> Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkish ruling elites have believed that Turkey can reach the level of advanced countries only if she follows the path of Western countries and joins their political, economic and cultural organisations. They have therefore directed their efforts towards having close relations with the West and avoided having clashes with the West in any arena. We can say that modernisation and Westernization efforts at home greatly affected Turkey's general foreign policy line. Especially after 1945, the main plank of Turkey's foreign policy was her alliance with the West. Turkish rulers have

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<sup>131</sup> Vali. op. cit., pp. 24-25.

<sup>132</sup> The author's interview with former Turkish foreign and defence minister Ü. Haluk Bayülken.

<sup>133</sup> Vali. op.cit., pp. 35-36, 56, 69, 70, 318, Metin Tamkoç, *the Warrior Diplomats*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976, p.298, the author's interview with Turkish academic Seyfi Taşham.

always attributed great importance to attaining full participation in all Western organisations and supported main Western activities in the international arena.

It is a traditional claim of Turkish policy-makers that their foreign policy aims at having friendly relations with every country and helping the establishment and continuation of peace in the international arena. On every occasion they declare that Turkey sincerely respects international law and international treaties and supports all peace initiatives in every part of the world. The saying of Kemal Atatürk, "peace at home, peace in the world" is a widely accepted principle of Turkish foreign policy. But this principle is also interpreted as preparedness for war against possible enemy attacks and willingness to use armed force in case of need to secure national security and interests.<sup>134</sup> This principle did not prevent Turks from intervening in Cyprus militarily, annexing Hatay and arming the Turkish Straits.<sup>135</sup>

Atatürkism, which means following the main principles of the founder of the Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk, has its impact on Turkish foreign policy too. Since the death of Atatürk, all main actors in Turkish political arena have claimed that they have followed the path of Atatürk and worked for the survival of his principles. As Ferenc A. Vali states, "Turkish statesmen, politicians, professors, and even common people still quote him and profess to follow his directions."<sup>136</sup> The main principles of the Atatürkism which were endorsed in 1937 by the constitution are known as the "Six Arrows": nationalism, secularism, republicanism, populism, statism, and revolutionism.<sup>137</sup> These principles and their interpretations are regarded by Turkish policy-makers as main references in foreign policy-making as well as domestic policy-making.

Other moral values, too, have affected minds of Turkish foreign policy-makers. Anti-communism and co-operating with other states against communist expansion was one of their main concerns. They like to be seen as champions of democracy in their dealings with other states. To gain the support of the Muslim world for Turkish interests, they emphasise the Islamic identity of the Turkish nation.

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<sup>134</sup> Tamkoç. op.cit., p.301.

<sup>135</sup> The author's interview with Ü. Haluk Bayülken.

<sup>136</sup> Vali. op.cit., p.27.

<sup>137</sup> Sowerwine. op.cit., p.15.

### 3.1.3 Economic Development

Economic development and modernisation also form an important part of Turkish foreign policy aims. For most Turkish ruling elites, acquiring the technological and economic strength of the Western advanced states has been an aim of both domestic and foreign policy making. Economic considerations played an important part in main Turkish foreign policy decisions such as joining NATO and making alliance with the Western powers. Turkey's needs for foreign economic assistance affected her relations with money supplying countries. Especially after the Second World War, Turkish leaders struggled to obtain maximum possible assistance of the West for its economic development and modernisation. Attaining full membership in the European Economic Community also remained as an unchanged foreign policy aim after 1959.

### 3.1.4 Strategic Location

Scholars who study main determinants of Turkish foreign policy give a special place to the geographical location of Turkey.<sup>138</sup> It is a widespread belief among scholars and Turkish politicians that Turkish foreign policy is under the inevitable influence of her geopolitical location. It is claimed that Turkey cannot afford to pursue a neutral policy outside the general superpower competition because of her strategic place between Europe and Asia. The Turkish Straits connecting the Black Sea with the Aegean and Mediterranean Sea constitute a potential source of power as well as threat for Turkey, because they are key points for the main sea powers for their presence in the Black Sea and Mediterranean. With her geographical position, Turkey has the potential to act both as a bridge and barrier between Europe and the Soviet Union, and between Europe and the Middle East. Turkish politicians put a special emphasis on the bridge position of Turkey between the two continents and between different cultures, expecting thereby to increase the role of Turkey in world politics. Turkey's closeness to the Middle East, so long the centre of conflict among super and regional powers, has also been an important factor influencing Turkish foreign policy-making.

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<sup>138</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.43. Sowerwine, op.cit., p.24, Richard D. Robinson, *the First Turkish Republic*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963, pp.164-165, Nuri Eren, *Turkey, NATO and Europe*, Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977, pp. 10-11.

### 3.1.5 Cyprus

Since the second half of the 1950s the Cyprus question has been a constant factor and problem of Turkish foreign policy, affecting decisions of policy makers in other matters as well. For Turks, Cyprus is a matter of national honour and prestige, and policies towards it cannot be decided by a few top officials on their own without regard for public opinion.<sup>139</sup> When the Cyprus issue showed in the 1960s that Turkey was isolated in the international arena and “betrayed” by even her allies, Turkish foreign policy became subject to public debate perhaps for the first time in Turkish history. Thus, the Cyprus problem played a catalyst role in attracting people’s attention to matters of foreign relations and encouraging them to express their views on foreign policy.<sup>140</sup> The developments on the Cyprus question also led the Turkish government to re-examine its foreign policy and pursue a more flexible one aiming at putting an end to Turkey’s isolation in the international arena and gaining support of the Soviet bloc and Third World countries on the Cyprus issue.

### 3.1.6 Continuity of Foreign Policy

It is widely believed among scholars and Turkish politicians that fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy have not changed since the foundation of the Republic in spite of slight changes in the composition of policy-makers and in the methods and means used in foreign relations.<sup>141</sup> Continuity is regarded as one of the main characteristics of Turkish foreign policy. Main political actors in the Turkish political arena including political parties, influential political figures, interest groups, the press and the military have an undeclared consensus on main Turkish foreign policy goals mentioned above though they attack each other on other matters. For Turkish ruling elites the main direction and line of Turkish national policy is so correct that trying to alter this line or even criticise it is unpatriotic and unacceptable.<sup>142</sup> In the 1960s, foreign policy became subject to parliamentary and public

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<sup>139</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.242.

<sup>140</sup> Mehmet Gönlübol, “NATO, USA and Turkey” in K.H. Karpat(ed.), *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, p.32.

<sup>141</sup> Vali, op.cit., pp. 68, 78, 79, 352, Dankwart A. Rustow, *Turkey: America’s Forgotten Ally*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987, pp.84, 85, Tamkoç, op.cit., p.298.

<sup>142</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.358.

debate and was criticised by many politicians and intellectuals but the official line of the government's policy remained unchanged.<sup>143</sup> In spite of heated discussions, a lot of noise and emotion on foreign policy matters, the government stood firm in pursuing its policy without reformulating it. For example, in spite of all pressures from different groups, the Turkish government did not sever its relations with the United States and did not think of leaving NATO.<sup>144</sup> Even during the rule of weak coalition and military-supported governments in the 1970s, special attention was paid to foreign policy in order to prevent radical changes and the post of foreign minister was given to respected figures from one of the major centrist parties or experienced career diplomats.<sup>145</sup>

### 3.2 Foreign Policy-Making in Turkey Before 1960

From the foundation of the Turkish Republic to the military coup of 1960, Turkey's foreign policy was made exclusively by the executive branch with minimum participation of other branches and groups.<sup>146</sup> At least until 1945, the leadership of the Republican People's Party single-handedly directed foreign policy of the country by using the power of the executive branch.<sup>147</sup> Although the constitution of 1924 gave the ultimate power to the Grand National Assembly, in practice the government formed by the top leadership of the RPP decided and implemented all domestic and foreign policy activities of the state.<sup>148</sup> Under the presidencies of Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü foreign policies were determined by the president and a small circle of advisers.<sup>149</sup> While the president took final decisions, "the members of the Council of Ministers, the General Staff of the armed forces, a few top Foreign Ministry officials and a few party members in the Assembly including the Head of the Parliamentary group of the RPP and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs" were, from time to time, called upon to express their

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<sup>143</sup> Gönlübol in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., p.22.

<sup>144</sup> Feroz Almad. *the Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, London: the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977, p.407.

<sup>145</sup> Rustow, op.cit., p.85.

<sup>146</sup> Sowerwine, op.cit.. p.165, Gönlübol in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., p.16.

<sup>147</sup> Sowerwine, op.cit., p.163.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., p.164.

<sup>149</sup> Vali, op.cit., pp.41, 43.

views on foreign policy matters.<sup>150</sup>

The first president of the Turkish Republic, Kemal Atatürk, saw foreign policy matters exclusively within his realm of authority and concern. In a sense, he acted as the chief diplomat of his country.<sup>151</sup> The second president, İsmet İnönü, “was his own prime minister and foreign minister. He was in absolute control of foreign relations of Turkey from 1938 to the middle of 1950.”<sup>152</sup> Holding all powers exclusively in his hand, he appointed and dismissed prime ministers and ministers and maintained a strict control over the election of deputies to the Grand National Assembly.<sup>153</sup> Foreign policy-making patterns remained unchanged under the administration of the Democrat Part government, which stayed in power in the 1950s. Foreign policy activities of the state were conducted exclusively by the executive branch headed by President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes.<sup>154</sup> Bayar and Menderes took the decision to send troops to Korea in consultation with only the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff and the commanders of the armed forces. The secret bilateral accords with the United States in the 1950s were reached without consultation or ratification by the Parliament. Turkey’s Middle East policy in the 1950s was determined only by Bayar and Menderes.

Before 1960 foreign policy of the Turkish governments was rarely discussed and criticised by the opposition parties and the press.<sup>155</sup> In this period foreign policy was considered a national issue which could not be questioned by public opinion. There was a widespread belief that the official foreign policy represented the unanimous will of the whole nation.<sup>156</sup> Even after transition to multi-party democracy in 1950, foreign policy was not made subject to political debates between the parties in spite of their severe disagreements in domestic politics.<sup>157</sup> The

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<sup>150</sup> Sowerwine, op.cit., p.165, Tamkoç, op.cit., p.221.

<sup>151</sup> Sowerwine, op.cit., p.166, Tamkoç, op. cit., p.127.

<sup>152</sup> Tamkoç, op.cit., p.221.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., p.33.

<sup>154</sup> Sowerwine, op.cit., p.173.

<sup>155</sup> Karpat(ed.), op.cit., p.7.

<sup>156</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.41, Tamkoç, op.cit., p.297.

<sup>157</sup> Ahmad, op.cit., p.390.

government's Middle East policy in 1958 was the first foreign policy issue to be criticised by the opposition party.

The military coup on 27 May 1960 and the constitution of 1961 brought about a new political atmosphere in Turkey. Under the constitution the exercise of sovereignty was divided among three main branches, the legislative (the bicameral Grand National Assembly), the executive (headed by the President and Council of Ministers) and an independent judiciary.<sup>158</sup> The new constitution provided a more pluralistic electoral system based on proportional representation, giving more place and effectiveness to smaller parties. In the new system trade unions and voluntary associations gained legitimacy and the autonomy of universities, the press, and the national radio and television increased.<sup>159</sup> In the atmosphere of greater freedom and democracy, the foreign policy of the government as well as ideological foundations of the regime became subject to questioning and criticism by political parties in parliament, journalists and columnists in the press and academics in universities. Thus the former taboo regarding discussion of foreign policy was lifted,<sup>160</sup> and national consensus on foreign policy was broken.<sup>161</sup> Ideology entered into Turkish politics as an important factor affecting foreign policy debates especially among radical groups. The changes mentioned above also played a part in widening the Turkish foreign policy-making circle, providing more political participation in the domestic and foreign policy-making process.<sup>162</sup>

### 3.3 Structure of Turkish Foreign Policy-Making Process

In theory, a wide range of political actors seemed to have the potential to participate in formulating foreign policy decisions or at least to affect them in the 1960s and 1970s. In practice, however, the impact of these groups on foreign policy-making differed in accordance with their real power and policy-making was generally concentrated in the hands of the top leadership in conjunction with a few directly involved officials.

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<sup>158</sup> *the Turkish Constitution as Amended*, Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1978, Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, pp.8-9.

<sup>159</sup> Sowerwine, op.cit., p.178.

<sup>160</sup> Vali, op.cit., pp. 40-41, 57-58, 71.

<sup>161</sup> Eren, op.cit., p.9.

<sup>162</sup> Tamkoç, *the Warrior Diplomats*, op.cit., pp. 297-298.

### 3.3.1 President

The Turkish political system created by the constitution of 1961 gave predominantly ceremonial responsibilities to the president, leaving actual policy-making and implementation to the prime minister and the Council of Ministers.<sup>163</sup> Almost all political decisions were ratified by the president as the ultimate nominal power, but real responsibility for taking decisions and implementing them remained in the hands of the government. According to the constitution, the president was the head of state representing the whole state and nation in the international arena and he was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The president had the right to preside over the Council of Ministers and the National Security Council when he felt it necessary. He was empowered to appoint a member of parliament to form a government and to reject laws accepted by Parliament and send them back for reconsideration. The candidate for prime ministry selected by the president was the person whose position was more suitable to form a government and the president had to ratify laws re-enacted by Parliament. The president had the right to appoint the chief of the general staff upon recommendation by the prime minister.<sup>164</sup> In the foreign policy arena, the president was authorised to receive representatives of foreign states, to appoint the diplomatic representatives of his own country and to ratify and publish international agreements and laws.<sup>165</sup> In the 1960s and 1970s the presidents continued to be very close to the real decision-making centres and had the opportunity to affect real policy-makers but they had not been in the position of making and implementing foreign policy decisions bypassing the power of the government.

### 3.3.2 Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister and advised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the chief foreign policy-making body of Turkey in the system introduced by the 1961 constitution.<sup>166</sup> In time of crises or in case of

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<sup>163</sup> Sowerwine. op.cit., pp. 181-182. Richard C. Company. *Turkey and the United States*, New York. London: Praeger, 1986, p.41, Rinn S. Shinn, “**Government and Politics**” in R.F. Nyrop (ed.). *Turkey*, Washington D.C.: the American University, 1980, p.195.

<sup>164</sup> Sowerwine. op.cit., p.181.

<sup>165</sup> Tamkoç. op.cit., p.128, Shinn. op.cit., p.195.

<sup>166</sup> Shinn in Nyrop (ed.). op.cit., p.195. Vali, op.cit., p.73.



discussing major national issues, the president and the chief of the general staff were allowed to attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers.<sup>167</sup> The prime minister was the most important actor in shaping foreign policy of Turkey with his duty of implementing the general government policy with the assistance of other ministers. Some prime ministers such as Bülent Ecevit played a more active role in foreign policy decisions. All other ministers had collective responsibility regarding the government's general foreign policy to Parliament.<sup>168</sup> In general, the council of ministers was more likely to reach foreign policy decisions by consensus and if a decision was taken by a majority vote, other ministers were obliged to support this decision. Especially from the second half of the 1960s the cabinet felt compelled to inform and consult leaders of political parties on essential questions and to defend its foreign policy before parliament and the electorate.<sup>169</sup> The vulnerability of the government in domestic and foreign policy issues increased during the coalition governments since the cabinet could be dismissed from power by parliament if its actions were unacceptable to the majority in parliament.

### 3.3.3 Foreign Ministry

The foreign ministry headed by the foreign minister was the major foreign policy-making body apart from the cabinet which formulated main foreign policy decisions.<sup>170</sup> Implementation of foreign policy decisions and day-to-day management of foreign affairs were in practice handed over to the foreign ministry and its minister. As Vali states, "the ministry of foreign affairs and its minister are in the position of exercising independent authority in matters of political detail and are able to influence the higher level decision-making process."<sup>171</sup> They were able to assist and advise top foreign policy-makers and charged with preparing the government's foreign policy program. The foreign minister held a unique position in deciding many foreign policy matters independently and had the final say in all matters which did not concern the council of ministers.<sup>172</sup> The foreign minister's

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<sup>167</sup> Vali. op.cit., p.73, Tanıkoç, op.cit., pp. 250-251.

<sup>168</sup> Şimşek, op.cit., pp. 195-196.

<sup>169</sup> Vali. op.cit., pp.72, 79.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., p.74, Sowerwine, op.cit., p.194.

<sup>171</sup> Vali. op.cit., p.74.

<sup>172</sup> Sowerwine, op.cit., p.196.

top advisers including the secretary general of the ministry and the general directors of the various divisions within the ministry and other high-ranking career foreign service officers had also great influence in foreign policy decisions.<sup>173</sup> The career diplomats of the Turkish Foreign Ministry had a special place in the Turkish political system, assuring the continuity of traditional Turkish foreign policy line for decades. They were “the best educated, the most Westernised, and also the most aristocratic” group among the civil service,<sup>174</sup> fully dedicated to the aim of integrating Turkey with the Western world.<sup>175</sup>

### 3.3.4 Military

The Ministry of National Defence and its minister played a vital role in shaping foreign policy decisions related to Turkey’s national security. They were empowered to prepare the government’s program on national defence. The minister of national defence had the final power in deciding national security matters which were not too important to attract the attention of the cabinet.<sup>176</sup> However, the defence minister was not the boss of the military, having no voice in the command and control of the armed forces. Actual military policy was shaped by the commanders of the armed forces.<sup>177</sup>

The military in Turkey had potentially great power in deciding the direction of Turkish political system. The 1960-1973 period saw the Turkish military playing an extensive part in ruling Turkey. Frequent interventions by the military in politics were based on the view that Kemal Atatürk had bequeathed to the military the duty of protecting the Republic and the reforms he had initiated. When the military felt that politicians were unable to rule the country effectively and that Atatürk’s reforms were under threat, it saw taking over the rule of the country and putting the train back on the track as its legitimate right and duty.<sup>178</sup> The majority of military officers were in favour of a democratic regime and they were

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<sup>173</sup> Tankoç, op.cit., p.255.

<sup>174</sup> Karpat(ed.), op.cit., p.7.

<sup>175</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.75.

<sup>176</sup> Sowerwine, op.cit., pp. 187-188.

<sup>177</sup> Company, op.cit., pp.41-42.

<sup>178</sup> R.P. Nye, *the Military in Turkish Politics*, Ph.D. Thesis, Washington University, 1974, pp.18, 66-67, 77, 248, Company, op.cit., p.42, Rustow, op.cit., pp.62, 119.

against politicising the armed forces through intervention in domestic politics,<sup>179</sup> but at the same time officers expected politicians to carry out Atatürk's reforms and take necessary measures against the extreme right and left. The officers of the 27 May 1960 coup<sup>180</sup> did not allow lower-rank officers to halt the democratic process<sup>181</sup> but pressurised governments and political parties in order to protect their revolution and reforms and to prevent revenge of anti-coupist politicians.<sup>182</sup> They forced party leaders to elect General Cemal Gürsel as president and İsmet İnönü as prime minister by threatening to prohibit all political parties.<sup>183</sup> On 12 March 1971 military officers caused the resignation of the Demirel government by delivering a stern memorandum<sup>184</sup> and ruled the country for the next two and half years behind the scenes through above-party governments. They suppressed extreme groups<sup>185</sup> and passed some laws in Parliament but could not persuade deputies to elect their candidate General Gürler as president.<sup>186</sup>

The army commanders preferred to stay outside the policy-making process in foreign affairs. They did not intervene in the structure of the Foreign Ministry and left the job of foreign policy-making to famous political figures or career diplomats. It might be said that particularly in the time of civilian rule the army acted as a pressure group rather than policy determiner.<sup>187</sup> However, when issues of national security and defence came to consideration, the government had to consider the views of the army commanders.<sup>188</sup> Especially the Supreme Military Council headed by the chief of the general staff and attended by the commanders of the army, navy, air forces, and gendarmerie had influence on policy-makers during the crises in which use of armed forces was considered. For example, during the Cyprus

<sup>179</sup> Nye, op.cit., pp.17, 121, 133, 248.

<sup>180</sup> For detailed information about the 27 May coup see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1959-1960*, vol.12, pp.17501-17505, E. Özbudun, *The Role of Military in Turkish Politics*, Occasional Papers, No.14, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1966.

<sup>181</sup> On the coup attempt of Colonel Aydemir see *Keesing's..., 1963-1964*, vol.14, pp.19656-19657, M.A. Birand et al., *12 Mart*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994, pp.55-70, 84-95.

<sup>182</sup> Nye, op.cit., pp.27, 252.

<sup>183</sup> Almad, op.cit., pp.178-179.

<sup>184</sup> For detailed information on the subject see *Keesing's..., 1971-1972*, vol.18, pp.24637-24642.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., p.24642.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., 1973, vol.19, pp.25853-25854.

<sup>187</sup> Sowerwine, op.cit., p.191.

<sup>188</sup> Campeny, op.cit., p.42.

crises in 1963-64 and 1967 the top military leadership was actively involved in the adoption of important decisions.<sup>189</sup>

### 3.3.5 National Security Council

In the 1960s and the 1970s Turkey maintained a National Security Council which was headed by the president when present or the prime minister and included the deputy prime minister; the ministers of foreign affairs, national defence, interior affairs, finance, communication, labour, industry; the chief of the general staff; the commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Forces and the secretary of the NSC, who was a general. The main functions of the council were to advise the president and the Council of Ministers on national security matters, to co-ordinate all activities of national mobilisation and defence and to prepare national security plans and programs.<sup>190</sup> Although the president had the right to preside over the council when at present, generally the prime minister directed activities of the council. The council became an important policy-making body on the matters of national security and seemed to carry more weight in taking decisions on important occasions than other bodies did.<sup>191</sup>

### 3.3.6 Parliament

Before 1960, Parliament acted as the legitimiser of the government's foreign policy by accepting all governmental actions with minimum discussion or resentment.<sup>192</sup> In the 1960s and the 1970s political parties which had different ideological views and interests were able to gain representation in parliament. The political system gave the political parties the chance of presenting their views to the public through various means such as the parliamentary debates, the press and radio and TV broadcasting.<sup>193</sup> Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s Turkish Parliament openly discussed foreign policy issues, criticised the government's foreign policy and influenced the government in re-examining some of its policies. At least the

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<sup>189</sup> Tamkoç, op.cit., p.249.

<sup>190</sup> Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, op.cit., pp. 76-77, Sowerwine, op.cit., p.185, Tamkoç, op.cit., p.250, Shinn, op.cit., p.196. H.D. Nelson and I. Kaplan. "National Security" in Nyrop (ed.), *Turkey*, op.cit., p.262.

<sup>191</sup> Tamkoç, op.cit., p.249.

<sup>192</sup> Sowerwine, op.cit., p.165. Karpat(ed.), op.cit., p.7.

<sup>193</sup> Sowerwine, op.cit., p.249.

government had to consider the reaction of Parliament when taking foreign policy decisions. The possibility of dismissing the government from power through a vote of no-confidence by parliament forced the governments, especially the coalition governments, to act more carefully in foreign affairs. However, Parliament was not directly involved in the foreign policy-making process and did not cause radical changes in the general direction of Turkish foreign policy.

According to the constitution of 1961, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, consisting of the Senate and the National Assembly, was empowered to ratify or reject international treaties and laws<sup>194</sup> and the budget of the Foreign Ministry. The authority to permit the use of armed forces, to send troops to foreign countries and to allow the stationing of foreign troops in Turkey was also given to the GNA.<sup>195</sup> Parliament endeavoured to check and control the government's foreign policy activities through debates on the Foreign Ministry budget, general debates, and parliamentary investigations, inquiries and interpellations.<sup>196</sup> The National Assembly had much more direct influence on the foreign policy-making process than the Senate had. The Assembly had direct means to supervise foreign policy activities whereas the Senate had more general authorities such as electing the president from among its own members, delaying or postponing bills passed by the National Assembly and accepting or rejecting a declaration of war.<sup>197</sup>

### 3.3.7 Political Parties and Groups

**Republican People's Party(RPP):** The RPP was founded by Kemal Atatürk and ruled the country single-handedly between 1923 and 1950. It always saw itself as a supporter and protector of the Turkish democratic and capitalist system but its actions sometimes seemed at variance with this professed role of champion of democracy. The RPP's top leadership approved the military coup on 27 May 1960<sup>198</sup> and the Commanders' Memorandum on 12 March 1971.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>194</sup> Ibid., p.200, Tanukoç, op.cit., p.259, Shinn, "Government and Politics" in Nyrop(ed.), op.cit., p.193.

<sup>195</sup> Tanukoç, op.cit., p.259.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid., p.259, Sowerwine, op.cit., p.202.

<sup>197</sup> Campamy, *Turkey and the United States*, op.cit., pp.40-41.

<sup>198</sup> S. Kili, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1976, pp.136, 186, *Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1959-1960*, vol.12, p.17505.

<sup>199</sup> Kili, op.cit., p.271, Alımad, op.cit., p.261, *Keessing's...*, 1971-1972, vol.18, p.24641.

The main problem for the RPP in the 1960s was to gain support of peasants, workers, intellectuals and students who were being drawn into newly-emerged left-ist movements. For this purpose party leader İsmet İnönü claimed that his party was on the left of centre.<sup>200</sup> Secretary-General Bülent Ecevit furthered the idea of “left-of-centre” and presented it to masses as the policy of the RPP.<sup>201</sup> RPP leaders condemned the policies and anti-NATO and anti-American protests of extreme leftists and limited their effect on the Turkish public. Ecevit himself claimed that “the left of centre is the strongest wall and the most effective barrier against the flood of the extreme left.”<sup>202</sup>

Republicans seemed to pay more attention to a planned economy in which the state sector would be the leading force, but they always felt it necessary to declare that the private sector would be encouraged and would not be interfered.<sup>203</sup> Specifically Ecevit’s aim was to establish a social democratic regime such as some Scandinavian regimes in which peasants and workers could be protected against large-scale capitalism.<sup>204</sup> However, as a whole Ecevit’s policy merely strove to help the survival of the capitalist system under Turkey’s special conditions.

Republicans were always staunch supporters of the Kemalist principles and Turkey’s Western connection,<sup>205</sup> although when they were in opposition in the second half of the 1960s they did criticise relations with the United States and NATO and Western attitudes toward the Cyprus question. Some Republicans believed that the U.S.A. took some actions to prevent the RPP from coming to power and gave support to rightist parties.<sup>206</sup> The RPP’s leader in the 1970s, Ecevit, seemed to be an advocate of a more independent policy in dealings with the West and improved relations with the Eastern bloc.<sup>207</sup> However, in the end

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<sup>200</sup> *Milliyet*, 29 July 1965.

<sup>201</sup> B. Ecevit, *Ortanın Solu*, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1973.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, p.28.

<sup>203</sup> Ahmad, *op.cit.*, pp.272-273.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.255-256, 329.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, p.213. M. Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, Ankara: SBF Yayınları, No.407, 1977, pp.337-338. İ. Arar, *Hükümet Programları*, İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968, pp.339-340, 369, 399.

<sup>206</sup> G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.69, 81, 83, 119, 132, 136, Kili, *op.cit.*, p.207, Ecevit, *op.cit.*, pp.16-17.

<sup>207</sup> Ahmad, *op.cit.*, pp.419, 421, 422, Ecevit, *op.cit.*, p.150.

RPP leaders stressed that Turkey should be a part of the West and NATO<sup>208</sup> and when they were in power they took great care not to harm relations with the West.

**Justice Party(JP):** The JP, the main moderate rightist party, was established on 11 February 1961 and ruled the country between 1965 and 1971 single-handedly. It, too, was an advocate of the Kemalist principles and Western-style democracy and economic system.<sup>209</sup> It favoured a mixed economy in which the private sector would be the leading force, guided but not controlled or restricted by the state.<sup>210</sup> In spite of their strong stand for secularism, JP leaders addressed the religious feelings of the Turkish people to gain their support and accused the RPP of encouraging atheism.<sup>211</sup> They also expected electoral gains from condemning socialist and leftist movements and accusing the RPP of co-operating with extreme leftists.<sup>212</sup>

The JP was a staunch supporter of Turkey's special relations with the West<sup>213</sup> and its membership of NATO.<sup>214</sup> Ironically it was also the JP government which was pushed by *internal and international factors* (such as the Cyprus issue, isolation in international arena, and detente) towards pursuing a more flexible foreign policy, improving relations with the Eastern bloc and Third World and making some changes in relations with the U.S.A.<sup>215</sup> JP leader Demirel dared to say, "No Turkish Prime Minister said 'No' to the United States as much as I did."<sup>216</sup> However, the JP government's actions were mainly directed to appeasing the angry Turkish public opinion. JP leaders always maintained their pro-American stand and feared that

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<sup>208</sup> B. Ecevit, "Batı'nın Bunalımı ve Türkiye", *Özgür İnsan*, June 1975.

<sup>209</sup> Arar, op.cit., p.431, F. Bozbeyli, *Parti Programları*, İstanbul: Ak Yayınları, 1970, p.3, S. Demirel, *1971 Buhranı ve Aydınlığa Doğru*, Ankara, 1973.

<sup>210</sup> Bozbeyli, op.cit., p.9, Arar, op.cit., p.445, Ahmad, op.cit., pp.238-239, S. Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye*, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975, p.236.

<sup>211</sup> Ahmad, op.cit., pp.242, 383-384, Demirel, *1971 Buhranı*, op.cit., p.293.

<sup>212</sup> Demirel, *1971 Buhranı*, op.cit., pp.22-23, 73-74, 170, 198-200, 359, Ahmad, op.cit., p.199, Harris, op.cit., p.140.

<sup>213</sup> Bozbeyli, op.cit., pp.38-40, Demirel, *1971 Buhranı*, op.cit., pp.165, 327, 360, Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye*, op.cit., pp.300, 302, 314, 422, 434-435, Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla...*, op.cit., p.540, Arar, op.cit., p.481.

<sup>214</sup> Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye*, op.cit., pp.412-413, 433-435, Harris, op.cit., pp.230, 235, 237-238, Arar, op.cit., pp.479, 487.

<sup>215</sup> Some JP actions in this regard can be seen in the chapters on military relations and opium.

<sup>216</sup> Gönübol et al., op.cit., p.520.

the U.S. commitment, and along with it U.S. military and economic aid, to Turkey might be reduced because of the anti-American atmosphere at home.

**Extreme Left:** The Turkish Labour Party (TLP), established on 13 February 1962, was the main representative of socialist groups in the 1960s. When M. Ali Aybar became chairman of the party in February 1962, TLP's character changed greatly, attracting workers, intellectuals and students who were dissatisfied with the current regime and influencing Turkish politics out of proportion to its size and representation in Parliament. In spite of its achievement of winning fifteen seats in the 1965 elections, the TLP had never been a strong, homogenous party. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 caused ideological and factional disagreements within the party.<sup>217</sup> After the military's intervention in politics in March 1971, the TLP was dissolved on 20 July 1971 by the Turkish constitutional court because it allegedly violated the law on political parties and the constitution. Its leaders were found guilty of encouraging leftist subversive activities against the regime.

Leftist leaders believed that Turkey could develop economically only under a socialist regime which would make the state sector the leading force in the economy, implement a strict development plan and nationalise vital economic sectors.<sup>218</sup> They condemned foreign capital, foreign aid and foreign debt as the means of outside powers and the internal elite of making Turkey dependent on foreign countries.<sup>219</sup>

Foreign policy provided a good means for leftist groups to increase their political influence by strongly opposing NATO and the West, especially the United States. In their opinion, the United States penetrated deeply into every part of Turkish administration and dominated all Turkey's domestic and foreign policies by using NATO and bilateral arrangements.<sup>220</sup> If Turkey withdrew from NATO

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<sup>217</sup> J.M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974, pp.129-130, Harris, op.cit., p.143.

<sup>218</sup> B. Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1970, pp.238, 241, 243, 246, 250. M.A. Aybar, *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi ve Sosyalizm*, İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1968, pp.192, 193, 203, 361, 407, 408, Bozbeyli, op.cit., pp.283, 289, 291, 317, 331, Landau, op.cit., pp.138, 145, 150, 151.

<sup>219</sup> Boran, op.cit., pp.241, 269-270, 286, 289-291, Aybar, op.cit., pp.203, 335, 338, 339, Ahmad, op.cit., p.413.

<sup>220</sup> Boran, op.cit., pp.267-268, Aybar, op.cit., pp.388, 402-403, 417, 462, 465, 498.



and ended her special relations with the U.S.A., she would have regained her complete independence and the possibility of U.S. intervention against socialist groups would have been reduced, giving way to the establishment of socialism in Turkey. Leftist leaders spent a great deal of time explaining the disadvantages of NATO for Turkey.<sup>221</sup> Apart from the TLP, leftist newspapers such as *Yön*, *Ant*, *Devrim*, *Akis*, *Akşam* and *Türk Solu*,<sup>222</sup> students, workers and trade union DİSK (the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Union) joined the condemnation of the West.

The poor performance of the TLP in the 1969 elections alienated a large section of the extreme left from the parliamentary system and pushed them to try extra parliamentary actions, particularly terror and violence, to attract the attention of the masses. Workers and students became increasingly more violent, paralysing factories and universities. A band of student extremists, believed to be a part of terrorist Dev-Genc organisation, started a terror campaign against American personnel and American activities in Turkey, announcing that they would struggle until the country was cleared from "imperialist" foreigners. When the Israeli Consul General was kidnapped and murdered by those leftist terrorists in May 1971, the Turkish government took harsh measures against leftist radicals. Suspected leftist activists and a number of professors, politicians and journalists who were accused of inspiring those leftist guerrillas were arrested, leftist periodicals were closed down and the TLP was dissolved.<sup>223</sup>

**Extreme Right:** The Republican Peasants Nation Party (RPNP), later renamed the Nationalist Action Party (NAP), followed the nationalistic line. Its leader in the post-1965 period, Alparslan Türkeş, a colonel who was actively involved in the 27 May 1960 Revolution and was then expelled from the National Union Committee because of his opposition to early parliamentary elections, almost single-handedly directed the party and determined its policies. The party

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<sup>221</sup> Boran, op.cit., pp.271-273, 276, 279, 297, Aybar, op.cit., pp.325-326, 340, 379, 459-460, 463, 560, 561, 580, 582, 591, 592, 605, 617, 623.

<sup>222</sup> For a good summary of leftist columnists' views see D. Sezer, *Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika*, Ankara: SBF Yayını, 1972, pp.358-362, 367-369, 374-378, 452-453, 455, 458-461.

<sup>223</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971-1972*, vol.18, pp.24642, 24753-24755, 25143, 25329-25331, ibid., 1973, vol.19, pp.25854-25855.

won 15 seats in the 1965 elections and one in 1969 though it increased its proportionate vote slightly. The NAP had influence in the political arena mainly because of activities of its youth organisations such as the Union of Homes of Ideals (Ülkü Ocakları Birliği), the Association of Young Idealists (Genç Ülkücüler Teşkilatı) and later Idealist Youth of Turkey (Türkiye Ülkücü Gençlik Teşkilatı).

Nationalists believed that Turkey could not be developed by copying the regimes of other countries such as capitalism and communism. In their opinion, Turkey needed a completely national regime based on its own history, national traditions and spirit, that was the regime of the Nine Lights (Dokuz Işık) whose principles were explained by Türkeş.<sup>224</sup> They proposed a mixed economic system in which the state would direct development and control main sectors.<sup>225</sup> In the thinking of nationalists, religion (Islam) held a secondary place and was seen not as a way of life but as an integral and important component of Turkish culture.<sup>226</sup> They addressed religious feelings of people to gain their support.<sup>227</sup> Nationalists saw international communism and its agents at home as the most dangerous threats to Turkey's independence and fought against them.<sup>228</sup> A well-disciplined paramilitary organisation called the commandos or Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar) clashed with leftists, broke up their meetings and demonstrations.<sup>229</sup>

The NAP leadership supported Turkey's alliance with NATO and the U.S.A. as necessary components of Turkish security and favoured having close relations with the West.<sup>230</sup> They paid a special attention to the situation of Turks living outside Turkey (the Outer Turks)<sup>231</sup> and strongly supported a Turkish military

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<sup>224</sup> A. Türkeş, *Temel Görüşler*, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975, pp.30, 37-38, 45, 52, 80, 146, 147, 178, 179. A. Türkeş, *Yeni Ufuklara Doğru*, İstanbul: Kutluğ Yayınları, 1974, pp.11, 15, 37-38, 53-54, 93.

<sup>225</sup> Türkeş, *Temel Görüşler*, op.cit., pp.84, 90, 91, 194, 196, 211-214, Türkeş, *Yeni Ufuklara*, op.cit., pp.21, 22, Bozbeyli, op.cit., pp.186, 187, 223, 225-227.

<sup>226</sup> Landau, op.cit., pp.193, 199, 202.

<sup>227</sup> Türkeş, *Temel Görüşler*, op.cit., pp.42, 179-180, Türkeş, *Yeni Ufuklara*, op.cit., pp.16, 17, 30, Bozbeyli, op.cit., p.181.

<sup>228</sup> Türkeş, *Yeni Ufuklara*, op.cit., pp.36-37, 41, 62, 66, 88, 91, Türkeş, *Temel Görüşler*, op.cit., pp.61, 65, Landau, op.cit., pp.229, 254-255, 265, 274.

<sup>229</sup> Landau, op.cit., pp.215-216, M. Toker, *Solda ve Sağda Vuruşanlar*, Ankara: Akis Yayınları, 1971, pp.157, 160.

<sup>230</sup> For Türkeş's views on NATO see Türkeş, *Temel Görüşler*, op.cit., pp.263-275.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid., pp.34, 294, 297, Türkeş, *Yeni Ufuklara*, op.cit., pp.19, 75, 80, 82, Landau, op.cit., pp.194-198.

intervention in Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots.<sup>232</sup>

**Islamist Groups:** Islamist groups (Nurcus, Süleymancıs etc.) were less active and effective in the political arena in the 1960s. Their activities were limited to publishing Islamic books, magazines and newspapers, arranging mass prayings and trying to organise themselves. Among them Mücadelecıs were the most active, clashing with leftists and campaigning against so-called imperialists.<sup>233</sup> Islamists attacked communism as a godless system challenging Islamic principles and Muslims and condemned “the international Jewish plot”, world-wide freemasonry and missionary activities.<sup>234</sup> Some considered Western imperialism equally as dangerous as communism and praised Islam as a system and civilisation which could compete with Western civilisation.

In the political arena Necmettin Erbakan organised Islamists. He had been a member of the Justice Party heading a more conservative, Islamic-minded faction. After his candidacy for parliament was vetoed by the JP he was elected to Parliament as an independent candidate in the 1969 elections. The National Order Party founded by Erbakan on 26 January 1970 was closed down on 20 May 1971 on the ground that it violated articles of the Constitution related to secularism.<sup>235</sup> Erbakan’s party re-emerged in October 1972 under the name of the National Salvation Party (NSP), won 48 seats in Parliament (11.8 percent of total votes) in the 1973 elections and joined the coalition government in 1974. Seven of its members served as ministers in the cabinet.

The NSP clearly stood for religion and made Islam the basis of its policies. Since Salvationists were restricted by the law in using Islamic terms, they used unclear moral and traditional terms in explaining their ideas. They talked of moral recovery and progress, i.e. Islamisation of the people. Salvationists seemed to have accepted secularism as a pillar of the state but rejected the interpretation of secularism in a way that would restrict religious freedoms and put religious people under pressure.<sup>236</sup> They were opposed to communism and capitalism as products

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<sup>232</sup> Türkoç, *Temel Görüşler*, op.cit., pp.310-320.

<sup>233</sup> Tokatlı, op.cit., pp.103-105, 107, 111-112, 119-120, 126.

<sup>234</sup> Ahmad, op.cit., p.376.

<sup>235</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971-1972*, vol.18, p.24640.

<sup>236</sup> Bozbeyli, op.cit., p.399.

of Christian Europe<sup>237</sup> and proposed a mixed economy model in which the state would play the most important part under a development plan.<sup>238</sup>

The NSP leadership was in favour of having close economic and political relations with the Muslim world rather than the West. Erbakan was strongly opposed to Turkey's membership of the European Economic Community which he regarded as a Christian club protecting the interests of only Christians and Jews.<sup>239</sup> He claimed that it would be to Turkey's advantage to lead the establishment of a Muslim Common Market by disassociating itself from the West.<sup>240</sup> When they were in government Salvationists agreed with the RPP that Turkey should remain within the Western security system and existing alliances.<sup>241</sup>

### 3.3.8 Public Opinion

From 1964 onward the Turkish press had played a special part in starting foreign policy discussions outside official circles for the first time and in stimulating other private groups and the general public to join the general foreign policy discussion.<sup>242</sup> As the most influential public opinion creator, the press became a forum for columnists, experts and well-known personalities to express their views on foreign policy matters. The government and other official policy-makers saw the press both as an important channel of information and a gauge of public opinion. Although the press had the potential to influence the views of both the general public and the official circles with its power to express and spread its views openly,<sup>243</sup> it did not achieve any radical foreign policy changes.

After 1965, university students were actively involved in the discussion of foreign policy matters and tried to influence the determination of foreign policy decisions by using various methods such as holding press conferences and public forums,

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<sup>237</sup> Ibid., pp.397, 414.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., pp.414-415, 417-418.

<sup>239</sup> M.Y. Geyikdagı, *Political Parties in Turkey*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984, p.123, Landau, op.cit., p.192.

<sup>240</sup> Ahmad, op.cit., pp.333, 382-383, Bozbeyli, op.cit., pp.421, 432.

<sup>241</sup> Ahmad, op.cit., p.337.

<sup>242</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.129, for the role of the press see also Sowerwine, op.cit., pp. 264-268.

<sup>243</sup> Sezer, *Kamuoyu*, op.cit., p.307.

organising demonstrations and boycotts, delivering their own literature and even resorting to violence.<sup>244</sup> Student groups played a part in fuelling public discussion on foreign policy and forced the government to have a more flexible attitude in foreign policy, but they were not able to influence the government to change its basic foreign policy line.<sup>245</sup> University lecturers also joined the discussion of foreign policy by issuing joint statements. Individually lecturers took part in foreign policy discussions by expressing their views in newspaper columns.<sup>246</sup>

Labour unions, too, contributed to the radicalisation of the public opinion in the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>247</sup> They tried to affect the official foreign policy especially in economic matters by organising strikes and boycotts and sometimes resorting to violence. They used influential figures in political parties to put pressure on the government. Business associations were also well-positioned to affect the official circles through their financial and political resources.

Despite the widespread discussion and criticism of the government's foreign policy by the political parties, the press, the intelligentsia, students and workers, the interest of the average Turkish citizen in foreign policy matters remained very little throughout the 1960s and the 1970s.<sup>248</sup> In general, the passive part of the Turkish public opinion which represented the majority of people did not feel any concern about foreign policy issues unless those issues affected its national and religious feelings. Questions affecting national honour or religious feelings were more likely to attract the attention of the general public.<sup>249</sup> The general public was also sensitive to foreign interferences in domestic affairs.<sup>250</sup> Especially in the second half of the 1960s, the general Turkish public opinion sharply criticised the United States and Turkey's other NATO allies over Cyprus and other issues,<sup>251</sup> but did not go so far as the radical groups did in criticising the government's policies.

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<sup>244</sup> Ibid., pp.346, 348.

<sup>245</sup> Gönlübol, "NATO, USA and Turkey" in Karpat(ed.), op.cit., p.23, Sowerwine, op.cit., pp.292-294.

<sup>246</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.353, 354.

<sup>247</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.130, Eren, op.cit., pp. 8-9.

<sup>248</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.100.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid., p.100.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid., p.360.

<sup>251</sup> Rustow, *Turkey*, op.cit., p.84.

### 3.4 Factors Affecting U.S. Foreign Policy 1960-1975

#### 3.4.1 Anti-Communism

In the 1960-1975 period American foreign policy continued to be affected by the opposition of American policy-makers to communism and their desire to contain so-called communist expansion in different parts of the world. Almost all the presidents and chief policy-makers saw communism directed by the Soviet Union and China as the most important threat to the United States and other countries of the "free world". They took the communist threat so seriously that even nationalist movements were perceived as communist-inspired subversive activities. In the 1960-1975 period cold war clashes occurred between the United States and communist countries such as the Soviet Union and China and American interventions took place in some small countries where communism was seen as a threat by the Americans. However, especially in the beginning of the 1970s American politicians realised that cold war conflict was not the only option in pursuing foreign policy and that the USA also could get benefits from relaxing her relations with communist countries.

Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon were sincere anti-Communists, trying to strengthen American power vis-a-vis the power of communist states. During his presidential campaign Kennedy accused his predecessors of not taking effective actions against Soviet moves and frequently emphasised the missile gap between the USA and USSR which was not real at that time.<sup>252</sup> He was strongly in favour of increasing American military capacity against an imaginary Soviet superiority in this arena. It was also Kennedy who advocated American superiority over the Russians in space by launching expensive space projects.<sup>253</sup> Kennedy took a very tough stance on the Vietnam issue, deciding not to give any concessions to the Vietnamese communists in order to isolate the People's Republic of China and to stop communist expansion in East Asia.<sup>254</sup> He thought that if Vietnam was lost to communists, this victory would encourage communist movements

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<sup>252</sup> M.A. Jones, *the Limits of Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, p.544.

<sup>253</sup> R.A. Divine, *Since 1945 Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History*, New York: London: John Wiley and sons, Inc., 1975, p.115. Jones, op.cit., p.545.

<sup>254</sup> Divine, op. cit., p.116. D.W. Grantham, *The United States Since 1945*, New York: London: McGraw Hill. Inc., 1976, p.189.

and therefore the West would have to deal with similar challenges throughout the world. The Cuban missile crisis demonstrated Kennedy's determination in opposing Soviet moves. He could not accept Soviet nuclear missiles on the doorstep of America.<sup>255</sup> Kennedy failed to realise the true character of national liberation wars by regarding them as communist expansionist actions.<sup>256</sup> In relations with the West, Kennedy placed considerable importance on strengthening the capability, unity and effectiveness of the NATO alliance. He also encouraged the Western Europeans to promote their union under the Common Market.<sup>257</sup>

Lyndon B. Johnson, too, believed that communism was the most important threat to the "free world" and that the USA should have the responsibility of halting its advance all over the world.<sup>258</sup> Although he seemed a more moderate leader during the presidential campaign in comparison with the Republican candidate, Barry M. Goldwater, who advocated a total struggle against communism and even suggested using tactical nuclear weapons in the Vietnamese war,<sup>259</sup> after coming to power Johnson also struggled for an American victory in Vietnam against communists by escalating the war. According to R.J. Barnett, Johnson held the view that the United States must oppose all newly-established communist or communist-leaning governments in the world even if they came to power by election.<sup>260</sup>

Richard Nixon had the same cold-war mentality in spite of his achievements in relaxing relations with the Soviet Union and communist China. Throughout his political career Nixon remained a sincere anti-communist, always seeking American superiority over communist states.<sup>261</sup> Realising the limits of the American power in continuing the war in Vietnam and remaining under the pressure of public opinion, Nixon decided to stop the war, but it had to be an honourable withdrawal for the USA, therefore in order to achieve this aim Nixon did not hesitate to attack

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<sup>255</sup> Divine, op. cit., pp. 128-131.

<sup>256</sup> Grantham, op. cit., p.177.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid., p.189.

<sup>258</sup> Jones, op. cit., pp. 554-555, Grantham, op. cit., p.230.

<sup>259</sup> Jones, op. cit., p.551, P.Y. Hammond, *Cold War and Detente*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1975, p.227.

<sup>260</sup> R.J. Barnett, *Intervention and Revolution*, London: Paladin, 1972, p.23.

<sup>261</sup> H. Brandon, *the Retreat of American Power*, London: The Bodley Head, 1973, p.270.

Cambodia and Laos to put pressure on the Vietnamese. His detente policy did not mean the end of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in different parts of the world, especially in Third World countries.

To summarise, opposition to communism was the main characteristic of both American conservatives and liberals, and of both Republican and Democrat administrations.<sup>262</sup> As J.W. Fulbright, a former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated, the fatal mistake of American policy-makers in this period was to regard communism as an absolute evil and to give their opposition to communism priority over their support for nationalist movements in the Third World.<sup>263</sup>

### 3.4.2 World Leadership

American leaders saw the United States as the leader of the "free world", having a global mission to protect countries of the world against the expansion of monolithic communism. In their opinion, the United States was the most powerful state in the free world, therefore it could not afford to avoid helping and protecting other countries against evil forces. It was the moral duty of the United States to intervene in affairs of other countries if necessary to protect freedoms. In this sense America appeared to undertake the job of world policeman and this concept of world leadership strongly affected American foreign policy decisions.

John F. Kennedy was a convinced believer in the American world leadership. On 17 September 1960 he declared that "our responsibility is to be the chief defender of freedom at a time when freedom is under attack all over the globe."<sup>264</sup> In a television speech during the presidential campaign Kennedy presented the USA as "the sentinel of the gates of freedom around the world" and said that "if we succeed, freedom succeeds. If we fail, freedom fails".<sup>265</sup> In his inaugural address Kennedy stated that the USA "would pay any price, bear any burdens, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success

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<sup>262</sup> J. Dull, *The Politics of American Foreign Policy*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985, pp. 177-178, 209.

<sup>263</sup> J.W. Fulbright, *The Arrogance of Power*, New York: Random House, 1966, pp.77, 78, 106-107, 119.

<sup>264</sup> H. Fairlie, *The Kennedy Promise*, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1973, p.68.

<sup>265</sup> Divine, op. cit., p.105.



of liberation.”<sup>266</sup> He accelerated U.S. military projects to fulfil the world leadership role and formed the Peace Corps to help Third World countries as a part of America’s global mission.<sup>267</sup>

Lyndon B. Johnson devoted most of his energy to winning the war in Vietnam, thus he wanted to keep the confidence of world nations in American leadership and American protection.<sup>268</sup> Realising dangers of direct commitments of the United States all over the world, the Nixon administration tried to carry on American world leadership by applying more indirect commitments, giving the duty of actual defence to local powers and helping them economically and militarily and encouraging them in facing evil forces. The Nixon Doctrine is the expression of this aim.<sup>269</sup> Nixon’s national security adviser Kissinger stated that “the Nixon Doctrine is our realistic way of remaining committed to the rest of the world. It can lay a basis for a continuing practical relationship, not a basis for a total withdrawal”.<sup>270</sup>

American governments tried to blockade revolutionary movements in the Third World in the name of her global mission to protect the present system. They extended economic and military assistance to governments of some Third World countries to preserve stability and the status quo.<sup>271</sup> American leaders saw themselves in a position where they could determine whether a movement anywhere in the world constituted a threat to the interests of the United States and the international community and felt that they could handle it in a way which they wished. In most cases they even did not need to consult other countries or international organisations. The Americans saw their world leadership as a unique opportunity to promote the ideals of democracy and capitalism throughout the world.<sup>272</sup>

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<sup>266</sup> Jones, op. cit., p.545.

<sup>267</sup> Ibid., p. 545.

<sup>268</sup> Divine, op. cit., p.161. Jones, op. cit., p.555.

<sup>269</sup> D. Landau, *Kissinger, the Uses of Power*, London: Robson Books Ltd., 1974, pp. 112-114, Grantham, op. cit., p.257.

<sup>270</sup> D. Landau, op. cit., p.112.

<sup>271</sup> Barnett, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

<sup>272</sup> Dull, op. cit., p.209.

### 3.4.3 Realism

The Nixon administration made some important changes in U.S. foreign policy by decreasing the influence of ideology and the containment of communism on foreign policy. In particular, Nixon's national security adviser Henry Kissinger, who taught foreign relations at Harvard University, played an important role in shifting the direction of American foreign policy with his "realist" views. He believed that ideology should not dominate relations between states and determine the general line of a country's foreign policy. He and Nixon realised that the world at the beginning of the 1970s was different from the world in the 1960s. The old polarity between the United States and the Soviet Union had undergone a radical change with the rise of such new centres of power and influence as China, Japan, France and the Third World bloc. They knew that the USA could not carry on cold war confrontations with communist powers throughout the world as she had before and that she could not undertake commitments which would lead her to armed conflicts. The Vietnam war had showed that it was not in American interests to carry out wars abroad on behalf of regional powers. The results of this kind of thinking were the detente policy which aimed at having better relations with ideological opponents and the Nixon Doctrine, which was intended to restrict American commitments, particularly military ones, abroad.

Believing that the United States and the Soviet Union could have some common interests and that it could be to American advantage to have normal trade relations and increased contacts with the Russians, Nixon tried to make some changes in U.S.-Soviet relations. As a sign of his realist views, Nixon said that "we have to live with communist powers and we have no illusion about communism, but we must accept the realities."<sup>273</sup> Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I between the USA and the USSR was the most important result of Nixon's detente policy. Nixon's visit to Moscow and his sincere efforts to ease tensions between the two superpowers made this kind of agreement real. Another Nixon revolution in American foreign policy was to open relations with China. He was the first American president to visit communist China.

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<sup>273</sup> Brandon, *op. cit.*, p.184.

The Nixon Doctrine was a clear realisation of the limits of American power by the American President. American retreat from different parts of the world in the military sense was necessary and Nixon wanted to carry out this retreat without damaging U.S. interests and prestige. In his inaugural address Nixon announced that “the time has passed, when America will make every other nation’s conflict our own, or make every other nation’s future our responsibility, or presume to tell the people of other nations how to manage their own affairs”.<sup>274</sup> Kissinger expressed the doctrine as follows: “The United States alone cannot make itself responsible for every part of the world at every moment of time against every danger and to capitalize every opportunity.”<sup>275</sup> According to the doctrine the United States would continue to support her allies against their enemies by supplying economic aid and weapons, but her allies would undertake more burdens and would face opponents and carry out military struggle on their own.<sup>276</sup> It might be said that the main goal was to preserve the position of American power in the world by establishing a new system in which American soldiers would not be involved directly. In this sense, the doctrine did not restrict U.S. commitments throughout the world and did not reduce her determination to face communist threats,<sup>277</sup> but it changed ways of fulfilling commitments.

#### 3.4.4 Other Moral Values

Certain moral values helped to shape U.S. foreign policy or, at least, American policy makers used these values to justify their actions. Linked with the world leadership concept, honour and prestige affected American leaders in some of their actions. American presidents tried to save the prestige and honour of the United States by escalating the war in Vietnam. In their minds, an American defeat against a Third World power would be humiliating for the United States before the world community.<sup>278</sup> Such ideas as democracy and anti-totalitarianism, freedom and liberty, free enterprise and capitalism and anti-imperialism also affected the minds of American policy-makers to some extent.<sup>279</sup> American politicians always

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<sup>274</sup> Grantham, op. cit., p.276.

<sup>275</sup> D. Landau, op. cit., p.112.

<sup>276</sup> Brandon, op. cit., pp.80-81, Barnet, op. cit., pp. 276-277.

<sup>277</sup> D. Landau, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

<sup>278</sup> Fulbright, *the Arrogance of Power*, op. cit., p.17.

<sup>279</sup> Dull, op. cit., p.179.

supported these ideas at home and abroad and claimed that one of their major goals in foreign policy was the acceptance of those ideas by the world community. However, in most cases American governments gave practical national interests priority over moral values. Many of the governments that had received U.S. economic and military aid and political support were totalitarian regimes violating civil liberties. American administrations also did not criticise, but recognised and supported many military coups in various friendly countries.<sup>280</sup>

#### 3.4.5 Vietnam

In the second half of the 1960s and at the first half of the 1970s the major concern of the American administrations was to gain an honourable victory in Vietnam. In this period, preoccupation with the war in Vietnam affected many aspects of U.S. foreign policy deeply. The subject common to the electoral campaigns of presidential candidates was the American military involvement in Vietnam.<sup>281</sup> Some suggested tough actions in Vietnam while others presented themselves as men of peace. To secure the support of more voters, the candidates accused other candidates on the Vietnamese issue and gave promises to the American people on the matter. His failure in handling the Vietnamese issue forced President Johnson not to become a candidate for the presidency a second time. President Nixon spent most of his energy and time trying to achieve an honourable end of the war. The continuation of the war divided and radicalised the American public and made it more conscious of foreign affairs. The presidents' way of the handling the war aroused the opposition of Congress to the presidents' foreign policy activities and led Congress to seek the restoration of its constitutional authorities in foreign affairs. The war in Vietnam caused some damage to America's relations with her allies and prevented the United States for a certain time from relaxing her relations with communist China and the Soviet Union.<sup>282</sup>

#### 3.4.6 Third World

Relations with Third World countries constituted a very big part of American policy. In the 1960-75 period the American administrations undertook commit-

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<sup>280</sup> Barnet, op. cit., p.274.

<sup>281</sup> Divine, *Since 1945...*, op. cit., p.148, Grantham, op. cit., pp. 245-246, 249, 272.

<sup>282</sup> Fulbright, op. cit., p.181.

ments in the Third World in the name of facing the threat of communist expansion and defending freedom against totalitarianism.<sup>283</sup> The United States provided economic, military and political support to some Third World countries to preserve the existing regimes<sup>284</sup> and it sometimes did not hesitate to interfere in their internal affairs. Competition with the USSR in extending influence to Third World countries and getting their support in the international arena affected U.S. foreign policy.<sup>285</sup> American policy makers pursued some moral values such as advancing development and democracy and defending freedoms in their dealings with the Third World.<sup>286</sup>

Economic and military aid, especially to Third World countries, was used as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.<sup>287</sup> It became a tool of the American administration in legitimising the U.S. presence in developing countries and the U.S. involvement in domestic affairs of these states. It was used to protect American military, political and economic interests in the recipient countries. For example, Congress tried to affect Turkey's opium policies by threatening to cut off aid to this country. As a part of aid programs, the Kennedy administration established a voluntary organisation in March 1961, called the Peace Corps. Voluntary peace corpsmen worked in developing countries to help them in such fields as education, sanitation, irrigation, and agriculture.<sup>288</sup> It was presented as evidence of the claim that the United States was fulfilling the world leadership role in a positive way.<sup>289</sup>

### 3.5 Structure of U.S. Foreign Policy-Making Process

A wide range of organisations, groups and individuals are involved in making and conducting American foreign policy : the president, staff men in the White House, the members of the cabinet, especially the secretaries of State and Defence and their departments, the National Security Council, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, many other sections

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<sup>283</sup> Grantham. op. cit., p.185.

<sup>284</sup> Barnett, *Intervention and Revolution*, op. cit., pp.22, 29.

<sup>285</sup> Grantham. op. cit., pp.185, 230.

<sup>286</sup> Fulbright. op. cit., p.18.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid., pp. 232, 237.

<sup>288</sup> Grantham. *The United States Since 1945*, op. cit., p.17, Dull, op. cit., p.61.

<sup>289</sup> Fairlie. *The Kennedy Promise*, op. cit., pp.284, 287, 288.

of the executive branch, members and relevant committees of the Congress, occasionally local governments of the USA, and intergovernmental and international organisations to which the United States belongs.<sup>290</sup> The press, pressure groups, research organisations, specialists and experts in universities and occasionally public opinion also affect American foreign policy decisions.

### 3.5.1 Presidency

At the top of the American foreign policy mechanism stands the American President. It is the president who is the centre of power, who controls the whole foreign policy making process and takes final decisions.<sup>291</sup> For most Americans, the President represents American national interests abroad, he is “the single source, the symbol and the spokesman of American policy”.<sup>292</sup> If he wants to do so, the president has enough means and authority to dominate foreign policy, in fact he has more freedom of action and power in foreign policy than he has in domestic policy. The American constitution gives a wide range of authority to the president.<sup>293</sup> It authorises him, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to negotiate and make treaties with foreign countries, and appoint American ambassadors and receive ambassadors of other countries. The constitution also empowers the president with the role of commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The president also can use the powers of making executive agreements<sup>294</sup> and recognising foreign governments in conducting foreign policy.

Since he is elected by the entire population, the president can stand out in most cases as the representative of the whole nation and deal with some foreign issues single-handedly, seeing it unnecessary to consult other branches of the American government. Moments of crisis, especially, present unique opportunities to the

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<sup>290</sup> Dull. op. cit., p.22, R. Hilsman, *the Politics of Policy Making in Defence and Foreign Affairs*, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971. pp. 118-119, 147.

<sup>291</sup> Dull. op. cit., pp.22, 296, C.V. Crabb and P.M. Holt, *Invitation to Struggle*, Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980, pp.3, 5, Hilsman, op. cit., pp.17, 18, 21.

<sup>292</sup> Dull. op. cit., p.21.

<sup>293</sup> For detailed information see Crabb and Holt, op. cit., pp.9-16.

<sup>294</sup> A.M. Schlesinger, Jr., *the Imperial Presidency*, London: Andre Deutsch, 1973. pp. 312-313. Agon Wildavsky, “**The Two Presidencies**” in D.M. Fox(ed.), *the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy Making*, Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1971, p.178, Hilsman. op. cit., p.74.

president to increase his power<sup>295</sup> because almost every American recognises that in emergency situations the president should act quickly and secretly to face the threat immediately even without securing the approval of other government officials.<sup>296</sup> Cold war confrontations between the United States and the communist bloc in the 1950s and the 1960s provided the American presidents with opportunities to increase their power in conducting foreign policy by securing the support of Congress and the American people.<sup>297</sup> The emergence of the United States as a world power, the adoption of containment strategy for facing communist expansionism, the need for handling serious crises quickly, the emotion of the American people in supporting the presidents against communist forces, all helped the concentration of the power in the hands of a very few people in the presidency.

John F. Kennedy came to power with a strong determination to use the fullest power and authority of the presidency in order to make important revisions in foreign policy. He believed in a strong and active presidency. In his speech on 25 January 1960 to the National Press Club, Kennedy declared that the president "must above all be the Chief Executive in every sense of the word. He must be prepared to exercise the fullest powers of his office."<sup>298</sup> On 3 September 1960 he claimed that the president "is the only one who can speak for the people of the United States."<sup>299</sup> In his article in the November issue of the *Catholic World*, Kennedy wrote that "If Washington is the capital city of the world, the President must be its leader... The President must be the man capable of acting as Commander-in-Chief of the grand alliance."<sup>300</sup> During his term of presidency, Kennedy took bold actions extending presidential power. Without consulting Congress, he allowed the C.I.A. to implement the Bays of Pigs landing to topple the Cuban regime,<sup>301</sup> he deepened the American involvement in Vietnam, he challenged Soviet Premier Khrushchev over Berlin<sup>302</sup> and he risked a nuclear war in the Cuban missile crisis.<sup>303</sup>

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<sup>295</sup> Fulbright, op. cit., p.45.

<sup>296</sup> Hilsman, op. cit., p.27.

<sup>297</sup> Fulbright, op. cit., p.45.

<sup>298</sup> Fairlie, op. cit., p.66.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid., p.67.

<sup>300</sup> Ibid., p.69.

<sup>301</sup> Schlesinger, *The Imperial Presidency*, op. cit., p.172.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid., p.173.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid., p. 173, Fulbright, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

Lyndon B. Johnson increased presidential power especially by his tactics of handling the Vietnam war. He took important decisions without involvement of Congress or other governmental bodies. His group of advisers was very small and he overwhelmed almost all of them with his personality in taking decisions. Like President Kennedy, he kept important decisions for himself and for the group of the Tuesday lunches, which included the Secretaries of State and Defence and the director of the C.I.A.<sup>304</sup> Johnson continued the consolidation of power in the presidency by securing the support of Congress in escalating the war in Vietnam. With the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, Congress almost unanimously decided to empower the president to "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression in Southeast Asia."<sup>305</sup> The resolution was adopted by the Senate by a vote of 88 to 2 and by the House of Representatives by a vote of 416 to 0.<sup>306</sup> It was considered by many scholars a blank cheque by Congress, giving the President wide war-making powers without having to consult Congress first. Johnson used the resolution to justify his actions of escalating the war in Vietnam and to share responsibilities with Congress. Johnson also ordered 22,000 American troops to the Dominican Republic in the spring of 1965 without consulting Congress.

The presidential power reached its peak during the Nixon administration, which succeeded in centralising power in the White House. Nixon and his national security adviser Kissinger both distrusted the professional foreign policy organisations and therefore preferred a system of foreign policy making which is dominated by the president and his advisers.<sup>307</sup> Nixon clearly wanted to be his own Secretary of State and therefore appointed one of his friends reliable but inexperienced in foreign affairs, William P. Rogers, as his Secretary of State. Nixon reduced the power of the Cabinet and the Congress in foreign affairs to the minimum point.<sup>308</sup> His adviser Kissinger was far more influential in making foreign policy than the

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<sup>304</sup> Brandon, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

<sup>305</sup> Divine, op. cit., p.555.

<sup>306</sup> For Senator Fulbright's views on the resolution see Fulbright, op. cit., pp. 50-52.

<sup>307</sup> R.J. Strong, *Bureaucracy and Statesmanship*, New York: University Press of America, 1986, pp.20, 57.

<sup>308</sup> Divine, op. cit., p. 212, A.M. Schlesinger, *the Cycles of American History*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986, p.280, Grantham, op. cit., pp.265, 277, Schlesinger, *the Imperial Presidency*, op. cit., pp.198, 200-201, 220, 246.



Secretaries of State and Defence. Nixon did not consult the Congress when he ordered the American troops to invade Cambodia and Laos. Using the concept of national security Nixon established a presidential secrecy system,<sup>309</sup> preventing the public from learning many activities of the administration in domestic affairs as well as in foreign affairs. The Nixon administration also extended the concept of executive privileges in order to refuse to testify before congressional committees.<sup>310</sup> The excessive use of presidential power in foreign affairs by Nixon led the Congress to compete with the Presidency to regain its powers in foreign affairs and to pass some acts to limit the presidential power. When, as a result of the Watergate Scandal,<sup>311</sup> it was known that Nixon used the secrecy system to defeat his political opponents at home, public pressure forced him to resign from the presidency.

Jimmy Carter's memoirs illuminate how a president can manipulate foreign policy even in the aftermath of the Congress's forceful actions to bring the president into line. He explains that final decisions on basic foreign policy were made by himself, not the State Department, and that he discussed major foreign policy issues with only few people (the National Security Adviser, the Vice-President and the Secretaries of State and Defence) to the extent that the Cabinet meetings on foreign policy became almost unnecessary.<sup>312</sup> Carter also states that his administration carried out negotiations with the Chinese to reach an agreement and prepared the plan of hostage rescue from Iran without informing congressmen and public.<sup>313</sup> However, Carter admits that he faced the opposition of congressmen, public and formidable lobbies in many issues and that many worthy agreements were rejected because of the effective power of a small group in the Senate.<sup>314</sup> While explaining how he struggled to gain support of public, congressmen, lobbies and even officials of his own administration for the Panama Canal treaties Carter reveals that he talked to one hundred senators privately and that he gained the

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<sup>309</sup> Schlesinger, *the Cycles...*, op. cit., pp. 280-281, Strong, op. cit., pp.61, 63, 70.

<sup>310</sup> Jones, op. cit., p.563, Schlesinger, *the Cycles...* op. cit., p.277.

<sup>311</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1973*, vol.19, pp.25917-25923, 26069-26080, 26109-26114, 26229-26233, *ibid.*, 1974, vol.20, pp.26290-26291, 26462-26464, 26537-26540, 26645-26650, 26677-26779, 26723-26724.

<sup>312</sup> J. Carter. *Keeping Faith, Memoirs of a President*, London: Collins, 1982, pp.52, 55-56, 60.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.199-200, 511.

<sup>314</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.83, 225.

vote of Jim Abourezk, a Lebanese descent, through the Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia.<sup>315</sup>

### 3.5.2 Congress

Congress has, too, wide powers in foreign policy, sufficient to check and balance the presidential power. If it wants to do so, Congress can block many foreign policy actions of the president and it can affect the general line of American foreign policy. Some constitutional prerogatives of Congress in foreign affairs are as follows:<sup>316</sup> (a) The advice and consent prerogative: The Senate has the authority to give advice to the president in negotiating and making treaties and to give consent to treaties. Treaties have to be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate to take effect but executive agreements do not require the approval of the Senate. (b) Confirmation of appointments: Appointment of ambassadors and high officials, too, has to gain senatorial approval. (c) Power of the purse: Congress has the right to reduce, maintain or refuse foreign policy allotments suggested by the executive branch. The House of the Representatives can legitimise, cut or refuse the executive budget. (d) War powers: The Congress is authorised to raise and support armed forces, to provide and maintain a navy and to declare war against an enemy. (e) Economic powers: The Congress is empowered with the authority of regulating commerce with foreign nations. Informally Congress constitutes a forum for national debate on foreign affairs. Discussion of foreign affairs in Congress, testimonies of specialists and experts and responsible officials before the Congress affect the Presidency and the public opinion.

In spite of its wide constitutional authorities Congress did not have a powerful voice in determining American foreign policy in the post-World War II period. Until the late 1960s, Congress's role in foreign affairs remained very small.<sup>317</sup> It generally served as an organ justifying foreign policy actions of the American administrations. It was regarded as a duty of the Congress to give prompt support and consent to the presidents on matters of foreign relations. Congress did not exploit the right of confirming diplomatic appointments as an instrument of policy

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<sup>315</sup> Ibid., pp.156-157.

<sup>316</sup> For detailed information see Crabb and Holt, *Invitation to Struggle*, op. cit., pp. 38-49.

<sup>317</sup> Fulbright, op. cit., p.45, Dull, op. cit., p.297, Crabb and Holt, op. cit., p.51.

and because the president could make executive agreements without the consent of Congress, the prerogative of approving treaties was of little effect. It made small cuts in the military budgets of the governments but the presidents generally succeeded in getting what they wanted. Congress did not reject the executive budgets. The example of how far Congress remained under the control of the Presidency is the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with which Congress gave a blank cheque to the executive in committing American troops abroad.

When it appeared that Johnson's tactics of handling the Vietnam war were not good enough to solve the problem, some Congressmen, especially some members of Johnson's own party, began to oppose the president's actions in Vietnam. Democrat senators William Fulbright, Frank Church, Eugene McCarthy and Vance Hartke bitterly attacked the escalation of American military involvement in Vietnam.<sup>318</sup> At the end of 1968, Congress, especially the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, started a campaign to reassert its constitutional powers in foreign affairs which it had lost to the Presidency since the end of the World War II.<sup>319</sup> Congressmen had felt humiliated by the way President Johnson had used their approval for escalating the war in Vietnam.

After Nixon came to power, Congress increased its initiatives to challenge Nixon's struggle to concentrate power in the White House. In June 1969 the Senate passed a resolution which asked the President not to commit the American armed forces to hostilities on foreign territory without affirmative action by Congress.<sup>320</sup> When Nixon sent American troops to Cambodia in December 1970, the Senate passed another law forbidding the President to use funds to introduce American ground combat troops or military advisers into Cambodia, Thailand and Laos.<sup>321</sup> In 1970 Congress also repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. In November 1971 the Senate completely rejected the foreign aid authorisation bill.<sup>322</sup> The Senate Foreign Relations Committee set up special committees to investigate the activities of the American administration. These committees inquired into American security

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<sup>318</sup> Divine, op. cit., p.161. Jones, op. cit., p.556, Grantham, op. cit., p.241.

<sup>319</sup> Brandon, *the Retreat of American Power*, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

<sup>320</sup> Ibid., p.145.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid., pp. 146-147, Schlesinger, *the Imperial Presidency*, op. cit., p.194.

<sup>322</sup> Brandon, op. cit., p.149.

agreements and commitments<sup>323</sup> and uncovered many unknown facts such as the American secret defence pact with Thailand and excessive American involvement in Laos.

The Congress's most important act in opposing the presidential power in foreign affairs is the War Powers Act of 1973, which was designed to restrain the President from taking the nation into armed conflicts and to provide Congressional participation in decisions of involving American troops abroad. Congress overrode a presidential veto in passing the act. According to the new act the President was forced to report to Congress within 48 hours of starting an American armed involvement abroad and to withdraw the troops if Congress refused to agree with it.<sup>324</sup> As a sign of its determination to affect foreign policy, Congress refused the extension of the most favourable nation status to the Soviet Union, it embargoed arms sales to Turkey in 1974, and in early 1975 it rejected the appeal of the Ford administration to provide emergency military aid to the South Vietnamese regime.

Although Congress showed some signs of affecting American foreign policy in the 1970s, the general trend in American tradition is the domination of foreign policy by the president. In general Congress can indirectly control the upper and lower limits of foreign policy and it can amend or block individual actions of the Presidency. But it has very little power to force the presidency to make changes in the general direction of American policy. It is generally believed that congressmen lack information and experience to make correct decisions and therefore foreign policy cannot be left to them.

As individual united political bodies, political parties in the American tradition have very little effect in shaping foreign policy. One party does not generally support or oppose foreign policy actions but some congressmen from different political parties take initiatives in foreign policy. Party loyalty and party unity is very rare in foreign policy matters. There are many basic foreign policy principles on which the political parties agreed. In the past, particularly in the post-world War II period, a considerable part of American foreign policy was bipartisan. The

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<sup>323</sup> Ibid., p.148, Schlesinger, *the Imperial Presidency*, op. cit., p.201.

<sup>324</sup> Brandon, op. cit., p.211, Schlesinger, *the Imperial Presidency*, op. cit., pp. 301-304.

views of an American political party are not radically different from those of the other party. During elections the parties feel compelled to present to the electorates different foreign policy options, different policy style and perceptions to appeal to as many voters as possible. But after the elections, they return to their state and local forms and pay very little attention to foreign policy matters and they exercise very little influence on policy-making process.<sup>325</sup>

### 3.5.3 Secretaries

The secretaries of state and defence are close advisers of the president in conducting foreign policy.<sup>326</sup> But their effect on foreign policy-making process depends on the president's willingness to consult them in shaping the policy and their personal capabilities. Some presidents may bypass the secretaries of state and defence and formulate foreign policy with his special advisers. Secretary of State of the Nixon administration, William Rogers, had less effect on foreign policy than national security adviser Kissinger. The secretaries of state and defence possess the potential to affect foreign policy decisions, provided by the important position of their departments. They have the power to formulate policies and take decisions within their departments, disregarding views of department officials and professionals. Channels are available for them to express their views to the president directly. But at the final stage their effectiveness depends on the president's will.

### 3.5.4 National Security Council

The National Security Council might be influential in foreign policy making in the sense that its members have the potential to be close special advisers of the president. President Kennedy benefited from the NSC in centralising power in the White House and dealing with foreign policy matters. During the Cuban missile crisis he set up an executive committee of the NSC to deal with the problem.<sup>327</sup> During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations the NSC served as an advisory body. As a whole the council did not directly intervene in foreign policy making

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<sup>325</sup> Dull, op. cit., p.135.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid., pp. 43-48.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid., p.41.

process but some of its members attended decision making meeting as advisers.<sup>328</sup> The unique position of Henry Kissinger in shaping American foreign policy is a good example of how far a national security adviser can affect the conduct of foreign policy. Throughout the Nixon administration period, Kissinger remained as Nixon's principal foreign policy adviser, his chief negotiator and his leading foreign policy spokesman.<sup>329</sup> Distrusting the bureaucracy, the public and Congress in the formulation of foreign policy,<sup>330</sup> Kissinger structured the NSC in a new way so that it could dominate other state bodies in affecting decisions.<sup>331</sup> But Kissinger remained chief director of the NSC, denying freedom of actions to the council. He dominated American foreign policy during his service and served as de facto Secretary of State towering over the Secretaries of State and Defence.<sup>332</sup>

### 3.5.5 CIA

The Central Intelligence Agency can be influential if it is allowed to be by the president. It was originally established to co-ordinate all American intelligence and counter-intelligence services and to perform services for the National Security Council. The director of the CIA is one of the closest associates of the president. Using his position, he can make recommendations to the president in foreign affairs and if he gains confidence of the president he can play part in making foreign policy. The CIA is famous for its plots to overthrow foreign governments. At the very beginning of his presidency, Kennedy was persuaded by the CIA to give permission for the Bay of Pigs operation designed to overthrow the Cuban communist regime.<sup>333</sup> After the failure of the operation, activities of the CIA diminished and the power of the agency decreased but the CIA continued to have the potential to

<sup>328</sup> Edward A. Kolodziaj, "The National Security Council: Innovations and Implications" in Fox(ed.), op. cit., pp. 187-188.

<sup>329</sup> Brandon. op. cit., p.24. Strong, *Bureaucracy and Statesmanship*, op. cit., pp.53, 64.

<sup>330</sup> Brandon. op. cit., p.32, D. Landau, *the Uses of Power*, op. cit., p.xiv, Dull, op. cit., pp.21, 52. J.G. Stoessinger, *Crusaders and Pragmatists*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1979, pp.237, 238, 239.

<sup>331</sup> Brandon. op. cit., p.46, D. Landau, op. cit., p.140, Dull, op. cit., pp. 41-42.

<sup>332</sup> D. Landau, op. cit., p.4, Strong, op. cit., p.xii. Jimmy Carter's NSC adviser, Zbigniew Brezizinski, too, was influential in foreign policy-making process. Carter, op.cit., pp.51-52, 55. Carter cites: "I hardly know the desk officers and others in State [Department], but work very closely with NSC people." Ibid., p.450.

<sup>333</sup> Dull. *the Politics of American Policy*, op. cit., p.81.

exercise considerable power.<sup>334</sup> The Senate investigations in the 1970s of the CIA activities revealed that from the time of the Kennedy administration onward the CIA had plotted to overthrow some foreign governments and assassinate their leaders and secretly watched the activities of individuals, groups, parties and radical political movements.<sup>335</sup>

### 3.5.6 Military

The American military has the potential to influence foreign policy decisions because there is a strong relationship between defence and foreign policy in the modern world and the United States has been able to assume the world leadership because of its military power.<sup>336</sup> During war periods, the military is more likely to affect decisions. The secretary of defence is the boss of the Pentagon, he can impose control over the military. The secretary of defence of the Kennedy and Johnson administration, Robert McNamara, established a civilian control over the Pentagon. During the term of McNamara and Clark M. Clifford the Pentagon had a powerful hand in formulating foreign policy.<sup>337</sup> But during the Nixon administration the Secretary of Defence, M.R. Laird, and the Pentagon lost their influence on foreign policy though they prevented Kissinger from imposing control over the military.<sup>338</sup> As Kissinger stated, "under the leadership of Secretary Laird, the Pentagon had not attempted to assert a prerogative in wide areas of foreign policy. It has confined itself more to strictly military considerations than has been the case at least in the two previous administrations."<sup>339</sup> The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, too, has a powerful position in affecting foreign policy initiatives.

### 3.5.7 Public Opinion

The president has to consider the reaction of the public before formulating policies. The public sometimes might force the president to change his policies. But it is generally too weak to oppose and challenge the president's foreign policy

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<sup>334</sup> Hilsman, *the Politics of Policy Making...*, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

<sup>335</sup> Jones, *the Limits of Liberty*, op. cit., p.565, Dull, op. cit., pp.78, 219.

<sup>336</sup> Dull, op. cit., p.62.

<sup>337</sup> Brandon, *the Retreat of American Power*, op. cit., pp.203, 209.

<sup>338</sup> Ibid., p.212.

<sup>339</sup> D. Landau, op. cit., p.139.

actions. In fact, the president has more power of manipulating the public in foreign matters than he has in domestic matters. The great mass of the public generally shows no concern on a foreign issue unless that issue affects its interests. When the escalation of the war in Vietnam by President Johnson committed more American troops, American public opinion increasingly turned against the war and wanted an immediate end to it. The continuing escalation gave momentum to the anti-war and peace movements. It polarised public opinion and politicised and radicalised many groups, especially the youth. Students, religious groups, and civil right activists attended anti-war protests arranged throughout the country.<sup>340</sup> Growing public opposition to his policies over the Vietnam issue severely dented Johnson's prestige and forced him to decide not to run for the presidency for a second term.

During the Nixon administration, anti-war activists continued to harass the regime. The invasion of Cambodia and Laos caused an eruption of violence and turmoil throughout the United States and brought about student riots in college and university campuses. Under public pressure, President Nixon felt compelled to seek a way of terminating the war. As an immediate step he began to withdraw a considerable number of the American troops from Vietnam. Opponents of the war did not get what they wanted from the Nixon administration. Nixon did not terminate the war immediately, on the contrary to gain an "honourable peace" he escalated the war and spread it to Cambodia and Laos. However, the public influenced Nixon's policy by forcing him to Vietnamise the war, that is to leave the war effort to the Vietnamese rather than to increase American troops in the battlefield.<sup>341</sup>

In the American political system, few pressure and interest groups are concerned with foreign policy decisions. Interest group structure is very weak in foreign affairs<sup>342</sup> and lobbying in the field of foreign relations is relatively rare. The most organised and effective pressure groups are ethnic associations whose members have strong ties with a country.<sup>343</sup> Those organised national minorities lobby

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<sup>340</sup> Grantham, op. cit., pp. 241-243.

<sup>341</sup> Hilsman, op. cit., p.104.

<sup>342</sup> Agron Wildavsky, "the Two Presidencies" in Fox(ed.), op. cit., p.180, Hilsman, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

<sup>343</sup> Wildavsky, op. cit., p.180, Hilsman, op. cit., p.70.



in order to affect American foreign policy decisions to the advantage of their homeland and they are supported and funded by the foreign countries with whom they have ethnic ties. The American Jewish community has worked for the interests of Israel and tried to influence foreign policy decisions related to Israel. The Turkish-American and the Greek-American communities have also worked to secure the American support for the cause of their ethnic groups in Cyprus.<sup>344</sup> Activities of interest groups in foreign affairs are directed towards Congress as well as the government to affect Congress decisions on matters of particular concern to their group. The president may also use some agencies to lobby on his behalf to ensure the acceptance of the laws supporting his policies and programs by Congress.

Sometimes senators may exert an influence on American foreign policy for reasons that have little or nothing to do with the particular foreign policy issue but arise from reaction to the President's domestic policies or other matters. President Carter's memoirs are illuminating in this connection. In his account of difficulties he faced in getting senators to accept the Panama Canal Treaties in 1979 he records: "Jim Abourezk says that because of the closed conference meetings in energy from which he is excluded, he's considering voting against the Panama Canal Treaty... Even my friend Senator Jim Sasser of Tennessee sent me word that he could not vote for the second treaty because of some of his home-state issues on which we disagreed."<sup>345</sup>

American business, too, has great interests in influencing foreign policy decisions. Since its investments abroad and its world-wide trade and business contacts are very important for the fate of its companies, American business asks the administration to pursue a foreign policy protecting business interests abroad. In the opinion of James Dull, "American foreign policy since the World War II has been designed, in part, to promote American business interests abroad." He also claims that "business is a major actor in the political process, and decision makers cannot easily disregard its voice".<sup>346</sup> Big business has a great power to influence the general policy making process because it provides financial support for candidates

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<sup>344</sup> Dull. op. cit., p.146. For more detailed information on the role of lobby groups see the section on the Johnson letter in Chapter VI and on the arms embargo in Chapter VII.

<sup>345</sup> Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith*. op.cit., p.175.

<sup>346</sup> Dull. op.cit., p.143.

for the presidency and Congress and its members serve in the administration. G. William Domhoff goes so far as to say that "... American foreign policy during the post war era was initiated, planned and carried out by the richest, most powerful and most international-minded owners and managers of major corporations and financial institutions".<sup>347</sup> Clearly the American president is expected to pursue the sort of foreign policy that will benefit American business interests abroad.

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<sup>347</sup> G. William Domhoff, **"Who Made American Foreign Policy 1945-1963?"** in Fox(ed.), *op. cit.*, p.95.

## Chapter IV

### U.S.-TURKISH MILITARY RELATIONS 1960-1975

Military contacts certainly constituted the most important aspect of the Turkish-American relationship because the two countries came together mainly as a result of security concerns. While mutual security interests brought about a special close alliance between the two states, the character of the relationship ended up with Turkey's military dependence on the United States. This chapter tries to explain how this relationship was established and took this character during the course of time. It notes the course of events in the development of this military relationship in the 1960s and 1970s, the problems that arose and their causes and mentions the heated public discussion on Turkey's alliance relations in Turkish domestic politics. It particularly emphasises the Turkish administration's attempts to alter its image as the satellite of the USA and questions how far it succeeded in these efforts. In order to establish a sound basis for understanding the true character of the military relationship and for assessing U.S. influence on Turkey, the chapter further considers why each country was important to the security and defence of the other. (Turkey's strategic importance for the USA and U.S. military assistance to Turkey.)

#### 4.1 The Formation of the Formal Military Relationship

Immediately following the Second World War, in response to a threat from the Soviet Union, Turkey began to seek an alliance with the United States.<sup>348</sup> In 1945 the Soviet Union informed Turkey of her intention not to extend the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression between the two countries, which was due to expire in November 1945, demanded military bases on the Straits and the secession of two north-eastern Turkish provinces to her, and sought in international forums the revision of the Montreaux Convention regulating the status of the

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<sup>348</sup> T.A. Couloumbis, *the United States, Greece and Turkey*, New York: Praeger, 1983, pp.12-13, 200.

Straits.<sup>349</sup> Although the United States did not offer help to Turkey in the early stages when Soviet pressures were more prominent, U.S. policy-makers gradually came to the conclusion that the fall of Turkey would further encourage Soviet expansion in the eastern Mediterranean and thus would harm specific U.S. interests in the region as well as the general ones in the context of the newly-emerging superpower competition. Believing that the loss of Turkey and Greece would bring the loss of the whole Middle Eastern region,<sup>350</sup> Americans decided to undertake responsibilities in Greece and Turkey, which were about to be relinquished by the British because of financial problems.

As a confirmation of the new policy, the United States sent a note to the Soviet Union on 9 August 1946, stating that any attack or threats of attack against the Turkish Straits would be a matter for the U.N. Security Council.<sup>351</sup> On 5 April 1946 the U.S. battleship Missouri visited Turkey, carrying the body of Turkish Ambassador Minur Ertegün, who died in Washington during the war. At the joint session of the Congress on 12 March 1947 President Truman asked the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey.<sup>352</sup> Truman's aid proposal was approved in the Senate with a vote of 67 to 23 on 22 April and in the House with a vote of 287 to 107 on 22 May. Truman considered the doctrine his most important decision since the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima; it certified the U.S. determination to resist any Soviet aggression against Turkey with all means at its disposal, including the force of arms.<sup>353</sup> In his memoirs, Harry Truman wrote:

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<sup>349</sup> D.B. Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies" in J. Alford (ed.), *Greece and Turkey*, Aldershot: Gower, 1984, p.54. R.C. Camp, *Turkey and the United States*, New York: Praeger, 1986, p.80. M. Gönlübol, "NATO, USA and Turkey" in K.H. Karpat (ed.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, p.13.

<sup>350</sup> G. McGhee (former U.S. ambassador to Turkey), *The U.S. Turkish NATO Middle East Connection*, London: MacMillan, 1990, pp.20-22.

<sup>351</sup> B.R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980, p.362. D. Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1970, p.196.

<sup>352</sup> J.M. Collins, *Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Related to NATO and the Middle East*, Report Prepared for Special Committee on Investigations of Committee on Foreign Affairs, 94th Congress, 1st Session, February 28, 1975, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pp.19-22. D.A. Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987, p.89.

<sup>353</sup> B.R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO: Past, Present and Future", *ORBIS*, Summer 1983, p.422.

The alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the Iron Curtain across the eastern Mediterranean. If Greece was lost, Turkey would become an untenable outpost in a sea of communism... The ideals and the traditions of our nation demanded that we come to the aid of Greece and Turkey and that we put the world on notice that it would be our policy to support the cause of freedom wherever it was threatened.<sup>354</sup>

The Truman doctrine marked the beginning of U.S.-Turkish defence relationship on the basis of containment of Soviet and communist expansionism.<sup>355</sup> The military assistance agreement on 12 July 1947<sup>356</sup> established the first official military contact between the two countries. Under the agreement the United States supplied Turkey with weaponry and other military equipment, personnel for instruction, and financial aid and technical advice for construction programs of road, harbour and strategic installations.<sup>357</sup> On 4 July 1948 the United States signed another agreement with Turkey in order to supply economic aid in accordance with the Marshall Plan which was aimed at helping the reconstruction of European countries whose main industry and infrastructure were destroyed by the war.

After the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was established in 1949, Turkish officials made the utmost efforts to join the organisation for the following reasons: Turkey needed the guarantee of NATO, especially the United States, which was the most powerful state and leader of the Western camp, to counter the threat of its big neighbour, the Soviet Union.<sup>358</sup> The NATO membership would guarantee and institutionalise the Western aid which was essential for socio-economic development of Turkey and modernisation of its armed forces. Acceptance by the Atlantic alliance would also confirm that Turkey was an integral part of the Western world and would strengthen organic relations with the European family of nations.<sup>359</sup> In Vali's words, "identification with that part of the world and with the civilisation represented by it was to guarantee security, development, and acculturation."<sup>360</sup>

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<sup>354</sup> H.S. Truman: *Memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope*, vol.II, Garden City: Doubleday, 1956, pp.100-101.

<sup>355</sup> Campany, op.cit., p.2. Couloubis, op.cit., p.13.

<sup>356</sup> For its text see Appendix A. Campany, op.cit., pp.96-99, G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.213-215.

<sup>357</sup> F.A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, Baltimore: the John Hopkins Press, 1971, pp.125-126.

<sup>358</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.54-55. Couloubis, op.cit., p.20, Campany, op.cit., p.26.

<sup>359</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.44. Vali, op.cit., p.115, Rustow, op.cit., p.91.

<sup>360</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.115.

It was clear that the Turks would not be satisfied with a membership of an alliance of Mediterranean or Middle Eastern states which would be sponsored by Western powers. In order to gain the trust of the Western states for NATO membership, Turkey sent a 4,500-man unit to the Korean war in 1950 to fight with U.S. troops.<sup>361</sup> The Turkish brigade, which was the third largest contingent after the American and South Korean forces, performed well during the war and earned high praise.<sup>362</sup> In spite of a general hesitation within NATO and opposition of some members,<sup>363</sup> NATO states gave approval to the membership of Turkey mostly as a result of U.S. request for it. On 15 May 1951 the United States proposed to NATO members that Greece and Turkey be accepted as full members.<sup>364</sup> The proposal was accepted at the meeting of the NATO Council in September 1951 in Ottawa<sup>365</sup> and finally Turkey became an official member of NATO with the protocol of accession<sup>366</sup> coming into force on 18 February 1952.

To NATO countries, specifically the United States, Turkey's membership of NATO offered considerable advantages at that time:<sup>367</sup> Firstly, the south-eastern flank of NATO would be protected against hostile forces, and Soviet aggression and expansion would be further contained. Secondly, an additional twenty two Turkish divisions, which were the least costly forces to maintain in the alliance, would make an important contribution to NATO's deterrent force. Thirdly, the presence of Turkish forces along its southern border would force the Soviet Union to

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<sup>361</sup> Ibid., p.37. Harris. op.cit., pp.39-40.

<sup>362</sup> U.S. President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk praised Turkey's Korean effort during Turkish President Sunay's visit to the USA in 1967, *Amerika'da Onbir Gün*, Ankara: Yarınlari Yayınları, 1967. pp.10. 16.

<sup>363</sup> M. Stearns, *Entangled Allies*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992. pp.74-75. Stearns, who was serving in the U.S. embassy in Ankara in the summer of 1950, argues that the high possibility of Soviet attack against Turkey at the time of the Korean crisis led Western leaders to invite Greece and Turkey to NATO. Ibid., p.75. He cites, "the military threat to Turkey was thought to be so grave after the outbreak of the Korean War that an evacuation plan for U.S. residents was prepared, and a handful of officials were designated to remain behind in the event of a Soviet occupation of Ankara." Ibid., p.170n.

<sup>364</sup> Harris. op.cit., p.42.

<sup>365</sup> Gönübol in Karpat(ed.), op.cit., pp.26-27.

<sup>366</sup> For the text see Collins, op.cit., pp.29-31.

<sup>367</sup> Harris. op.cit., pp.42, 50, Gönübol, op.cit., p.26, M. Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, Ankara: A.Ü. S.B.F. Yayını, 1977, p.238, Vali, op.cit., p.117, B.R. Kuniholm. "U.S. Policy in the Near East: the Triumphs and Tribulations of the Truman Administration" in M.J. Lacey(ed.), *the Truman Presidency*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. pp.309, 316, 317.

divert significant forces from Central Europe to commit against Turkey. Fourthly, Turkey's strategic location would be a valuable asset to prevent the Soviet expansion to the Middle East, whose oil held vital importance for the Western states. As Omar Bradley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate on 15 January 1952: "Turkey, astride the Bosphorus and Dardenelles, guards the approach by water from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and to the Suez Canal and Egypt farther south. Turkey flanks the land routes from the North to the strategically important oil fields of the Middle East."<sup>368</sup> Finally, Turkish airfields would be available for NATO allies for important missions.

## 4.2 Relations in the 1950s

Once Turkey entered NATO, this connection served as the general basis for the whole range of military relations between Turkey and the United States. Under the NATO arrangement mainly Americans were involved in the Turkish military establishment. American military advisers directed works to co-ordinate Turkey's defence plans with those of other NATO states and tried to train, equip and organise Turkish armed forces under the American model to increase their efficiency.<sup>369</sup> Together with arming of Turkish military forces with U.S. weapons, this heavy American involvement in the Turkish military structure certainly played an important role in Turkey's military dependence on the USA, which was more clearly realised when the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in 1975. This situation also led to the accusation that Turkey was a satellite of the USA.

Under Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement of June 1951 Turkey and the United States entered a wide range of bilateral military arrangements.<sup>370</sup> Article III states: "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop

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<sup>368</sup> McGhee, *op.cit.*, pp.88-89.

<sup>369</sup> Harris, *op.cit.*, pp.53-54, C. Wolf, *Garrison Community*, Westport: Greenwood, 1969, pp.42-43.

<sup>370</sup> Gönlübol in Karpat(ed.), *op.cit.*, p.35, Gönlübol et al., *op.cit.*, pp.244, 525.

their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”<sup>371</sup> Some of these arrangements were full-fledged agreements, openly published and ratified by the Turkish parliament, such as the Status of Forces Agreement of June 1954, which provided privileges and immunities for non-diplomatic U.S. personnel in Turkey.<sup>372</sup> There were also public and secret exchanges of notes and executive agreements, which were negotiated between U.S. and Turkish officials in different ranks and ministries and not ratified by the Turkish parliament. The Military Facilities Agreement of June 1954 was the most important of these. Apart from formal understandings U.S. and Turkish officials often worked out their own mutually agreeable procedures to fill gaps or implement a general agreement.<sup>373</sup>

These bilateral agreements dealt with “such specific matters as (a) U.S. force deployments; (b) military exercises by U.S. forces; (c) the legal and administrative status of U.S. forces; (d) intelligence activities; (e) operations plans for U.S. forces; (f) operations plans for joint force commands.”<sup>374</sup> The agreements which granted U.S. personnel immunity from the Turkish tax and law system and allowed various kinds of U.S. facilities to operate free from Turkish taxes, rules or laws were subjected to heavy criticism by Turkish public opinion later in the 1960s. The number of U.S. personnel and dependants, who came to Turkey under the bilateral agreements, reached 24,000 at its height. Some of them were military advisers belonging to JUSMMAT, Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, which was originally established in 1947.<sup>375</sup> The civilian group included members of the U.S. diplomatic and consular missions, the U.S. Information Service, the Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps and various private business or educational organisations.<sup>376</sup> TUSLOG, The United States Logistics Group, which was established in 1955, regulated all activities of U.S. personnel such as hospital, dental, veterinary, legal, weather, chaplain, mortuary, and postal services; the

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<sup>371</sup> R.F. Grimmett, *United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean*, Report for Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations. U.S. Congress, March 27, 1977. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, p.57.

<sup>372</sup> For the text see Appendix B. Harris, *op.cit.*, pp.217-220, Campany, *op.cit.*, pp.100-102.

<sup>373</sup> Harris, *op.cit.*, pp.54-55. Gönlübol in Karpat(ed.), *op.cit.*, pp.35,36, Gönlübol et.al., *op.cit.*, pp.244, 525, Grimmett, *op.cit.*, p.6, 41.

<sup>374</sup> Grimmett, *op.cit.*, p.6.

<sup>375</sup> Wolf, *op.cit.*, pp.42-43.

<sup>376</sup> Vali, *op.cit.*, p.137.



exchange and missionary services, recreational facilities, intelligence groups, all means of communication, the dependant schools, transportation, security, law enforcement, control of the estate, etc.<sup>377</sup>

In formulating bilateral arrangements Turkish and U.S. officials made some mistakes which brought about the severe criticism of the U.S. and NATO by Turkish public opinion in the 1960s. Former U.S. official George Harris wrote in his book:

Neither state exercised close and comprehensive control over American activity in Turkey. There were no full records of the verbal understandings to which either was committed; knowledge of some of the more sensitive activities was extremely closely held on both sides. The Turkish General Staff was not organised to provide centralised co-ordination of U.S. activities in Turkey. Nor, indeed, was any responsible senior American commander named to oversee all the various U.S. military elements in Turkey.<sup>378</sup>

Perhaps not surprisingly, in such an atmosphere of close friendship Turkish officials and military officers belonging to different departments fulfilled requests of their American counterparts without applying bureaucratic procedures but this resulted in a web of written and oral bilateral agreements made by different government offices, each not knowing what the others were doing.<sup>379</sup>

During the 1950s, seeing no way of staying outside the East-West conflict and alliances in a bipolar world and seeing no defence policy outside NATO,<sup>380</sup> the Turkish governments identified Turkey's security interests with those of NATO, especially the United States. It is striking that Turkey's entry into NATO was approved in the Turkish Parliament by a vote of 404 to 0, with one abstention. Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü told the Turkish Parliament in December 1951: "Our national interests are identical from every standpoint with the joint interests of NATO and with its geographic and military requirements."<sup>381</sup> In the 1950s

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<sup>377</sup> Wolf, op.cit., pp.44-45.

<sup>378</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.55.

<sup>379</sup> Gönlübol in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., pp.35-36. S. Orkunt (retired Turkish admiral), *Türkiye-ABD Askeri İlişkileri*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1978, p.258, the author's interview with retired Turkish academic and columnist Fahir Armaoğlu, A. Halil, *Atatürkçü Dış Politika ve NATO ve Türkiye*, İstanbul, 1968, p.205.

<sup>380</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.51.

<sup>381</sup> Ibid. p.45. See also speeches of Köprülü in 1955 and President Celal Bayar in 1956, which considered Turkey's NATO connection a national policy in Gönlübol et al., op.cit., pp.321-322.

Turkey supported and joined Western initiatives in different parts of the world.<sup>382</sup> She played a major role in the establishment of the abortive Middle East Command and the Baghdad and Balkan Pacts,<sup>383</sup> she acted as the spokesman of the West at the Bandung Conference of non-aligned states in 1955 and she gave full support to the West during some events in the Middle East such as the Suez crisis of 1956, the Eisenhower doctrine<sup>384</sup> and the Syrian crisis of 1957, the Lebanese and Jordanian events<sup>385</sup> and the Iraqi revolution of 1958.

The United States, in return, frequently reiterated its commitment to Turkey's security. After the Suez crisis, on 29 November 1956, the USA declared that threats to the territory of the Baghdad Pact members (including Turkey) would be viewed "with utmost gravity."<sup>386</sup> When Turkey was threatened by Moscow during the Syrian crisis, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles assured Turkish rulers that, in case of a Soviet attack, the United States would not limit itself to a "purely defensive operation."<sup>387</sup> After the Iraqi revolution, at the request of Turkish officials, the United States signed with Turkey the Cooperation Agreement on 5 March 1959, which stated that "in case of aggression against Turkey" the United States "will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" to assist Turkey.<sup>388</sup> The Turkish opposition, the Republican People's Party, severely criticised the agreement on the ground that it included the concept of "indirect aggression", which could be used by the government to call U.S. intervention against internal oppo-

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<sup>382</sup> Gönlübol in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., p.30, G.S. Harris, "Turkey and the United States" in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., pp.54-55, Vali, op.cit., pp.126-127.

<sup>383</sup> *Documents on International Affairs 1951*, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, p.65. *ibid.* 1953, pp.264-266. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954*, Washington D.C.: the U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, pp.138-140, McGhee, op.cit., pp.154-156.

<sup>384</sup> R.P. Magnus, *Documents on the Middle East*, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1969, pp.86-94, *Documents on International Affairs 1957*, p.259.

<sup>385</sup> *Documents on International Affairs 1958*, p.295.

<sup>386</sup> *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, New York: Harper Brothers, 1957, p.378, *Documents on International Affairs 1956*, pp.341-342.

<sup>387</sup> Vali, op.cit., pp.126-127.

<sup>388</sup> For the text see Appendix C. *Keating's Contemporary Archives, 1959-1960*, vol.12, p.167-169, Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., pp.221-223, *Documents on International Affairs 1959*, pp.343-345, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Greece and Turkey*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Part 7, June 9 and 11, 1970, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, pp.1857-1858.

sition as Lebanese President Chamoun did in 1958.<sup>389</sup> Later in the 1960s some Turkish critics claimed that the agreement did not bring any additional guarantee for Turkey's security but constituted a threat for her independence, being a constant reminder of the U.S. control of Turkey.<sup>390</sup>

In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration accepted "massive retaliation" as the strategy of NATO, which required a total nuclear response to Soviet aggression on any scale against a member of the alliance.<sup>391</sup> The Turks thought that the strategy provided enough deterrence to the Soviet threat against Turkey. The strategy seemed reasonable in an age when the Soviet Union had considerable advantage over Europe on conventional forces and neither of the superpowers had long-range missiles to hit the other side from their own countries. The absence of long-range missiles gave importance to U.S. bases in Turkey to check Soviet military activities and to hit Soviet territory with short-range missiles.<sup>392</sup> When the Soviets seemed to take the lead on inter-continental strategic missiles with the launching of Sputnik in 1957, the United States tried to fill the missile gap by deploying intermediate range strategic missiles (Jupiters and Thors) to NATO's European allies.<sup>393</sup> The story of the Jupiter missiles which had implications for U.S.-Turkish military relations will be mentioned in the next chapter.

Turkish initiatives in the 1950s, which in effect advanced U.S. interests in the Middle East, and U.S. announcements of support for Turkish security, too, strengthened Turkey's image as a faithful follower of U.S. policies.

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<sup>389</sup> MP Bülent Ecevit was particularly outspoken in this subject. Harris, op.cit., pp.67, 69, Gönlübol et al., op.cit., pp.319-320, *Cumhuriyet*, 6.2.1960, p.5, A.H. Ulman and R.H. Dekmejian, "Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1959-1967", *ORBIS*, vol.11, Fall 1967, pp.773-774. Turkish columnist Fahir Armaoğlu told the author that "indirect aggression" meant internal subversive activities. Turkish academic Seyfi Taşhan commented that the RPP's criticism was a part of its transformation to leftism.

<sup>390</sup> Saffet Ural, *Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi (CSTD)*, 4.2.1968, term 1. sess.7, vol.45-3, p.452, Edip Çelik, "İkili Andlaşmalardan Biri", *Cumhuriyet*, 2.3.1966, p.2.

<sup>391</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.51, Gönlübol in Karpaz(ed.), op.cit., p.41.

<sup>392</sup> Orkunt, op.cit., p.246.

<sup>393</sup> Gönlübol in Karpaz(ed.), op.cit., p.41, Sezer in Alford(ed.), op.cit., p.62, O. Sander, "Turkey: the Staunchest Ally of the United States?", *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, vol.15, 1975, p.19.

### 4.3 The Turkish Junta Period

The Turkish military officers who seized power on 27 May 1960 did not make any changes in Turkey's military relations. They proclaimed in their first public declaration that they believed in NATO and CENTO and were loyal to them.<sup>394</sup> They held their predecessor's view on the cold war, seeing the Soviet Union as a threat to Turkey's security and considering the U.S. and NATO connection in the interests of Turkey. In the eyes of military rulers, U.S. economic and military aid was vital to achieve economic development, to keep a strong army and to improve the situation of military officers.<sup>395</sup> Therefore, the 27 May regime was more dependent on the United States than the Menderes government had been, thus it, too, was open to U.S. influence.<sup>396</sup> In his reply to Soviet Premier Khrushchev's letter, which proposed good relations between the two countries provided that Turkey embarked upon neutrality, Turkish President Cemal Gürsel reiterated Turkey's loyalty to her commitments stemming from NATO and CENTO.<sup>397</sup> The new Turkish regime's attitude toward its alliances was welcomed by the U.S. President in his message to the Turkish premier on 11 June 1960.<sup>398</sup>

The Turkish military regime seemed willing to make some changes in bilateral military arrangements with the United States. In his press conference on 17 September 1960 Turkish President Gürsel hinted that the implementation method of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement should be changed.<sup>399</sup> Some inter-ministerial studies were made to deal with difficulties stemming from the use of U.S. bases in Turkey and the Turkish Foreign Ministry gave its opinion that all principles of non-secret bilateral agreements should be collected in a document.<sup>400</sup>

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<sup>394</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 27.5.1960, Vali. op.cit., pp.40, 127. Gönübol et al., op.cit., p.333. See also Foreign Minister Selim Sarper's 1961 budget speech praising NATO and CENTO in Gönübol et al., op.cit., pp.334-335.

<sup>395</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.86, Gönübol in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., pp.14-15, F. Ahmad, *Turkey's Experiment in Democracy*, London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977. p.401. In his memoirs published in Turkish newspaper *Sabah* on 22.6.1994 Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, who was among the military leadership of the 27 May coup, confirmed this point.

<sup>396</sup> Former Turkish MP and diplomat Kamran İnan told the author that the 27 May regime was more submissive to U.S. demands.

<sup>397</sup> For the texts of letters dated June 28, 1960 and July 8, 1960 see *Middle Eastern Affairs*, vol.11, no.10, November 1960, pp.317-320.

<sup>398</sup> Gönübol et al., op.cit., pp.333-334, *Cumhuriyet*, 17.6.1960, p.5.

<sup>399</sup> Gönübol et al., op.cit., p.336.

<sup>400</sup> Orkunt, op.cit., p.255, Haydar Tunçkanat, *CSTD*, 3.2.1967, term 1, sess.6, vol.38-3. p.569.

Military rulers showed particular interest in restricting the privileges and immunities of U.S. personnel. To obtain the right to decide the duty status of U.S. personnel committing a crime, the junta formed a special inter-ministerial commission and proposed to U.S. authorities changes in this issue. Since the Americans did not want to surrender this important right, no development was achieved.<sup>401</sup> While failing to obtain concessions from U.S. authorities, the Turkish military junta brought a new legal mechanism under the 1961 constitution, which would facilitate the legalisation of secret and public executive agreements with the United States. With the new arrangement, “implementing agreements pursuant to an international agreement... do not require approval by the Turkish Grand National Assembly.”<sup>402</sup> A parliamentary committee specifically noted that this article would permit the government “to carry out some necessarily secret arrangements of the free world defence system which we joined...”<sup>403</sup>

#### 4.4 The Johnson Letter

U.S. President Johnson’s famous letter to Turkish President İnönü in June 1964 caused changes in the Turkish perception of the Atlantic alliance.<sup>404</sup> Firstly, Johnson stated that “adhesion to NATO... means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other” and that therefore a war between Turkey and Greece was unthinkable. This was interpreted as meaning that only the United States could determine who could be Turkey’s enemy and that Turkey could have no enemy other than the Soviet Union. If a NATO country violated Turkey’s rights, NATO’s interests would prevent her from taking any action.<sup>405</sup> Secondly, Johnson stated that the United States would not agree to the use of any U.S.-supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus and reminded İnönü that “under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for

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<sup>401</sup> Harris, op.cit., pp.88-89.

<sup>402</sup> Article 65 of the constitution cited by ibid., p.89.

<sup>403</sup> Ibid., p.89.

<sup>404</sup> For the texts of both premiers’ letters see Appendix D and *Middle East Journal*, vol.20, Summer 1966, pp.386-393. The Johnson letter was also mentioned in the Chapter VI in the context of the Cyprus question.

<sup>405</sup> Gönlübol in Karpat(ed.), op.cit., pp.18, 35.



purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished.”<sup>406</sup> The Turks realised that their alliance with the U.S.A. brought some limitations to Turkey’s freedom of action and sovereignty.<sup>407</sup> Their army was equipped predominantly with U.S. weaponry and they would not be able to use them to defend themselves against threats which were not approved by the United States.

Finally and most importantly, Johnson warned that “your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.” The Turks were really shocked because they had based all their security on the guarantee provided by NATO and now doubts began to emerge about the credibility of the NATO umbrella in case of a Soviet attack. It seemed that the U.S.-Turkish alliance was favouring one side; the Turks had taken risks to support the U.S. (Cuba and Korea) but the Americans did not even agree to the working of the NATO commitment for Turkey’s survival.<sup>408</sup> In Sezer’s words, Johnson “reserved to himself the right to define when and under what conditions the Soviet Union could be a threat to the security of Turkey.”<sup>409</sup> Johnson’s remarks compelled Turkish P.M. İnönü to conclude in his letter to Johnson that “there are between us wide divergences of views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern.. If NATO’s structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor’s allegations, then it means that this defect of NATO needs really to be remedied.”<sup>410</sup> The Johnson letter led the Turks to begin a wide-ranging re-evaluation of their alliance with NATO and to be more cautious in their dealings with both the USA and the USSR.

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<sup>406</sup> For the full text of Article IV see Appendix A and Harris, op.cit., pp.214-215.

<sup>407</sup> E. Güresin, “**Amerika Dikkat Etmeli**”, *Cumhuriyet*, 25.8.1964, p.1

<sup>408</sup> Harris in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., pp.59-60. Fahir Armaoğlu rightly commented that Turkey had entered NATO mainly to gain the commitment of the USA (not any other NATO members) and that if the USA was telling Turkey now that “NATO might not protect you”, this was a total collapse of Turkey’s security policy.

<sup>409</sup> Sezer in Alford(ed.), op.cit., pp.65-66.

<sup>410</sup> In his interview with the author, former Turkish foreign minister Osman Olcay stressed this point.

## 4.5 Turkish Initiatives to Gain More Independence

### 4.5.1 Improving Relations With Countries Outside the West

The disappointment over the Western attitude toward the Cyprus question led the Turks to try to normalise their relations with the Eastern bloc and Third World countries. The Soviet Union had renounced its claims on some Turkish territories in 1953<sup>411</sup> and made some overtures to Turkey to relax relations. All major NATO countries had already mended their fences with the Soviet Union. However, Turkey, seeing Soviet gestures as tactical changes, had stayed behind as the last inflexible “Cold Warrior.”<sup>412</sup> With the realisation that NATO did not provide firm and automatic security, Turkish rulers began to avoid getting involved in superpower politics and provoking the Soviet Union unnecessarily.<sup>413</sup> They thought that rapprochement with the USSR would bring economic assistance, increasing detente in military confrontation, hence greater security,<sup>414</sup> and more international support in matters involving national interests, especially in the Cyprus question.<sup>415</sup> The result was intensive exchanges of state visits and parliamentary delegations between Turkey and the Eastern bloc countries and USSR economic assistance to Turkey.<sup>416</sup> After returning from his visit to Moscow in September 1967, P.M. Demirel said: “I think we have entered a new era in our dealings with the Russians. As is known, there had been great strain between our countries over the years, and in the period after World War II we had no relations at all. Now that gap has been bridged, I am not suggesting that all the doubts are gone, but I think the hostility is gone.”<sup>417</sup> In the international arena, contrary to Western attitudes, Turks gave more support

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<sup>411</sup> Gönlübol in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., p.27.

<sup>412</sup> Ibid., pp.28, 29, 30, Vali, op.cit., pp.133, 356.

<sup>413</sup> Sezer in Alford(ed.), op.cit., pp.66, 76.

<sup>414</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.127.

<sup>415</sup> Ulman and Dekmejian, op.cit., p.779.

<sup>416</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1963-1964*, vol.14, p.20500, ibid., 1965-1966, vol.15, p.20936, ibid., 1967-1968, vol.16, pp.21881, 22335, 22672, ibid., 1969-1970, vol.17, p.23632. Y.T. Kurat, *Ellı Yıllık Cumhuriyetin Dış Politikası, 1923-1973*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1975, pp.299-304, M. Gönlübol and A.H. Ulman, “**Türk Dış Politikasının Yirmi Yılı 1945-1965**”, *SBF Dergisi*, vol.21, No.1, March 1966, pp. 174-175. On the improvement of Turkey's relations with the USSR see also G. Harris, “**Cross-Alliance Politics: Turkey and the Soviet Union**”, *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, vol.12, 1972, pp.1-32.

<sup>417</sup> *Milliyet*, 14.10.1967, translated by Vali, op.cit., p.179.

to the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict and to Third World countries in colonial issues.<sup>418</sup> Turkish rulers' new policy softened their rigid evaluation of the Soviet threat and thus affected their perception of the alliance with NATO countries.<sup>419</sup> However, they never considered making the Soviet Union a defence partner as an alternative to NATO, but wanted only normalisation of relations between the two countries.<sup>420</sup>

#### 4.5.2 Turkish Withdrawal From MLF

A multilateral force had been suggested by the United States to cope with anxieties of its European allies over the control of nuclear arms. It would include Polaris missile-equipped submarines with crews of mixed nationalities. Although Turkey did not have any special interest in joining the force, it had accepted the idea and sent a crew to the Working Group. In January 1965 the Turkish government declared that it would not participate in the MLF and would withdraw its crew serving on the USS Claude V. Ricketts.<sup>421</sup> Official sources presented financial considerations and the refusal of some other NATO members to join the force as the reasons for the decision<sup>422</sup> but it cannot be denied that Soviet objections to the plan and Turkish resentment toward the USA because of its attitude toward the Cyprus question played an important role in the decision.<sup>423</sup>

#### 4.5.3 U-2 Flights

In 1956 Turkey had allowed U.S. forces in the İncirlik airbase near Adana to operate "scientific" U-2 flights but did not have detailed information on them.<sup>424</sup> Until 1960 the United States secretly carried out the U-2 program of high-altitude

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<sup>418</sup> Ulman and Dekincjian, op.cit., p.784. Kurat, op.cit., pp.303-304. On the improvement of Turkey's relations with Arab countries see Ö. Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğusuna Karşı Politikası, 1945-1970*, Ankara: SBF Yayını, 1972.

<sup>419</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., pp.127-128.

<sup>420</sup> Harris in Karpat (ed.), op.cit., p.61.

<sup>421</sup> *Milliyet*, 10, 15, 16 January 1965, *Hürriyet*, 17.1.1965, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni (DBB)*, January 1965, p.56. Halil, op.cit., pp.159-160.

<sup>422</sup> Deputy P.M. Kemal Satır's statement, *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (MMTD)*, 26.1.1965, term 1, sess.4, vol.35, pp.173-174.

<sup>423</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.151, Vali, op.cit., p.121, Gönübol et al., op.cit., pp.522-523. Orkunt, op.cit., pp.392-408, "Durum", *Milliyet*, 15.1.1965, p.1.

<sup>424</sup> Orkunt, op.cit., p.360, Gönübol et al., op.cit., p.325.



overflights of the Soviet Union from the İncirlik base to take photographs of Soviet missile activities. When the U-2 plane which took off from İncirlik and which was used by U.S. pilot Gary Powers was shot down by the Soviets over their territories on 1 May 1960,<sup>425</sup> U-2 flights became a subject of public discussion in Turkey. Soviet Premier Khrushchev's speech on 7 May<sup>426</sup> and the Soviet note to Turkey on 13 May warned Turkish officials over their "allowing foreign military aircraft to use their airspace for the preparation and execution of intrusions into Soviet airspace."<sup>427</sup> While the Turkish government announced that it "has never authorised any American aircraft to fly over Russian territory for reconnaissance flights or any other reason,"<sup>428</sup> Turkish politicians and newspaper columnists criticised the United States over the timing of the Powers flight but generally blamed Khrushchev for sabotaging the Paris summit under the pretext of the incident and defended the necessity of the U-2 flights.<sup>429</sup> Later in the second half of the 1960s, in the atmosphere of heavy criticism of the United States, Turkish critics mentioned the Powers incident frequently to warn against Turkey's involvement in an unwanted conflict because of the U-2 flights.

In December 1965 another U.S. reconnaissance plane which started its journey in İncirlik accidentally crashed in the Black Sea while flying over international waters. The Soviet government and press complained that Turkey was allowing its territory to be used for dangerous missions.<sup>430</sup> Turkish military authorities particularly felt resentment since the flight of the plane occurred without their knowledge.<sup>431</sup> On 28 December 1965 the Demirel government asked the United States to stop all reconnaissance flights carried out from Turkish bases.<sup>432</sup> The United States tried to persuade the Turks to reverse their decision through the

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<sup>425</sup> For details of the events and statements of both the U.S. and USSR governments see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1959-1960*, vol.12, pp.17425-17429.

<sup>426</sup> Khrushchev said: "The Governments... of Turkey must be clearly aware that they were accomplices of this flight because they permitted the use of their airfields against the Soviet Union. This is a hostile act on their part against the Soviet Union." *Ibid.*, p.17427.

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*, p.17429, Gölübol et al., *op.cit.*, p.328, Orkunt, *op.cit.*, pp.368, 374, *Cumhuriyet*, 14.5.1960, p.1.

<sup>428</sup> *Keesing's....* vol.12. p.17430.

<sup>429</sup> Harris, *op.cit.*, p.57.

<sup>430</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.165-166.

<sup>431</sup> Orkunt, *op.cit.*, pp.377-378.

<sup>432</sup> P.M. Süleyman Demirel's press conference on 7 February 1970, *DBB*, February 1970, pp.101, 106.

visit of the U.S. commander in NATO to Turkey,<sup>433</sup> but such flights were not resumed in the 1965-1975 period.<sup>434</sup> This Turkish attitude showed how serious the Turks were in their decision to be more cautious in their dealings with the superpowers. It was also an act aimed at easing intensive public criticism directed toward the government on its military relations with the USA.

#### 4.5.4 The Use of the İncirlik Base for non-NATO Purposes

During the landing of U.S. marines in Lebanon in 1958, the United States dispatched 1,600 U.S. Army troops in Germany to İncirlik to prepare to join in the Lebanese action. U.S. authorities notified Turkish officials of the troops' movement only after the fact, rather than consulting with them prior to the action.<sup>435</sup> The Turkish opposition criticised the deployment of U.S. troops to İncirlik on the grounds that they came on the initiative of Washington, not Ankara.<sup>436</sup> In the second half of the 1960s Turkish critics stated that the 1958 incident showed that the United States, whenever it wished, could use the İncirlik base for military purposes other than NATO defence plans and thus could drag Turkey into a war against its will or at least could harm Turkey's relations with its neighbours.<sup>437</sup>

The Demirel government took the position that joint defence bases could be used only against an attack from the enemy camp under the NATO agreement.<sup>438</sup> When the Arab-Israel war broke out in June 1967 the Turkish Foreign Minister told the Turkish Parliament that the bases could not be used without the explicit

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<sup>433</sup> Orkunt, op.cit., p.380, Çağlayangil's interview with Cem in İ. Cem, *Tarih Açısından 12 Mart*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1980, pp.303-304.

<sup>434</sup> Demirel's press conference, op.cit., p.106.

<sup>435</sup> Harris, op.cit., pp.66-67, Couloumbis, op.cit., p.35, Orkunt, op.cit., p.266, J.W. Lewis, Jr., *the Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean*, Washington D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute, 1976, p.30.

<sup>436</sup> Gönübol et al., op.cit., pp.315-316, Turkish academic Seyfi Taşhan agreed that the use of the İncirlik base by the Americans was a mistake but he also pointed out that the perception of the Soviet threat led Turkish rulers to make concessions to the USA and that the use of the İncirlik base was one of them.

<sup>437</sup> Cem, op.cit., p.273, T. Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, Ankara: Aydınlık Yayınevi, 1969, pp.218, 219, O. Bölükbaşı, *MMTD*, 19.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.42, D. Avcıoğlu, "Türkiye'deki Amerikan Üsleri", *Yön*, 25.11.1966, pp.8-9, N. Arda "Türkiye'deki Amerikan Üsleri", ibid., p.7, A. İpekçi, "Üsler Sorunu", *Milliyet*, 21.5.1970, p.1.

<sup>438</sup> *United States Security Agreements*, op.cit., p.1862.

permission of Turkey.<sup>439</sup> Reportedly, in the 1967 war Turkey allowed the United States to use communications stations but did not allow her to use bases for re-fuelling or supply activities.<sup>440</sup> During the Lebanese disturbances of October 1969 Turkish P.M. Demirel openly said that Turkey would not let the United States use the İncirlik base for a landing in Lebanon, recalling the principle that joint bases could not serve for operations to interfere in internal affairs of other states.<sup>441</sup> When the Jordanian government suppressed the Palestinian commando uprising in September 1970, Turkish authorities showed the same sensitiveness toward possible use of bases by the United States.<sup>442</sup> However, at that time Turkey allowed the U.S. to use bases for the evacuation of U.S. citizens in Jordan and transfer of supplies from İncirlik to Amman.<sup>443</sup>

These Turkish actions demonstrate that the Turkish government did not want deterioration of its relations with other states because of its contacts with the United States, which threatened that it might not come to Turkey's help if she was attacked by the Soviet Union. Turkish rulers also apparently wanted to prove that their defence policy was not totally dependent on the USA and that they could reject important demands of the Americans even in the security area. One cannot predict how Turkish authorities would have acted if the United States really needed to use the Turkish bases for its operations in the Middle East. However, it is certain that the Americans felt displeasure with the Turkish attitudes mentioned above. U.S. officials and politicians sometimes cited these attitudes while they claimed that Turkey was not co-operating with the USA adequately in the defence area.

#### 4.5.5 Duty Status Issue

The NATO Status of Forces Agreement of 1951 certified that in case of "offences arising out of any act or mission done in the performance of official duty" a NATO country would surrender jurisdiction to the allied country whose person-

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<sup>439</sup> *MMTD*, 8.6.1967, term 2. sess.2, vol.18, p.168.

<sup>440</sup> Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO", op.cit., p.426.

<sup>441</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 31.10.1969, pp.1.7.

<sup>442</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.166, Cem, op.cit., p.273.

<sup>443</sup> Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO", op.cit., p.426, Collins, op.cit., p.17.

nel were charged with the crime.<sup>444</sup> The real problem was the definition of duty status and of the right to determine it. Turkish Law no. 6816 of 16 July 1956 clarified that the words of “in the performance of official duty” meant “while on a general duty status.”<sup>445</sup> On 31 July 1956 the Turkish Ministry of Justice sent instructions to judicial authorities throughout Turkey that jurisdiction would be left to U.S. officials upon certification by the senior American commander that the offender was on duty when the crime was committed.<sup>446</sup> Thus, the initial U.S.-Turkish arrangements left the interpretation of what constituted “duty” to the U.S. commander.

A major incident which caught the attention of Turkish public opinion was the traffic accident in November 1959 in which Lieutenant Colonel Allen I. Morrison ran into a contingent of the Presidential Guard, killing one and injuring eleven others. Morrison was tried by U.S. authorities since he was considered on duty at the time of accident and fined 1,200 dollars.<sup>447</sup> Finding it inadequate, the Turkish press protested against the punishment<sup>448</sup> and later publicised all actions of U.S. personnel including incidents involving Turkish national symbols such as the Turkish flag and the statues of Atatürk.

In the 1960s Turkey’s sacrifice of jurisdiction over U.S. personnel was heavily criticised by Turkish columnists and politicians as a breach of sovereignty reminiscent of the old capitulations. It was claimed that exemption of U.S. personnel from Turkish justice went beyond NATO’s general agreements, keeping the limits of related personnel and the “duty” concept too wide. It was believed that U.S. personnel were abusing their rights under the present arrangement at the expense of Turkish citizens.<sup>449</sup> It should be noted that American personnel felt that Turkish

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<sup>444</sup> Harris. op.cit., p.57.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid., p.58. H. Tunçkanat, *İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü*, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1975. pp.237-238.

<sup>446</sup> Harris. op.cit., p.58, Tunçkanat, op.cit., pp.238-240.

<sup>447</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.59.

<sup>448</sup> *Cumhuriyet*. 9-17 March 1960.

<sup>449</sup> Gönlübol in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., p.243, the author’s interview with Fahir Arımaoğlu, Ataöv, op.cit., p.215, Saffet Ural, *CSTD*, 4.2.1968, term 1, sess.7, vol.45-3, p.451. M.A. Aybar, *MMTD*, 7.11.1965. term 2, sess.1, vol.1, pp.176-177; in *Cumhuriyet*, H. Eroğlu, “ABD İle Aramızdaki Anlaşmaların Yeniden Gözden Geçirilmesi”, 7.9.1964. G. Güneri. “Resmi Görev Dolayısıyla İşlenen Suçlar”, 23-24.11.1965, B. Akel. “Amerikan Üsleri

law was irrational and unfairly applied to them.<sup>450</sup>

Starting in the early 1960s Turkish and U.S. officials held long-lasting negotiations on the duty status issue,<sup>451</sup> revolving around the Turkish right to reject the certificate of the U.S. commander. Finally, on 24 September 1968 the United States and Turkey signed the Duty Status Agreement formulating procedures to be followed by the Turkish General Staff if it rejected the duty certificate.<sup>452</sup> Although Turkish rulers declared that the new agreement, which was published in July 1969, constituted the most suitable solution to the duty status problem,<sup>453</sup> it gave Turkish officers the right of objecting to certificates given by Americans but, as Turkish critics claimed, the Americans had the final say in the matter.<sup>454</sup> Thus, in the duty status issue, Turkish authorities could not obtain the result which they wanted to obtain, but they hoped that the new arrangement would improve their image in the eyes of Turkish people as a government which could force the Americans to make changes in the previous defence arrangements.

#### 4.5.6 Problems Related to U.S. Personnel

Turkish public opinion attacked customs and tax privileges granted to U.S. personnel,<sup>455</sup> U.S. PX shops (Post of Exchanges) and Army Postal Service (APO), claiming that Americans, staying out of Turkish control, carried out large-scale black-market activities and illegal currency trafficking and smuggled Turkish historic and cultural treasures out of Turkey. Turkish critics stated that activities of U.S. personnel harmed the Turkish economy, deprived Turkey of an important income source and affected social life of Turkish society in a negative way.<sup>456</sup> Arrests

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ve İkili Anlaşmalar", 18.12.1965, A. Kabaklı, "Faydası Ne?", *Tercüman*, 30.8.1964.

<sup>450</sup> Wolf, op.cit., pp.191-192. Seyfi Taşhan agreed with Wolf's point that some incidents happened because U.S. personnel did not understand the Turkish way of life. He commented that these incidents were exaggerated by anti-American leftist groups as a propaganda means.

<sup>451</sup> S. Demirel, *MMTD*, 9.11.1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.1, pp.289-290.

<sup>452</sup> Appendix E, Harris, op.cit., pp.225-228, Tunçkanat, op.cit., pp.244-248, Gönlübol et al., op.cit., pp.532-533.

<sup>453</sup> Demirel's press conference, op.cit., pp.108-109.

<sup>454</sup> Harris, op.cit., pp.168-169. Tunçkanat, op.cit., pp.249-250, E. Çelik, "İkili Anlaşmalar", *Cumhuriyet*, 25.3.1970, p.2, A. İpekçi, "Durum", *Milliyet*, 25.5.1970, p.11.

<sup>455</sup> For the text of the U.S.-Turkish tax exemption agreement of 1954 see Tunçkanat, op.cit., pp.251-270.

<sup>456</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.60. Gönlübol in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., p.37, Tunçkanat, op.cit., pp.271, 294, Rifat

of some Americans carrying out black-markeetering gave ammunition to Turkish people for their criticism.<sup>457</sup>

The radical left showed their anger toward Americans by demonstrating against visits of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, attacking its personnel,<sup>458</sup> and targeting U.S. personnel and facilities in Turkey.<sup>459</sup> The Sixth Fleet visits were seen by leftists as a U.S. demonstration of its influence on Turkey.<sup>460</sup> They protested, sometimes violently, against each visit of the Fleet in the second half of the 1960s. The intervention of police and rightist groups in demonstrations resulted in serious clashes and the death of some people.<sup>461</sup> While Turkish authorities saw nothing wrong in visits of a friendly country's fleet,<sup>462</sup> the U.S. administration continued the Sixth Fleet visits in spite of violent demonstrations, but it eventually reduced the number of visits toward the end of the 1960s upon the advice of the U.S. ambassador to Turkey.<sup>463</sup>

Labour strikes in U.S. bases brought some clashes between U.S. personnel and Turkish workers. Concerned with the situation of U.S. personnel affected by the strikes, some U.S. senators came to Turkey and held talks with Turkish authorities on the subject.<sup>464</sup> The Turkish government's decision to postpone the strike of the Harb-İş trade union in U.S. bases on the ground that the strike would damage national security at a time when a NATO operation would take place caused angry protests of Turkish critics who claimed that the government came under U.S. influence and cared about U.S. interests rather than Turkish workers.<sup>465</sup>

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Baykal. *MMTD*. 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, p.463. **"Modern Kapitülasyonlar ve Amerikan Kaçakçılığı"**, *Yön.* 3.12.1965, pp.8-9, K. Esengin **"Türkiye'deki Amerikan Personeli"**, *Cumhuriyet*, 10.4.1965, p.2, Ulman and Dekmejian, op.cit., p.781.

<sup>457</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.60, *Cumhuriyet*, 4.12.1965, pp.1.7.

<sup>458</sup> Harris, op.cit., pp.169-171, Vali, op.cit., p.143, *Cumhuriyet*, 16-19 July 1968, 11-17 February 1969, 20-22 December 1969, *United States Security Agreements...*, op.cit., p.1832, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1971-1972*, vol.18, p.24637.

<sup>459</sup> *Cumhuriyet*. January-March 1971.

<sup>460</sup> İ. Selçuk, **"Pencere"**, *Cumhuriyet*, 17.10.1967, p.2, T. Ataöv, **"Altıncı Filo Defol"**, *Forum*, 1.8.1968, p.14.

<sup>461</sup> M.A. Birand et al., *12 Mart*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994, pp.148-150, 153-154.

<sup>462</sup> President Sunay's Victory Day speech, *Cumhuriyet*, 31.8.1968, p.7, P.M. Demirel's statement, *DBB*, September 1968, p.58.

<sup>463</sup> *United States Security Agreements...*, op.cit., p.1864.

<sup>464</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 23, 26 September 1967, 18 April- 31 May 1969.

<sup>465</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 29.9.1967, pp.1, 7, A. İpekçi, **"Ertelenen Grev"**, *Milliyet*, 1.10.1967, p.1.

As a result of the anti-American atmosphere in Turkey , the United States took some measures to make the U.S. presence in Turkey less obvious. It shifted some irritant elements in Ankara such as the Post of Exchange and the American school to isolated locations. Economic pressures at home, too, forced the Americans to reduce the number of U.S. personnel in Turkey and to transfer some facilities to the Turks.<sup>466</sup> The Anadolu Kavağı and Manzaralı joint defence installations near Ankara (1968), radar sites in Trabzon and Samsun and the Çiğli airbase near İzmir (1970) were turned over to Turkish authorities.<sup>467</sup> The number of U.S. personnel and their dependants was cut down from 24,000 in 1968 to 16,000 in 1970.<sup>468</sup>

Turkish authorities saw the Sixth Fleet events and the labour strikes as actions of far-leftist groups and therefore they did not demand any response from the Americans. Neither apparently did they make any demands to U.S. officials on the subjects of the number of U.S. personnel, their high profile in big cities and the transfer of some facilities to Turkey. But they warmly welcomed U.S. initiatives in these issues, which eased their position before Turkish public opinion. To counter public criticism of tax privileges of U.S. personnel, the Turkish government signed an agreement with the United States in May 1967, making the Americans subject to Turkish custom arrangements.<sup>469</sup>

#### 4.5.7 Passage Through Straits

Until January 1966 Turkish authorities had permitted American ships armed with missiles to pass through the Straits. But beginning in 1966 the Turks changed their interpretation of the limitations imposed by the Montreaux agreement and no longer permitted the passage of U.S. ships armed with anti-aircraft missiles.<sup>470</sup> They seemed determined not to treat the United States specially in this issue as

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<sup>466</sup> The statement of Robert J. Pranger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence, *United States Security Agreements*, op.cit., p.1861.

<sup>467</sup> Demirel's press conference, op.cit., p.107, *DBB*, June 1968, pp.34-35, 38-41, Gönübol et al., op.cit., pp.533-534, *Cumhuriyet*, 15 June 1968, 1 July 1970.

<sup>468</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.167. *United States Security Agreements...*, op.cit., p.1860. Demirel stated in his press conference in February 1970 that the number of U.S. personnel in Turkey in 1970 was 7,000. op.cit., p.107. According to Collins there were 6,570 U.S. personnel in Turkey in November 1974, Collins, op.cit., p.3n.

<sup>469</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 7.5.1967, pp.1, 7.

<sup>470</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 28.4.1966, pp.1,7, Harris, op.cit., pp.171-172, Ulman and Dekmejian, op.cit., p.781, Gönübol and Ulman, op.cit., p.175.

well, as a part of their policy of being more cautious in their contacts with the Americans.

#### 4.5.8 NATO's New Strategy

Appreciating the threat of annihilation for both superpowers in a global conflict with nuclear weapons, the Kennedy administration suggested in 1961 that NATO should meet Soviet aggression with a flexible response rather than an all-out attack. In December 1967 the NATO Defence Planning Committee formally gave approval to the strategy of flexible response.<sup>471</sup> Turkey officially supported the U.S. position on the new strategy but some Turkish officials and senior military officers expressed doubts about it: The strategy implied a difference between "wing" and "centre"; the centre would be defended at its perimeter but a localised Soviet attack on Turkey would be met in depth, sacrificing Turkish territories, or Turkey would be left to the aggressor for the sake of central regions.<sup>472</sup> To counter the weakness of the strategy, NATO defence planners proposed various schemes such as the ACE Mobile Force for immediate deployment, atomic demolition munitions for mining the borders with atomic bombs and an integrated naval unit in the Mediterranean.<sup>473</sup> But none of them allayed Turkish anxieties. Nevertheless, the Turks had no choice but to accept the flexible response strategy and to try to obtain guarantees for Turkey's security in accordance with this strategy.

NATO's flexible response strategy was subjected to heavy criticism by Turkish politicians, newspaper columnists, academics and retired military officers:<sup>474</sup> The

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<sup>471</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.149. Gönlübol et.al., op.cit., pp.537-538, Orkunt, op.cit., pp.247-248, Demirel's press conference, op.cit., pp.118-120, Gönlübol in Karpat(ed.), op.cit., pp.43-44, the author's interview with Seyfi Taşhan.

<sup>472</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.150, Vali, op.cit., p.121.

<sup>473</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.150, Vali, op.cit., pp.121-122, 163, N. Eren, *Turkey, NATO and Europe*, Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977, pp.19-20, P.M. Demirel praised these schemes in his press conference in February 1970, op.cit., pp.130-132.

<sup>474</sup> In *MMTD*: F. Güley, 24.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.26, p.342; B. Boran, 19.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.3, p.573; B. Boran, 18.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.396; İ. İnönü, 22.1.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.2, p.290; S. Orkunt, 24.5.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.5, p.393; in *CSTD*: M. Ataklı, 31.1.1969, term 1, sess.8, vol.50-3, p.498; Gönlübol in Karpat (ed.), op.cit., p.45; D. Sezer, *Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika*, Ankara: A.Ü. S.B.F. Yayını, 1972, pp.377, 414-415, 477; Ataöv, op.cit., p.222; Orkunt, op.cit., pp.248-249; in *Cumhuriyet*: M. Ok, "NATO Stratejisi ve Milli Strateji", 20.4.1968, A.H. Ulman, "Türkiye ve NATO", 23.5.1968, A. Yıldız, "NATO, İkili Anlaşmalar ve Bilinmesi Gereken Gerçekler", 12.2.1970; A. İpekçi, "Esnek Mukabele Nedir?", *Milliyet*, 23.5.1970.



new strategy protected the superpowers almost completely but did not provide total security for Turkey. Under NATO planning large areas of eastern Anatolia would be abandoned and the main defence line would be established along the Zagros and Taurus mountain chains. Thus, the new doctrine left Turkey exposed to aggression and made her a first target and forward front of a possible war. P.M Demirel rejected all these claims in his press conference in February 1970: The new nuclear balance made the change of strategy necessary. An aggressor could not risk a military operation against Turkey because it would result in a change in the balance of Europe and the outbreak of a global war. The new NATO strategy did not see Turkey as a dispensable area nor made any differentiation between the centre and wings.<sup>475</sup>

#### 4.5.9 Control of Nuclear Weapons

In connection with implications of the flexible response strategy, Turkish critics argued that Turkey did not have the right to use nuclear weapons on its territory but their presence attracted the Soviet threat.<sup>476</sup> In their opinion, the Soviet Union could bomb the bases armed with nuclear weapons in case of a war with the Western world or as a preventive strike. Or the United States could drag Turkey into a war against her will by using nuclear weapons on Turkish territory, which were not under the control of the Turkish government.<sup>477</sup> It was suggested that either Turkish control should be established over nuclear weapons or all nuclear weapons in Turkey should be withdrawn.<sup>478</sup>

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<sup>475</sup> *DBB*, February 1970, pp.120-121.

<sup>476</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu told the author that this was a Soviet propaganda. He argued that even if there were no nuclear weapons in Turkey, the Soviet Union would still see Turkey as one of first targets during a possible East-West confrontation because of her strategic position. Seyfi Taşhan rightly pointed to the fact that the same critics of nuclear weapons severely condemned the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in 1963.

<sup>477</sup> Sezer, *op.cit.*, pp.369, 377, 401, 414-415; Orkunt, *op.cit.*, pp.248-249; Ataöv, *op.cit.*, p.219; in *MMTD*: M. Karınca, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, p.471, B. Boran, 5.1.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.11, pp.88-89; in *Cumhuriyet*: S. Orkunt, “Yine İkili Anlaşmalar”, 24.10.1967. M. Ok. “Türkiye Nükleer Bir Hedef midir?”, 6.10.1968; A.Ş. Esmer, “NATO Cenderesi”, *Milliyet*, 4.4.1968; N. Arda, “Türkiye’deki Amerikan Üsleri”, *Yön*, 25.10.1966, p.7.

<sup>478</sup> The RPP’s NATO report in 1968 in *Cumhuriyet*, 8.2.1975; F. Güley, *MMTD* 24.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.26, p.342. S. Koç, *ibid.*, p.353; M. Atakh, *CSTD* 31.1.1969, term 1, sess.8, vol.50-3, p.499.

P.M. Demirel answered these claims in his press conference: Nuclear weapons in Turkey were defensive and short-range, and could not be used without Turkey's consent because they were subjected to the double-key system. The launching devices of weapons and their use after a NATO decision were entirely in the hands of Turkish personnel. Nuclear weapons in İncirlik which were not subjected to the double-key system could only be used with the decision of the NATO Council in which Turkey had the power of veto. Military installations in Turkey did not constitute a threat for Turkey or its enemies but they were legitimate defence bases providing additional deterrence.<sup>479</sup>

From the beginning Turkey had accepted the close supervision of nuclear weapons by the United States and appreciated the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954.<sup>480</sup> But in the 1960s to counter the possibility that their allies might not come to their help in case of an aggression Turkish military planners demanded an increased role in the planning and decision for the use of nuclear weapons. The Turkish General Staff insisted that one of the revolving seats in the Nuclear Planning Group established by NATO in December 1966 should be allocated to Turkey. The Turkish government requested placing of nuclear mines in the eastern Turkish border hoping that the United States would relax the system of dual control imposed on nuclear arms. But when it was realised that the legal limits of the U.S. system precluded any effective surrender of U.S. control, Turkish rulers dropped the matter officially in May 1969.<sup>481</sup> Thus, they did not obtain any concrete results on the control of nuclear weapons which they could use against public criticism.

#### 4.5.10 Bilateral Agreements

Starting at the end of 1965 Turkish public opinion expressed intense criticism of the U.S.-Turkish bilateral agreements for the following reasons: 1- Bilateral agreements did not have any legal basis since they were not approved by the Turkish Parliament. 2- They were not related to NATO arrangements but mainly served U.S. interests. 3- They included articles which gave the United States excessive

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<sup>479</sup> *DBB*, February 1970, pp.103, 110, 124-126.

<sup>480</sup> Collins. *op.cit.*, p.4.

<sup>481</sup> Harris. *op.cit.*, pp.152-153.

rights at the expense of Turkey's independence, security and economic development. 4- The United States had complete control over military installations based on bilateral agreements, Turkish authorities had no power to check them.<sup>482</sup> There were widespread calls among Turkish critics for abolition or at least reconsideration of bilateral agreements.

Turkish rulers countered accusations by claiming that under the 1961 constitution bilateral agreements did not need to be approved by the Turkish Parliament and stating that if they really had violated Turkey's interests, the previous governments would have made some changes in them. As for military bases, they were Turkish territories, belonged to Turkey and Turkish authorities had the power to check them at any time. They were established for defensive purposes under NATO arrangements and did not serve a particular country.<sup>483</sup>

Under strong domestic pressure, the Demirel government asked the United States on 7 April 1966 to open negotiations to review and bring up to date existing bilateral arrangements. Washington accepted the proposal on 18 April 1966.<sup>484</sup> Turkish rulers generally admitted that there were some gaps and mistakes in bilateral arrangements that needed to be corrected.<sup>485</sup> P.M. Demirel stated in his press conference: "For over ten years preceding 1965 there were scattered agreements

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<sup>482</sup> In *MMTD*: M.A. Aybar, 7.11.1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.1, pp.176, 179, R. Baykal, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, pp.462-463, K. Esengin, 12.4.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.16, p.78, B. Boran, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, p.472; in *CSTD*: H.O. Bekata, 27.6.1967, term 1, sess.6, vol.42, p.20, S. Ural, 4.2.1968, term 1, sess.7, vol.45-3, p.452; Sezer, op.cit., pp.342, 368, 369, 399, 400-404, 406; the RPP's NATO report in *Cumhuriyet*, 8.2.1975; M. Gönübol, "Türkiye ve İkili Andlaşmalar", *Milliyet*, 12.7.1969; D. Avcıoğlu, "Türkiye'deki Amerikan Üsleri", *Yön*, 25.11.1966, pp.8-9; the author's interview with F. Armaoğlu; İ. Selçuk, "Şu Acı Gerçek", *Cumhuriyet*, 26.11.1965, p.2, E. Çelik, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1969, p.159. Seyfi Taşhan told the author that Turkey gave some concessions to the USA on the control of military bases because of her general security interests but she did not have the technological capacity to control them even if she was allowed to do so. Former Turkish foreign minister Osman Olcay made the more or less same comment.

<sup>483</sup> In *MMTD*: P.M. S. Demirel, 8.11.1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.1, pp.257-258, Defence Minister A. Topaloğlu, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.18, p.490, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil, 17.2.1967, term 2 sess.2, vol.13, pp.366-367, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, p.489; *DBB*, June 1968, pp.39, 41.

<sup>484</sup> The Turkish government's press release on 3 July 1969, *the Middle East Journal*, Winter 1970, vol.24, p.72. See Appendix F.

<sup>485</sup> Foreign Minister Çağlayangil, *MMTD*, 6.1.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.11, pp.126, 128, *ibid.*, 19.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.78, F. Sükan, *CSTD*, 27.6.1967, term 1, sess.6, vol.42, p.21, the government's white paper, *DBB*, November 1966, p.63, the author's interview with former Turkish foreign minister Ü. Haluk Bayülken.

concluded by several authorities not based on any principles. We were up against a practice whose legal grounds and content were not known and which led to great difficulty and complaints.”<sup>486</sup> According to Harris, former U.S. official, through reconsideration of bilateral agreements,

The Turkish civilian authorities sought essentially a thoroughgoing reaffirmation of Turkish sovereignty and control over every facet of military co-operation with the United States. To obviate recurrent criticism that some American activities in Turkey fell outside the bounds of NATO, the Ankara authorities wished the agreement to state specifically that all joint defense co-operation would take place pursuant to the NATO Pact and within the limits of NATO commitments. The Turkish side wanted to establish for the record its right to have full and detailed knowledge before granting permission for any American activity... The Ankara government felt an overriding concern to demonstrate that the United States did not operate these facilities as a sovereign lessee, but rather shared them with Turkey for mutually beneficial purposes.<sup>487</sup>

According to statements of Turkish rulers, officials of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the General Staff, working together, reviewed all bilateral agreements with the United States,<sup>488</sup> prepared a basic draft agreement including general principles on which bilateral accords should be based and submitted it to the U.S. Embassy on 8 September 1966. After the Americans made their own preparations Turkish Foreign Ministry and U.S. Embassy representatives started negotiations officially on 20 January 1967.<sup>489</sup> Turkish authorities occasionally informed Turkish public opinion of developments on the matter.<sup>490</sup> In his various speeches to parliament, Foreign Minister Çağlayangil read out the general principles on which U.S.-Turkish bilateral agreements would be based.<sup>491</sup> Given the diverse nature of arrangements and the sensitivity of the problem, the pace of negotiations proved extremely slow. Many technical questions arose; the removal of files and related officials by the 1960 regime, the status of verbal understandings, Turkish expectation of additional aid, the absence of the U.S. ambassador for some time and changing some agreements completely caused delay.<sup>492</sup>

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<sup>486</sup> *DBB*, February 1970, p.106.

<sup>487</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., pp. 160-161, 162.

<sup>488</sup> The author's interview with Ü.H. Bayülken.

<sup>489</sup> Çağlayangil, *CSTD*, 1.2.1967, term 1. sess.6, vol.38-3, p.377; Çağlayangil, *MMTD*, 19.2.1969, term 2. sess.4, vol.34, p.77; Demirel's press conference, *DBB*, February 1970, p.104; Orkunt, op.cit., pp.257-258; Tunçkanat, op.cit., pp.302, 304.

<sup>490</sup> Gönübol et al., op.cit., pp.528-529, Sezer, op.cit., pp.524-527, *DBB*, April 1967, p.84.

<sup>491</sup> *MMTD*, 6.1.1967, term 2. sess.2, vol.11, pp.125-126; *DBB*, January 1967, p.73; *MMTD*, 20.2.1968, term 2. sess.3, vol.25, p.489; Vali, op.cit., pp.139-140.

<sup>492</sup> Harris, op.cit., pp.161-163, Vali, op.cit., p.139.

After two years and four months of extensive and detailed negotiations, on 3 July 1969 Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil and U.S. Ambassador William J. Handley signed the Defence Co-operation Agreement in Ankara.<sup>493</sup> The agreement, which was kept secret from the public under the 1961 constitution, replaced the Military Facilities Agreement of 1954, revised some of the bilateral agreements and attempted to clarify others. It was to be supplemented by individual accords to govern each U.S. activity or facility in Turkey. The Turkish government's press release on 3 July 1969<sup>494</sup> and P.M. Demirel's press conference on 7 February 1970<sup>495</sup> gave general information about the agreement and cited its basic principles: No action could be taken from installations without Turkey's consent. Turkey retained property rights of the areas allotted to joint defence installations. Turkish authorities had the full control over and the right to inspect them and to assign their own military or civil personnel to these areas. The Turkish government would be able to restrict American utilisation of bases in the event of a national emergency. The joint management and utilisation principle would be applied in these installations.

The 1969 Agreement was the most important effort of Turkish rulers to gain initiative in their military relations with the USA. The published general principles of the agreement showed that they were quite successful in this regard. However, one cannot reach a conclusion because military agreements between the USA and Turkey remained classified. The tone of the general principles leads to the comment that efforts of Turkish authorities were largely directed to appeasing public opinion. The new arrangement was not satisfactory to the mainly leftist anti-American groups<sup>496</sup> but it was more acceptable to moderates.<sup>497</sup> Opposition parties called for a debate and approval of the agreement by parliament; when the government chose not to seek parliament's approval, the opposition heavily criticised it.<sup>498</sup>

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<sup>493</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969-1970*, vol.17, p.23484.

<sup>494</sup> For the text see *the Middle East Journal*, Winter 1970, vol.24, pp.72-73, *DBB*, July 1969, pp.30-35, Appendix F.

<sup>495</sup> For the text see *DBB*, February 1970, pp.98-139, for its English translation see Harris. op.cit., pp.229-238, Appendix G.

<sup>496</sup> Tunçkanat. op.cit., p.324.

<sup>497</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu told the author that with the 1969 Agreement Turkey established full sovereignty over the bases.

<sup>498</sup> N. Erim, *MMTD*, 23.5.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.5, p.347.

## 4.6 Other Matters

### 4.6.1 Detente

Although Turkish officials expressed their pleasure with the detente between the two blocs, they had doubts over the West's attitude toward the Soviet camp. They feared that the new approach would destroy the Western sensitiveness toward the Soviet threat, would harm the consolidation of NATO and would encourage communist expansionism.<sup>499</sup> Turkish authorities were particularly concerned about the U.S. troop reduction in Europe in 1968 and subsequent strategic arms limitation and mutual force reduction talks with the Eastern bloc because they thought that Moscow could transfer its troops in Europe to the Turkish border.<sup>500</sup>

### 4.6.2 Military Aid

Turkish defence planners felt that Turkey needed more U.S. aid to modernise the Turkish military establishment. But there was already a wide divergence in 1966 between Turkish expectations and availability of U.S. military aid. In his visit to Turkey in February 1966 the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defence, John McNaughton, proposed a five-year program of modernisation for Turkish armed forces calling for 134 million dollars a year in U.S. aid starting in 1967. Turks were unhappy about the amount of aid and its allocation between different forces. Washington failed to meet even this level in the years following the first year.<sup>501</sup>

## 4.7 NATO Discussion in Turkish Politics in the 1960s

### 4.7.1 Views of Those Who Criticised NATO

The following remarks are typical of the criticisms made in Turkey at the time.<sup>502</sup>

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<sup>499</sup> S. Demirel, *Büyük Türkiye*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları. 1975, pp.412-413.

<sup>500</sup> Harris, op.cit., pp.150-151, Ü.H. Bayülken (Turkish foreign minister), **"Turkey's Foreign Policy"**, *Foreign Policy*, No.1, March 1973, p.70.

<sup>501</sup> Harris, op.cit., pp.153-160, Harris in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., pp.65-66.

<sup>502</sup> These criticisms constitute public questioning of characteristics of the U.S.-Turkish alliance, which were mentioned in Chapter II.

All Turkish armed forces were assigned to NATO and put under the command of foreign generals. Even the most senior Turkish generals were under the command of a NATO lieutenant-general. Turkey could not use its armed forces and military equipment given by NATO for its national interests which fell outside of NATO purposes. The Turkish Army was organised in accordance with NATO's interests and defence strategy which did not suit Turkey's realities. After Turkey entered NATO, all military equipment was bought from the United States, thus Turkish forces became dependent on the U.S. in every aspect and the national defence industry was destroyed. The present situation which restricted Turkey's freedom of action was not compatible with Turkey's independence, sovereignty and national defence.<sup>503</sup> Turkey should develop a national force through her own resources to create a local deterrence. The national defence industry should be developed and a national defence strategy should be created.<sup>504</sup>

NATO did not arm the Turkish army with modern weapons and kept it below the NATO standards.<sup>505</sup> Weapons which were given by NATO were outdated and did not suit Turkey's defence requirements, their maintenance expenses were high but their fire-power was low.<sup>506</sup> NATO provided more military equipment for

<sup>503</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.267,268, 375,376, 379, 381,382, 413, 417; in *MMTD*: H. Ataman, 9.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.10, p.655. A. Oğuz, 7.9.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.32, p.312, R. Baykal, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, pp.462,463, M. Karınca, ibid., pp.470,471. B. Boran, 5.1.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.11, p.87, B. Boran, 18.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, pp.395-397, B. Boran, 24.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.26, pp.358,359, İ. Kabadayı, 19.2.1971, term 3, sess.2, vol.11, p.625; in *CSTD*: A. Yıldız, 1.2.1967, term 1, sess.6, vol.38-3, p.356, H. Tunçkanat, ibid., pp.570,571; in *Cumhuriyet*: İ. Selçuk, "Mağlup Devletler Gibi", 10.9.1964, "Ordunun İtildiği Çıkamaz", 23.2.1967, "Silahlı Kuvvetler Problemi", 3.2.1969, the RPP's NATO's report, 8.2.1975; Halil, op.cit., p.171; the author's interview with Kamran İnan. To counter these accusations Turkish authorities claimed that Turkish forces were under Turkish control in the time of peace and would come under NATO's command in the event of a war to defend the region and that Turkey could use its forces at any time for its own interests as the Cyprus crises proved. See in *MMTD*: S. Demirel, 9.11.1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.1, p.288, Defence Minister A. Topaloğlu, 18.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.412, S. Demirel, 30.9.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.28, p.714, Çağlayangil, 19.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.76; in *CSTD*: A. Topaloğlu, 3.2.1967, term 1, sess.6, vol.38-3, p.594.

<sup>504</sup> Sezer, op.cit., p.359, M. Karınca, *MMTD*, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, p.471; B. Boran, ibid., p.573; A. Yıldız, *CSTD*, 1.2.1965, term 1, sess.4, vol.24-3, p.995; K. Esengin, "Milli Ordu Ne Demektir?", *Cumhuriyet*, 9.2.1969; the RPP's NATO report, *Cumhuriyet*, 8.2.1975. For this purpose the Turkish press and other groups organised fund-raising campaigns which gained the support of the government. See Harris, op.cit., p.154, S. Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers and the Third World*, New York: University Press of America, 1988, p.123.

<sup>505</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.376-377, 381, 414, 423, 473-474, B. Boran, *MMTD*, 17.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.33, p.404, Halil, op.cit., p.171, A.H. Ulman, "Türk Ulusal Savunması Üzerine Düşünceler", *SBF Dergisi*, vol.21, No.4, December 1966, p.205.

<sup>506</sup> B. Boran, *MMTD*, 18.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.395; Ulman, op.cit., pp.203-205. The

Greece than it provided for Turkey, and thus changed the balance between the two countries' military power in favour of Greece.<sup>507</sup> NATO, specifically the United States, did not provide enough military and economic aid in comparison with Turkey's contribution to NATO and responsibilities which she undertook within the alliance.<sup>508</sup> For NATO, Turkey maintained the second largest military force in terms of numbers in the alliance by using her limited resources which should be allocated for economic development, put her survival under threat, paid for salaries of U.S. personnel and maintenance of NATO installations while not receiving any rent, etc.<sup>509</sup>

As the Cyprus crises and the Johnson letter proved, NATO did not provide total security for Turkey and did not protect her from a Soviet attack.<sup>510</sup> Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which called upon members to help the member under attack, was too flexible to require automatic aid of NATO.<sup>511</sup> Events showed

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comment of David C. Jones, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a Senate hearing: "Over the years, the Turkish Armed Forces have been equipped almost totally with arms and equipment that were being phased out of U.S. and NATO inventories. Due to lack of replacements, Turkey has been compelled to keep in its inventory World War II and Korean vintage arms and equipment far beyond their scheduled phase out. M-47 tanks, F-84, F-100 and F-102 aircraft, and ships over 30 years old are but a few examples." *The Military Aspects of Banning Arms Aid to Turkey*; hearing before the Committee on Armed Services; U.S. Senate, 95th Congress, 2nd session, June 28, 1978, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, p.45.

<sup>507</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.473-474, Y. Çetiner, "Atina Ankara'ya Tercih Edildi", *Cumhuriyet*, 29.4.1965.

<sup>508</sup> In *MMTD*: F. Güley, 21.2.1962, term 1, sess.1, vol.3, p.92; A. Tahtakılıç, ibid., p.142; Z. Dorman, 2.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.10, pp.516-517; H. Ataman, 9.1.1963, ibid., pp.655-656; A. Oğuz, 11.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.11, p.71; S. Koç, 18.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.387.

<sup>509</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.377, 379,381; F. Güley, *MMTD*, 21.2.1962, op.cit., p.92; A. Oğuz, *MMTD*, 11.1.1963, op.cit., p.71; İ. Selçuk "Kolombun Yumurtası", *Cumhuriyet*, 31.8.1964, p.2. The remark of the U.S. Commander in Chief in NATO in 1978, Alexander Haig: "Turkey has historically and traditionally contributed at a relative level above the overall NATO average and at as much as twice the rate of some NATO forces. This created a drag on their economic development efforts..." *the Military Aspects*.... op.cit., p.17. For ideas claiming that it cost the Americans less to buy security from the Turks than to produce it at home see E.N. Botsas, "The U.S. Cyprus Turkey Greece Tetragon; the Economics of an Alliance", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol.16, No.2, Fall 1988, pp.252-253, G.E. Gruen, "Ambivalence in the Alliance...", *ORBIS*, vol.24, No.2, Summer 1980, p.368, R. Ayres, "Turkish Foreign Relations", *Khamsin*, No.11, pp.119, 120. Turkish rulers stated that even if Turkey were not in NATO, she had to keep the size of her army for her defence: Defence Minister İ. Sancar, *MMTD*, 14.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.11, p.111. Foreign Minister Çağlayangil's speech in the budget committee, *DBB*, January 1969, p.37, İ.S. Çağlayangil, "NATO ve Türkiye", *Milliyet*, 8.4.1968.

<sup>510</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.164-165, 376, 413-414, 422-423; in *MMTD*: A. Oğuz, 7.9.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.32, p.312; B. Boran, 19.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.3, pp.572-573; R. Baykal, 24.2.1966, ibid., p.462; B. Boran, 24.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.26, pp.358, 360.

<sup>511</sup> İ. İnönü, *MMTD*, 22.1.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.2, pp.290-291; H. Tunçkanat, *CSTD*, 3.2.1967,



that the United States interpreted Article V differently from Turkey.<sup>512</sup> As was seen during the Cyprus crises, NATO restricted Turkey's freedom of action and decision in her national causes.<sup>513</sup> Loyalty to NATO and looking at events from NATO's point of view made Turkey's foreign policy inflexible and alienated her from Muslim Arab countries and the Third World and thus deprived her of their votes in the United Nations.<sup>514</sup>

Turkey was not able to act independently within NATO, it had no say in NATO organs which decide and implement policies.<sup>515</sup> Turkey's membership in NATO could drag her into a war between the military blocs which was unrelated to her national interests.<sup>516</sup> The United States kept NATO under her control, determined its strategies and policies and used it for her own interests.<sup>517</sup>

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term 1, sess.6, vol.38-3, pp.570-571; B. Boran, "NATO Nedir ve Ne Değildir?", *Milliyet*, 5.4.1968. Commenting on the absence of NATO's automatic aid, P.M. Demirel said in his press conference: "In a collective security system formed by independent and sovereign states the agreements could not have been otherwise. Like Turkey, other NATO countries are also tied by the provisions of their constitutions and the will of their parliaments... But NATO has taken some measures to counter this shortcoming." *DBB*, February 1970, p.130.

<sup>512</sup> Collins cites in his report: State Department interpretations submit that shape, extent and timing of U.S. responses "would in the final analysis depend on the nature of the attack, the defensive capacity of the state or states attacked, and other relevant circumstances." According to State Department authorities Article V will be inoperative if Greece attacked Turkey, or vice versa, since it "does not cover an attack by one NATO member on another." Collins, op.cit., p.3 and 3n. See also the statement of Rodger Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, in 1970 in this regard in *United States Security Agreements...*, op.cit., pp.1771, 1855.

<sup>513</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.164, 374, A.H. Ulman, "Ulusal Savunmamızın Sorunları", *Cumhuriyet*, 15.2.1967, p.2, A.H. Ulman, "Türkiye ve NATO", *SBF Dergisi*, vol.12, December 1967, pp.163-164.

<sup>514</sup> Sezer, op.cit., p.380, Eren, op.cit., p.20, İ. Selçuk, "NATO", *Cumhuriyet*, 11.9.1965, p.2.

<sup>515</sup> İ. Selçuk, "NATO'ya Girelim", *Cumhuriyet*, 20.6.1973, p.2. Turkish rulers claimed that Turkey acted independently within the NATO framework. As an example, in October 1968 she refused to allow the Orient Express manoeuvres to be held along the Syrian border. Vali, op.cit., p.136. They stated that Turkey had equal rights with the other members in all organs of the alliance and had a role in policy making and implementing. Foreign Minister F.C. Erkin, *MMTD*, 9.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.10, pp.629-630, Defence Minister İ. Sancar, *MMTD*, 14.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.11, p.111, the author's interview with Kamran İnan.

<sup>516</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.377, 422; Eren, op.cit., p.20; in *MMTD*: M. Karınca, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, pp.469-470, B. Boran, 5.1.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.11, p.89, B. Boran, 24.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.26, p.363, İ. İnönü, 22.1.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.2, p.292; in *Cumhuriyet*: A.H. Ulman, "Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri", 25.11.1966, p.2, İ. Selçuk, "NATO Güvenliğimizi Sağlıyor mu?", 21.7.1967, p.2. Turkish authorities claimed that NATO could not drag Turkey into a war against her wishes because decisions in the NATO Council were taken unanimously. Çağlayangil's statement to Bayram Gazetesi on 13 March 1968, *DBB*, March 1968, p.43. Vali, op.cit., p.135. Çağlayangil, *MMTD*, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, p.489, the author's interview with Osman Olcay.

<sup>517</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.374-375, 379-382, 402, 413, 416; Ataöv, op.cit., p.221; in *MMTD*: A. Oğuz.

The necessity of keeping an alliance with the West could not be explained by the Soviet threat. Turkey had resisted the post-war Soviet pressures alone without receiving any help from the West.<sup>518</sup> The Soviet Union could not dare to attack Turkey since such an action would bring great dangers for her.<sup>519</sup> The Soviet Union was no longer a threat<sup>520</sup> or only threat for Turkey<sup>521</sup> or its danger decreased greatly.<sup>522</sup> Turkey should determine its defence policy considering other threats as well, take great care not to provoke the Russians<sup>523</sup> and improve her relations with the Eastern bloc countries.

#### 4.7.2 Views of Those Who Defended Turkey's NATO Connection

Turkish politicians, columnists and academics who believed that Turkey should continue to be a member of NATO voiced the following ideas which explain importance of the USA and NATO for Turkey's security quite well: The Soviet Union was a close threat for Turkey as it had been in the past. The recent events such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet involvement in the Middle East and the Soviet naval penetration into the eastern Mediterranean<sup>524</sup> demonstrated that the Soviet policy of expanding her territory and sphere of influence had not undergone any substantial change. Since Turkey was located within the expansion zone of the Soviet Union and since she was not capable of meeting the Soviet expansion with her own resources, Turkey needed the alliance of NATO to balance the Soviet power.<sup>525</sup> Turkey could not remain outside the conflict of

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7.9.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.32, p.312, B. Boran, 24.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.26, p.360; Ç. Özek, **"Türkiye Amerika NATO"**, *Milliyet*, 13.9.1964. Turkish rulers rejected the claim that NATO was under the control of the U.S. by stating that all important decisions in NATO were taken by the Council in which every member had the power of veto. P.M. Demirel, *MMTD*, 9.11.1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.1, p.288, the author's interview with Kamran İnan.

<sup>518</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.271, 403, 461-462.

<sup>519</sup> B. Boran, *MMTD*, 17.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.346, D. Avcıoğlu, **"Dış Politika Tabuları"**, *Yön*, 25.3.1966, p.3, A.H. Ulman, **"Ulusal Savunmamızın Sorunları"**, *Cumhuriyet*, 18.2.1967, p.2.

<sup>520</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.459-460, 462.

<sup>521</sup> Ibid., pp.375-376, 413, 423, B. Boran, *MMTD*, 19.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.3, p.572.

<sup>522</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.269, 416, 420.

<sup>523</sup> In *MMTD*: B. Boran, 5.1.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.11, p.88, B. Boran, 17.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.33, p.408.

<sup>524</sup> Stearns, *Entangled Allies*, op.cit., pp.64-65.

<sup>525</sup> Gönülbol in Karpat(ed.), op.cit., pp.47,48; Vali, op.cit., p.375; Sezer, op.cit., pp.426,427, 444-445, 449-451, 464,465; F. Armaoğlu, **"Turkey and the United States: A New Alliance"**, *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, vol.6, 1965, p.12; in

superpowers because she was located in a strategically important area; geopolitical and historical factors compelled her to join a defence pact (NATO).<sup>526</sup> She did not have enough economic and military power and other elements to be able to pursue a neutralist policy; neutrality did not suit Turkey's interests for the time being.<sup>527</sup>

NATO brought restrictions and responsibilities for Turkey as it did for the other members,<sup>528</sup> but its benefits were much greater. NATO provided security for its members including Turkey since it was established.<sup>529</sup> It maintained balance of power and peace in Europe,<sup>530</sup> it forced the Soviet Union to pursue more moderate policies<sup>531</sup> and to renounce her demands on Turkey.<sup>532</sup> NATO continued to be the most important guarantee of Turkey's defence, deterring her enemies.

NATO provided Turkey with military aid in the form of arms equipment, ammunition, repair parts, construction projects, training and miscellaneous services.<sup>533</sup> From the financial point of view, Turkey's benefits from NATO were far superior to the value of her contribution to the alliance.<sup>534</sup> If Turkey did not receive the NATO aid, she could not have maintained a well-disciplined modern

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*MMTD*: İ.S. Çağlayangil, 19.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.3, p.592, İ. Sarıgöz, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, pp.476-477, S. Koç, 18.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.396, İ. Sarıgöz, 17.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.33, p.412, Y. Menderes, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.64; A. Kabaklı, "NATO'dan Çıkmak, Çıkmamak", *Tercüman*, 27.5.1968.

<sup>526</sup> Vali, op.cit., pp.381-382; Sezer, op.cit., pp.427, 432, 451, 462-463; in *MMTD*: İ. Sarıgöz, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, pp.476-477; S. Koç, 18.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.387. S.A. Emre, 24.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.26, p.396, C. Kırca, 19.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.56; C.S. Barlas, "Dış Politika ile Oynanmaz", *Cumhuriyet*, 13.9.1964, p.2.

<sup>527</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.302-303, in *MMTD*: N. Erim, 9.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.10, p.648, R. Baykal, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, p.463, İ.S. Çağlayangil, 17.2.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.13, p.367; Armaoğlu, "Turkey and the United States...", op.cit., p.13; Sezer in Alford(ed.), op.cit., p.83, the author's interview with Osman Olcay.

<sup>528</sup> The author's interview with Ü. Haluk Bayülken.

<sup>529</sup> Gönübol in Karpat(ed.), op.cit., p.48; İ. Giritli, *Neden NATO'ya Evet?*, İstanbul: Ak Yayınları, 1968, pp.12, 51; C. Baban, "NATO'ya Hayır", *Cumhuriyet*, 22.2.1972, p.2; in *MMTD*: S. Demirel, 9.11.1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.1, p.287, N. Diler, 19.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.4, p.61, T. Feyzioğlu, 23.5.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.5, p.341.

<sup>530</sup> Vali, op.cit., pp.162, 163; President C. Sunay's speech in White House on 3 April 1967, *Amerika'da Onbir Gün*, op.cit., p.26; İ.S. Çağlayangil, "NATO ve Türkiye", *Milliyet*, 8.4.1968.

<sup>531</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.416, 464, C. Kırca, *MMTD*, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, p.450.

<sup>532</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.432, 442-443, 464, A. Kabaklı, "Yine NATO", *Tercüman*, 14.12.1967.

<sup>533</sup> Collins, op.cit., p.4, F.C. Erkin, *MMTD*, 9.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.10, p.630. Botsas, op.cit., p.252, the author's interview with Ü.H. Bayülken.

<sup>534</sup> Turkey's quota in NATO for the cost sharing is 1.1 percent. Vali, op.cit., p.124, S. Orkunt, *MMTD*, term 3, sess.4, vol.34, p.443.

army<sup>535</sup> and she would have to spare more resources for her defence, cutting down her economic development efforts.<sup>536</sup> Since Turkey could not maintain her defence with her own resources she had to rely on the assistance of NATO.<sup>537</sup>

Through her membership in NATO, Turkey became a part and an equal member of the West. She benefited greatly from consultation, discussion and exchange of views in various subjects among Western powers.<sup>538</sup> Within the NATO framework, Turkey was continuing her political, economic and cultural relations with the West in a better way.<sup>539</sup> Due to her membership of NATO, Turkey obtained information about modern warfare and equipment. Her general staff gained experience and first-hand knowledge through participating in discussions and exercises at high levels.<sup>540</sup> Turkey could better defend her interests and national causes and influence international developments by remaining in NATO, thus participating political and defence discussions and decisions of NATO.<sup>541</sup>

NATO membership could also dissuade the United States, which had naturally different interests in the region than Turkey, from taking forceful actions against her. If Turkey was not a NATO member, the United States could directly threaten her on the Cyprus issue.<sup>542</sup> If Turkey left NATO, the balance of power between Turkey and Greece would lean in favour of Greece and the Turkish stand on the Cyprus question would be weakened. NATO aid to Greece would be to the disadvantage of Turkey, and Western powers were more likely to support the Greek cause on Cyprus.<sup>543</sup>

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<sup>535</sup> Gönübol in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., p.49; Sezer, op.cit., p.445; Vali, op.cit., p.124; in *Tercüman*: A. Kabaklı, "Yine NATO", 14.12.1967, "Niçin NATO'dayız?", 25.5.1968.

<sup>536</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.162; Sezer, op.cit., pp.445-446; İ.S. Çağlayangil, "NATO ve Türkiye". *Milliyet*, 8.4.1968; in *MMTD*: Çağlayangil, 19.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.76; M. Büyükc, 19.2.1971, term 3, sess.2, vol.11, p.621.

<sup>537</sup> Sezer, op.cit., pp.421, 439, 445, 451; in *MMTD*: İ.S. Çağlayangil, 19.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.3, p.592. A. Topaloglu, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, p.489, Çağlayangil, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, p.481.

<sup>538</sup> Vali, op.cit., pp.124-125.

<sup>539</sup> İ.S. Çağlayangil. *MMTD*, 19.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.75.

<sup>540</sup> Eren, op.cit., pp.48-49; F.C. Erkin. *MMTD*, 9.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.10, p.630; S. Orkunt, "NATO, Milli Güvenlik ve Ötesi". *Cumhuriyet*, 10.4.1968, p.2.

<sup>541</sup> Eren, op.cit., p.49; in *MMTD*: C. Kırca, 19.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.57, T. Feyzioğlu, 22.1.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.2, p.297, the author's interview with Ü.H. Bayülken.

<sup>542</sup> The author's interview with Ü.H. Bayülken and Osman Olcay.

<sup>543</sup> Gönübol in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., pp.48-49; Vali, op.cit., p.161; S. Orkunt, "NATO, Milli

The NATO discussion in Turkish domestic politics had been initiated by radical leftist groups, organisations, students and scholars, and the Turkish Labour Party members, who wanted Turkey's complete withdrawal from NATO on the 20th anniversary of NATO's establishment, that is 1969.<sup>544</sup> The reformist slightly leftist part of Turkish public opinion supported the idea that Turkey should reduce her participation in NATO and disengage herself from the United States.<sup>545</sup> Liberal, pro-Western critics saw NATO as a necessity for Turkey and stated that Turkey's defence ties with the West should be maintained provided that present mistakes in Turkey's relations with NATO and the United States were corrected.<sup>546</sup> Rightists and extreme rightists supported Turkey's NATO and U.S. connection for reasons of Turkish self-interest and security and fear of communism; they accused critics of NATO of trying to make Turkey a satellite of the Soviet Union.<sup>547</sup>

All opposition parties except the TLP were in favour of Turkey's membership of NATO on the condition that relations should be revised.<sup>548</sup> The major opposition party, the Republican People's Party, commissioned a panel chaired by Nihat Erim to report to the party's top policy organ on NATO. The committee's report in spring 1967 weighed the pros and cons of Turkey's NATO membership and recommended that Turkey retain its NATO ties but with substantial change. The RPP's formal policy paper which was released to the public in July 1967 approved the committee's recommendations by watering down the criticism of NATO.<sup>549</sup> RPP leader İsmet İnönü, in his various speeches, expressed his support for Turkey's NATO connection provided that Turkey did not pursue policies which would provoke any of the superpowers.<sup>550</sup> All the Turkish governments from 1960 to 1971

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**Güvenlik ve Ötesi",** *Cumhuriyet*, 10.4.1968, p.2; A. İpekçi, "NATO Sorunu", *Milliyet*, 20.5.1970; T. Feyzioğlu, *MMTD*, 23.5.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.5, p.343.

<sup>544</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.141, Sezer, op.cit., pp.331, 342, 379, Vali, op.cit., p.103.

<sup>545</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.102.

<sup>546</sup> Ibid., p.101, Sezer, op.cit., pp.275, 282-284, 384, 387, 415, 417, 463, S. Orkunt, "NATO, Milli Güvenlik ve Ötesi", *Cumhuriyet*, 11.4.1968, p.2.

<sup>547</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.104, Sezer, op.cit., pp.428, 447, 450, A. Kabaklı, "NATO III", *Tercüman*, 15.12.1967.

<sup>548</sup> In *MMTD*: S. Koç, 24.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.26, p.353. S.A. Emre, ibid., p.357, O. Bölükbaşı, 19.2.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.34, p.41.

<sup>549</sup> Harris, op.cit., pp.141-142, Vali, op.cit., pp.160-161, Sezer, op.cit., pp.340-341, *Cumhuriyet*, 10.7.1968, p.7, 8.2.1975.

<sup>550</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.83, İ. İnönü, *MMTD*, 12.3.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.3, p.449. *Cumhuriyet*, 19.10.1966, p.7, 14.1.1968, p.7, 6.10.1968, p.7, 2.4.1970, pp.1,7.

promised that they would strengthen Turkey's relations with NATO.<sup>551</sup> With the help of some factors such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, change in France's adamant position within NATO with the fall of De Gaulle and İnönü's stand in favour of NATO, the NATO discussion on Turkish politics lost its momentum after 1969<sup>552</sup> and opinion polls showed that the majority of Turkish people supported Turkey's membership of NATO.<sup>553</sup>

It should be noted that ideas of both critics and supporters of Turkey's NATO connection carried some correct points and their discussion helped the Turkish governments assess their defence policies more realistically. The one who sees the content of the Johnson letter which was mentioned previously in the chapter cannot help appreciating criticisms directed toward Turkey's alliance with the USA and NATO. Turkish critics were right in stating that security could not be entrusted only to NATO. It was obvious that interests of NATO and Turkey could clash with each other in some matters or NATO might decide not to come Turkey' help in case of attack for different reasons. Turkey itself had to ensure its security by taking measures, including modernising its army which was equipped with outdated weapons at that time. On the other hand, NATO was certainly a great guarantee for Turkey's security, contributing to different aspects of its defence. Any alliance would bring costs and problems as well as benefits, the important thing was to find the right balance and Turkey could do it by staying within NATO. One important point is that many aspects of Turkey's alliance with NATO, which were subjected to criticism, were hidden in secret arrangements, therefore one could not make any judgements on these issues.

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<sup>551</sup> İ. Arar, *IIükümet Programları*, İstanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1968, pp.311-312, 339-340, 369, 399, 424, 479, 487.

<sup>552</sup> Harris, op.cit., pp.142-143.

<sup>553</sup> Vali, op.cit., pp.112-113, Eren, op.cit., pp.46-47, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp.122-123. In his report to the Congress, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers stated that the anti-American Turkish leftists constituted very small percentage of Turkish population and that they targeted the Turkish government as well as America. *ABD Dışışleri Bakanı Rogers'ın Kongreye Sunduğu Rapordan Bölümler*. Ankara: Amerikan Basın ve Kültür Merkezi, 1972, p.3.

## 4.8 Military Relations in the 1970s

### 4.8.1 The Arms Embargo

As a reaction to Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in July and August 1974, the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey.<sup>554</sup> With the provisions of section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act entering into force on 5 February 1975, "all military assistance, all sales of defence articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, or any other means), and all licences with respect to the transportation of arms, ammunitions, and implements of war" to the Turkish government were suspended.<sup>555</sup>

Supporters of the arms embargo claimed that Turkey had violated U.S. law by employing U.S. arms and equipment in its military intervention in Cyprus contrary to the provisions of the agreements under which these arms had been sold to it.<sup>556</sup> It was stated that U.S. failure to impose an embargo on Turkey would alienate Greece, a strategically vital ally of the United States.<sup>557</sup> Some congressmen went so far to say that the United States did not need Turkey any more because its strategic value and benefits to NATO and the U.S. had sunk to almost zero.<sup>558</sup>

The U.S. administration opposed the arms embargo for the following strategic reasons: 1- Turkey, whose strategic importance with respect to the Soviet Union and the Middle East remained vital to the Western alliance, could be alienated and consequently Turkey might seek non-NATO resources to satisfy its defence

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<sup>554</sup> The arms embargo issue was also mentioned in Chapter VII in the context of the Cyprus question.

<sup>555</sup> *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1979; Current Legislation and Related Executive Orders*, vol.1, U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, p.113.

<sup>556</sup> Couloumbis, op.cit., p.104. Campany, op.cit., pp.75, 76. P.Y. Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress and American Foreign Policy*, London: Greenwood Press, 1984, pp.113,114. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (PL 87-195) and the Military Sales Act of 1968 (PL 90-629) stipulated that defence articles and services to any country should be furnished solely for internal security and legitimate self-defence and that any substantial violation of these provisions should render the violator immediately ineligible for further assistance.

<sup>557</sup> Couloumbis, op.cit., p.104.

<sup>558</sup> Sezer in Alford (ed.), op.cit., p.63. Senator Walter Mondale's speech on the opium issue in S. Tashan, "Turkey's Relations With the U.S.A. and Possible Future Developments", *Foreign Policy*, vol.8, Nos.1-2, 1979, pp.20-21, Gruen, op.cit., p.372.

requirements.<sup>559</sup> 2- The suspension of the U.S. activities in some Turkish installations because of the embargo resulted in the loss of some intelligence information on Soviet space, missile and military systems development, operations and training. It hampered the U.S. capability to develop countermeasures to Soviet weapons systems under development and degraded intelligence acquisition used to monitor and verify compliance with the SALT agreements.<sup>560</sup> 3- The embargo had impaired the cohesion and strength of the south-eastern flank of NATO.<sup>561</sup> 4- The fighting capability, deterrent posture and material readiness of the Turkish armed forces had been diminished and the Turkish NATO forces had been weakened.<sup>562</sup> 5- The unavailability of Turkish ports for the U.S. 6th Fleet visits had created morale and other problems for the fleet.<sup>563</sup> 6- In the final analysis, the embargo had degraded NATO's overall military capabilities and adversely affected U.S. national security interests.<sup>564</sup>

The Turkish side responded sharply to the embargo, stating that the Congress action constituted a unilateral violation of defence co-operation accords between the two countries.<sup>565</sup> The embargo was perceived as a hostile act that undermined the capability, preparedness and effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces.<sup>566</sup> On 25 July 1975 the Turkish government declared that the Defence Co-operation Agreement of 1969 and all other related agreements had lost their legal validity and that all U.S. installations in Turkey passed under the full control and custody of the Turkish armed forces. The İncirlik air base was to be used only for direct

<sup>559</sup> Couloumbis, op.cit., pp.104-105; Campany, op.cit., p.77; *the Military Aspects of Banning Arms Aid to Turkey*, op.cit., pp.8, 62. In the latter reference, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Secretary of Defence Harold Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David C. Jones, Commander in Chief in U.S. European Command Alexander Haig, five former supreme allied commanders and Colonel Phelps Jones presented arguments for the necessity of lifting the arms embargo.

<sup>560</sup> *The Military Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.8, 26, 48, 49. Watanabe, op.cit., pp.109, 131. L. Stern, *the Wrong Horse*, New York: Times Books, 1977, pp.152-154.

<sup>561</sup> *The Military Aspects*, op.cit., pp.4, 11, 12, 15.

<sup>562</sup> Ibid., pp.4-5, 7, 9-10, 12, 23-24, 39, 48.

<sup>563</sup> Ibid., p.48.

<sup>564</sup> Ibid., pp.4, 10, 62. Watanabe, op.cit., p.109.

<sup>565</sup> In *MMTD*: M. Altınsoy, 20.2.1975, term 4, sess.2, vol.9, p.369, İ. Müftüoğlu, 21.2.1975, ibid., p.444, S. Öztürk, ibid., p.452. H. Ulman, ibid., p.457. Foreign Minister M. Esenbel, ibid., p.460. Foreign Minister İ.S. Çağlayangil, 12.6.1975, term 4, sess.2, vol.12, p.579. H. Savaşçı, 28.4.1976, term 4, sess.2, vol.19, p.120; Prime Minister S. İrmak's statement in *Cumhuriyet*, 4.2.1975, p.7.

<sup>566</sup> Sezer in Alford(ed.), op.cit., p.66, B. Ecevit, "Turkey's Security Policies" in Alford(ed.), op.cit., p.137.



NATO purposes. The decision also meant the suspension of operations at four intelligence-collecting centres at Karamürsel, Sinop, Diyarbakır and Belbaşı.<sup>567</sup>

On 6 October 1975 the U.S. Congress partially lifted the arms embargo; it exempted from the embargo military deliveries contracted for before the effective day of the embargo, that meant arms worth 185 million dollars.<sup>568</sup> But the Turkish administration did not allow the resumption of functioning of U.S. bases in return.

To complete the account of this important aspect of Turkish-American relations and to see the period of our study in perspective it will now be necessary to go beyond the 1975 cut-off point, so in the succeeding pages of this chapter we shall include references to more recent developments.

According to the statement of U.S. Defence Secretary Harold Brown, between 1975 and 1979 Turkey was authorised credits of 425 million dollars under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Financing Program.<sup>569</sup> In this period Turkey also purchased U.S. military repair parts, maintenance services and spares totalling 31.2 million dollars through the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)<sup>570</sup> and received about 265 million dollars worth of military equipment from other Western powers.<sup>571</sup> On 26 March 1976 Turkey and the United States signed a new Defence Co-operation Agreement, providing 800 million dollars in FMS and 200 million dollars in grant aid over a four-year period. But it was not approved by the Congress and was never implemented.<sup>572</sup> On 26 July 1978 the U.S. Senate voted to repeal the embargo, the House followed through on August 1.<sup>573</sup> President Carter signed the embargo repeal legislation on 26 September 1978, thus lifting

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<sup>567</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 26.7.1975, Couloumbis, op.cit., p.151, Grimmett, op.cit., pp.43-44, *the Military Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.8, 72.

<sup>568</sup> U.S. Public Law 94-104 in *Current Legislation...*, op.cit., pp.247-249, Company, op.cit., p.63, Rustow, op.cit., p.104, Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO", op.cit., p.440.

<sup>569</sup> *The Military Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.21-22, 32, Company, op.cit., p.63, Kuniholm, op.cit., p.440. For the detailed information about the military equipment received by Turkey in this period see *the Military Aspects...*, op.cit., p.76.

<sup>570</sup> *The Military Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.35, 48, 79.

<sup>571</sup> *Ibid.*, p.33.

<sup>572</sup> Grimmett, op.cit., pp.44, 88-93(text), Couloumbis, op.cit., p.151, Company, op.cit., p.63, Stern, op.cit., pp.155-156.

<sup>573</sup> U.S. PL 95-384 in *Current Legislation*, op.cit., p.320.

the embargo completely. On 9 October 1978 the Turkish government terminated the suspension measures implemented in U.S. bases and facilities.<sup>574</sup>

On 29 March 1980 Turkey and the United States signed an updated Defence and Economic Co-operation Agreement (DECA).<sup>575</sup> It was a five-year executive agreement, renewable annually, which would implement the NATO treaty. The United States undertook to provide defence equipment, services, and training to the Turks; Turkey, in return, authorised the United States to maintain forces and carry out military activities at specified installations. A U.S.-Turkish Joint Commission was created as a mechanism for discussing how to use Turkey's resources for its security objectives.

The arms embargo and suspension of functioning of military bases in Turkey represented a serious cut-off on U.S.-Turkish military relations though the two states remained allies within NATO. The embargo did not achieve its original declared aim, Turkish concessions on the Cyprus question, but it reminded the Turks that their defence was heavily dependent on the United States. By nullifying the 1969 agreement, the Turks showed that they were not merely a stooge of the United States. But they could not save themselves entirely from military dependence on the USA. U.S. imposed conditions on aid in the following years continued to be a headache for Turkish authorities.

#### 4.8.2 Use of Bases

The use of Turkish territory by the United States for non-NATO purposes continued to be a sensitive issue in the U.S.-Turkish military relations in the 1970s and the 1980s. During the Arab-Israel war in 1973, the Turkish government announced again that the İncirlik airbase could not be used for non-NATO purposes.<sup>576</sup> Allegedly, at that time, Turkey permitted Soviet overflights and naval transit through the Straits to resupply Egypt and Syria (normally the Soviet Union has this right)<sup>577</sup> but she did not allow the United States to use bases for direct

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<sup>574</sup> Coulombis, op.cit., p.106, Kuniholm, op.cit., p.427n.

<sup>575</sup> For the texts of the main agreement and supplementary agreements see Company, op.cit., pp.103-123, Appendix H.

<sup>576</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 17.10.1973, p.7.

<sup>577</sup> R.F. Grimmett and E.B. Laipson, *Turkey's Problems and Prospects: Implications for U.S. Interests*, Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of

combat or logistical support though she permitted the Americans to use communications stations.<sup>578</sup> During the Iranian revolution in 1979 Turkey allowed the use of bases for evacuation of U.S. citizens<sup>579</sup> but did not cooperate with the hostage rescue mission to Iran in 1980.<sup>580</sup> The use of the İncirlik base by U.S. planes to attack Iraqi positions during the Gulf War of 1991 showed that the United States could obtain the use of bases for non-NATO purposes if she really needed them.<sup>581</sup>

The Turkish government announced in 1979 that it would not permit U-2 flights from Turkish territory as part of the proposed monitoring of SALT II agreement unless the Soviet Union agreed.<sup>582</sup> One controversial issue in the 1980s was the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which was suggested by the Americans to be used in emergency situations in the region. In October 1982, Turkey and the United States signed a co-located operating bases agreement, providing for the modernisation of the ten Turkish airfields and the construction of two new ones in eastern Anatolia. To counter rumours that the airfields could be used for a Western intervention in the Gulf, Turkish authorities emphasised that the 1982 agreement had no connection with RDF and that the use of the airfields would be limited to NATO missions.<sup>583</sup>

#### 4.8.3 Turkish Perception of NATO

In the 1970s, all the Turkish parties which had members in parliament supported Turkey's membership of NATO provided that Turkey took measures to meet

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the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, p.48, Senator Mandela's speech in Tashan, op.cit., p.20, Gruen, op.cit., p.372, J. Galen, "Turkey As a Self-Inflicted Wound...", *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 1980, p.71.

<sup>578</sup> Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO", op.cit., p.426.

<sup>579</sup> Ibid., H. Binnendijk and A. Friendly, *Turkey, Greece, and NATO: The Strained Alliance*, A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, March 1980, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, p.29.

<sup>580</sup> Rustow, op.cit., p.113.

<sup>581</sup> During the Gulf War NATO countries promised Turkey that if she came under attack because of the use of the İncirlik base NATO would come to her help. The author's interview with Fahir Armaoğlu.

<sup>582</sup> Gruen, op.cit., p.376, M.M. Boll, "Turkey's New National Security Concept...", *ORBIS*, Fall 1979, p.611, Binnendijk and Friendly, op.cit., p.12.

<sup>583</sup> W. Hale, "Turkey, NATO, and the Middle East" in R. Lawless(ed.), *Foreign Policy in the Middle East*. Durham: University of Durham, 1985, pp.57-58, Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO", op.cit., pp.438-439, G. Harris(ed.), *The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations*, Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1985, p.ix.

her security needs independent of NATO, was not dragged into conflicts unrelated to her national interests, and maintained her freedom of decision and action.<sup>584</sup> As a result of the American arms embargo, Turkish authorities became aware of Turkey's dependence on the United States in terms of military equipment and came to the conclusion that security could not be totally entrusted to their NATO allies.<sup>585</sup> They developed a new national security concept aiming at expansion of domestic defence industry for self-sufficiency in defence.<sup>586</sup> The REMO plan which was created to modernise the Turkish armed forces and to manufacture weapons at home was perceived as a step in this direction.<sup>587</sup>

Turkish rulers also expressed some adverse criticism of NATO.<sup>588</sup> Turkey's dependence on one source (the U.S.) within NATO constituted a disadvantageous position for Turkey's defence. NATO did not help Turkey to modernise her defence structure in accordance with technological developments. Turkey had been carrying too heavy a burden for NATO, allocating to NATO a proportionately greater part of her national income and manpower than any other member. Turkey had neglected her economy because of her defence burden. Turkey's contribution to NATO should be equal to NATO's contribution to Turkey's security and her position in NATO should not provoke her neighbours.

In the 1970s Turkey seemed more eager to develop relations with the Soviet Union and her other neighbours, creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence.<sup>589</sup> Although she did not purchase any Soviet military equipment she received from the Soviet Union economic aid worth 650 million dollars between 1974 and 1979.<sup>590</sup>

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<sup>584</sup> Eren, op.cit., p.47; in *MMTD*: İ.F. Cumahoğlu, 21.5.1974, term 4, sess.1, vol.4, p.527, S. Selek, ibid., p.530, Defence Minister H.E. Işık, ibid., p.550, H. Ulman, 22.5.1974, ibid., p.625, Foreign Minister T. Güneş, ibid., p.630, Prime Minister B. Ecevit, 3.7.1974, term 4, sess.1, vol.6, pp.363-364, H. Ulman, ibid., p.430, A. Akarca, 21.2.1975, term 4, sess.2, vol.9, p.454, H. Savaşçı, 13.5.1976, term 4, sess.3, vol.19, p.496.

<sup>585</sup> Sezer in Alford (ed.), op.cit., pp.66, 67.

<sup>586</sup> Boll, op.cit., pp.613-614, P.M. B. Ecevit's statements in Eren, op.cit., p.50, İ. Gürkan, *NATO, Turkey and the Southern Flank*, New York: National Strategy Information Centre, 1980, p.36.

<sup>587</sup> In *MMTD*: M. Altınoy, 20.2.1975, term 4, sess.2, vol.9, p.368, H. Savaşçı, 13.5.1976, term 4, sess.3, vol.19, p.497.

<sup>588</sup> Ecevit (Prime Minister) in Alford (ed.), op.cit., pp.136-139.

<sup>589</sup> Ibid., p.138, Gürkan, op.cit., pp.35,36.

<sup>590</sup> Campany, op.cit., pp.80-81, Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO", op.cit., p.427, CSIA European Security Working Group, "Instability and Change on NATO's Southern

In July 1976 Turkey permitted the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev to pass through the Straits.<sup>591</sup> In July 1978 Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit paid a much publicised visit to Moscow, signing there a document on friendly relations and co-operation. Although the document reiterated many of the basic principles of the Helsinki Agreement and fell short of a non-aggression pact, it caused anxieties in the Western powers.<sup>592</sup> In spite of these developments, the Turks still saw the Soviet Union as a threat to Turkish security, and in particular the rising power of the USSR in the Mediterranean worried them.<sup>593</sup> Turkish rulers also continued to express their doubts about detente, mutual troop reduction talks with the Eastern bloc and the possibility of Soviet troop transfers from Europe to the Turkish border.<sup>594</sup>

#### 4.9 Turkey's Benefits From the United States and NATO

The following information leads to the conclusion that crucial benefits from the United States in military area compels Turkey to continue its alliance with the USA.

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**Flank**", *International Security*, Winter 1978, p.172, Grimmett and Laipson, op.cit., p.45.

<sup>591</sup> CSIA, op.cit., p.172, Galen, op.cit., p.71.

<sup>592</sup> CSIA, op.cit., p.172, Boll, op.cit., p.621, Galen, op.cit., p.71.

<sup>593</sup> In *MMTD*: Defence Minister M. İzmen, 20.2.1973, term 3, sess.4, vol.34, p.454, İ.F. Cumalıoğlu, 21.5.1974, term 4, sess.1, vol.4, p.527, F. Sükan, ibid., p.535; CSIA, op.cit., p.151.

<sup>594</sup> H. Batu (Turkish diplomat), "New Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Foreign Policy*, vol.5, No.4, 1976, pp.14-15; in *MMTD*: Defence Minister M. İzmen, op.cit., p.454, Foreign Minister T. Güneş, 22.5.1974, term 4, sess.1, vol.4, p.630, Prime Minister B. Ecevit, 3.7.1974, term 4, ses.1, vol.6, p.364.

#### 4.9.1 Military and Economic Aid

**Table 1: US ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY 1946-1985(millions of dollars)**

Fiscal Year	Military	Economic
1946-1948	68.8	44.5
1949	83.5	
1950	7.3	
1951	43.1	
1952	102.0	
1949-1952		225.1
1953	151.8	
1954	238.2	
1955	178.2	
1956	191.3	
1957	152.4	
1958	249.4	
1959	196.3	
1960	92.6	
1961	85.9	
1952-1962		1,107.8
1962	156.4	195.9
1963	172.2	165.3
1964	101.6	174.8
1965	118.4	193.0
1966	126.5	160.2
1967	160.8	150.0

Fiscal Year	Military	Economic
1968	121.1	85.8
1969	124.6	91.3
1970	122.8	90.2
1971	142.1	82.7
1972	152.6	66.9
1973	148.6	22.9
1974	147.5	5.5
1975	109.1	4.4
1976	-	-
1977	125.0	0.2
1978	175.4	1.1
1979	180.3	69.6
1980	208.3	198.1
1981	253.0	201.0
1982	403.0	301.0
1983	403.0	491.0
1984	718.0	442.0
1985	704.0	477.0

Sources: Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, Office of Financial Management, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organisations, Obligations and Loan Authorisations*, July 1, 1945- June 30, 1973, p.28; *Türkiye'ye Amerikan İktisadi Yardımları, 1949-1968*, Ankara: Maliye Bakanlığı, November 1968 (this source gives great detail of U.S. economic assistance to Turkey); Binnendijk and Friendly, op.cit., p.17; Grimmett and Laipson, op.cit., p.38; Harris, op.cit., p.155; Botsas, op.cit., p.253; Couloumbis, op.cit., p.178.

Tables prepared by Shorter give some idea of the amount of U.S. military assistance to Turkey in comparison with Turkey's Gross National Product and total military expenditure. He converted U.S. aid in dollars to Turkish liras. In the table "military assistance import" represents the U.S. aid to Turkey.

**Table 2: TURKISH MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GNP (BILLION TL)**

Years	Total Military Expenditure	Military Assistance Import	GNP
1948	0.733	0.203	10.1
1949	0.712	0.156	9.3
1950	0.730	0.131	10.4
1951	0.817	0.165	12.3
1952	1.134	0.409	14.3
1953	1.318	0.491	16.8
1954	1.556	0.620	17.1
1955	1.542	0.465	21.1
1956	1.641	0.482	24.3
1957	2.090	0.824	30.5
1958	3.734	2.264	38.5
1959	3.281	1.128	47.7
1960	3.196	0.786	51.0
1961	3.468	0.750	53.7
1962	4.389	1.419	60.7

Source: F.C. Shorter, "Military Expenditures and the Allocation of Resources" in F.C. Shorter(ed.), *Four Studies on the Economic Development of Turkey*, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1967, pp.38-43.

On average, over the 15-year period (1948-1962), U.S. assistance constituted 34 percent of Turkey's total military expenditure. In 1970 total U.S. aid to Turkey constituted 2.1 percent of Turkish Domestic Product (272 million dollars in 12.8 billion dollars). This percentage became 0.71 in 1980 (406 million dollars in 56.9



billion dollars) and 1.4 in 1985 (734 million dollars in 49.7 billion dollars).<sup>595</sup> U.S. economic aid to Turkey between 1950 and 1964 was equivalent to 17 percent of total gross investment and 35 percent of total public investment in Turkey,<sup>596</sup> and it contributed to Turkey's economic growth substantially. However, too much emphasis on security led Turkish rulers to attribute secondary importance to economic development.<sup>597</sup>

Immediately after World War II, the United States was the most important trading partner of Turkey but she was replaced by West Germany after 1951. The USA's share in Turkey's trade constantly fell between 1960 and 1978: 24.2 percent in 1960-65, 15.4 percent in 1966-72 and 8.4 percent in 1973-78. Between 1956 and 1966 and between 1969 and 1972 the United States shipped grain and other products to Turkey Under Public Law 480, which allows the sale of surplus agricultural products to Third World countries against payment in local currency. Clearly, EEC countries were more important trade partners for Turkey than the USA was. Their share in Turkey's trade continuously increased, reaching 46 percent in 1973-1978.<sup>598</sup>

In the 1980s Turkey was the third largest recipient of the U.S. military and economic aid after Israel and Egypt. The U.S. Congress had a pattern of conditioning aid on good Turkish behaviour on the Cyprus question and limiting it to a ratio (10:7) between the assistance given to Turkey and Greece.<sup>599</sup>

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<sup>595</sup> Rustow, *Turkey*, op.cit., pp.136-137.

<sup>596</sup> L. Tansky, *U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967, pp.60-62.

<sup>597</sup> Ibid., pp.60, 167, 177.

<sup>598</sup> W. Hale, *the Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*, London: Croom Helm, 1981, pp.234, 240, 244-245, *Industrialization and Trade Strategy*, Washington: the World Bank, 1982, pp.417-418, A.O. Krueger, *Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Turkey*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, pp.183-184, Z.Y. Hershlag, *Turkey, the Challenge of the Growth*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968, pp.253, 373, Vali, op.cit., pp.326, 332.

<sup>599</sup> R.N. Haas, "Managing NATO's Weakest Flank; the United States, Greece and Turkey", *ORBIS*, vol.30, No.3, Fall 1986, p.466. For a detailed study of the 10:7 ratio see Stearns, op.cit., pp.40-50.

#### 4.9.2 Military Equipment

**Table 3: MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES**

Item	Number	Supplier
Aircraft	-	-
Lockheed T-33 A-N	36	USA
Lockheed RT-33A	18	FR Germany
Lockheed T-33 A-N	30	USA
Beech T-34 Mentor	24	Canada
Cessina T-37C	25	USA
Lockheed T-33	12	FR Germany
Lockheed T-33	9	USA
Cessina T-410	20	USA
Beech T-42 Boron	5	USA
Republic F-84F	(130)	USA
Republic F-84F	42	FR Germany
Republic F-84F	42	FR Germany
Republic RF-84F	(30)	USA
Republic RF-84F	(5)	France
NA F-86D Sabre	50	USA
NA F-86K Sabre	(65)	Netherland
NA F-100C SuperSabre	260	USA
NA F-100C SuperSabre	40	USA
NA F-100F SuperSabre	(25)	USA
Convair F-102A Delta Dagger	36	USA
Convair TF-102	3	USA
Lockheed F-104 Straight fighter	32	USA

Item	Number	Supplier
F-104 Straight fighter	113	-
F-104D	45	-
F-104S	18	-
TF-104	12	-
TF-104G	4	-
F-4E Phantom	80	USA
RF-4E	7	USA
Northrop F-5 Freedom fighter	140	-
Beech C-45	(8)	USA
C-47A	64	-
Douglas C-54	3	USA
Lockheed C-130 Hercules	10	USA
Transall C-160	20	FR Germany
Piper L-18 Super Cub	200	USA
Canadair CL-13 Sabre Mk4	25	UK
Canadair CL-13 Sabre	82	Canada
Cessna 421	20	-
Cessna U-17A	20	USA
Cessna 206	8	USA
Dornier Do-27	15	FR Germany
Dornier Do-27	3	FR Germany
Dornier Do-28	14	FR Germany
Dornier Do-28B-1	5	FR Germany
Bell 47G	(5)	USA
Agusta-Bell 47	20	Italy

Item	Number	Supplier
Agusta-Bell 204B	13	Italy
Agusta-Bell 204B	7	Italy
Agusta-Bell 205Iraquois	3	USA
Agusta-Bell 206AJetRanger	(35)	-
Grumman S-2 Tracker	8	Netherlands
Grumman S-2 Tracker	12	USA
Grumman TS-2	2	USA
Srat 223 Flamingo	15	FR Germany
Britten-Norman BN-2Islander	2	UK
Missiles	-	-
Nike Ajax	75	USA
Nike Hercules	(75)	USA
Usamicon MGR-1 Honest John	(24)	USA
NWC Sidewinder	(600)	USA
MBB Bo 810 Cobra2000	(300)	FR Germany
MBB Bo810 Cobra2000	(500)	FR Germany
Martin Bullpup (AGM-128)	300	USA
Nord SS.11	(100)	France
Hughes TOW(BGM-71A)	-	USA
Penguin	-	Norway
Naval Vessels	-	-
Submarine GuppyIA,II,IIA,III	9	USA
Submarine Gur Class	7	USA
Submarine rescue ship	1	USA
Submarine depot ship	1	USA

Item	Number	Supplier
Destroyer Gearing class	9	USA
Destroyer AllanMSummer	1	USA
Destroyer Fletcher class	5	USA
Destroyer Milne class	4	UK
Motor torpedo boat Jaguar	7	FR Germany
Torpedo boat Nasty	4	FR Germany
Patrol boat Akhisar	5	USA
Patrol boat Ashwille	2	USA
Coastal escor Batia	9	Canada
Coastal mine layer	6	USA
Mine layer	1	Denmark
Mine layer	2	FR Germany
Coastal mine sweeper MCB	4	Canada
Coastal mine sweeper Adjutant	12	USA
Coastal mine sweeper MSC	3	USA
Cape inshore mine sweeper	4	USA
Motor launch	4	USA
Motor launch	9	FR Germany
Repair ship	1	USA
Boom defence vessel	2	USA
Boom defence vessel	1	France
Gunboat	7	USA
Fleet ocean tug	1	USA
Barracks craft	1	USA
Supply ship	1	FR Germany

Item	Number	Supplier
Armoured fighting vehicles	-	-
M-36	(25)	USA
M-26 Pershing	(100)	USA
M-24 Chaffee	(50)	USA
M-47 main battle tanks	500	USA
M-48A1 main battle tanks	2,775	USA
M-48A5 main battle tanks	180	USA
Leopard IA3 main battle tanks	77	FR Germany
M-60A1 main battle tanks	-	USA
M-41 Lighttank	(100)	USA
M-113 armoured personnel carrier	1,400	USA
M-59 armoured personnel carrier	(400)	USA
V-150 commando vehicle		USA
M-44 and M-52	24	FR Germany
M-74	69	FR Germany
M-59 155mm towed guns	150	USA
M-107 175mm self-propelled guns	36	USA
M-101A-1 105mm howitzer	600	USA
M-114A1 155mm howitzer	400	USA
M-7 105mm howitzer	345	USA
M-44 155mm howitzer	108	USA
M.110 203mm howitzer	-	USA
M-1A1 40mm antiaircraft gun	900	USA
M-51 75mm antiaircraft gun	-	USA
M-118 90mm antiaircraft gun	-	USA
M-117 90mm antiaircraft gun	-	USA

Sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *Arms Trade Registers*, Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksel International, 1975, pp.126-130; *Journal of Defence and Diplomacy*, vol.3, No.9, September 1985, pp.34-35; Binnendijk and Friendly, op.cit., p.15; C.F. Foss, *Jane's Pocket Book of Towed Artillery*, London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1977, pp.31, 87, 133, 135, 197, 239, 247, 251, 253; R. Pretty, *Jane's Pocket Book of Missiles*, London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1978, pp.49, 64, 84, 149, 201; J.W.R. Taylor, *Jane's Pocket Book 2 Major Combat Aircraft*, London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1978, pp.23, 49, 51, 97, 131, 149, 151, 185, 191; J.E. Moore, *Jane's Pocket Book 1 Major Warships*, London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1978, pp.20, 44-46, 125-127, 146, 181, 189, 209; C.F. Foss, *Jane's Pocket Book Modern Tanks and Armoured Fighting Vehicles*, London: Jane's, 1981, pp.21, 57, 59, 61, 63, 149, 207, 209, 215, 259, 263, 265, 267, 269; Lewis, op.cit., pp.130, 136, 143, 150, 152, 153. For claims that equipment of the Turkish army is antiquated and that its control systems are inefficient see Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO", op.cit., pp.440-441, Galen, op.cit., p.66-67, *Journal of Defence and Diplomacy*, op.cit., p.34.

According to Military Assistance Program Data of U.S. Defense Security Agency, the United States delivered the following military material to Turkey as of 7 August 1974:<sup>600</sup> (a) Tactical aircraft (some tactical aircraft, plus all 8 inch howitzer, and Honest John rockets can be used for tactical nuclear purposes): 965. (b) Destroyers: 2. (c) Submarines: 7. (d) Tanks (all types): 3,915. (e) Armoured personnel carriers: 1,827. (f) Self-propelled artillery: 861. (g) Towed artillery: 1,127. (h) NIKE missiles: 540. (i) Honest John missiles: 831. (j) Recoilless rifles (90-106mm); 2,044. (k) Mortars (81mm- 4.2in): 1,248. (l) Machine-guns: 14,296. (m) Rifles: 320,450. (n) 1:4 ton trucks: 22,588. (o) Two and half ton trucks: 23,928. (p) Tactical radios: 21, 811.

#### 4.10 Importance of Turkey for the USA

The information in the following sections, which was derived from articles, books and speeches of scholars and Turkish and American officials, considers mostly the period before the disengagement of the Soviet Union, and therefore expresses

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<sup>600</sup> Cited by Collins, op.cit., p.50. The wide discrepancies between above lists and this list may be accounted for by the fact that the latter list refers to outright U.S. grants to Turkey whereas the former lists include items purchased.

the viewpoints concerned as they were stated at the time. Some of the points made then might be applied to the post-Soviet Union period as well.

#### 4.10.1 Importance of Turkey's Strategic Position

Under the provisions of the Montreaux Convention, Turkey has control over the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, which link the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. She was in the unique position of being able to close the Straits and thereby deny the Soviet Black Sea Fleet access into the Mediterranean and cut off all Soviet naval vessels operating in the Mediterranean from their homeports and lines of communications. If the Turkish control over passage through the Straits was abrogated, Soviet naval vessels would enjoy a significant surge capacity in times of international crises or war and thus NATO forces would have to contend with much greater Soviet power in the Mediterranean. The Straits were the major route used by Soviet navy and merchant ships to reach the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East. With the Straits and the Suez Canal open, Soviet ships could easily reach the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. Turkey had the potential to deny these vital opportunities to the Russians. The requirements to give advance notice to warship transit and to traverse only on the surface by submarine in the Straits provided continuing intelligence opportunities for the West in peacetime. Soviet ships could easily be monitored in this way.<sup>601</sup>

Turkey has control over the high plateau of Anatolia which commands the entire Fertile Crescent down to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. She lies along the roads from the Balkans to the Middle East and from the Caucasus to the Persian Gulf; she commands land, sea and air communications in much of the Balkans and the Middle East. She controlled the ideal Soviet land route to oilfields of the Persian Gulf.<sup>602</sup> Turkey was also in a position to regulate and deny Soviet overflights to the

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<sup>601</sup> *The Military Aspects of Banning Arms Aid to Turkey*, op.cit., pp.7, 16, 24, 41, 47; Vali, op.cit., pp.46, 216-217; Couloumbis, op.cit., pp.137, 187; Company, op.cit., pp.v-vi; McGhee, op.cit., p.170; M. Krahenbuhl, *Turkish-American Relations; An Affair to Remember*, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1974, p.2; Haas, op.cit., p.458; Gürkan, op.cit., p.13; Lewis, op.cit., pp.28, 31-32, 70-72; Collins, op.cit., pp.5-6, 15,17; *United States Security Agreements*, op.cit., p.1817; Stearns, op.cit., pp.53, 59.

<sup>602</sup> Karpas (ed.), op.cit., p.2, Vali, op.cit., pp.xi-xii, Company, op.cit., pp.v-vi, McGhee, op.cit., pp.88-89, L.V. Thomas and R.N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951, p.145.



Middle East.<sup>603</sup> She served as an obstacle and powerful deterrence to any Soviet aggression directed toward Southern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.<sup>604</sup>

Apart from Norway, Turkey was the only NATO country which shared a long border (1500 mile) with the Soviet Union.<sup>605</sup> She was vital to the security and stability of NATO's southern flank and constituted the first line of defence for the flank.<sup>606</sup> The Turkish armed forces strengthened NATO in the eastern Mediterranean, enabling it to control the region and giving to it superiority against the Soviet power in the area.<sup>607</sup> Turkey contributed the second largest land force to NATO; 490,000 men, 15 divisions and 20 air squadrons.<sup>608</sup> The Turkish forces tied down 50 Warsaw Pact divisions on the east of Turkey and Baltic fronts, which could otherwise be concentrated against other areas of NATO, including the central sector.<sup>609</sup> Turkey served as a staging ground for counterattacks against the Soviet Union and provided facilities for NATO forward tactical operations and support activities.<sup>610</sup> And finally Turkey provided a valuable link between the Islamic World and the West as a member of both the Islamic Conference and NATO.<sup>611</sup>

#### 4.10.2 Importance of U.S. Bases in Turkey

The United States had 61 military facilities in Turkey as of June 30, 1976.<sup>612</sup> The following conflation of American assessments of some of them illustrates the importance of these facilities to the U.S.

**Intelligence-collection stations:**<sup>613</sup> 1- Sinop (on the Black Sea coast in

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<sup>603</sup> Sezer in Alford(ed.), op.cit., p.63, Collins, op.cit., p.17, *the Military Aspects...*, op.cit., p.3.

<sup>604</sup> McGhee, op.cit., pp.88-89, Sezer in Alford(ed.), op.cit., p.63, Thomas and Frye, op.cit., p.145, Collins, op.cit., p.5, *the Military Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.6,9, 16,74.

<sup>605</sup> *The Military Aspects...*, op.cit., p.3, Gürkan, op.cit., pp.14-15.

<sup>606</sup> Vali, op.cit., pp.xi-xii, 373, Company, op.cit., p.v, Sezer in Alford(ed.), op.cit., p.63, Krahenbuhl, op.cit., p.2, *the Military Aspects...*, op.cit., p.6.

<sup>607</sup> McGhee, op.cit., p.170, Collins, op.cit., pp.ix,9.

<sup>608</sup> *The Military Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.3,16, 62,74, Collins, op.cit., p.9.

<sup>609</sup> *The Military Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.6,9, 10,17, 24,47,74, Collins, op.cit., pp.9,16, McGhee, op.cit., p.170, Haas, op.cit., p.,458.

<sup>610</sup> *The Military Aspects....* op.cit., p.6.

<sup>611</sup> Company, op.cit., p.vi.

<sup>612</sup> Grimmett, op.cit., p.8n.

<sup>613</sup> Ibid., p.39, Couloumbis, op.cit., pp.135-136, Lewis, op.cit., pp.29-30. For the following information on bases see also Grimmett and Laipson, op.cit., pp.15-23, Binnendijk and Friendly, op.cit., pp.8-9.

north-central Turkey almost directly opposite Yalta): A radar monitoring and communications facility, manned by personnel from the Army Security Agency (ASA), a component of the National Security Agency (NSA). It collected data on the Soviet Union's air and naval activities in the Black Sea area, as well as that country's missile testing activities. 2- Samsun (on the Black Sea coast in north-central Turkey): A communications site, associated with Sinop, manned by personnel of the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), also a component of NSA. Radars at Samsun had been tracking down Soviet missile test shots from Kapustin Yar (east of Volgograd) since 1955 - including SLBMs.<sup>614</sup> 3- Karamürsel Air Station (located on the south-east shore of the Sea of Marmara and south-east of İstanbul): A communications and monitoring installation which tracked Soviet naval traffic in the western Black Sea area and the area surrounding the Straits. It was manned by USAFSS personnel. 4- Diyarbakır Air Station (in south-eastern Turkey near the Syrian border): A long-range radar and communications complex that tracked Soviet missile launches from various Soviet testing sites and monitored other Soviet military activities. Its activities were carried out by personnel of USAFSS. 5- The Belbaşı Station (near Ankara in central Turkey): A seismographic detection base which monitored Soviet nuclear tests.

Intelligence collection installations were vital to monitor Soviet military activity in the south-eastern military districts of that country, development of certain Soviet weapons systems, Soviet nuclear explosions and missile tests, and Soviet compliance with SALT treaties, ABM and Test Ban treaties.<sup>615</sup> U.S. Secretary of Defence Harold Brown stated that some of them were irreplaceable and more important than those in Greece.<sup>616</sup> The former NATO Supreme Commander, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, described their importance as follows: "There is no area in the world comparable to Turkey as a vital base of intelligence-gathering operations against the Warsaw Pact... These bases when fully operational are capable of providing valuable and irreplaceable intelligence coverage for which no substitute is available."<sup>617</sup>

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<sup>614</sup> Collins, op.cit., p.13.

<sup>615</sup> *The Military Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.16, 26,65, Collins, op.cit., p.13, Grimmett, op.cit., pp.37, 46-47, Lewis, op.cit., pp.30-31, Gruen, op.cit., p.367.

<sup>616</sup> *The Military Aspects...*, op.cit., p.26.

<sup>617</sup> Campany, op.cit., p.57.

**The U.S. Defence Communication System (DSC) terminals:** 6 in European Turkey, 5 in Ankara area, 13 in İzmit area, 3 in İzmir area, 7 in Diyarbakır area, 2 in İncirlik area, 3 in Malatya area, 1 in Sinop and 1 in Samsun.<sup>618</sup> The Yamanlar facility in western Turkey just north of İzmir connects Turkey with Greece through the Mt. Pateras terminal, located south of Athens. It is also connected to the Şahin Tepesi terminal, which links the Karamürsel-Yalova communications terminals with a number of European Turkey DSC sites and with the Elmadağ terminal, which is located north-east of Ankara. The Elmadağ terminal is linked to the Samsun communications facility near the Black Sea coast and the Karataş terminal near the İncirlik Air Base, which is connected with the Malatya terminal in east-central Turkey. The Malatya terminal is linked to the Diyarbakır terminal which houses a Defence Satellite Communications System earth terminal that is connected with Lakehurst Naval Air Station in Lakehurst, N.J.<sup>619</sup>

**NADGE (NATO's Air Defence Grand Environment) early-warning radar sites:** They are spread throughout Turkey: Ankara, İzmit, Eskişehir, Lüleburgaz, Bartın, Diyarbakır, Merzifon, Perşembe, Pazar, Erzurum, Mardin, Çanakkale, Sarıkışla, Kargapazar.<sup>620</sup> 19 fully-integrated, semi-automatic sites astride the Aegean centralise missile and aircraft warning efforts in that area and direct air defence actions in response to proven and possible threats.<sup>621</sup> For Soviet aircraft overflying near either Greece or Turkey, warning could be provided while these aircraft were over Bulgaria or the Black Sea. Early-warning is critical to the operation of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.<sup>622</sup>

**Airbases, stations:** 1- The İncirlik Air Base (located near the city of Adana in south-central Turkey): The major tactical fighter base in Turkey, where USAFE (U.S. Air Forces, Europe) F-4 squadrons from Torrejon Air Base in Spain and Aviano Air Base in Italy serve on a rotational basis. U.S. fighters located at İncirlik are the most forward deployed land-based American aircraft in the eastern Mediterranean that are capable of launching a tactical nuclear airstrike in the event

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<sup>618</sup> Collins, op.cit., pp.62-63.

<sup>619</sup> Grimmett, op.cit., pp.39, 41.

<sup>620</sup> Collins, op.cit., p.62.

<sup>621</sup> Ibid., p.12.

<sup>622</sup> *The Military Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.6,62.

of conflict in the region.<sup>623</sup> 2- Karamürsel Air Base (near the city of İzmit): It might be used to guard against any threat to the Straits.<sup>624</sup> 3- The Ankara Air Station: Ankara also houses The Joint U.S. Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT) and the U.S. Logistic Group (TUSLOG), which is the central logistical and support command for all U.S. supply services in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.<sup>625</sup> 4- The İzmir Air Station (in west-central Turkey off the Aegean coast) and the Çiğli Air Base: İzmir is the site of an air support base for USAFE, as well as the headquarters of NATO's Allied Land Forces, South-eastern Europe (LANDSOUTHEAST) and the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force (SIXATAF). A USAFE tactical airbase is located in Çiğli, north of İzmir.<sup>626</sup>

**ACE High communications sites:** 12 communications sites in Turkey are associated with NATO's tropospheric scatter network (ACE High): Ankara, İzmir, Eskişehir, Elmadag, Amasra, Merzifon, Perşembe, Pazar, Sivas, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Adana.<sup>627</sup>

**Storage facilities:** İskenderun and Yumurtalık are the most important supply, and storage centres for U.S. military forces in the extreme eastern Mediterranean.<sup>628</sup>

The Kargaburun U.S. Navy LORAN (long-range aid to navigation) station, located on the northern shore of the Sea of Marmara, is an installation which assists U.S. military aircraft in fixing their positions in the eastern Mediterranean from long ranges through electronic radio-navigational devices.<sup>629</sup>

The report of Grimmett claims that in the event that the United States had to withdraw from its bases in Turkey,

Greece would be able to provide the most viable and useful base sites for relocation from Turkey of naval and air support installations and facilities for tactical fighter aircraft... Certain defence communications installations currently in Turkey could be

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<sup>623</sup> Grimmett, op.cit., p.41, Collins, op.cit., p.10, Couloubis, op.cit., p.136.

<sup>624</sup> Lewis, op.cit., p.30.

<sup>625</sup> Grimmett, op.cit., p.41, Collins, op.cit., p.12, Couloubis, op.cit., pp.135, 136, Lewis, op.cit., p.30.

<sup>626</sup> Grimmett, op.cit., p.41, Collins, op.cit., p.12, Couloubis, op.cit., pp.135, 136, Lewis, op.cit., p.30.

<sup>627</sup> Collins, op.cit., pp.12, 62.

<sup>628</sup> Grimmett, op.cit., p.41.

<sup>629</sup> Ibid., p.41, Couloubis, op.cit., p.135.

replaced by use of other communications systems, including those that presently interconnect with Greece, and through the use of satellites. All of the above, of course, would require the approval of the Greek government.<sup>630</sup>

Mentioning the views of U.S. policy-makers that some intelligence facilities in Turkey could not be replaced, Grimmett's report states: "Yet since collection of intelligence data on the Soviet Union's military activities by the United States does not depend upon Turkish installations alone... the essential problem... would be a loss of information that could strongly confirm data... obtained from other sources." As alternatives it gives satellites, Crete, Greece and Iran (unavailable after 1979).<sup>631</sup> These opinions cannot change the fact that U.S. officials attributed great importance to their facilities in Turkey.

#### 4.10.3 Turkey's Position With Respect to the Middle East

Turkey's importance to the United States with respect to the Middle East can be understood better if U.S. stated aims in the Middle East are mentioned: 1- To deter Soviet armed aggression against the region. 2- To secure NATO's southern flank. 3- To encourage stability in the Middle East. 4- To support friendly states like Israel. 5- To maintain western supply lines in the Mediterranean. 6- To ensure continued access to Middle Eastern oil.<sup>632</sup>

Turkey protected the Middle East against Soviet expansion and influence by constituting a barrier between the Soviet Union and the region.<sup>633</sup> The United States would lose substantially its political and military posture and influence in the Middle East without the collaboration of Turkey.<sup>634</sup> In the absence of the Turkish barrier, "Soviet support for and accessibility to such countries as Syria and Iraq would have been much more pervasive and potentially threatening to

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<sup>630</sup> Grimmett, op.cit., p.45.

<sup>631</sup> Ibid., pp.46-47. See also Collins, op.cit., p.17.

<sup>632</sup> Grimmett, op.cit., p.5, Collins, op.cit., p.2.

<sup>633</sup> McGhee, op.cit., pp.xvi, 174, 176,177, B. Lewis's Preface in Rustow, op.cit., pp.vii, ix, Rustow, op.cit., pp.107, 110, Tashan, op.cit., pp.21, 22, *the Military Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.6, 75. Former U.S. ambassador Stearns claims that the hope that Turkey would help discourage Soviet take-overs in the Middle East was exaggerated. He argues that as was proved by the Gulf War Turkey is likely to play the role of stepping stone rather than a barrier in the context of the Middle East. Stearns, op.cit., pp.52-53.

<sup>634</sup> Vali, op.cit., p.372, Collins, op.cit., p.ix.

U.S. interests in the region”<sup>635</sup> and Israel would not be able to “maintain its status as a regional power and cope with continuing Arab hostility without the risk of facing... the full force of the Red Army.”<sup>636</sup> Turkey neutralised potential risks of the Middle Eastern region for U.S. global strategy,<sup>637</sup> contributed to the stability of the region, which was essential for U.S. interests<sup>638</sup> and provided an important access to the Middle East and Africa.<sup>639</sup> The İncirlik air base in Turkey served as a staging base for U.S. contingents for use in the Middle East and an important stopover for transport airport en route to the Persian Gulf.<sup>640</sup>

Some developments in the 1980s increased Turkey’s importance to the United States vis-a-vis the Middle East: 1- The Middle East continued to be NATO countries’ main source of energy (oil and gas) and raw materials which were essential to their economic well-being.<sup>641</sup> 2- Soviet military build up in its southern military districts, the invasion of Afghanistan, the expansion of Soviet influence to Aden and Ethiopia, and growing Soviet military presence in Syria threatened the regional balance. 3- The Iranian revolution in 1979 and growth of Islamic fundamentalism in its aftermath posed threats to the stability of the region. 4- The Iranian hostage crisis. 5- The Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s.<sup>642</sup> 6- The upgrading of some airfields in eastern Turkey in the early 1980s made Turkey more valuable as a possible base for rapid deployment in the Middle East.<sup>643</sup> 7- The important role played by Turkey in the allied coalition against Iraq in 1991 led U.S. officials to assess Turkey’s strategic significance in its Middle East context once again.<sup>644</sup>

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<sup>635</sup> B.R. Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol.70, No.2, Spring 1991, p.39.

<sup>636</sup> Rustow, op.cit., p.110.

<sup>637</sup> Ibid., p.111.

<sup>638</sup> *The Military Aspects...*, op.cit., p.15.

<sup>639</sup> Ibid., p.3.

<sup>640</sup> Collins, op.cit., p.16.

<sup>641</sup> Richard Burt, “Turkey and the Reagan Administration” in Harris(ed.), op.cit., p.19, Gürkan, op.cit., pp.4, 34, *the Military Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.24,47.

<sup>642</sup> Burt, op.cit., p.19, Barry Rubin, “Middle East Policy in the Turkish Context” in Harris (ed.), op.cit., pp.75,78.

<sup>643</sup> Rustow, op.cit., pp.113-114.

<sup>644</sup> Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West”, op.cit., pp.34,43.

## 4.11 Conclusion

The close military relationship in the 1950s opened the way for U.S. influence on Turkey and eventually brought about the anti-American atmosphere of the 1960s in Turkey. The closeness of the relationship during honeymoon period in the 1950s was far beyond that is seen in normal inter-state relations. The excessive confidence of Turkish rulers in the United States as a close companion who would do anything to protect her “dear” partner against hostile forces led them to entrust the Turkish military establishment to American experts. The presence of U.S. military officers and the flow of U.S. military equipment were enthusiastically welcomed. Together with a firm stance in favour of Western powers in international forums, this situation caused the portrayal of Turkey’s image as the satellite of the United States in the eyes of international community. The following factors brought about the spread of anti-Americanism among Turkish people in the 1960s: Misconduct by officials on both sides who exceeded their authority by signing of various bilateral military agreements; misuse of their rights and privileges by U.S. personnel in Turkey; U.S. use of Turkish territory for secret reconnaissance flights; free political discussion atmosphere in Turkey, which was introduced by the 1960 constitution; apparent U.S. indifference to the fate of Turkish Cypriots at the hands of the Greek Cypriots; President Johnson’s bitter letter, which stated that NATO might not protect Turkey against a Soviet attack and which warned that Turkish rulers should not use U.S.-supplied weapons for purposes not approved by the USA.

Public pressures and the disappointing attitude of the USA led Turkish rulers to take some actions to gain initiative in their military relations with the Americans. Their actions, which displeased U.S. officials to some extent, surely showed that they were not merely a puppet of the United States and that they might reject important U.S. demands if these demands were not compatible with Turkish interests. However, it should be stated that changes brought about by these actions were not radical and that the real character of the U.S.-Turkish military relationship which was hidden in secret bilateral agreements continued to be a mystery. Turkey’s military dependence on the United States has also continued up to now though Turkish rulers sought alternative defence partners and sources. U.S. officials sometimes felt disappointment with some Turkish attitudes in the defence area such as the use of bases and U-2 flights but they were generally pleased

with Turkey's commitment to NATO and the availability of Turkish bases for their general use. Nevertheless, U.S. authorities knew that Turkey could take drastic measures against them in the defence area if she was forced to do so.



## Chapter V

### THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962 AND TURKEY

The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 came to a point which concerned Turkey's very survival. The crisis had started in mid-October 1962 when American U-2 planes spotted some Soviet SAMs (surface-to-air missiles) on Cuban soil and President Kennedy decided to enforce a naval blockade of Cuba. While the two superpowers approached the brink of armed conflict, probably a nuclear war, removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey in return for the Soviet removal of its missiles from Cuba seemed to many an appropriate way to end the crisis. At the peak of the crisis, on 27 October 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev officially proposed such a solution. The Cuban crisis presents a good example of evaluating different aspects of the U.S.-Turkish alliance, which were mentioned in Chapter II. In this chapter events and discussions surrounding the Jupiters during the crisis will be studied in order to explore how Turkey's alliance with the United States made her a party to a superpower conflict and put her survival under threat.

#### 5.1 History of the Jupiters

When the Soviets successfully launched the first Sputnik in 1957, the Eisenhower administration feared that the Soviets were leading the West in nuclear armament and that a deterrence or at least a confidence gap was emerging. To strengthen NATO both militarily and psychologically, the United States gained unanimous approval of NATO members for stationing American-made intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe.<sup>645</sup> However, most NATO allies declined to accept deployment of missiles on their territories because they were fearful of provoking

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<sup>645</sup> *The Times*, 29 October 1962, p.8, B.J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?", *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.95, No.1, Spring 1980, pp.98-99, M.R. Beschloss, *Kennedy v. Khrushchev*, London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1991, p.439.

Soviet aggression, becoming a target of a nuclear war and provoking domestic opposition.<sup>646</sup> Only Britain, Italy and Turkey consented to take these missiles.<sup>647</sup>

The agreement for installing fifteen Jupiters in Turkey was signed in October 1959 between the USA and Turkey. According to the agreement "the missiles would be owned by the United States...; the weapons could be launched only on the order of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (an American) on the approval of both American and Turkish governments; and the sites would be manned by soldiers of both nations."<sup>648</sup> The Turkish government did not make this agreement public though Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu promised in January 1959 that the Turkish Parliament would be informed when the Jupiter agreement was concluded.<sup>649</sup> The Jupiters went to Turkey at about the time of Soviet Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959.<sup>650</sup> Preliminary installation arrangements were accomplished during the era of the Menderes government, which was toppled by a military coup on 27 May 1960.<sup>651</sup> Despite strong Soviet objections to these activities the new Turkish military regime went along in carrying out preliminary works at the same speed. Turkish crews were sent to America for special training and installations for the missiles were constructed in the İzmir area in the west of Turkey. As George Harris stated, "the Turkish military rulers appeared far more eager to receive these missiles than Washington to provide them."<sup>652</sup>

The Jupiters were installed in Turkey in late 1961 by the Kennedy administration to implement the 1959 agreement. They became fully operational in about July 1962.<sup>653</sup> But the actual transfer of the first Jupiter missile (warheads remained under American control) to Turkish armed forces took place on 22 October 1962, on the same day Kennedy announced the quarantine of Cuba.<sup>654</sup>

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<sup>646</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.99, "Başyazı", *Forum*, 1 June 1964, p.4.

<sup>647</sup> Beschloss, op.cit., p.439, R.L. Garthoff, *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989, p.71n.

<sup>648</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.99.

<sup>649</sup> G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p.92.

<sup>650</sup> Beschloss, op.cit., p.439.

<sup>651</sup> G.S. Harris, "Turkey and the United States" in K.H. Karpat (ed.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, p.58.

<sup>652</sup> Ibid, p.58.

<sup>653</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.100, T.C. Reeves, *A Question of Character: A Life of John F. Kennedy*, New York: The Free Press, 1991, p.375, Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.92.

<sup>654</sup> J.G. Blight and D.A. Welch, *On the Brink*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1989, p.172.

## 5.2 U.S. Attempts to Remove the Jupiters from Turkey

As early as 11 February 1961, a report of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, entitled “the Study of US and NATO Nuclear Arrangements”, recommended that “construction should not be permitted to begin on the Jupiter sites in Turkey. Instead of placing obsolete liquid-fuel IRBMs in Turkey, an alternative system such as Polaris submarines should be assigned to NATO.”<sup>655</sup> Unlike the Jupiters, which were inaccurate and vulnerable, “the Polaris would add to deterrence and better protect the United States, NATO and Turkey” since they were “mobile, concealed and thus virtually immune from a Soviet attack.”<sup>656</sup>

U.S. President John Kennedy raised the question of the Jupiters in a National Security Council meeting on 29 March 1961. According to a NSC memorandum on this meeting, which was dated 6 April 1961, the president instructed a committee consisting of officials of Departments of State and Defence and the CIA to review the issue of stationing IRBMs in Turkey.<sup>657</sup> A member of this committee, George McGhee, reports in his book that in a meeting he was asked by the president, “if I thought the Turks would permit us to take the IRBMs out. I replied that I doubted it...”<sup>658</sup> In his book McGhee also cites that in their talk during a CENTO meeting the Turkish foreign minister strongly opposed removal of the IRBMs because Turkey “had put a good deal of money into the installations of the Jupiters, which had just come into place”, and therefore “it would be difficult for the Turkish people to understand their removal without any compensating additions to their security.”<sup>659</sup> McGhee’s report on 22 June 1961 to McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s special assistant for national security, argued against cancellation of the Jupiters project; “in the aftermath of Khrushchev’s hard posture at Vienna, cancellation... might seem a weakness,”<sup>660</sup> moreover, the Turkish military was unwilling to aban-

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<sup>655</sup> G.T. Allison, *Essence of Decision*, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971, pp.311n, 312n, Blight and Welch, op.cit., p.172, Bernstein, op.cit., p.100.

<sup>656</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.100.

<sup>657</sup> Blight and Welch, op.cit., pp.100-101.

<sup>658</sup> G. McGhee, *The US Turkish NATO Middle East Connection*, London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1990, p.166.

<sup>659</sup> Ibid., p.166.

<sup>660</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.101, D. Detzer, *The Brink; Cuban Missile Crisis 1962*, London: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1979, p.157, Beschloss, op.cit., p.439.

don the project.<sup>661</sup> General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, warned that the Turks could feel insulted if the Jupiters were removed and that this could cause some problems within NATO.<sup>662</sup>

In Dean Rusk's account, in their meeting in May 1961, Selim Sarper, the Turkish foreign minister, told him that "they had just gotten from their parliament the appropriations for the Turkish side of the cost of those missiles, and it would be very embarrassing to go right back to them and say that they were being taken out... It would be very bad for the morale of Turkey as a member of NATO if they were taken out before Polaris submarines were in the Mediterranean to take their place."<sup>663</sup> In fact, as Secretary of Defence McNamara confirmed, there were no extra Polaris submarines at that time to offer the Turks.<sup>664</sup> A study of the American administration on the Jupiters, which was completed in early 1962, deduced that these missiles were worthless, and therefore should be phased out.<sup>665</sup>

It seems that Turkish military leaders who were anxious to obtain modern weaponry believed that the Jupiters, which were a part of their military asset, increased Turkey's military capabilities and strengthened its security against the Soviet Union. The newly installed civilian government was in no position to insist on withdrawing missiles over the opposition of the Turkish armed forces.<sup>666</sup> Turkish officials probably did not think about strategic liabilities of the missiles. For them the Jupiters "added prestige, emphasised Turkey's role in NATO, and exaggerated the warmth of relations with a great power, the United States. The missiles were political assets abroad and possibly at home."<sup>667</sup>

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<sup>661</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.101.

<sup>662</sup> Detzer, op.cit., p.157, Beschloss, op.cit., pp. 439-440.

<sup>663</sup> Blight and Welch, op.cit., p.173. See also Allison, op.cit., pp.141, 226, R.F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc., 1971, p.72, Bernstein, op.cit., p.102, Hafner, op.cit., pp.318-319. Former Turkish foreign minister Ü. Haluk Bayülken confirmed Sarper's response. According to him, Sarper agreed with the Americans but thought that Turkish military rulers who recently overthrew the government could misunderstand the U.S. proposal. Bayülken told the author that he himself heard the U.S. proposal from Dean Rusk.

<sup>664</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., pp. 101-102.

<sup>665</sup> Allison, op.cit., p.141, E. Abel, *The Missile Crisis*, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966, p.190, D.L. Hafner, "Bureaucratic Politics and Those Frigging Missiles", *ORBIS*, vol.21, no.2, Summer 1977, p.318.

<sup>666</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., pp.92-93.

<sup>667</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., pp.99, 100.

In August 1962 during a National Security Council meeting President Kennedy ordered U.S. officials to investigate what action could be taken to get the Jupiters out of Turkey in the light of the new Soviet bloc activity in Cuba.<sup>668</sup> It is clear that Kennedy linked the Jupiter missiles in Turkey to the Cuban problem, presumably concerning that the Soviets might justify an arming of Cuba with nuclear arms by pointing to the Jupiters in Turkey. In the late summer of 1962 when Secretary of State Rusk was in Europe, President Kennedy pressed Undersecretary of State George Ball to push forward the issue.<sup>669</sup> During their talks, the Turkish ambassador to Washington told Ball that removal of the Jupiters would have harmful effects on Turkish public opinion.<sup>670</sup> After this initiative State Department officials decided not to pursue the issue so as not to allow relations with the Turks to deteriorate.

Some authors claim that before the Cuban crisis erupted Kennedy had already ordered the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy and erased this issue from his mind assuming that his orders had been carried out. According to these authors, Khrushchev's proposal of Turkey-for-Cuba trade on 27 October 1962 made Kennedy aware of the fact that his orders had not been implemented by American bureaucrats. However, as most authors who studied the Cuban missile crisis argue, although President Kennedy several times gave instructions to review the matter of removing the Jupiter missiles, he never actually ordered their removal and knew that they were still in Turkey when the Cuban crisis broke out.<sup>671</sup> The NSC Action Memorandum of 23 August 1962, the last move of the Kennedy administration before the Cuban crisis to remove the Jupiters, ordered State Department officials only to study what actions could be taken to get the missiles out of Turkey. Even if it had ordered their removal, it would be practically impossible to finish the job by the time when the Cuban crisis came about.<sup>672</sup> During the

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<sup>668</sup> Reeves, *A Question of Character*, op.cit., p.375, Bernstein, op.cit., pp. 102-103.

<sup>669</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.102, Allison, op.cit., pp.142, 226, Kennedy, op.cit., pp.72-73, Abel, op.cit., pp. 190-191.

<sup>670</sup> Abel, op.cit., p.191, Allison, *Essence of Decision*, op.cit., p.142.

<sup>671</sup> Reeves, op.cit., p.375, Garthoff, *Reflections...*, op.cit., p.71n, Bernstein, "the Cuban Missile Crisis", op.cit., pp. 103-104, Detzer, *the Brink*, op.cit., pp.157, 244, G.W. Ball, *the Past Has Another Pattern*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1982, p.501n.

<sup>672</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.103.

crisis the Turkey-for-Cuba trade was discussed by American officials and Kennedy was aware of it and he was himself involved in some of these discussions.<sup>673</sup>

### 5.3 Role of Jupiters in the Russian Move in Cuba

To explore the role of the Jupiters in the Soviet action to arm Cuba with nuclear weapons will show to what extent Turkey contributed to a major move of a superpower with nuclear missiles on its territory, whose warheads belonged to another superpower.

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev began questioning encirclement of the Soviet Union by American military bases as early as 1958 when he complained to Adlai Stevenson, the Kennedy administration's ambassador to the United Nations, that "we see ourselves surrounded by military bases... The Americans have bases in England, Turkey, Greece... What would the Americans think if the Russians set up bases in Mexico or some other place? How would you feel?"<sup>674</sup> In June 1959, Khrushchev expressed his feeling of humiliation by the American nuclear bases close to the Soviet border during his conversation with Averell Harriman, two-time American presidential candidate who had served as Franklin Roosevelt's wartime envoy to Stalin.<sup>675</sup>

In summer 1959 U.S. President Eisenhower predicted that placing the Jupiters near the Soviet Union could lead the Russians to take actions in other places: "If Mexico or Cuba had been penetrated by the communists and then began getting arms and missiles from [the Soviets], we would be bound to look on such developments with the gravest concern and in fact... it would be imperative for us to take... offensive military action."<sup>676</sup> In the same summer, Premier Khrushchev complained to U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon about the American plan to station the Jupiters in Turkey.<sup>677</sup>

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<sup>673</sup> McGeorge Bundy's recollection approves this point. Ibid., p.104, Reeves, op.cit., p.375.

<sup>674</sup> Beschloss, *Kennedy v. Khrushchev*, op.cit., pp. 381-382.

<sup>675</sup> Ibid., p.382.

<sup>676</sup> B.R. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey" in J.A. Nathan(ed.), *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, p.58.

<sup>677</sup> Ibid., pp.58-59.

When some rumours erupted in February 1961 that the Americans were planning to transfer ownership of the Jupiter missiles to the Turks, Nikita Ryzhov, the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, asked the Turkish foreign minister to tell him what was going on.<sup>678</sup> During their summit meeting in June 1961, Khrushchev told Kennedy: "can six million people really be a threat to the mighty United States? If the United States felt threatened by tiny Cuba, what was the Soviet Union to do about Turkey and Iran? These two countries are followers of the United States. They march in its wake, and they have U.S. bases and rockets."<sup>679</sup> In his interview with American columnist Drew Pearson in August 1961, Khrushchev pointed to the American bases in Turkey; "maybe they are going to blow us up here."<sup>680</sup>

It was suggested that Khrushchev first got the idea of deploying nuclear missiles to Cuba in April 1962 during his talk with Defence Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky in Crimea.<sup>681</sup> Malinovsky told him that nuclear missiles in Turkey, just across the Black Sea, "could in a short time destroy all our southern cities... The Americans have surrounded us with bases on all sides, and we have no possibility and right to do the same."<sup>682</sup>

During his visit to Bulgaria in May 1962, Khrushchev strongly criticised the installation of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey.<sup>683</sup> The Soviet government issued a public statement on 11 September 1962 complaining that

The whole world knows that the United States has ringed the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with bases... They have brought armaments there in their ships, and these armaments stationed along the frontier of the Soviet Union - in Turkey, Iran, Greece, Italy, Britain, Holland, Pakistan and other countries belonging to the military blocs of NATO, CENTO and SEATO... They consider this their right! But to others the United States does not permit this even for defence...<sup>684</sup>

Under this awareness of what American bases and missiles around the Soviet Union meant, the Soviets were struck with the idea of using the same American

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<sup>678</sup> Beschloss, *op.cit.*, p.65.

<sup>679</sup> *Ibid.*, p.200.

<sup>680</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.290, 382.

<sup>681</sup> Garthoff, *op.cit.*, p.12.

<sup>682</sup> Beschloss, *op.cit.*, p.381.

<sup>683</sup> Garthoff, *op.cit.*, p.11.

<sup>684</sup> Allison, *Essence of Decision*, *op.cit.*, p.43, Hafner, *op.cit.*, p.318.

tactic to prevent the Americans from toppling the Castro regime in Cuba.<sup>685</sup> In a memoir attributed to himself, Khrushchev stated: "We had to establish a tangible and effective deterrent to American interference in the Caribbean. But what exactly? The logical answer was missiles. The United States had already surrounded the Soviet Union with its own bomber bases and missiles. We knew that American missiles were aimed against us in Turkey and Italy."<sup>686</sup> In a meeting of Soviet officials, Soviet premier Khrushchev favoured missile deployment to Cuba "to repay the Americans in kind for surrounding the Soviet Union with military bases and missiles" and to teach them "what it is like to live under sights of nuclear weapons." Khrushchev thought that "faced with a fait accompli of secretly installed missiles the pragmatic Americans would not dare to take irrational risks and would learn to live with them just as the Soviet Union had learned to live with American missiles in Turkey, Italy and West Germany."<sup>687</sup>

Before the Cuban crisis, the last time Soviet Premier Khrushchev expressed his sharp objections to the installation of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy was during his meeting with Foy Kohler, the new American ambassador to Moscow, on 16 October 1962.<sup>688</sup> Unlike American leaders Khrushchev was aware of the fact that in a few days the first Jupiter missile launch position in Turkey would be turned over to the Turks<sup>689</sup> and perhaps misunderstanding that the Turks would gain the ability to trigger the missiles led him to attribute too much importance to the matter.<sup>690</sup> He told Kohler: "Just because I am building a fishing port in Cuba, you want to go to war. After all I'm not doing anything you haven't done to me in Turkey and Iran."<sup>691</sup>

After the Cuban missile crisis broke out Soviet officials in the United Nations, Britain and the USA urged a trade-off between Soviet missiles in Cuba and the Jupiters in Turkey.<sup>692</sup> Soviet ambassador Ryzkov raised the issue in his meeting

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<sup>685</sup> B. Miroff, *Pragmatic Illusions*, New York: David McKay Company Inc., 1976, pp.85-86.

<sup>686</sup> N. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, London: Andre Deutsch, 1971, p.493.

<sup>687</sup> Garthoff, op.cit., p.15.

<sup>688</sup> Ibid., p.28, Allison, op.cit., pp.43-44, Beschloss, op.cit., p.439.

<sup>689</sup> Garthoff, op.cit., p.60, Beschloss, op.cit., p.439.

<sup>690</sup> Beschloss, op.cit., p.440.

<sup>691</sup> Ibid., p.8.

<sup>692</sup> Allison, op.cit., p.44.



with Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun C. Erkin on 25 October 1962.<sup>693</sup> In his letter to Kennedy on 27 October 1962, Khrushchev stated:

...your actions, in effect, mean that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases... literally around our country... You say that Cuba worries you because it lies at a distance of ninety miles across the sea from the shores of the United States. However, Turkey lies next to us... You have stationed devastating rocket weapons... in Turkey literally right next to us.<sup>694</sup>

It is clear that the Soviets were always worried about nuclear weapons in Turkey, very close to their country. They also used the issue for propaganda in their confrontations with the Western camp. In any case Turkey was considered a threat by the Soviet Union, therefore she was at the top of the Soviet defence agenda. It is also fair to say that by giving the idea to them, the presence of the Jupiters in Turkey contributed to the Soviet decision to deploy missiles to Cuba, which brought the world to the edge of a nuclear war. Thus Turkey became an indirect cause of a superpower conflict. However, it should be stated that the Soviets did not originally intend to trade the Cuban missiles for the Jupiters.<sup>695</sup> When they faced a difficult situation arising from the strong American response, by offering a trade-off Soviet officials probably wanted to gain something from a bad situation and to appease military hawks at home.

## 5.4 Missile Trade Discussions During the Crisis

From the beginning of the Cuban missile crisis American officials predicted that the Soviets might propose a trade-off between Turkish and Cuban missiles, and they made preparations bearing this possibility in their mind.<sup>696</sup> Even before Soviet missiles were spotted in Cuban territory a National Security Council staff member prepared an argument rejecting similarities between Turkish and Cuban missiles in the case of a Soviet demand to trade them: Soviet weapons in Cuba were offensive and deployed secretly, American weapons in Turkey were defensive and deployed openly.<sup>697</sup>

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<sup>693</sup> Garthoff, op.cit., p.79.

<sup>694</sup> Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, op.cit., pp. 161-162.

<sup>695</sup> Garthoff, op.cit., p.22, Hafner, op.cit., p.330.

<sup>696</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.295.

<sup>697</sup> Bernstein, "the Cuban Missile Crisis", op.cit., p.104.

According to the notes of Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy's close counsel, in the initial meetings of the Executive Committee (ExCom), which was established by Kennedy to deal with the Cuban crisis, "the removal of our missile bases in Turkey in exchange for the removal of the Cuban missiles [was discussed]... as a possibility which Khrushchev was likely to suggest if we did not."<sup>698</sup> In the meeting on Tuesday, October 16, some members suggested that Khrushchev might be preparing to trade off the Cuban missiles for the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy.<sup>699</sup> On Wednesday, October 17, even hawkish members who were in favour of an air strike against Cuba proposed making a deal with the Soviets, withdrawing all American nuclear forces based in Turkey - aircraft as well as missiles - in return for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.<sup>700</sup> On the same day Adlai Stevenson, the American ambassador to the United Nations, warned President Kennedy that the world opinion would equate American missiles in Turkey with Soviet missiles in Cuba and recommended that "you should [make] it clear that the existence of nuclear missile bases anywhere is negotiable before we start anything."<sup>701</sup>

According to Kennedy's special assistant Arthur Schlesinger's quotations from minutes of the ExCom meeting on Friday, October 19, "more than once during the afternoon Secretary [of Defence] McNamara voiced the opinion that the United States... would at least have to give up our missile bases in Italy and Turkey and would probably have to pay more besides... to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba." On Saturday and Monday McNamara voiced the same opinion again and emphasised that the United States would be lucky to get out of the crisis with only a trade of the Turkish missiles. Nobody in these meetings raised objection to McNamara's remarks.<sup>702</sup>

On the Saturday, October 20th, meeting of the ExCom, Adlai Stevenson recommended that the United States should establish a bargaining position and should

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<sup>698</sup> Hafner, op.cit., p.313.

<sup>699</sup> **"White House Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban Missile Crisis"**, *International Security*, Summer 1985, vol.10, No.1, p.178, Abel, *the Missile Crisis*, op.cit., p.47, Bernstein in Nathan(ed.), op.cit., pp.68-69.

<sup>700</sup> Detzer, *the Brink*, op.cit., p.157, Reeves, *A Question of Character*, op.cit., p.376.

<sup>701</sup> Bernstein, **"the Cuban Missile Crisis"**, op.cit., pp.104-105.

<sup>702</sup> A. Chayes, *the Cuban Missile Crisis*, London: Oxford University Press, 1974, p.95.

consider offering to abolish the American naval base at Guantanamo and to withdraw its Turkish and Italian Jupiter missile bases if the Soviets would withdraw their Cuban bases, and to send U.N. inspection teams to all the foreign bases maintained by both sides to prevent their use in a surprise attack while the dismantling was being carried out.<sup>703</sup> In Stevenson's opinion, it was almost certain that the Soviets would propose the trade and world opinion "would ask why it was right for the United States to have bases in Turkey, but wrong for the Russians to have bases in Cuba."<sup>704</sup> He was not proposing a simple trade but he was thinking that to accomplish the significant goal of removing all Russian presence from the Caribbean the United States ought to pay some price such as giving up some bases of debatable military value.<sup>705</sup>

According to A.M. Schlesinger, who saw the classified ExCom minutes, after hearing Stevenson's proposal almost every participant of the meeting "jumped on Stevenson."<sup>706</sup> Most participants feared that Stevenson's suggestion, by starting with concessions, would legitimise Khrushchev's action and give him an easy triumph. It would mean offering to pay Russia to take the missiles out and looking weak and backing down against the Soviet Union.<sup>707</sup> Robert Kennedy, brother and Attorney General of President Kennedy, was among those who strongly objected to Stevenson's proposal.<sup>708</sup> He told Stevenson's aide Schlesinger on Monday, 22 October, that "we will have to make a deal at the end, but we must stand absolutely firm now. Concessions must come at the end of negotiations, not at the beginning."<sup>709</sup> He also warned President John Kennedy that "he [Stevenson] is not strong or tough enough to be representing us at the United Nations at a time like this."<sup>710</sup> President Kennedy replied: "I think Adlai Stevenson showed plenty of strength and courage, presenting that viewpoint at the risk of being called an

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<sup>703</sup> Allison, op.cit., p.209, Miroff, op.cit., p.90, Reeves, op.cit., p.375, Kennedy, op.cit., p.27, Abel, op.cit., p.95, Bernstein, op.cit., p.105, Detzer, op.cit., pp.155-156, Beschloss, op.cit., p.468, A.M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, London: Andre Deutsch, 1965, p.690.

<sup>704</sup> Abel, op.cit., p.95.

<sup>705</sup> Ibid., p.96, Detzer, op.cit., p.156.

<sup>706</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.105, Kennedy, op.cit., p.27, Abel, op.cit., p.95.

<sup>707</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.105, Detzer, op.cit., p.156.

<sup>708</sup> Kennedy, op.cit., p.28.

<sup>709</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.105.

<sup>710</sup> Reeves, op.cit., p.376, Detzer, *the Brink*, op.cit., p.159.

appeaser... Maybe he went too far when he suggested giving up Guantanamo, but... I admire him for saying what he did.”<sup>711</sup>

In the ExCom meeting in which Stevenson made his proposal President Kennedy rejected his ideas.<sup>712</sup> From his point of view, accepting the removal of the Jupiters would cause loss of American prestige, damage trust of NATO members in America and seem to confirm the idea Charles De Gaulle planted that the United States would sacrifice the interests of its allies to protect its own security. According to ExCom minutes reported by Schlesinger, “Kennedy agreed that at an appropriate time we would have to acknowledge that we were willing to take strategic missiles out of Turkey and Italy if this issue was raised by the Russians. But he was firm in saying that we should only make such a proposal in the future.”<sup>713</sup>

On October 21, W. Averell Harriman, assistant secretary of state, counselled President Kennedy about Khrushchev’s position at home and likely Soviet purposes and hinted that offering a trade of the Cuban and Turkish missiles might rescue Khrushchev from taking a radical action to appease hawkish military leaders. Harriman informed Kennedy that “there has undoubtedly been greatest pressure on Khrushchev for a considerable time to do something about our ring of bases, aggravated by our placing Jupiter missiles in Turkey.”<sup>714</sup>

A State Department group working on U.N. aspects of the Cuban missile crisis headed by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk on Sunday, 21 October. During the meeting a proposal for a U.N. Security Council resolution embracing mutual concessions for both American and Soviet sides, perhaps including a missile trade, was put forward by Stevenson and seconded by Secretary Rusk. There was a feeling among the participants that “if the missiles were to be given up anyway, it might make sense, from the viewpoint of U.N. planning, to offer that concession to gain a tactical advantage in the Security Council.”<sup>715</sup> According to Chayes, proposals were ultimately abandoned not

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<sup>711</sup> Detzer, op.cit., p.159.

<sup>712</sup> Allison, *Essence of Decision*, op.cit., p.209, Miroff, *Pragmatic Illusions*, op.cit., p.97, Abel, op.cit., p.95.

<sup>713</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.106, Beschloss, *Kennedy v. Khrushchev*, op.cit., p.468.

<sup>714</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.105.

<sup>715</sup> Chayes, op.cit., pp.81-82.

because they added up to a 'Munich' but because they had great tactical disadvantages. One could not be sure that they would really satisfy demands of the Soviets. "All the proposals would have required consultation with other affected parties. The United States could hardly propose... drastic changes in the Turkish defence posture without talking to this ally first."<sup>716</sup>

After Kennedy's speech on Tuesday, October 22, announcing a naval blockade of Cuba, some American officials expressed their strong objections to a possible trade-off of the Jupiters in Turkey. According to Bernstein, one American official warned that "the danger in Turkey can be especially acute... If the alliance or the United States seems to be pulling away from [Turkey] it could lead to the fall of the present government."<sup>717</sup>

On Wednesday, October 24, George Ball drafted and sent duplicate telegrams to the American ambassador in Turkey and the American NATO delegation in Fontainebleau.<sup>718</sup> The telegrams stated that the administration considered "that a negotiated solution for removal of Cuban offensive threat may involve dismantling and removal of the Jupiters" and requested these American diplomats to assess the political situation in Turkey and smooth the way for such an operation, without harming America's relations with an important ally, Turkey. Ball's telegram also asked if Turkey would consent to withdrawal of the Jupiters if there was some military replacement such as deployment of an American-controlled Polaris submarine or establishment of a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) within NATO.<sup>719</sup>

Bernstein cites the reply of Raymond Hare, U.S. ambassador to Turkey, to Ball as follows:

[Hare responded that] removal of the Jupiters as part of an explicit trade would weaken NATO and injure American relations with Turkey... Turkish officials would greatly resent that 'their interests were being traded off in order to appease an enemy.' They were proud that, unlike the Cubans, they were not the stooge of a great power. Both Turkey's political and military power were at stake... and the Jupiters fulfilled both needs... Hare reluctantly suggested a secret Soviet-American arrangement (without Turkey's knowledge) and then the prompt dismantling of the missiles.<sup>720</sup>

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<sup>716</sup> Ibid., p.82.

<sup>717</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., pp.107-108.

<sup>718</sup> Ball, *the Past*, op.cit., p.295.

<sup>719</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.108, Detzer, op.cit., p.243.

<sup>720</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.108.

The American ambassador to NATO, Thomas Finletter, also replied to Ball's telegram that the Turks would resent the idea greatly. He warned State Department officials that making a trade-off with the Russians could encourage them to initiate other adventures and frighten other NATO members by leading them to think that the next time they could be asked to give up some military capability to appease the Soviets.<sup>721</sup>

Meanwhile, the idea of a missile trade had been discussed in European press and United Nations corridors from the beginning of the week. The British newspaper, *The Guardian* predicted that a Soviet countermove against the Jupiter bases in Turkey was possible<sup>722</sup> and suggested "what is sauce for Cuba, is also sauce for Turkey."<sup>723</sup> In fact, as Chayes states, "British newspapers of all political shades had been urging the dismantling of the Turkish missiles as a basis for settlement from the first announcement of the crisis."<sup>724</sup> The editorial of the *Times* of London on 26 October 1962 stated:

If it could be brought about there seems to be one way which President Kennedy could secure the elimination of the missile bases in Cuba. That is by opening up the broader question of precautions against surprise attack. Comparisons between the Cuban and the Turkish bases are hotly and quite rightly resented by most Americans. The history and the whole extent are, indeed, different. Even so a case can be made for banishing offensive missiles from each base.<sup>725</sup>

British Labour Party leader, Hugh Gaitskell, complained about American insistence on continuing the crisis by pointing to American missiles in Turkey: "If indeed there were to be an American attack on Cuba on these grounds, it would be difficult to see how the Russians would not be able to justify a similar attack on Turkey. If the ground for attack is that there are nuclear bases in neighbouring territories, I am afraid this seems to follow."<sup>726</sup>

A more open proposal to trade Turkish for Cuban missiles as a way of ending the crisis came from *Washington Post* columnist Walter Lippmann. In his column on Thursday, 25 October, Lippmann stated:

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<sup>721</sup> Ibid., pp.108-109.

<sup>722</sup> Abel, *the Missile Crisis*, op.cit., p.129.

<sup>723</sup> Detzer, *the Brink*, op.cit., p.203.

<sup>724</sup> Chayes, op.cit., p.97.

<sup>725</sup> *The Times*, 26 October 1962, p.11.

<sup>726</sup> *The Times*, 26 October 1962, p.6.

The way [of ending the crisis] is to try to negotiate a face-saving agreement. The only place that is truly comparable with Cuba is Turkey. This is the only place where there are strategic weapons right on the frontier of the Soviet Union... The Soviet missile in Cuba, like the U.S. NATO base in Turkey, is of little military value. The Soviet military base in Cuba is defenceless and the base in Turkey is all but obsolete. The two bases could be dismantled without altering the world balance of power.<sup>727</sup>

It was likely that Soviet leaders, who probably thought that Lippmann's column spoke for the President, assumed that the White House was sending up a trial balloon through Lippmann.<sup>728</sup> Beschloss speculates that

once Lippmann made his Thursday proposal, Kennedy may have thought it useful to call Khrushchev's attention to one route by which they could negotiate an end to the crisis. Had he wished to warn Khrushchev away from such a route of bargaining, he could have easily asked Salinger [his press secretary] to issue a statement to the effect that the United States could not accept the suggestion of a Turkey-for-Cuba trade that had appeared in public prints. Knowing Khrushchev might assume that Lippmann was proposing the trade on his behalf, the President let the column stand.<sup>729</sup>

On Thursday, October 25, a special National Security Council committee recommended the withdrawal of Turkish missiles in return for removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Not to antagonise the Turks and other NATO members such an offer "might be expressed in generalised form, such as withdrawal of missiles from territory [near] the other [great power]."<sup>730</sup>

On Friday, October 26, Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland proposed that only nuclear powers should station nuclear weapons in their territories, thus the United States and the Soviet Union should withdraw their nuclear arms from non-nuclear countries including Turkey and Cuba. Endorsing Cleveland's resolution, Averell Harriman suggested that "agreement should not be put forward as a trade over Cuba [and Turkey] but as a first and important step towards disarmament."<sup>731</sup> On the same day, to provide a face-saving solution for the Soviets a special NSC committee recommended suggesting "a summit conference, to be preceded by the agreement of NATO and Turkey to accept a Multilateral Force

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<sup>727</sup> *Washington Post*, 25 October 1962, p.A-25, col.1.

<sup>728</sup> Garthoff, *Reflection...*, op.cit., p.70, Detzer, op.cit., p.243, Beschloss, op.cit., p.529, Abel, op.cit., pp.188-189.

<sup>729</sup> Beschloss, op.cit., p.530.

<sup>730</sup> Bernstein, "the Cuban Missile Crisis", op.cit., p.109.

<sup>731</sup> *Ibid.*, p.109.

and to remove missiles from Turkey and Italy.”<sup>732</sup> Director of the Policy Planning Council Walt W. Rostow’s solution was to secure NATO’s speedy approval for MLF with an agreement to dismantle the Jupiters. He thought the Soviets “could read it [dismantling the Jupiters] as a way of helping them off the hook.”<sup>733</sup> In the ExCom meeting in Friday morning, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson predicted that the Soviets would ask the United States to guarantee the territorial integrity of Cuba and to dismantle U.S. strategic missiles in Turkey. John McCone, director of the CIA, strongly objected the linkage of Cuban missiles with Turkish missiles.<sup>734</sup>

According to Garthoff, several recent Soviet disclosures revealed that there was a previously unreported meeting of Attorney General Robert Kennedy with the Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, at the Soviet Embassy on Friday, October 26. In this meeting, when Dobrynin complained about American double standards in considering the presence of American missiles in Turkey legitimate while denying legitimacy of Soviet missiles in Cuba, Robert Kennedy asked if the Turkish missiles were really important for the Soviet Union and informed Dobrynin that President Kennedy was planning to phase out the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. “He, then, left the room to talk with the president, and upon his return confirmed the president’s intention to remove the missiles from Turkey if the overall situation was normalised. Dobrynin then reported this possibility to Moscow.”<sup>735</sup>

It is clear that all U.S. officials were willing to trade the Jupiters in Turkey with Soviet missiles in Cuba on the condition that the Turks and other NATO members would not know about it and/or would not show resentment against it. Most of U.S. officials were even in favour of risking resentment of NATO members to oust the Soviets from the Caribbean in a peaceful way whereas some of them were really worried about its repercussions for U.S. relations with Turkey and NATO. In any case Turkey was on the discussion table, being a part of the missile crisis, and Turkish authorities did not know about it.

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<sup>732</sup> Ibid., p.110.

<sup>733</sup> Ibid., pp.110-111.

<sup>734</sup> Ibid., p.111, Beschloss, op.cit., p.508, “White House Tapes”, op.cit., p.195.

<sup>735</sup> Garthoff, op.cit., p.87, see also L. Chang, “The View from Washington and the View from Nowhere: Cuban Missile Crisis Historiography” in Nathan(ed.), op.cit., pp.150-151.



## 5.5 Russian Moves to End the Crisis Peacefully

The first Soviet initiative to find a peaceful solution for the Cuban crisis came on Friday, 26 October, through an unofficial channel. Aleksandr Fomin, a counselor of the Soviet embassy in Washington, lunched with John Scali, the diplomatic reporter of the American ABC TV, and asked him if the United States “would be interested in settlement of the Cuban crisis along these lines: Bases [in Cuba] would be dismantled under the U.N.’s supervision and Castro would pledge not to accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever, in return for U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba.”<sup>736</sup> When President Kennedy heard Fomin’s proposal he agreed with Secretary of State Dean Rusk that it was an acceptable basis for the settlement and told Scali: “Tell them you’ve gotten a favourable response from the highest authority in the government”<sup>737</sup> adding, “without attributing it to the President”. John Scali then informed Fomin that “I have reason to believe that the United States government sees real possibilities in this and supposes that the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States in New York can work this matter out with [U.N. Secretary General] U Thant and with each other.”<sup>738</sup> Fomin, then, promised that this information would be passed on immediately to the highest levels.

Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s long personal letter to Kennedy on the evening of the same day repeated the same general proposal made by Aleksandr Fomin. The letter stated: “If assurances were given that the president of the United States would not participate in an attack on Cuba and the blockade lifted, the question of the removal or the destruction of the missile sites in Cuba would then be an entirely different question.”<sup>739</sup>

These acceptable Soviet proposals made American officials optimistic about ending the crisis peacefully and caused great relief. But when the ExCom met in the morning of Saturday, October 27, a new message from Khrushchev had arrived. Khrushchev’s new letter added a new element to the solution of the crisis: Removal of American missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet withdrawal from

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<sup>736</sup> P. Salinger, *With Kennedy*, London: Jonathan Cope, 1967, p.274.

<sup>737</sup> Detzer, *the Brink*, op.cit., p.238.

<sup>738</sup> Salinger, op.cit., p. 275.

<sup>739</sup> Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, op.cit., pp.66-67.

Cuba. Roger Hilsman, the State Department intelligence chief , later recalled that “it was the blackest hour of the crisis.”<sup>740</sup>

The proposal in Khrushchev’s second letter was as follows:

We agree to remove those weapons from Cuba which you regard as offensive weapons. We agree to do this and to state this commitment in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a statement to the effect that the United States, on its part, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern of the Soviet state, will evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey... Of course it is necessary that the governments of Cuba and Turkey would allow these [U.N.] representatives to come to their countries and check fulfilment of this commitment, which each side undertakes... We, having assumed this commitment in order to give satisfaction and hope to the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to increase their confidence in their security, will make a statement in the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet government gives a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of the frontiers and the sovereignty of Turkey, not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available its territory as a place d’armes for such invasion and also will restrain those who would think of launching an aggression against Turkey either from Soviet territory or from the territory of other states bordering on Turkey.<sup>741</sup>

The American government would give exactly same assurances regarding Cuba.

The reasons for Soviet Premier Khrushchev including a missile trade in a settlement of the crisis could be summarised as follows: Firstly, in their meeting on 26 October, Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that the American president was willing to phase out the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Dobrynin reported this exchange to Moscow. Secondly, a missile trade to end the crisis was popular in the Western press and U.N. corridors and the Soviets knew this. Thirdly, Walter Lippmann’s open proposal of a missile trade might have been seen by the Soviet rulers as a trial balloon of the Americans. Finally, it is possible that hawkish Soviet military leaders put pressure on Khrushchev for radical action and that Khrushchev proposed the missile trade to appease them.

On why Khrushchev did not propose the Turkey-for-Cuba trade in his first letter Beschloss states:

Georgi Kornienko [a counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington in 1962] and other Soviet officials suggested in 1991 that on Friday night [26 October 1962], the Chairman [Khrushchev] was convinced that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent and that to achieve a quick settlement, he dropped his intention to demand removal of the

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<sup>740</sup> Bernstein, *op.cit.*, p.113.

<sup>741</sup> Kennedy, *op.cit.*, pp. 162-163.

Turkish missiles... By Saturday, surrounded by his generals, Khrushchev considered such an assault more remote and thus included the demand in the second letter.<sup>742</sup>

With Khrushchev's proposal Turkish missiles were put on the bargaining table, thus Turkey became a direct part of the crisis outside the knowledge and intention of her rulers.

## 5.6 Danger of a Nuclear War and Turkey

It was considered highly possible by American officials that if America attacked Soviet missiles in Cuba and thus killed Soviet citizens there, the Soviet Union would retaliate by attacking the Jupiter missiles and American bases in Turkey.<sup>743</sup> As early as Tuesday, October 23, Secretary Rusk had told George Ball that "we have won a considerable victory. You and I are still alive." On that morning the Secretary of State's fears had not been realised. The Russians had not blocked the autobahn to Berlin. They had not bombed the Jupiter bases in Turkey or moved to close the Dardanelles.<sup>744</sup> In the ExCom meeting on Saturday, October 27, President Kennedy said that the NATO countries did not realise that if the USA carried out an air strike against Cuba probably in two or three days and the Soviet Union answered by attacking Turkey all NATO was going to be involved. The president, then, would have to decide whether he would fire nuclear missiles in Turkey.<sup>745</sup>

When a Soviet SAM missile shot down an American U-2 reconnaissance plane over Cuba on 27 October, killing its pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., a nuclear war between two super powers seemed even more imminent. Earlier in the week, the ExCom had decided that if a U-2 were shot down, the United States would retaliate against a single SAM site. If a second U-2 were attacked, the United States would destroy all SAM sites in Cuba. According to Allison and Robert Kennedy "in the ExCom [meeting on Saturday, 27 October], there was almost unanimous agreement that the United States had to attack early the next morning" with bombers and fighters and destroy the SAM sites.<sup>746</sup> Kennedy's counsel Theodore

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<sup>742</sup> Beschloss, *Kennedy v. Khrushchev*, op.cit., p.526.

<sup>743</sup> Hafner, "Bureaucratic Politics...", op.cit., p.312.

<sup>744</sup> Abel, *the Missile Crisis*, op.cit., p.127.

<sup>745</sup> Allison, op.cit., p.227, Beschloss, op.cit., pp. 527-528, Kennedy, op.cit., p.74.

<sup>746</sup> Allison, op.cit., pp. 224-225, Kennedy, op.cit., p.76, "White House Tapes", op.cit., p.203.

Sorensen later wrote that "our little group seated around the cabinet table in continuous session that Saturday felt nuclear war to be closer on that day than at any time in the nuclear age."<sup>747</sup>

In spite of eagerness among top American officials for an attack, President Kennedy decided to stand back and give one more chance to the Soviets.<sup>748</sup> The president held back on the order until they could be sure that the U-2 plane had not accidentally crashed but had been shot down by a Soviet missile.<sup>749</sup> His most important concern at that moment of the crisis was a nuclear holocaust causing a human tragedy all over the world. He told the ExCom members that "it isn't the first step that concerns me, but both sides escalating to the fourth and fifth step - and we do not go to the sixth because there is no one around to do so."<sup>750</sup> According to Allison, this process of escalating to a nuclear war would directly involve Turkey at the beginning.<sup>751</sup>

Robert Kennedy described those critical moments and President Kennedy's concern about involvement of other countries in his memoir as follows:

His mind went to other areas of the world... If we attacked Cuba and the Russians reciprocated with an attack on Turkey, would or should the Turkish missiles be fired? He ordered preparations taken to defuse missiles with atomic warheads, so that he personally would have to give permission before they were used. What role Turkey and the rest of NATO have in determining our response? Within a very short time, they might be faced with decisions of life and death. Before that happened, should they not have a right to learn what we were deciding to do, particularly if that was likely to affect them in such a rapid and possibly devastating way? These hourly decisions, necessarily made with such rapidity, could be made only by the president of the United States, but any of them might close and lock doors for peoples and governments in many other lands, we had to be aware of this responsibility at all times, he said, aware that we were deciding, the president was deciding, for the United States, the Soviet Union, Turkey, NATO and really for all mankind.<sup>752</sup>

Thus, the presence of the Jupiters on its territory positioned Turkey under a direct threat of a nuclear war and put its fate in the hands of the Americans and the Soviets. She could be one of very few targets which would be seriously damaged

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<sup>747</sup> Reeves, *A Question of Character*, op.cit., p.387.

<sup>748</sup> Allison, op.cit., p.225.

<sup>749</sup> Reeves, op.cit., p.387, Sallinger, op.cit., p.272, Kennedy, op.cit., p.76.

<sup>750</sup> Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, op.cit., p.76.

<sup>751</sup> Allison, op.cit., p.217.

<sup>752</sup> Kennedy, op.cit., p.77.

in a limited nuclear war which would be halted before escalating to involve the whole humanity. In the event of an all-out nuclear war, Turkey's situation would not present a special, different case than others.

## 5.7 Role of the Jupiters in Resolving the Crisis

In the Saturday morning meeting of the ExCom (October 27), President Kennedy was really frustrated with hearing the new Soviet proposal. The Turkish missiles had put him in a very difficult situation. Because of them, Kennedy was confronted with one of two difficult choices: to give in to this Soviet demand and look weak and shake the Western alliance or refuse the Soviet proposal and possibly bring about a thermonuclear war.<sup>753</sup> In one point of the discussions Kennedy boiled with anger and reportedly shouted: "Get those frigging missiles off the board!"<sup>754</sup> Hafner suggests that "the President, in his anger that Saturday morning, seemed to think that if the Jupiters had not been there, no Soviet proposal for a trade-off would have been possible. That is unlikely."<sup>755</sup> There were other bargaining points and it was easy for the Soviets to come with another trade proposal.

At that moment of the crisis President Kennedy had come to a point that he was now utterly determined to withdraw American missiles from Turkey in order to remove a target that the Soviets could legitimately strike in retaliation for an American action or subject to a trade again in the future. He seemed to be ready to come to terms with Khrushchev's proposal. The President privately talked with Secretaries McNamara and Rusk at the close of the morning session of the ExCom (27 October), instructing them to consider the possibility of missile trade very carefully. He did not want to offend or frighten Turkey and other NATO members. He assigned McNamara's deputy Roswell Gilpatric to spend the afternoon in McGeorge Bundy's office at the White House with representatives of the State Department and the Joint of Chief Staff and prepare a scenario for withdrawing the Jupiters from Turkey and Italy in the possible earliest time.<sup>756</sup>

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<sup>753</sup> Ibid., p.73.

<sup>754</sup> Allison, op.cit., p.142, Detzer, *the Brink*, op.cit., p.244.

<sup>755</sup> Hafner, "Bureaucratic Politics..." op.cit., p.330.

<sup>756</sup> Abel, *the Missile Crisis*, op.cit., pp. 194-195, Detzer, op.cit., p.245.

In the afternoon meeting President Kennedy pondered upon the notion of bargaining. Although he was willing to get rid of the Turkish missiles, President Kennedy regretted that “the Russians had made the Turkish proposal in the most difficult way,”<sup>757</sup> “it’s not as if it was a private proposal, which would give us an opportunity to negotiate with the Turks. Khrushchev has put it out in a way that the Turks are bound to say they don’t agree to this.”<sup>758</sup> Kennedy also said:

... we are now in the position of risking war in Cuba and Berlin over missiles in Turkey which are of little military value. From the political point of view, it would be hard to get support on an airstrike against Cuba because many would think that we would make a good trade if we offered to take the missiles out of Turkey... We cannot propose to withdraw the missiles... but the Turks could offer to do so. [They] must be informed of the great danger in which they will live during the next week and we have to face up to the possibility of some kind of a trade over the missiles.<sup>759</sup>

In the ExCom meeting after 4 p.m. Kennedy expressed his feeling that “we would not be in a position to offer any trade for several days... If we could succeed in freezing the situation in Cuba and rendering the strategic missiles inoperable, then we would be in a position to negotiate with the Russians.” When Bundy warned that “if we sound as if we wanted to make this trade to our NATO people and to all the people who are tied to us by alliance, we are in real trouble”, the President replied, “yes, but if we refused to discuss such a trade and then take military action in Cuba, we would also be in a difficult situation.”<sup>760</sup> In the meeting some members and the Joint of Chiefs staff suggested a military action: reject the trade, defuse the Jupiters in Turkey, inform the Soviets, and then attack Cuba. Kennedy did not like the idea because “if the Russians do attack the NATO countries [in retaliation], we do not want them [NATO allies] to say that they had not been consulted about the actions we were taking.”<sup>761</sup> At one point President Kennedy said, “the best position now was to let Khrushchev know that the United States was glad to discuss Turkish missiles with them once we get a positive indication that they’ve ceased their work in Cuba.”<sup>762</sup>

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<sup>757</sup> Bernstein, “the Cuban Missile Crisis”, op.cit., p.118.

<sup>758</sup> Beschloss, *Kennedy v. Khrushchev*, op.cit., p.527, “White House Tapes”, op.cit., pp.197. 198.

<sup>759</sup> “White House Tapes”, op.cit., p.199, Bernstein, op.cit., p.118.

<sup>760</sup> “White House Tapes”, op.cit., p.201, Bernstein, op.cit., pp.119-120, Beschloss, op.cit., p.527.

<sup>761</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., pp. 119-120.

<sup>762</sup> Beschloss, op.cit., p.527.

In late afternoon in the cabinet room Kennedy suggested again, "I think... I'll just say [to Khrushchev], 'of course we ought to try to go to the first route which you suggest'... But it seems to me we ought to have this discussion with NATO about these Turkish missiles."<sup>763</sup> In an informal discussion following the afternoon meeting, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson asked George Ball "why we were not prepared to [accept the trade proposal] if we were prepared to give up the use of U.S. missiles in Turkey?" Ball responded that "last week we thought it might be acceptable to trade the withdrawal of the missiles in Turkey if such action would save Berlin. Why not now? We can... replace the missiles in Turkey by assigning Polaris submarines to the area".<sup>764</sup>

As for the issue of preparing a response to Khrushchev's letters American officials differed. State Department officials generally were in favour of sending a letter openly rejecting the trade proposal. In the morning session of the ExCom meeting, Assistant Secretary of Defence Paul Nitze had said that "it would be an anathema to the Turks to pull the missiles out... The next Soviet step would be a demand for denuclearization of the entire NATO area." McGeorge Bundy's view was that "we cannot get into the position of appearing to sell out an ally... to serve our own interests, i.e., getting the Soviet missiles out of Cuba."<sup>765</sup> Rusk and Ball predicted that such a trade "would undermine the faith of the whole alliance in America's pledged word" and State Department's Soviet expert Llewellyn Thompson argued that "the Russians would certainly interpret the President's acceptance as proof of weakness."<sup>766</sup> In the afternoon session, Rusk and Ball submitted a draft letter as response from the American President to Khrushchev answering arguments of Khrushchev's latest letter, rejecting a missile trade and demanding a halt to work on the missiles in Cuba.<sup>767</sup> The other members, including Robert Kennedy, objected to the draft by arguing that "it would be difficult for the administration to persuade world opinion, and perhaps opinion at home as well, that prolonging or intensifying the crisis was preferable to withdrawing obsolete missiles from

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<sup>763</sup> Ibid., p.533.

<sup>764</sup> Ibid., p.535, Bernstein, op.cit., p.120, "**White House Tapes**", op.cit., p.203.

<sup>765</sup> Bernstein, op.cit., p.118, "**White House Tapes**", op.cit., p.197.

<sup>766</sup> Allison, *Essence of Decision*, op.cit., p.226.

<sup>767</sup> Ibid., p.227, Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, op.cit., p.79.

Turkey.”<sup>768</sup>

Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen came up with the idea that President Kennedy should ignore Khrushchev’s second letter and respond to the terms of the first letter. With the President’s instruction, Robert Kennedy and Sorensen left the room, drafted a letter consisting of their proposal, and submitted it to the ExCom. With minor changes the committee accepted the letter and gave consent to sending it to Khrushchev.<sup>769</sup> The deal which was proposed by Kennedy’s letter to Khrushchev on October 27 was as follows:

1- You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems into Cuba. 2- We, on our part, would agree -upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.<sup>770</sup>

Although the letter did not mention the Jupiter missiles specifically, it left the door open for some future arrangement about them. It stated:

The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding ‘other armaments’, as proposed in your second letter which you made public... If your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

But Kennedy’s letter also warned: “The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security would surely lead to an intensified situation on the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world.”<sup>771</sup>

After sending this letter to Khrushchev, in order to ensure world peace President Kennedy asked his brother Robert Kennedy to make a private arrangement with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on the Jupiters. This secret decision was taken by the President in the Oval Office in the presence of Rusk, Bundy, McNamara,

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<sup>768</sup> Garthoff, *Reflections...*, op.cit., p.85.

<sup>769</sup> Allison, op.cit., p.227, Kennedy, op.cit., pp.79-80, Reeves, op.cit., pp. 387-388.

<sup>770</sup> Kennedy, op.cit., p.165.

<sup>771</sup> Ibid., p.165.



Sorensen and Robert Kennedy after the afternoon meeting of the ExCom on October 27.<sup>772</sup> It was Dean Rusk who proposed it. According to McGeorge Bundy's notes, "the fact that Rusk, stalwart on interests of the NATO alliance, made the proposal encouraged rapid consensus and presidential decision... Rusk was aware of the President's own favourable inclination and saw it as appropriate to assist the President in using this diplomatic asset."<sup>773</sup>

Robert Kennedy's memoir cites his meeting with Dobrynin as follows:

[I told Dobrynin:] We had to have commitment by tomorrow that these bases would be removed ... He should understand that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them... Perhaps his country might feel it necessary to take retaliatory action; but before that was over, there would be not only dead Americans but dead Russians as well. He [Dobrynin] raised the question of our removing the missiles from Turkey. I said that there could be no quid pro quo or any arrangement made under this kind of threat or pressure, and that in the last analysis this was a decision would have to be made by NATO. However, I said, President Kennedy had been anxious to remove these missiles from Turkey and Italy for a long period of time. He had ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our judgement that, within a short time after the crisis was over, these missiles would be gone.<sup>774</sup>

Robert Kennedy also warned that the understanding would be cancelled at once if the Soviets tried to claim public credit for removing the Turkish missiles.<sup>775</sup>

Robert Kennedy's message to Dobrynin had double characteristics, an ultimatum coupled with a way out. It threatened an American attack on Cuba unless the Soviets agreed with terms of the American proposal. On the other hand, it showed a way out to the Soviets by stating the American pledge not to invade Cuba in return for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. The American concession of withdrawing the Jupiter missiles in Turkey was aimed at saving the face of the Soviets and smoothing the way for them to accept a peaceful solution. It had to be kept secret, otherwise the American administration would come under attack from several sides, including the Republicans, the Pentagon, militant ExCom members and America's NATO allies.

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<sup>772</sup> Beschloss, *op.cit.*, p.535, Garthoff, *op.cit.*, p.88, Bernstein in Nathan(ed.), *op.cit.*, p.95.

<sup>773</sup> Garthoff, *op.cit.*, p.88.

<sup>774</sup> Kennedy, *op.cit.*, pp.86-87.

<sup>775</sup> Beschloss, *op.cit.*, p.537.

When Dobrynin complained in 1989 that Americans were still refusing to acknowledge that the Jupiters were part of an explicit Soviet-American deal to settle the missile crisis, Sorensen made the following statement:

Ambassador Dobrynin felt that Robert Kennedy's book did not adequately express that the 'deal' on the Turkish missiles was part of the resolution of the crisis. And here I have a confession to make... I was the editor of Robert Kennedy's book... His diary was very explicit that this was part of the deal; but at that time it was still a secret even on the American side, except for the six of us who had been present at that meeting. So I took it upon myself to edit that out of his diaries, and that is why the Ambassador is somewhat justified in saying that the diaries are not as explicit as his conversation.<sup>776</sup>

In the Saturday night meeting of the ExCom the participants agreed not to tell other NATO countries and Turkey about the private missile deal. Kennedy told the ExCom members what should be said to U.S. ambassador to Turkey:

Let's give him an explanation of what we're trying to do. We're trying to get it back on the original proposition of last night... because we don't want to get into this [Jupiters] trade. If it's unsuccessful, then... it's possible that we may have to get back on the Jupiter thing. If we do, then we would of course want it to come from the Turks themselves and NATO, rather than just the United States. We're hopeful, however, that that won't come. If it does, his judgement on how it should be handled... we're prepared to do the Polaris and others, does he think this thing can be made?<sup>777</sup>

Meanwhile a special message was sent to Finletter for Sunday's NATO meeting, emphasising that he should not "hint of any [American] readiness to meet Soviet Jupiter exchange proposal."<sup>778</sup>

On Sunday morning, October 28, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy's letter by accepting its terms without referring to the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. The crisis was over now.<sup>779</sup>

According to more recent revelations of Dean Rusk in 1987, in the evening of 27 October 1962 after Robert Kennedy's departure to see Dobrynin, President Kennedy privately asked Secretary Rusk to deliver a secret message to Andrew Cordier, former U.N. parliamentarian. Rusk's statement is as follows:

[T]here is a postscript which I only can furnish. It was clear to me that President Kennedy would not let the Jupiters in Turkey become an obstacle to the removal of the

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<sup>776</sup> Bernstein in Nathan(ed.), op.cit., p.96.

<sup>777</sup> Ibid., pp.92-93.

<sup>778</sup> Ibid., p.93.

<sup>779</sup> For Khrushchev's letter see Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, op.cit., p.168.

missile sites in Cuba because the Jupiters were coming out in any event. He instructed me to telephone the late Andrew Cordier, then at Columbia University, and dictate to him a statement which would be made by U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, proposing the removal of both the Jupiters and the missiles in Cuba. Mr Cordier was to put that statement in the hands of U Thant only after further signal from us. That step was never taken and the statement I furnished to Mr Cordier has never seen the light of day. So far as I know, President Kennedy, Andrew Cordier and I were the only ones who knew of this particular step.<sup>780</sup>

As was understood from this revelation, the United States, as a last resort, would accept an open trade which was literally proposed by an independent person. It is clear that President Kennedy was ready to pay the political price rather than go to war. Dean Rusk said in 1987 that he felt the Cordier ploy "would have been used before we landed troops in Cuba, because landing those troops... would have been a major escalation from the Soviet point of view."<sup>781</sup>

On Monday, 29 October, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin brought Robert Kennedy an unsigned draft letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy, spelling out their secret agreement on the Turkish missiles. Dobrynin's original aim was to ensure a formal American pledge to withdraw the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and to get a presidential letter fulfilling this purpose.<sup>782</sup> According to Dobrynin's account of this meeting "Robert Kennedy told him that it would be very hard for the United States to accept the letter, since withdrawal of the Turkish missiles had to be sanctioned by NATO. This would take time. He renewed his guarantee, on behalf of the President, that the missiles would be gone within four to five months."<sup>783</sup> After studying the letter with President Kennedy, the next day Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that they could not accept any such written exchange. There could be no quid pro quo in this matter. He said: "Take back your letter, reconsider it and if you feel it is necessary to write letters then we will also write one which you cannot enjoy. Also if you should publish any document indicating a deal then it is off and also if done afterward will further affect the relationship [of the two countries]." Although Robert Kennedy assured Dobrynin that the missiles would be gone in a near future, he emphasised that "it was important not to publicise it"

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<sup>780</sup> Blight and Welch, *op.cit.*, pp.83-84, see also *ibid.*, pp.114-115, 170-171, Reeves, *op.cit.*, p.387, Garthoff, *op.cit.*, pp.95-96, Beschloss, *op.cit.*, p.538, Bernstein in Nathan(ed.), *op.cit.*, p.100.

<sup>781</sup> Blight and Welch, *op.cit.*, pp.173-174.

<sup>782</sup> *Ibid.*, p.174, Garthoff, *op.cit.*, 95n.

<sup>783</sup> Beschloss, *op.cit.*, p.546.

because he and the President would appear to be “purveying a falsehood to the American public.”<sup>784</sup>

The secret initiatives of the American administration which were mentioned above were known to only few people close to President John Kennedy. Other members of the ExCom, the American Congress, the American people and America’s allies believed that the President was determined not to bargain with the Soviets on the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. American officials publicly claimed that the Jupiter missiles did not play any kind of role whatsoever in resolving the Cuban crisis. On 29 October 1962 Rusk cabled Ambassadors Hare and Finletter that “no ‘deal’ of any kind was made involving Turkey.” In 1963, McNamara told the House Appropriations Committee: “without any qualifications whatsoever there was absolutely no deal between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the removal of the Jupiter weapons from either Italy or Turkey.”<sup>785</sup> In his testimony in an executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1963, Dean Rusk told Senators that the administration had long been planning to phase out the Jupiters and that their removal was “not the basis of any deal or agreement”. When Senator Bourke Hickenlooper asked whether the Secretary meant that the removal of the missiles from Turkey “was in no way, shape or form, directly or indirectly, connected with the settlement, the discussion or manipulation of the Cuban situation,” Rusk replied: “that is correct, sir.”<sup>786</sup>

It is clear from revelations that the Jupiters were a part of the U.S.-Soviet deal in ending the crisis. Kennedy had secretly pledged to scrap the Turkish missiles without informing the Turks. American authorities were even prepared to make the trade openly if it was necessary. Turkish response and interests obviously held secondary place for the Americans who were dying to see the end of the crisis.

## 5.8 Turkey’s Attitude During the Crisis

From the outset of the Cuban missile crisis, Turkey stood staunchly behind its ally, the United States, and without hesitation gave its full support to all American actions during the crisis. Turkey was one of the first countries which announced

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<sup>784</sup> Ibid., pp. 546-547.

<sup>785</sup> Bernstein in Nathan(ed.), op.cit., p.98.

<sup>786</sup> Garthoff, op.cit., pp. 132-133n.

that it would comply with the American decision to establish a naval blockade of Cuba.<sup>787</sup> On 22 October 1962, Turkish President Cemal Gürsel, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin and Chief of the General Staff Cevdet Sunay met in the presidential palace. They confirmed that Turkey was one of the first targets of a possible war and discussed what precautions could be taken to minimise the loss in Turkey if a war broke out. Prime Minister İnönü said that his government was going to support America without condition until the last moment of the crisis. In his opinion, America was right in its worries about Cuba and should be supported by Turkey as a requirement of Turkey's commitments to the NATO alliance.<sup>788</sup>

In his speech to the Turkish Parliament on 24 October 1962, İnönü said:

Turkey's whole hope is that the dispute could be solved by peaceful means. But if one of our allies asked us to do our duty, we shall of course fulfil our obligations. We are keeping steadily in mind as a faithful ally the complaint and serious anxiety of the United States... We are quite sure that the American nation is sincerely trying to achieve a peaceful solution as befits a great nation which sincerely desires to live in peace.<sup>789</sup>

On the same day, President Gürsel told journalists: "America is our friend and ally. We have to sympathise with the American attitude [towards the Cuban crisis]. We, the Turkish nation, are determined in respecting alliances to which we belong, therefore there is nothing odd in our attitude of supporting our friends in their difficult times."<sup>790</sup>

After the Cuban crisis, Turkish officials continued to express their sympathy with America's attitude during the crisis. In his speech to the Turkish National Assembly on 19 January 1963 Foreign Minister Erkin praised the American action which "prevented the crisis from developing to more dangerous stages and abolished the miscalculation of the enemy side that the United States was not determined enough to protect vital interests of the West." Erkin also proudly mentioned that the speech of the Turkish prime minister in front of Parliament,

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<sup>787</sup> M. Gönübol, et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, Ankara: A.Ü. S.B.F. Yayınları, No. 407, 1977, p.338.

<sup>788</sup> M. Toker, "İsmet Paşa ile 4 Buhranlı Yıl", *Milliyet*, 4 February 1969, p.5.

<sup>789</sup> *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (MMTD)*, 24 October 1962, term 1, sess.1, vol.8, p.246.

<sup>790</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 25 October 1962, p.5.

which declared open support for America, strengthened the feelings of trust and gratification of America and other NATO members towards Turkey.<sup>791</sup>

The Turkish public, too, supported America during the Cuban crisis. But the Turkish people did not know that the crisis put Turkey under a great danger. Most Turks were not even aware before the crisis that there were American-made Jupiter missiles on Turkish territory. On behalf of the main opposition party, MP Fethi Tevetoglu told the Turkish press that the Justice Party had endorsed the government's attitude which suited "Turkey's alliance relations and its important place within NATO."<sup>792</sup> Youth organisations issued statements backing America and the Turkish government's attitude and sent a Turkish flag and a letter to American President Kennedy, supporting his policy. According to Metin Toker, the Turkish government was receiving messages approving its position from all over the country.<sup>793</sup>

While supporting the American side during the Cuban crisis, the Turks greatly resented ideas making comparisons between Cuba and Turkey and proposing a trade-off between the Turkish and Cuban missiles as a way of ending the crisis. Accepting the missile trade under Soviet pressure was impossible for the Turks. They were proud that they were not the stooge of a great power and could not stomach the bargaining of their interests by a great power to appease an enemy state.

When Khrushchev's official proposal of the missile trade was known by the whole world, Turkish officials did not make any comment on it. *The Times* correspondent interpreted this situation as follows: "Behind the almost complete silence one can detect a certain irritation that Turkey was not consulted or, it seems, hardly even informed, before the American-Soviet exchange of messages involving Turkey's defence arrangements and vital interests." As the correspondent stated, Turkish officials followed the American line in interpreting the proposal of missile trade: "There is no similarity between the Cuban and the Turkish bases, not only because of the complete different fashion in which they were set up [the Cuban missiles were deployed secretly while the Turkish ones were deployed openly], but also

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<sup>791</sup> *MMTD*, 9 January 1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.10, pp. 628-629.

<sup>792</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 1962, p.5.

<sup>793</sup> M. Toker, op.cit., 5 February 1969, p.5.

because the Turkish bases are NATO bases and are part of a well-publicised Western defence network.” The correspondent cited the view of a source close to the Turkish Foreign Ministry: “The question of any withdrawal of missile bases from Turkey is a matter not for Turkey alone but for the whole of NATO to decide.”<sup>794</sup>

On 31 October 1962, in his statement to the press, Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun C. Erkin indirectly commented on Soviet demands of withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey: “Those who have demanded abolition of our bases first should themselves promise to abolish their bases which constituted a threat to Turkey.”<sup>795</sup> Later on 9 January 1963 Erkin told the Turkish Parliament that during the Cuban crisis the Soviets tried to bargain the Jupiter missiles in Turkey with Cuban missiles but this Soviet proposal was flatly rejected by the Americans. He also added that no decision concerned Turkey could be taken without its participation.<sup>796</sup>

The Turkish press showed great anger against Khrushchev’s official proposal of a missile trade-off. Earlier on 24 October 1962 Cumhuriyet columnist Ecvet Güresin had warned that in order to put the Americans in a difficult situation the Soviet Union could try to make bargain on NATO bases in Turkey.<sup>797</sup> Other newspaper columnists claimed that it was not fair to make comparisons between the Cuban and Turkish missiles because while the former was offensive and changed the status quo, the latter was defensive and kept the status quo which was established in 1957. Therefore, the press comments suggested, neither Turkey nor America could take the Soviet proposal into consideration.<sup>798</sup> In fact, Turkish officials and Turkish people were almost sure that their ally, the United States, would not make such a concession which would harm the cohesion of the NATO alliance.

## 5.9 Implications of the Crisis for Turkey

When the Soviet-American deal on the Cuban and Turkish missiles was known by the world, it caused a deep resentment and apprehension in Turkish public

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<sup>794</sup> *The Times*, 29 October 1962, p.8.

<sup>795</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 1 November 1962, p.5.

<sup>796</sup> *MMTD*, 9 January 1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.10, p.629.

<sup>797</sup> E. Güresin, “Küba Olayları Karşısında Ankara’daki Akisler”, *Cumhuriyet*, 24 October 1962.

<sup>798</sup> D. Sezer, *Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika*, Ankara: A.Ü. S.B.F. Yayınları, No.339, 1972, p.131.

opinion and led to accusations that the United States decided to withdraw the Jupiters as a part of its deal with the Soviets without consulting the Turkish government, which actually owned the missiles (but not their warheads), for the sake of her own interests, pushing the Soviets out of the Caribbean and preventing an armed combat with them. It was feared that she treated Turkey as a client state whose interests were negotiable with enemy states. It was clear that in the future when American interests demanded, the United States would not hesitate to engage in deals with other powers at the expense of Turkey.<sup>799</sup>

The Turkish prime minister in 1962, İsmet İnönü, made the following explanations to the Turkish Parliament later in January 1970: The Americans told the Turkish leaders that they wanted to remove the Jupiter missiles in Turkey because they were outdated and obsolete and to replace them with Polaris submarines carrying nuclear missiles. The Turkish rulers found the American proposal reasonable, therefore accepted it without hesitation. But later they found out that the Americans had made a deal with the Soviets on the missiles. Keeping this fact in mind, the present Turkish leaders should be careful about not allowing the Americans to involve Turkey in unwanted crisis situations against its will.<sup>800</sup>

Another implication of the Cuban crisis for the Turks was that Turkey might become a target for a Soviet nuclear attack because of American bases and nuclear weapons on its territory. Soviet premier Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy on 27 October 1962 had stated as a part of its proposal that the Soviet Union would give a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of the frontiers and sovereignty of Turkey, not to intervene in its domestic affairs and not to invade it. It means that if the United States did not accept the Soviet proposal the Soviet Union might do the opposite. In fact, according to Metin Toker's account of the Cuban crisis, the Turkish leaders felt that their country together with the United States was on the brink of a nuclear war. İsmet İnönü was fearing that it would be too difficult this time to keep Turkey out of the war if a conflict erupted between the two superpowers.<sup>801</sup> During the crisis Turkey went through almost a state of war for

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<sup>799</sup> Turkish columnist Fahir Armaoğlu rightly commented that the Turkish response to U.S. attitude on the Cyprus question after 1963 was so strong mainly because of U.S. attitude on the Cuban missile crisis.

<sup>800</sup> *MMTD*, 22 January 1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.2, pp. 291-292.

<sup>801</sup> Toker, "İsmet Paşa ile 4 Buhranlı Yıl", *Milliyet*, 4 February 1969, p.5.



few days. The Soviet ambassador in Ankara, Ryzhov, was threatening Turkish politicians by saying that a nuclear war was at the door of Turkey. The Turkish rulers were thinking that if a nuclear war erupted, the Hiroshimas of this nuclear war would be İstanbul and Ankara.<sup>802</sup>

During the Cuban crisis, probably for the first time the Turkish rulers realised that increased military force did not mean increased security. The crisis showed that having nuclear missiles and being part of NATO might not deter enemies. Danger of war could arise without warning and Turkey's alliance ties might not be able to do anything about it. This was a serious blow to the long-held security perception of Turkish leaders. It made them accept the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles without voicing strong complaints. The Turks also understood that a decision taken by Washington might jeopardise Turkey's security and her very existence. The lives of 30 million Turkish people might come under threat because of a disagreement between the two superpowers in a region which is thousands of miles away from Turkey.

## 5.10 Removal of the Jupiters and its Implications for Turkey

Immediately after the Cuban crisis was over, American officials began to take necessary actions for the removal of the Jupiters. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara said later that at the end of the Cuban crisis, "right away I went back to the Pentagon and ordered them [the Turkish missiles] withdrawn, cut up and photographed so that I could personally see that those missiles had been destroyed."<sup>803</sup> Reportedly McNamara told John McNaughton, the general counsel of the Defence Department: "I'm going to tell you something. I don't want you to ask any questions about it. I don't want you to say to anybody else why it's being done, 'cause I'm not going to tell you, I just want you to do it, and I want every single missile removed out of Turkey."<sup>804</sup> On Monday, 29 October 1962, an interdepartmental task force was assembled to work on the removal of the Jupiters under the chairmanship of McNaughton, who said in the first meeting: "Those missiles are going

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<sup>802</sup> Ibid., 5 February 1969, p.5.

<sup>803</sup> Beschloss, *Kennedy v. Khrushchev*, op.cit., p.588n.

<sup>804</sup> Bernstein in Nathan(ed.), op.cit., p.98.

to be out of there by April 1, [1963] if we have to shoot them out.”<sup>805</sup>

On 9 November 1962 Dean Rusk advised President Kennedy that the Jupiters in Turkey and Italy should not be withdrawn in the near future on the grounds that “they were useful sponges in the event of a Soviet first strike because the 45 missiles would be targets for Soviet weapons that would otherwise be aimed at Western Europe... If the Jupiters were soon removed, American credibility would be found wanting, and allies besides Turkey and Italy might no longer trust the United States. But as modern and effective weapons systems come into being... and as the Cuban missile crisis recedes, the phasing out of the [Jupiters] would at a later time be entirely feasible.”<sup>806</sup> Rusk’s argument was not incompatible with the U.S. promise to the Soviets that the missiles would go in about five months. In early November 1962 and January 1963, McBundy’s aide Robert Komer, ignorant of the deal, strongly advised against the withdrawal of the missiles from Turkey, pointing to uncertainties in Turkish political outlook.<sup>807</sup>

In January 1963, Turkish and American officials discussed what should be done about the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. On 9 January 1963 Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin informed the Turkish National Assembly that Turkey would join the joint discussions in NATO, which would consider the value of NATO’s present weapon systems. He said that if NATO decided to replace some weapon systems with others because of technological changes it would strengthen the security of NATO and Turkey and therefore Turkey would accept it.<sup>808</sup>

Eventually Erkin declared in the Turkish Parliament on 17 February 1963 that the Turkish government officially informed the American ambassador in Ankara that Turkey accepted the American proposal to replace the Jupiter missiles in Turkey with Polaris submarines which would be placed in the Mediterranean.<sup>809</sup> In April 1963 the United States and Turkey exchanged notes for this end.<sup>810</sup> On

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<sup>805</sup> Chayes, *the Cuban Missile Crisis*, op.cit., p.98n, Hafner, “**Bureaucratic Politics...**”, op.cit., p.319.

<sup>806</sup> Bernstein in Nathan(ed.), op.cit., pp.98-99.

<sup>807</sup> Ibid., p.99.

<sup>808</sup> Sezer, op.cit., p.133.

<sup>809</sup> *MMTD*, 17 February 1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.13, pp. 222-223.

<sup>810</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.94.

25 April U.S. Defence Secretary McNamara informed President Kennedy, “the last Jupiter came down [in Turkey] yesterday”, and it would be flown out at the end of the week. A Polaris submarine with 16 missiles was deployed to the area.<sup>811</sup>

The removal of the Jupiters was met by the Turkish public opinion with a certain degree of caution. Some articles appeared in the press, expressing doubts that the removal of the Jupiters would weaken Turkey’s defence system and cause a security gap in deterring the Soviet Union. Some newspaper columnists warned that after the Jupiters were gone, Turkey’s strategic importance might seem decreased, therefore foreign aid to Turkey might be reduced.<sup>812</sup> In his speeches to the Turkish Parliament, Foreign Minister Erkin stated that these kinds of doubts expressed by Turkish writers were baseless. He explained that Polaris submarines had many advantages in comparison with the Jupiters, therefore in terms of Turkey’s security and defence deployment of Polaris submarines was a success for the Turkish government. Denying the loss of Turkey’s strategic importance Erkin also said that American officials gave assurances on the continuity of aid.<sup>813</sup>

In fact, the removal of the intermediate range Jupiters from Turkey did cause a change in strategic importance of Turkey. Turkey no longer had nuclear missiles in its territory, which could reach the Soviet Union. Thus it ceased to present a kind of danger to the Soviets, which would attract the first strike in the event of conflict. It no longer held the position of extreme importance in the cold war conflict, which it had occupied in the past.<sup>814</sup> The Turkish military continued to welcome the American strike aircraft, equipped with nuclear weapons, which were stationed in Turkey in accordance with a tactical rotation agreement concluded in February 1957. But these aircraft did not pose such a compelling threat for the Soviets since they had effective surface-to-air missiles to face strike aircraft. In the eyes of the Turkish military leaders, strike aircraft served to assure the American

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<sup>811</sup> Bernstein in Nathan(ed.), op.cit., p.99.

<sup>812</sup> Sezer, op.cit., p.134, “Durum”, *Milliyet*, 4 and 13 February 1963, p.1, E. Güresin, “NATO’da Görüş Değişikliği ve Toplantılar”, *Cumhuriyet*, 20.1.1963.

<sup>813</sup> *MMTD*, 9.1.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.10, p.629, *ibid.*, 17.2.1963, term 1, sess.2, vol.13, pp. 222-225. Former Turkish foreign minister Bayülken told the author that Foreign Ministry officials did not deplore the removal of the Jupiters because they would go any way since they were outdated.

<sup>814</sup> G. Harris, “Turkey and the United States”, in Karpas(ed.), *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition*, op.cit., pp.58-59, Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.95.

involvement in defending Turkey in the event of a Soviet attack.<sup>815</sup>

## 5.11 Conclusion

The Cuban missile crisis was one of the most important influences on U.S.-Turkish relations during the period of our concern. In particular, it played a part in the cautious attitude of Turkish rulers in military relations with the USA from 1965. It also sharpened the Turkish disappointment over the American attitude toward the Cyprus problem.

It is instructive to consider the relevance of theoretical explanations to this crisis in the light of historical account we have outlined above. The crisis constituted a very good example of costs and dangers of the U.S.-Turkish alliance for its smaller partner, Turkey. The Turks had entered into alliance relations with the USA to protect their security against more powerful enemies, especially the Soviet Union. They had also welcomed the stationing of the Jupiters on their territory, thinking that it would help the defence of Turkey and the whole NATO region. But the crisis showed that alliance relations with one superpower and allowing the presence of its weapons and forces in the country might also attract and increase the threat of the other superpower and drag Turkey into a terrible nuclear war over an issue in the outbreak of which she actively played no role. The Soviets would prefer to attack Turkey as a first step because the similarity between the Cuban and Turkish missiles would justify their action and also attacking the weakest, the smallest link in the Western alliance might have prevented escalation of the conflict.

The crisis also showed difficulties of having alliance relations with a big power for a small state. U.S. authorities had easily put Turkey on the bargaining table without consulting with Turkish rulers. This was totally the opposite of the Turkish attitude of consulting with the Americans even in matters which did not concern the USA. In cold-war matters the Turks would not dare to take one step before informing U.S. rulers. In this context, the Cuban crisis shows that U.S.-Turkish contacts bore the characteristics of the patron-client relationship at that time. Turkish expectation of reward and praise from the Americans for their

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<sup>815</sup> Harris in Karpat(ed.), op.cit., pp.58-59, Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., pp.94-95.

steadfast support for the USA during the crisis also fits this pattern. This unconditional Turkish support for the big ally without considering national interests first constitutes another aspect of the patron-client relationship.

The Cuban crisis also reflects the Turkish perception of their alliance with the USA. The Turks had thought that the apparent close relationship between the two countries, which depended on having same ideological principles, required unconditional support for each other. That was why they supported America wholeheartedly during the crisis. They would not expect from the Americans to bargain interests of an ally with the enemy. They would be proved to be wrong in their opinion for the second time later during the Cyprus crises.

The Cuban crisis also confirmed the idea that the agreement between superpowers could be to the disadvantage of small powers. Finally, it should be stated that as was explained earlier, Turkey's strategic location (the stationing of the Jupiters near the Soviet Union) contributed to the outbreak of a conflict between the two superpowers and that the removal of the Jupiters decreased strategic importance of Turkey, thus reduced its bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States.

## Chapter VI

### THE CYPRUS QUESTION BETWEEN 1960 AND 1965 AND ITS EFFECT UPON TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The Cyprus question and the U.S. attitude toward it were major influences on Turkish foreign policy, and undoubtedly played an important role in shaping Turkish-American relations and affected the alliance between the two countries in the 1964-1975 period. It is, therefore, necessary to study the Cyprus question to comprehend characteristics of the two countries' relations and alliance. For the sake of clarity it is convenient to divide our consideration of this topic into two chapters, each marking separate critical developments in Cyprus that had profound but different influences on Turkish-U.S. relations. The first of these two chapters will examine the effects of the breakdown in 1964-65 of the 1960 constitutional regime. The following chapter will cover the 1974 Sampson coup and the subsequent Turkish military intervention. In the present chapter the events between 1960 and 1965 will be reviewed briefly and then Cyprus policies of Turkey and the United States and the impact of the Cyprus issue on relations and the alliance between the two countries and on foreign policies of each state, especially Turkey, will be analysed.

#### 6.1 The 1960-1963 Period

The Zurich-London settlement of the Cyprus question in 1959<sup>816</sup> and the subsequent declaration of the independent Republic of Cyprus on 16 August 1960<sup>817</sup> were welcomed by the United States. For American policy-makers a serious matter which threatened the co-operation of the three NATO powers, Greece, Britain and Turkey, had been eliminated and thus the stability of the Western alliance

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<sup>816</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1959-1960, vol.12, pp.16643-16647, 16657-16661. (The source gives details of negotiations and agreements.)

<sup>817</sup> *Ibid.*, p.17730.

had been saved.<sup>818</sup> President Eisenhower praised the settlement as a “a victory for common sense”, an “imaginative and courageous act of statesmanship” and a “splendid achievement”.<sup>819</sup> Deputy Under-secretary of State Murphy endorsed it as a happy solution and the statesmanlike action of America’s allies.<sup>820</sup> Subsequently, the Americans expected that Cyprus would join Britain, Greece and Turkey to form a solid bulwark against communism and allow the United States to use its existing communication facilities in Cyprus and the British sovereign base areas on the island.<sup>821</sup>

Turkey was pleased with the settlement of the Cyprus issue since Turkish Cypriots were granted constitutional guarantees which would protect their existence as a separate community and would provide their participation in the administration effectively.<sup>822</sup> Moreover, Turkey’s fears that Cyprus could fall into hands of a hostile state and threaten Turkey’s security seemed to be eliminated by the Treaty of Guarantee, which authorised Turkey to intervene militarily in the island to protect the status quo.<sup>823</sup>

It soon became clear that the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities would not cooperate sufficiently to enable the new regime to work successfully. As early as the summer of 1961, the American administration had worried that the system of guarantees assuring the stability of Cyprus would break down soon. In August 1961, Kennedy said: “It seems to me if the situation is as desperate as we hear it is, we cannot continue to rely upon our policy of hoping that the guarantor powers

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<sup>818</sup> V. Coufoudakis, “United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question” in M.A. Attalides(ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed*, Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977, p.108.

<sup>819</sup> J. Reddaway, *Burdened with Cyprus*, London: K. Rustem and Brother, 1986, p.124.

<sup>820</sup> E.B. Laipson, “Cyprus: A Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy” in J.T.A. Koumoulides (ed.), *Cyprus in Transition 1960-1985*, London: Trigraph, 1986, p.58.

<sup>821</sup> T.A. Adams and A.J. Cottrell, *Cyprus Between East and West*, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968, p.56.

<sup>822</sup> *Keessing’s...*, vol.12, p.17069.

<sup>823</sup> S. Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers and the Third World*, New York: University Press of America, 1988, p.38. Former Turkish foreign minister Ü. Haluk Bayülken told the author that experienced, high-quality Turkish diplomats obtained successful results on the Cyprus question in the U.N. in the 1950s and succeeded in getting a favourable solution of the problem so that Turkey was able to have a say in the future of Cyprus in the following years. In his interview with the author, Turkish academic Seyfi Taşhan agreed with this point.

will shoulder the principal share of the Western burden.”<sup>824</sup> In 1962 Kennedy and Vice-President Johnson separately urged Cypriot leaders to act to deter the growth of the communist movement in Cyprus.<sup>825</sup> Nevertheless, the Americans were extremely reluctant to intervene directly in the matter, fearing to alienate their allies, Turkey and Greece.<sup>826</sup> When intercommunal disputes in Cyprus worried the State Department officials in February 1963, Secretary of State Rusk sent a cable to the American Ambassador in London, stating: “We want Britain to emphasise to Greeks and Turks similarities [in] their present positions and guide them to a common stance and coordinated three-power pressure on Cypriot communities.”<sup>827</sup>

The Turkish response to disputes between Turkish and Greek Cypriots on violations of the Cypriot constitution was to send notes warning the Greek side that they would not allow any change in the constitution,<sup>828</sup> but Turkish warnings were mild in order not to cause a crisis.

## 6.2 The Cyprus Crisis of December 1963

On 30 November 1963 Cypriot President Makarios submitted to Turkish Vice-President Küçük a memorandum proposing thirteen substantive amendments to the Cypriot constitution.<sup>829</sup> On 16 December the Turkish government rejected the entire memorandum as totally unacceptable and insisted that no change whatsoever could be made in the constitution.<sup>830</sup> On 21 December widespread shootings and killings began in Cyprus when the Turkish community was targeted by the Greek police and ex-terrorist irregulars who wanted the unification of the island

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<sup>824</sup> H.W. Brands, Jr., “America Enters the Cyprus Tangle, 1964”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.23, No.3, July 1987, p.350.

<sup>825</sup> Ibid., p.350, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.54, Adams and Cottrell, op.cit., pp.59-60.

<sup>826</sup> Brands, op.cit., pp.349, 350-351.

<sup>827</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.55.

<sup>828</sup> İnönü’s Address in the Turkish National Assembly on 5 May 1964 as quoted by S. Bilge et al., (eds.). *Cyprus: Past, Present, Future*, Ankara, 1964, pp.97-99, Foreign Minister Erkin’s speech in Parliament on 9.1.1963, *Keesing’s...*, 1963-1964, vol.14, p.19257.

<sup>829</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp.55-56, *Keesing’s...*, vol.14, p.20113, M. Tamkoç, *the Turkish Cypriot State*, London: K. Rustem and Brother, 1988, p.73, Z. Stavrinides, *the Cyprus Conflict*, Loris Stavrinides Press, 1976, p.12.

<sup>830</sup> R. Stephens, *Cyprus*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1966, p.180, D.S. Bitsios, *Cyprus; the Vulnerable Republic*, Thessaloniki, Greece: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975, p.125, *Keesing’s...*, vol.14, p.20113.



with Greece (enosis).<sup>831</sup>

The Turks were convinced that the Greek side had tried to achieve constitutional changes and ultimately enosis by force under a pre-planned programme, the Akritas plan.<sup>832</sup> Turkish rulers informed Western states that they took the events in Cyprus seriously and threatened to intervene in the island as a guarantor of the Cyprus system.<sup>833</sup> On 25 December Turkish jets flew over Cyprus to warn Greek Cypriots.<sup>834</sup> The Turkish warnings had their effect on 26 December. Greek Cypriots accepted the establishment of a joint peace force consisting of Turkish, Greek and British forces on the island.<sup>835</sup>

As the hostilities began and spread over Cyprus, the immediate American concern was to bring about a cease-fire or at least contain the fighting and thus to prevent a military clash between Turkey and Greece and to save the southeastern flank of NATO.<sup>836</sup> The Americans did not want the breakdown of the political system of the Cyprus Republic because it could create conditions that might be exploited by AKEL (the Cypriot Communist Party) and the Russians. The United States also opposed the internationalisation of the Cyprus question through the discussion of the problem in the United Nations and preferred its solution within a Western setting securing Western strategic interests. To fulfil these purposes U.S. officials urged restraint on all sides and particularly asked the Turks not to

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<sup>831</sup> Reddaway, op.cit., pp.137-138, N. Crawshaw, *the Cyprus Revolt*, London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1978, pp.366-367, Stephens, op.cit., pp.182-184, *The Historical Background of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*, Ankara: The Cyprus-Turkish Cultural Association, pp.23-24, 31-32, *Keesing's...*, vol.14, pp.20113-20114.

<sup>832</sup> N. Erim *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, Ankara: Ajans-Türk, 1975, p.207, R.R. Denktash, *the Cyprus Triangle*, London: K. Rustem and Brother, 1988, pp.26-27, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.57, N. Erim, "Reminiscences on Cyprus" *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, Nos.2-3, February, 1975, p.158, Tamkoç, op.cit., p.74, Y.T. Kurat, *Elli Yıllık Cumhuriyetin Dış Politikası 1923-1973*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1975, pp.294-295. Independent observers and even Greek Cypriots confirmed the existence of the plan. C.H. Dodd, *The Cyprus Issue, A Current Perspective*, Huntingdon: the Eothen Press, 1994, p.4.

<sup>833</sup> Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm...*, op.cit., p.208, Bilge, et al. (eds.), *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.5, Stephens, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.184, *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20114.

<sup>834</sup> Bilge et al., (eds.), op.cit., p.7.

<sup>835</sup> T. Ehrlich, *Cyprus: 1958-1967*, London: Oxford University Press, 1974, p.58, Stephens, op.cit., p.185, Crawshaw, op.cit., p.367, *Keesing's*, vol.14, p.20114.

<sup>836</sup> V. Coufoudakis in Attalides (ed.), op.cit., p.110, J.S. Joseph, *Cyprus; Ethnic Conflict and International Concern*, New York: Peter Lang, 1985, p.127, Adams and Cottrell, op.cit., p.56.

intervene in Cyprus<sup>837</sup> though they did not condemn the action of Turkish jet fighters which were provided under NATO auspices and assigned to the NATO command.<sup>838</sup> To tone down the Turkish threats to invade Cyprus, President Johnson sent a letter on 26 December 1963 to Turkish President Cemal Gürsel, stating that the United States was ready “to support any and all actions proposed by the three guarantor powers which offer any reasonable hope of assisting in a peaceful solution.”<sup>839</sup>

The State Department’s policy directive to the U.S. representatives in the United Nations on 27 December shows that the United States did not want to get too closely involved in the Cyprus question:

The U.K., Greece and Turkey have treaty responsibilities. We look to [the] U.K. to take [the] lead to keep debate in constructive channels... The U.S. should take a back seat during debate but should discreetly seek [to] keep discussion in [a] moderate key, particularly when chair... We assume, however, it will be necessary for the U.S. to speak. Our statement should not discuss [the] merits of Cypriot complaint against Turkey or of background issues which brought on recent communal violence, but should stress [the] need for those concerned to work out their differences... [the United States] did not want to “do anything to abet [the] Greek Cypriots in their efforts [to] bypass [the 1959] treaties.”<sup>840</sup>

W. Averell Harriman, undersecretary of state for political affairs, summarised his impressions and worries after the U.N. Security Council meeting on 27 December 1963 in a cable to various American embassies: “The results of this meeting were to weaken current efforts to reestablish law and order on Cyprus, to strengthen the hands of extremists in both communities on Cyprus and in Greece and Turkey and to provide an opportunity for Soviet and other anti-Western propaganda initiatives.”<sup>841</sup>

### 6.3 The NATO Plan of January-February 1964

On 25 January 1964, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir David Ormsby-Gore, informed U.S. Undersecretary of State George Ball that Britain could no

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<sup>837</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp.58, 60, Johnson’s letter to Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders in H.İ. Salih, *Cyprus: the Impact of Diverse Nationalism in a State*, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978, p.35, Brands, op.cit., p.351.

<sup>838</sup> G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p.108.

<sup>839</sup> Salih, op.cit., p.35.

<sup>840</sup> Quoted by Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.61.

<sup>841</sup> Brands, op.cit., p.351.

longer undertake primary responsibility alone for keeping peace in Cyprus<sup>842</sup> and said that “Her Majesty’s government has concluded that it is best to establish an international force on Cyprus, and early rather than later.”<sup>843</sup> Such a force could be broadly based but should include detachments only from NATO countries.<sup>844</sup> When George Ball responded that the United States did not want to get involved because it “had far too much on [its] plate”, the ambassador warned that if such a NATO force could not be summoned, Britain would turn the Cyprus question over to the United Nations.<sup>845</sup>

On the same day George Ball told Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor, “we must tell the British that we have other responsibilities which we will continue to bear. They must bear theirs.”<sup>846</sup> McNamara, too, was reluctant to broaden American responsibilities but “he was fully aware that an exploding Cyprus could not only endanger... Mediterranean position [of America] but undermine the whole southern flank of NATO.”<sup>847</sup> In the evening Ball discussed the matter with President Johnson. The President was reluctant to accept the British proposal but since he understood the seriousness of the Cyprus question he directed Ball to draw up an acceptable solution.<sup>848</sup> Half an hour later George Ball told Ormsby-Gore that the United States would support a NATO force diplomatically and logistically, but that no American troops would be committed.<sup>849</sup> He said, “[we] did not wish [to] move into another political problem with no end in sight... We are prepared to do what we could with Greeks and Turks but [we are] not sure what could be said that [is] new... [The] U.K. should understand that we viewed getting involved with greatest reluctance.”<sup>850</sup>

Under constant pressures from Turks that they would invade Cyprus unless the

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<sup>842</sup> G.W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern*, New York, London: W.W. Norton, 1982, p.340, Brands, op.cit., p.349.

<sup>843</sup> E. Weintal and C. Bartlett, *Facing the Brink*, London: Hutchinson, 1967, p.18.

<sup>844</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.340.

<sup>845</sup> Brands, op.cit., p.349, Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.18.

<sup>846</sup> Brands, op.cit., p.352.

<sup>847</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.341.

<sup>848</sup> Ibid., p.341.

<sup>849</sup> Brands, op.cit., p.352.

<sup>850</sup> Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers...*, op.cit., p.63.

USA did something,<sup>851</sup> the U.S. administration revised its decision in a few days. In order to appease hawkish Turkish commanders and also to warn the Turks on the fatal consequences of unilateral intervention, President Johnson dispatched General Lyman Lemnitzer, the American commander of NATO, to Ankara and Athens on 28 January 1964.<sup>852</sup> By 29 January 1964 President Johnson had decided to approve a plan for American participation in a peace force.<sup>853</sup> The conditions for participating in the NATO plan were summarised by George Ball to McNamara: "We should insist... 1- that the duration of the force be limited to three months, 2- that the Greeks and Turks agree not to use their unilateral intervention rights for three months, and 3- that they agree on a mediator who was not representative of any of the three guarantor powers but from another NATO European country."<sup>854</sup>

Even after the Greek Cypriot side rejected the NATO plan on 4 February 1964,<sup>855</sup> the United States tried to achieve the implementation of the plan. On 7 February Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated in a press conference that the United States was willing to participate in a peacekeeping operation in Cyprus with other NATO partners.<sup>856</sup> George Ball was dispatched by President Johnson from 9 February 1964 to Athens, Ankara and Nicosia to sell the plan. In the first stage of his visit Ball stopped in London on 9 February 1964 to talk to British officials. In London Ball also talked to the Cypriot foreign minister, Sypros Kyprianou. Kyprianou was so adamant in rejecting the NATO plan that, as Brands states,

Ball came convinced that the idea was futile... He began to fear that even if such a force made it to the island, the American contingent would be singled out for attack by Cypriot terrorists - an opinion seconded by the CIA. However, because the United States had made a commitment to the NATO force, Ball did not want the Johnson administration to be seen as backing out... As he described to Johnson, his plan was to place on Makarios' shoulders the primary onus for... [America's] non-participation.<sup>857</sup>

On 10 February George Ball talked to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü

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<sup>851</sup> Ibid., pp.63-64, Ball, op.cit., p.341.

<sup>852</sup> Salih, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.34, Brands, op.cit., p.352.

<sup>853</sup> Brands, op.cit., p.352.

<sup>854</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.341. For the full text of the Anglo -American proposal for a NATO force, which was submitted to the parties concerned on 31 January 1964, see *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20116.

<sup>855</sup> For Makarios's note to Britain and the USA see *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20116.

<sup>856</sup> Salih, op.cit., p.33.

<sup>857</sup> Brands, op.cit., p.353.

in Ankara and persuaded him to accept the NATO plan.<sup>858</sup> İnönü insisted that the United States must “move swiftly; Turkish patience was running out. Given the excited state of public opinion, any overnight flare up of killing on the island might force the Turkish military to intervene... So long as nothing was done to impair Turkey’s right of intervention to protect the Turkish Cypriot population, the Turkish government was prepared to go along with the Anglo-American proposal for a NATO force.”<sup>859</sup> Meanwhile, on 10 February, the U.S. State Department clarified that the United States had no intention of imposing any solution on any side on the Cyprus question and that it “has no preconceptions or preference as to the shape or form of final solutions that might be developed for the Cyprus problem... The United States must emphasise that it does have a major interest in the maintenance of peace in the eastern Mediterranean... It will do whatever it can to assure that objective.”<sup>860</sup>

During their meeting on 12 February, Makarios, Greek Cypriot President, rejected Ball’s proposal for a NATO peace force and suggested that the whole matter of peacekeeping force must be submitted to the U.N. Security Council. In George Ball’s view, “Makarios’s central interest was to block off Turkish intervention so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish Cypriots. Obviously we would never permit that.”<sup>861</sup> Ball warned Makarios that if he continued to block a solution that would eliminate Turkey’s reason for intervening, “the Turks... would inevitably invade, and neither the United States nor any other Western power would raise a finger to stop them.”<sup>862</sup> In the evening Ball cabled President Johnson and Dean Rusk that “overwhelming pressure must be brought on Makarios to frighten him sufficiently to consider some move to halt the killing.”<sup>863</sup>

Meanwhile, on 12 February, Greek Cypriots broke a cease-fire agreement and launched a massive attack against the Turkish positions in Limassol. Rumours then spread that Turkish ships were sailing for Cyprus and later that a military

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<sup>858</sup> M. Toker, “İsmet Paşa ile 4 Buhranlı Yıl”, *Milliyet*, 7 February 1969, p.5.

<sup>859</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.343.

<sup>860</sup> Salih, op.cit., p.33, *Cumhuriyet*, 11 February 1964, p.7.

<sup>861</sup> Ball, op.cit., pp.344-345.

<sup>862</sup> Ibid., pp.342, 345.

<sup>863</sup> Ibid., p.345.

invasion had been prevented by American diplomatic efforts and the deliberate obstruction of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.<sup>864</sup> Secretary of State Rusk directed George Ball to return to Turkey “to keep [the Turks] at home.”<sup>865</sup> In their meeting Ball wanted İnönü not to intervene in Cyprus until the U.N. Security Council discussed the issue and assured him that the United Nations would take no action nullifying Turkey’s intervention right and that Makarios would get a severe lesson at the U.N..<sup>866</sup> In Ball’s words, “İnönü reluctantly agreed but emphasised that if there were further serious violence on the island, Turkey would no longer stand still.”<sup>867</sup>

When he left Ankara, Ball was convinced that Turkey was seriously thinking of intervening in Cyprus. He cabled to President Johnson from London on 16 February: “we can count on only a few days. Even that time could be foreshortened by a major incident in Cyprus. The Turks are not bluffing.”<sup>868</sup> “Both the governments and people of Turkey and Greece want peace but.. they cannot, by their own unaided efforts, avoid catastrophe. They can be pushed off a collision course only by some outside agency... The Greek Cypriots do not want a peace-making force; they just want to be left alone to kill Turkish Cypriots.”<sup>869</sup> As a last minute attempt, Ball proposed to bypass Makarios entirely and organise a joint peace force composed of Greek, Turkish and British units. It would be an action of the three guarantor powers to exercise their rights of intervention under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee.<sup>870</sup> President Johnson accepted the proposal and asked the British Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home to convene a summit conference to implement the plan,<sup>871</sup> but the British refused to go along with the plan.<sup>872</sup> When Ball reported this to President Johnson, “Johnson agreed that the United States had gone as far as we should try to deflect a tribal conflict. Now

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<sup>864</sup> Stephens, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.189.

<sup>865</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.71.

<sup>866</sup> Ball, *the Past...*, op.cit., p.347, Prime Minister İnönü’s letter to President Johnson, 13 June 1964, Appendix D, *Middle East Journal*, vol.20, summer 1966, pp. 386-389, Toker, op.cit., 7 February 1969, p.5.

<sup>867</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.347.

<sup>868</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.71.

<sup>869</sup> Brands, op.cit., p. 354, Ball, op.cit., p.347.

<sup>870</sup> Brands, op.cit., p.354, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.71.

<sup>871</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.71, Weintal and Bartlett, *Facing the Brink*, op.cit., p.21.

<sup>872</sup> Brands, op.cit., p.354, Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.21.

our only available course was to work through the United Nations.”<sup>873</sup>

The Americans certainly would have liked the discussion of the Cyprus problem within the NATO framework. In this way, they could assert their influence more easily and the involvement of the Eastern bloc and non-aligned countries in a matter which mainly concerned NATO powers could be prevented. However, since Makarios was adamant in rejecting it and he was supported by Greek rulers the Americans saw no way other than allowing the discussion of the matter in the U.N..

The Turks had accepted the NATO plan mainly because it provided for American participation. They hoped that the Americans would deter Greek Cypriots from continuing their atrocities. The spokesman of the Turkish government, A. İhsan Göğüş, expressed pleasure with the U.S. decision of participating in the peace force: “Our great ally America has recognised the importance of the Cyprus question and, therefore, has decided to work for the restoration of peace and security in Cyprus.”<sup>874</sup> For Turkish P.M. İnönü U.S. involvement would make it easier for him to call for U.S. mediation during crisis situations and resist the pressures of pro-intervention circles at home.<sup>875</sup> Moreover, the plan would provide for a temporary solution in the absence of Turkish military intervention which stemmed from Turkey’s technical unpreparedness.<sup>876</sup> Turks also preferred the involvement of NATO rather than the United Nations, which was the aim of the Greek side, fearing that the U.N. could abolish their role as guarantor power.<sup>877</sup>

#### 6.4 The U.N. Security Council Meeting on Cyprus

Before the U.N. Security Council met to discuss the Cyprus problem, the United States tried to dissuade Greeks from taking the matter to the U.N. and working for a resolution which would support mainly the Greek cause and alienate Turkey. Allegedly, U.S. officials threatened the Greek delegation in the U.N.

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<sup>873</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.348.

<sup>874</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 30.1.1964, p.7.

<sup>875</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.65.

<sup>876</sup> Toker, op.cit., *Milliyet*, 7 February 1969 p.5.

<sup>877</sup> P. Windsor, *NATO and the Cyprus Crisis*, London: the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1964, pp.10-11.

with not preventing Turkish intervention in Cyprus and proposed to them a draft resolution which seemed to support the Turkish viewpoint.<sup>878</sup> However, according to Greek representative Bitsios's accounts, on 17 February he received the following statement from America's U.N. ambassador, Adlai Stevenson: "Press reports from London that the United States is seeking to isolate Archbishop Makarios, and favours settlement of the communal conflict in Cyprus by partition, are untrue... The United States has no position on the terms of any settlement."<sup>879</sup>

During the 1096th meeting of the Security Council in February 1964,<sup>880</sup> U.S. ambassador Stevenson made the following points: "the Treaty of Guarantee forms an integral part of the organic arrangements that created the Republic of Cyprus. In fact, it is so-called a basic article of the Constitution of Cyprus... This treaty or any international treaty cannot be abrogated, cannot be nullified, cannot be modified either in fact or in effect by the Security Council of the U.N."<sup>881</sup>

The major business before the Council... was the restoration of communal peace and order. His government had no position as to the shape of a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. The leaders of the two communities had to work out their differences together but in the present climate this was patently impossible. The Security Council had therefore to make an effective contribution to the reestablishment of conditions in which a long-term political solution could be sought with due regard to the interests, the rights and the responsibilities of all parties concerned... [The United States] was [not] even proposing that the international force be comprised only of NATO military units [but] recommended that the Council, in consultation with the Secretary General, appeal to the parties concerned to move ahead quickly in working out peace-keeping arrangements to which other states could make a contribution.<sup>882</sup>

As the first part of Stevenson's speech supported mainly the Turkish theory of the validity of the London-Zurich agreements, the second part of it sought a more balancing attitude which aimed to accommodate the views of both sides.

On 4 March 1964 U.N. Security Council accepted a different resolution from the Anglo-American proposal which regarded the London-Zurich agreements as the basis of the independence of Cyprus and which mentioned the rights of the

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<sup>878</sup> Bitsios, op.cit., pp.141-146.

<sup>879</sup> Ibid., pp. 142-143.

<sup>880</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.14, pp.20118-20119.

<sup>881</sup> Salih, op.cit., p.37.

<sup>882</sup> "Cypriot Complaint of Turkish Aggression and Interference in its Internal Affairs", *International Organisation*, vol.18, 1964, p.482.



guarantor powers to intervene in Cyprus.<sup>883</sup> Yet the American officials did not consider it a defeat for the United States. They reasoned that their aim, which was endorsed by the resolution, was “to install a U.N. force as quickly as possible, while assuring that the resolution did not nullify the intervention rights of the guarantor powers, since the Turks would not stand still for that. We sought also to keep the Soviet Union as far as possible out of the action.” It was in fact a success for the United States because both sides were happy; “Makarios regarded it as foreclosing the Turkish right to intervene, the Turks saw it as preserving their intervention rights.”<sup>884</sup>

The United States endorsed the Security Council resolution which required the establishment of the U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the appointment of a mediator. She pledged financial support for the force and help with the airlift of its troops.<sup>885</sup> In the eyes of American officials, UNFICYP “was a satisfactory substitute for a direct NATO presence on the island, since the participating countries did not include any eastern bloc nations.”<sup>886</sup> However, the appointment of a mediator, did not satisfy American officials entirely, therefore they sought alternative peace mediation ways in the following months.

The Turkish side, too, seemed happy with the acceptance of the Security Council resolution. They welcomed the resolution in their public statements, noting that it did not abrogate Turkey’s right of intervention and but would hopefully help the restoration of peace and stability in Cyprus.<sup>887</sup>

When Greek Cypriots attacked Turkish positions in Paphos, Nicosia and Kyrenia on 8 March 1964,<sup>888</sup> the Turkish government sent a strong ultimatum to Greek

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<sup>883</sup> Reddaway, *Burdened With Cyprus*, op.cit., p.159. For the text see *Keesing’s...*, vol.14, p.20119.

<sup>884</sup> Ball, *the Past Has Another Pattern*, op.cit., p.348.

<sup>885</sup> Laipson in Koumoulides(ed.), op.cit., p.60.

<sup>886</sup> Ibid., p.61. On the UNFICYP see also T.W. Adams and A.J. Cottrell, “**American Foreign Policy and the U.N. Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus**”, *ORBIS*, vol.12, No.2, Summer 1968, pp.490-503, J.M. Boyd, “**Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping**”, *International Organisation*, vol.20, 1966, pp.1-17, R. Higgins, “**Basic Facts on the U.N. Force in Cyprus**”, *The World Today*, vol.20, January-December 1964, pp.347-350.

<sup>887</sup> M. Gönülöbol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, Ankara: A.Ü. S.B.F. Yayınları, No. 407, 1977, p.396.

<sup>888</sup> Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers...*, op.cit., p.72.

Cypriots and informed the United States that it would invade the island if the attacks did not stop.<sup>889</sup> In order to prevent the Turkish action, U.S. officials secured the quick arrival of the U.N. contingent to Cyprus through intensive diplomatic efforts. Subsequently tension eased and Turks postponed their action.<sup>890</sup>

## 6.5 The Johnson Letter of June 1964

### 6.5.1 The Johnson Letter

The Greek Cypriot administration's rapid militarization efforts and its decision to introduce military conscription caused another Cyprus crisis.<sup>891</sup> On 2 June 1964, the Turkish National Security Council decided to intervene in Cyprus militarily.<sup>892</sup> Nevertheless, Turkish Prime Minister İnönü decided to consult with American officials before starting military operations, though his foreign minister, F. Cemal Erkin, opposed him, arguing that if the United States was informed of the action she would certainly stop it.<sup>893</sup> On 4 June 1964 İnönü said to U.S. Ambassador Raymond Hare: "all GOT [Government of Turkey] has in mind is [to] occupy part of [the] island and stop there. Greeks could [also] occupy part [of it] and [the U.N.] force could remain between them. From that position one could get down to meaningful discussion."<sup>894</sup> Hare asked for a twenty-four hour delay of Turkish action to consult with his administration and İnönü accepted it.

Meanwhile, the United States took some actions apparently to prevent Turkish action. The U.S. commander of NATO, General Lemnitzer, warned Turkish military leaders about possible harmful results of a Turkish military intervention

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<sup>889</sup> Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm...*, op.cit., pp.256-257, 264, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.73, Bitsios, op.cit., p.159, *Cumhuriyet*, 13 March 1964, p.7, Stephens, op.cit., p.191, *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20120.

<sup>890</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.73, Prime Minister İnönü's response to President Johnson, Appendix D, *Middle East Journal*, op.cit., p.389.

<sup>891</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20125, E. Mütercimler, *Kıbrıs Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Yönleri*. İstanbul: Yaprak Yayınevi, 1990, p.97, Erim, op.cit., p.298, T.A. Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey*, New York: Praeger, 1983, p.62.

<sup>892</sup> Weintal and Bartlett, *Facing the Brink*, op.cit., pp.21-22, Erim, op.cit., pp.300, 309.

<sup>893</sup> C. Arcayürek, *Yeni Demokrasi, Yeni Arayışlar*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1984, p.274, M.A. Birand et al., *12 Mart*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, pp.104-105, the author's interview with former Turkish foreign minister Ü.H. Bayülken. Former Turkish diplomat and MP Kamran İnan and Turkish academic Seyfi Taşhan supported Erkin's argument.

<sup>894</sup> Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers...*, op.cit., p.75.

in Cyprus for NATO interests. Allegedly, Americans positioned a Carrier Task Force of the Sixth Fleet between Cyprus and Turkey to prevent a movement of Turkish troops onto the island<sup>895</sup> and used electronic means to block Turkish communications so that Turks could not carry out the military operations successfully. Rodger Davies, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, denied these allegations in his testimony before a Senate committee in 1970. He promised to senators to supply the information where the Sixth Fleet was at that time but later it was recorded in the Senate papers that this information was classified.<sup>896</sup>

In Washington, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, aided by Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland and his deputy Joseph Sisco, prepared a letter to be sent to the Turkish premier. In the view of Undersecretary of State George Ball, who saw the letter before it was submitted to Johnson, the letter was “the most brutal diplomatic note” which he had ever seen and “the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb.” He said to Rusk: “I think that may stop İnönü from invading but I don’t know how we’ll ever get him down off the ceiling after that. The Secretary looked at me with a sweet smile. ‘That’ll be your problem’ he said.”<sup>897</sup> On 5 June 1964, the letter was signed by President Johnson and sent to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü.

In the letter,<sup>898</sup> President Johnson expressed his grave concern on the Turkish decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus and stated that “such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-reaching consequences, is [not] consistent with the commitment of your government to consult fully in advance with us... I must... first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.” Johnson claimed that Turkey’s action was inconsistent with the Treaty of Guarantee because it did not consult with other guarantor powers and its action would

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<sup>895</sup> Ibid., p.76, İ. Selçuk, “Pencere”, *Cumhuriyet*, 9 April 1965, p.2.

<sup>896</sup> *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Greece and Turkey*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, Part7, June 9 and 11, 1970, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, p.1831.

<sup>897</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.350. Former U.S. ambassador Stearns calls the letter, “a startling specimen of diplomatic overkill.” M. Stearns, *Entangled Allies*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, p.36.

<sup>898</sup> For its text see Appendix D and *Middle East Journal*, vol. 20, Summer 1966, pp. 386-388. The Johnson letter was also studied in Chapter IV in the context of military relations.

result in partition of the island which was excluded by the Treaty. Calling İnönü's attention to the possibility of a war between Turkey and Greece as a result of Turkish action, Johnson reminded him that a war between the two countries was unthinkable. He warned that NATO might not help Turkey in case of the Soviet involvement and stated that the USA could not allow the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment by Turkey in its intervention in Cyprus. Finally, Johnson assured İnönü that the United States had "no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community" and would remain "deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots." Johnson also invited İnönü to Washington to discuss the Cyprus question.

In the opinion of American officials the harshness of Johnson's letter was necessary to deter the Turks effectively from invading Cyprus and thus to prevent likely fatal results.<sup>899</sup> Although the letter aroused bitter resentment in Turkey, American leaders did not regret it and believed that the letter had its desired effect since no Turkish military action was taken. They believed that they had chosen the lesser evil, i.e. alienating the Turks rather than having a war between Greece and Turkey.<sup>900</sup>

It should be noted that the intensive and organised campaigning of Greek-Americans on the Cyprus question influenced at least the timing of the Johnson letter and its undiplomatic, brutal tone because Greek-American votes held importance in the approaching presidential elections.<sup>901</sup> Greek-American individuals, various associations of Greek people including the Orthodox church had bombarded President Johnson with letters and cables urging him to pressurise Turkey not to invade Cyprus. Many messages referred to Johnson's candidacy for presidency. President Johnson was aware of the importance of Greek-American votes. Greek-Americans were far more numerous than Turkish ones and were located in some of the big urban centres that controlled large numbers of electors. Some Democrats, including Johnson, were concerned that Republican candidate Goldwater would gain their votes by trading on the Cyprus question.

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<sup>899</sup> Weintal and Bartlett, *op.cit.*, p.24, H. Şahin, *Gece Gelen Mektup*, İstanbul: Cep Kitapları, 1987, pp.48-50, Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, *op.cit.*, p.115.

<sup>900</sup> Rodger Davies' statement in *United States Security Agreements*, *op.cit.*, pp.1834-1835.

<sup>901</sup> For detailed information see J.M. Landau, *Johnson's 1964 Letter to İnönü and Greek Lobbying at the White House*, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Press, 1979.

Turks interpreted the Johnson letter as abandonment of Turkey by the United States in favour of Greece. Prime Minister İnönü was reported to have said to his cabinet: "Our friends and our enemies have joined hands against us."<sup>902</sup> The letter was perceived as an ultimatum, forcing Turkey to act in a certain way and thus constituting a clear U.S. intervention in Turkey's sovereign affairs.<sup>903</sup> In MP Nihat Erim's words, it included every kind of threat except only one sentence, that was that if Turkey did not comply with the letter's content in a short time, the U.S. Sixth Fleet would have bombed the Turkish ports.<sup>904</sup> According to former Turkish foreign minister Bayülken, high-level Foreign Ministry officials saw Johnson's threat as bluff because they believed that the United States could not let the Soviet Union attack Turkey since it would harm U.S. interests first.<sup>905</sup> This explanation does not reflect the general political atmosphere in Turkey and the tone of Turkish rulers' statements at that time and it does not eliminate the fact that the Turks really feared that they could be abandoned by the West. But the explanation coincides with İnönü's real intention which will be mentioned later in this chapter.

The Johnson letter was kept secret from the public but Turkish people knew that it had prevented Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. When the text of the letter was released by the White House in January 1966,<sup>906</sup> the anti-Americanism was already popular among Turkish people. Leftist circles saw it as confirmation of the fact that Turkey was merely a satellite state of the United States.<sup>907</sup> Other people thought that the United States went too far in pressurising Turkey while not preventing the Greek side from violating rights of Turkish Cypriots.

The question of why Turkey complied with the Johnson letter should be dealt

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<sup>902</sup> F.A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1971, p.132.

<sup>903</sup> "Amerikan Elçisinin Siyasi Komiser Edası", *Forum*, 15 January 1966, p.6, A. İpekçi, "Mektup mu, Ültimat mu?", *Milliyet*, 15.1.1966, p.1, B. Ecevit, "Mektuplar", *Akis*, 22.1.1966, pp.8-9.

<sup>904</sup> *MMTD*, 29 December 1965, term 2, sess.1, vol.2, p.164.

<sup>905</sup> The author's interview with Bayülken.

<sup>906</sup> On the occasion of the release of Johnson and İnönü's letters, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Parker T. Hart, stated that U.S.-Turkish relations continued to be friendly even after the exchange of these letters. He showed İnönü's visit to Washington in June 1964 and the joint communique at the end of this visit as the proofs of this fact. *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, January 1966, p.60.

<sup>907</sup> İ. Selçuk, "Pencere", *Cumhuriyet*, 14 January 1966, p.2.

with here very briefly. One reason might be the fear of Turkish leaders that U.S. military assistance would be suspended. Even American “refusal to furnish repair and replacement parts might have been almost as effective within a short period as the removal of equipment already provided” and might have mutilated Turkish military forces.<sup>908</sup> Secondly, Turkish leaders could not act against the will of the two super-powers, that was why no Turkish MPs suggested intervening in Cyprus and ignoring the American warning during the closed session of Parliament.<sup>909</sup> The Turks could not afford to have a major rupture in their relations with the USA.<sup>910</sup>

However, the most important reason lies in Turkish P.M. İnönü’s reluctance to intervene in Cyprus militarily.<sup>911</sup> He was not sure that the Turkish armed forces would achieve a decisive military victory in Cyprus because they were neither trained, equipped nor positioned to undertake a landing on Cyprus.<sup>912</sup> İnönü also feared that a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus might endanger Turkey’s security by involving the Soviet Union in the matter.<sup>913</sup> Soviet leaders had already warned Turkey not to invade Cyprus and had announced their support for Makarios in case of an outside aggression. The best option for İnönü was to consult with American rulers and to seek their approval for a military intervention in Cyprus. This could eliminate at least the alienation of the United States. American leaders could give their consent to a limited Turkish military operation and they could prevent an outbreak of war between Turkey and Greece.

Some suggest that İsmet İnönü deliberately informed American leaders of the decision to intervene in Cyprus and he deliberately leaked preparations of Turkish armed forces to the public. He was sure that the United States would step in and warn Turkish rulers not to resort to military action.<sup>914</sup> Then, İnönü would cancel the military operation and blame the United States for his own inactivity.<sup>915</sup> Thus,

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<sup>908</sup> Ehlich, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.84.

<sup>909</sup> Nihat Erim, *MMTD*, 7 October 1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.32, p.327.

<sup>910</sup> *United States Security Agreements...*, op.cit., pp.1834-1835.

<sup>911</sup> Toker, “İsmet Paşa ile...”, op.cit., 7 February 1969, p.5.

<sup>912</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.107, Şahin, op.cit., pp. 104-105, Birand et al., op.cit., p.104. Former Turkish foreign ministers Osman Olcay and Bayülken confirmed this point.

<sup>913</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.76.

<sup>914</sup> Metin Toker’s statement to a Turkish TV documentary, Birand et al., op.cit., p.105.

<sup>915</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp.75-76, Harris, op.cit., p.114, Şahin, op.cit., p.105. Ü.H. Bayülken told the author that this might be a possibility.

he would be able to appease pro-intervention public opinion and military leaders at home. İsmet İnönü also might have assumed that apparent Turkish insistence on military intervention would lead American leaders to put more pressure on the Greek and Greek Cypriot side<sup>916</sup> and would deter Greek Cypriots from attacking the Turkish community in Cyprus.<sup>917</sup> Other instances of İnönü's political acumen lend plausibility to this interpretation.

### 6.5.2 İnönü's Response to Johnson

Writing to Johnson on 13 June 1964,<sup>918</sup> İnönü pointed out that the Turkish government had, at American request, postponed its decision to exercise its right of unilateral action in Cyprus, which was granted by the Treaty of Guarantee. Johnson's message, "both in wording and content", had therefore been disappointing for an ally like Turkey, who had always given the most serious attention to its relations with the United States. Johnson's letter had "brought to the fore substantial divergences of opinion in various fundamental matters pertaining to these relations." Contrary to Johnson's claim, on several occasions Turkey did consult with the United States and the other guarantor powers on its decision to intervene in Cyprus, and complied with American demands not to intervene, though no positive development was achieved in the Cyprus question. However, this did not mean that Turkey gave up its right to intervene in Cyprus. Finally, the Turkish premier stated:

As a member of the [NATO] alliance our nation is fully conscious of her duties and rights. We do not pursue any other aim than the settlement of the Cyprus problem in compliance with the provisions of the existing treaties. Such a settlement is likely to be reached if you lend your support and give effect with your supreme authority to the sense of justice inherent in the character of the American nation.

At the end of his letter İnönü accepted Johnson's invitation to Washington to discuss the Cyprus problem.

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<sup>916</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.114.

<sup>917</sup> M. Tamkoç, *the Warrior Diplomats*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976, pp. 266-267.

<sup>918</sup> For the letter's text see Appendix D and *Middle East Journal*, vol.20, Summer 1966, pp.388-393.

### 6.5.3 Short Evaluation

The Johnson letter constitutes the most important event of U.S.-Turkish contacts on the Cyprus question, which affected the subsequent situation of relations between the two countries. It is clear that the Americans heavily pressured Turkish authorities to prevent their intervention in Cyprus. The Turks had expected U.S. opposition to their planned action but the severe tone of the U.S. warning certainly disappointed them to the extent they began to have doubts on the value of their alliance with the USA. Up to that point they had not faced a U.S. action which appeared to treat Turkey as a satellite. As proud people, the Turks could not stomach Johnson's threats which put Turkey in a position of puppet state which was expected to listen to advice from its big partner. The most unacceptable thing for Turkish rulers was the use of the U.S.-Turkish alliance (which was supposed to serve Turkish interests) by the Americans as a threat to prevent their action in a vital national interest. The Americans probably made a mistake by ignoring realities of Turkish politics and interests and by concentrating only on prevention of Turkish intervention which was expected to bring grave dangers for NATO and U.S. interests.<sup>919</sup>

## 6.6 American Mediation Efforts on the Cyprus Problem

### 6.6.1 George Ball's Visit to Greece and Turkey

From the outset of the Cyprus crisis the United States tried to pursue a policy which would not alienate both Greece and Turkey. After sending a harsh letter to Turks, President Johnson felt that an equally severe presentation should be made to Greek rulers, warning them not to provoke the Turks on the Cyprus question. Johnson also thought that neither the NATO machinery nor the United Nations mediation efforts would provide a solution to the Cyprus issue, and that therefore the United States should intervene in the matter directly, offering its mediation between the concerned parties. He considered it necessary to encourage Turkey and Greece to find a solution to the problem through bilateral talks. In order to achieve these aims, Undersecretary of State George Ball was dispatched to Greece and Turkey in mid-June 1964.

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<sup>919</sup> Stearns, *op.cit.*, p.24.



In Athens on 10 June 1964 Ball told Greek P.M. Papandreou that "disaster was avoided only by President Johnson's forceful intervention and his adamant insistence that there could be no war between NATO allies"<sup>920</sup> and that if Greece did not show greater co-operation, the United States would not take such a hard line again.<sup>921</sup> When Papandreou complained about Turkish intervention threats, Ball said that "nobody could determine how the threat of intervention contributed to the turbulence over Cyprus, nor how the turbulence gave reality to the intervention threat."<sup>922</sup> Reiterating that the United States had no formula for a Cyprus settlement and was committed to no side in the matter, Ball informed Papandreou that President Johnson was of the opinion that only the prime ministers of Turkey and Greece could work out a satisfactory formula for a settlement through mutual concessions. Pressing the Greek prime minister to undertake talks with the Turkish P.M. Ball said: "If you, Mr Prime Minister, and the Turkish government, take no immediate and effective action, the Cyprus crisis can expand into war, or open the way to communism in the eastern Mediterranean."<sup>923</sup> Papandreou seemed unmoved, he did not accept Ball's proposal. In Ball's words, "against all the evidence, he [Papandreou] still seemed to assume that Greece could pursue its goal of enosis without danger of the Turks invading Cyprus, since he apparently took it for granted that the United States would always stand ready to thwart the Turks."<sup>924</sup> Nevertheless, Ball persuaded Papandreou to visit the United States to have talks with President Johnson.<sup>925</sup>

In his meeting with Prime Minister İnönü in Ankara on 11 June,<sup>926</sup> in his own words, Ball "reassured him regarding the warmth of America's friendship for Turkey and our desire to cooperate closely with the Turks in resolving a festering quarrel... America, I told him, was not partial to the Greek side; indeed, we recognised that the Greek Cypriot majority had largely created the problem by terrorising the Turkish Cypriots. I made clear that we totally mistrusted Makarios...

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<sup>920</sup> Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., pp. 25-26.

<sup>921</sup> Ball, *the Past Has Another Pattern*, op.cit., p.353, A. Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, London: Andre Deutsch, 1970, p.101.

<sup>922</sup> Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.26.

<sup>923</sup> Weintal and Bartlett. op.cit., p.26, Ball, op.cit., p.353, Papandreou, op.cit., p.101.

<sup>924</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.353.

<sup>925</sup> Papandreou, op.cit., p.101.

<sup>926</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 12 June 1964.

İnönü was deeply troubled and personally hurt by the scolding he had received from President [Johnson].” After Ball gave reassurances, İnönü said that the American “attempt to promote a settlement based on strong principles is an encouraging development, but experience had shown that principles are sometimes abandoned when the time comes to translate them into concrete measures.”<sup>927</sup> İnönü also told Ball that Johnson’s letter included “all the juridicial thunderbolts that could be assembled. And, of course, as a result, you have committed some errors and some unjust things. Our foreign office will answer the thunderbolts.”<sup>928</sup> The U.S.-Turkish joint communique on the same day stated that America believed that any solution of the Cyprus problem should be compatible with the interests of both Turkey and Greece.<sup>929</sup>

### 6.6.2 Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers’ Visit to the USA

İnönü’s visit to the United States took place between 22 and 26 June 1964. The joint Turkish-American communique on 23 June reaffirmed the validity and binding effects of the existing treaties on Cyprus as a starting point for a new solution.<sup>930</sup> This was considered a great success by Turkish rulers because the validity of the Cyprus treaties was their main viewpoint. In his press conference in New York on 25 June İnönü stated: “We believe in the present regime in Cyprus, which is based on the Cypriot constitution and the international agreements on Cyprus. But we even accept enosis on the condition that it should be implemented with its original form, i.e. one part of the island is left to Turkey, another to Greece.”<sup>931</sup> According to accounts by Nihat Erim, who was in İnönü’s official delegation, officials from the State Department inquired the opinion of the Turkish delegation on the proposal of leaving Cyprus to Greece in return for a Greek island on the Aegean Sea.<sup>932</sup> Americans also showed that they were not worried about the arrival of pro-enosist Greek General Grivas in Cyprus, arguing that he had gone there to

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<sup>927</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.354.

<sup>928</sup> Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.28.

<sup>929</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 12 June 1964.

<sup>930</sup> Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm...*, op.cit., p.329, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, July 1964, pp.16-17, *Keesing’s...*, vol.14, p.20268.

<sup>931</sup> Erim, op.cit., p.330, Sarıca et al., op.cit., p.76.

<sup>932</sup> Erim, op.cit., p.328.

fight communists not Turks.<sup>933</sup> It seems that enosis in return for some concessions to Turks was on the agenda even at that time.

During Greek P.M. Papandreou's visit to Washington on 24 and 25 June 1964, President Johnson and other high-level U.S. officials allegedly pressured him to have direct talks with Turkish P.M. İnönü on the Cyprus problem by threatening that otherwise they would not prevent a Turkish military intervention in the island.<sup>934</sup> But Papandreou remained unmoved. In Ball's words Johnson "liked Prime Minister İnönü, with whom he could talk straight forwardly. If the Greek leader had shown anything like the same understanding, serious progress could have been made."<sup>935</sup> On 26 June George Ball proposed to the Greek delegation that Greek and Turkish representatives meet separately in Geneva with Dean Acheson, former secretary of state.<sup>936</sup> After U.N. Secretary-General U Thant gave consent to the plan on the condition that talks would be held under the chairmanship of the U.N. mediator, Greeks, too, accepted it.<sup>937</sup>

In order to ensure that Greek-Turkish bilateral talks would take place Johnson sent a letter to Papandreou on 2 July 1964, urging him to send delegates to Geneva.<sup>938</sup> Papandreou responded harshly against the United States, asserting that Johnson's letter was an ultimatum of the same kind Greece had received from the Nazis in 1940.<sup>939</sup> Nevertheless, he reiterated his promise to send delegates to Geneva.

While encouraging Turks and Greeks to have direct talks under the auspices of American mediation, American officials emphasised that their efforts were not intended to forestall the U.N. mediation. When the U.S. administration was criticised in the U.N. because of its attempt, the White House issued a statement

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<sup>933</sup> Ibid., p.334.

<sup>934</sup> Papandreou, *Democracy At Gunpoint*, op.cit., pp.102-104. Greeks had received the same warnings from the U.S. ambassador to Athens and President Johnson through the Greek ambassador in Washington in the first two weeks of June. Brands, "America Enters the Cyprus Tangle", op.cit., p.355.

<sup>935</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.355. See also *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20268.

<sup>936</sup> Papandreou, op.cit., p.103.

<sup>937</sup> Ball, op.cit., pp. 355-356, Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., pp.28-29.

<sup>938</sup> Coufoudakis, "United States..." in Attalides (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed*, op.cit., p.113, Salih, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.47.

<sup>939</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.356, Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.30.

claiming that the American initiative was not incompatible with the U.N. mediation efforts. The statement noted that the peace-keeping and peace-making role belonged entirely to the United Nations and the only aim of the American efforts was to prevent an armed combat in the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>940</sup>

### 6.6.3 The Acheson Mission

The Geneva talks between Turkish and Greek representatives began on 8 July 1964 under the chairmanship of U.N. mediator Sakari Tuomioja. No Cypriot representative had been called to the talks. Dean Acheson was present at Geneva as the special envoy of President Johnson but he undertook the actual mediation responsibility. On 14 July Acheson submitted his proposals, the Acheson plan, to the Turkish and Greek delegations headed by *Nihat Erim and Nicolareisis: Cyprus was to be free to choose to unify itself with Greece (enosis). On the Carpas peninsula in the northeast of Cyprus a territory was to be given to Turkey. This territory was to become an indivisible part of Turkey and Turkey was to have full sovereignty over it and to have the right of stationing as large a military force as it wished on the territory. The Greek island of Kastellorizion (Meis) was to be ceded to Turkey.*<sup>941</sup> In Acheson's own words, his plan was to bring about the union of Cyprus with Greece but also provide for Turkey "a military presence unhampered by the need for tripartite consent at every turn. A sequestered base for ground, air and sea forces not only could be a defence for Cyprus but prevent its being used hostilely against Turkey, could defend the sea approaches to the south Turkish seaports, and be a constant reminder on the island of Turkish presence and interests."<sup>942</sup>

It seemed that the Acheson plan could solve the Cyprus problem permanently to the advantage of the United States and the West. If it was implemented, Cyprus would be removed from the non-alignment camp and would be placed in the NATO sphere. The power of Makarios and AKEL which were thought to be harmful to Western interests would be neutralised. Friction between two NATO allies would be eliminated and the alienation of Turkey and Greece from the Western alliance

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<sup>940</sup> Bitsios, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.166.

<sup>941</sup> Erim, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm...*, op.cit., pp. 351-359, Salih, op.cit., pp.47-48. Articles which are related to only Cyprus were ignored.

<sup>942</sup> P.G. Polyviou, *Cyprus, the Tragedy and the Challenge*, Washington: American Hellenic Institute, 1975, p.47, Salih, op.cit., p.50, Adams and Cottrell, op.cit., p.66.

would be prevented. The extension of Soviet influence to the region would be blocked.<sup>943</sup>

For Turkish rulers, the Acheson plan seemed to satisfy Turkey's interests. Hence the Turkish government authorised the Turkish delegation to continue negotiations on the basis of the Acheson plan and to try to achieve the enlargement of Turkish sovereign base area.<sup>944</sup> During the talks, while Nihat Erim emphasised Turkey's security interests on Cyprus and the necessity for Turkish control over a portion of the island, Turkish commander Turgut Sunalp claimed that the base area offered to Turkey was too small to provide for enough space for Turkey's military activities.<sup>945</sup> The Greek delegation totally opposed the secession of Cypriot territory to Turkey and instead they offered to lease a small base to Turkey for twenty-five years.<sup>946</sup> Meanwhile, the talks were interrupted by the outbreak of new violence in Cyprus.

It should be noted that during the summer of 1964 American officials considered exploiting the hostility between Greek Cypriot leader Makarios and Greek General Grivas to solve the Cyprus problem. American intelligence had reported that the antipathy between the two persons still existed and was growing. "Though Grivas was... a passionate advocate of enosis", George Ball thought that "he might be easier to work with than Makarios" and established an underground contact with Grivas through Socrates Iliades, chief lieutenant to Grivas.<sup>947</sup> Ball and Grivas agreed that Cyprus would be united with Greece and as compensation some bases would be turned over to Turkey. Makarios, who was the chief obstacle to such designs, would be ousted.<sup>948</sup> When clashes broke out in Cyprus in August, all these schemes were upset.

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<sup>943</sup> Couloumbis, op.cit., p.47, M.A. Attalides, *Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics*, Edinburgh: Q Press Ltd., p.19, P.N. Vanezis, *Makarios*, London: Abelard-Schuman, 1974, p.133.

<sup>944</sup> Erim, op.cit., pp.360, 372.

<sup>945</sup> Ibid., pp.347-350, 359-362.

<sup>946</sup> Ibid., pp. 363-366, 372-373, 376-378.

<sup>947</sup> Ball, op.cit., p.357.

<sup>948</sup> Ibid. p.357, Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.116, Attalides, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.70, Brands, op.cit., p.357, Weintal and Bartlett, *Facing the Brink*, op.cit., p.32.

#### 6.6.4 The August 1964 Fighting in Cyprus

On 6 August 1964, the Greek Cypriot forces under the command of General Grivas<sup>949</sup> launched a major attack from land and sea against the Turkish positions in the Kokkina-Mansoura area in the northwestern part of the island.<sup>950</sup> Turkish leaders feared that, encouraged by Turkey's inactivity, Greek Cypriots would try to resolve the Cyprus question by force and remove the major pockets of Turkish Cypriot resistance. Nihat Erim told Prime Minister İnönü that he had the impression from his talks with American mediator Acheson that the Americans would not oppose a limited military action to give a lesson to Archbishop Makarios.<sup>951</sup> On 8 August Turkish jet fighters supplied by the United States bombed the positions of Greek forces around Kokkina.<sup>952</sup>

American officials moved to contain the fighting in Cyprus and prevent a possible Greco-Turkish war. On the night of 8 August 1964, President Johnson sent identical letters to Makarios, Papandreou and İnönü, urging the greatest possible restraint.<sup>953</sup> Dean Rusk's cable to Papandreou asked him to cooperate with General Grivas in neutralising Makarios, who was threatening a general massacre in Cyprus unless the Turkish air raids were stopped. On August 9, Rusk sent a cable to the U.S. ambassador to Greece, Henry Labouisse, stating that while the USA was pressuring the Turks to halt their air raids, Papandreou must abandon "horsetrading or equivocation or passionate oratory and act decisively to restore peace in Cyprus".<sup>954</sup>

In New York the U.N. Security Council accepted a resolution which was prepared by U.S. and British representatives.<sup>955</sup> The resolution requested the interested parties to establish a cease-fire and to refrain from any action liable to

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<sup>949</sup> Grivas had secretly returned to Cyprus with the knowledge of the Greek government. He openly announced that his intention was to unify Cyprus with Greece. *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20270.

<sup>950</sup> Ehlich, *Cyprus*, op.cit., pp.62-63, Stephens, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.196, Crawshaw, *the Cyprus Revolt*, op.cit., p.371, Salih, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.50, *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20265.

<sup>951</sup> Erim, op.cit., p.381.

<sup>952</sup> M. Sarıca et al., *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1975, p.81, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp.82-83, Bitsios, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.170, Salih, op.cit., p.51, Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., pp.32-33, *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20270.

<sup>953</sup> Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.33, Brands, op.cit., p.357, *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20266.

<sup>954</sup> Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., pp.33-34.

<sup>955</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20265.

aggravate the situation. During Security Council talks U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson emphasised that all hostilities should stop, because as long as any of them continued all would continue and it would mount up to a dangerous international war.<sup>956</sup> With Soviet Premier Khrushchev's urging,<sup>957</sup> Makarios accepted the U.N.'s cease-fire call. In spite of strong opposition by members of the Turkish National Security Council, Turkish P.M. İnönü, too, ordered cessation of aerial bombing.<sup>958</sup>

### 6.6.5 The Second Acheson Plan

On 15 August 1964 the Greek and Turkish representatives met again with the U.N. mediator and Dean Acheson in Geneva. On 20 August Dean Acheson put forward his so-called Second Acheson Plan whose main aim was to overcome the objections of the Greek side: 1- Cyprus was to be free in choosing enosis. 2- A military base on the Carpas peninsula was to be leased to Turkey for fifty years. 3- The Greek government was to give strong guarantees to the Turkish Cypriot community regarding human and minority rights. 4- With the consent of the Greek and Turkish governments, a high commissioner from an international organisation was to be appointed for Cyprus.<sup>959</sup>

On 21 August the Turkish delegation informed Acheson that the Turkish government decided to reject the plan because the renting of a small territory in return for enosis did not meet Turkey's long-term security interests.<sup>960</sup> Acheson told the Turkish representatives that he was not going to press the Greeks to make more concessions. The plan was the last opportunity to find a peaceful solution to the problem with the help of the American administration. If the Turks rejected it, no NATO countries would appreciate Turkey's position.<sup>961</sup> The Greek side, too, rejected the plan because of Makarios's opposition.<sup>962</sup>

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<sup>956</sup> Bitsios, op.cit., pp. 173-174.

<sup>957</sup> Weintal and Bartlett, op.cit., p.34.

<sup>958</sup> Erim, op.cit., p.393, Arcayürek, *Yeni Demokrasi Yeni Arayışlar*, op.cit., p.283, Tamkoç, *the Warrior Diplomats*, op.cit., p.275, *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20266.

<sup>959</sup> Erim, op.cit., pp. 399-400, Sarıca et al., op.cit., pp.82-83, Salih, op.cit., p.49.

<sup>960</sup> Erim, op.cit., p.401.

<sup>961</sup> Ibid., pp.402-404, Toker, *"İsmet Paşa ile...*, op.cit., 11 February 1969, p.5.

<sup>962</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.14, p.20269.

On 18 August 1964 Dean Acheson had sent a message to George Ball, suggesting that he should “liquidate” the Geneva effort. Ball responded that this would encourage Makarios to drive the island into another crisis and bring about Turkish military intervention. In his next cable to Ball, Acheson stated that the United States should stop irritating the Turks and Greeks by trying to pressure them into a Cyprus agreement. If the United States walked away, both sides would realise that they alone were responsible for finding a way out. Finally Acheson said that if an American retreat from Cyprus brought on a showdown with Makarios, “then let it come.”<sup>963</sup> After the rejection of the second Acheson plan by both sides, the American administration adjourned its Geneva efforts on 31 August 1964 by calling Acheson to Washington.

#### 6.6.6 The Aftermath of the Geneva Talks

In September 1964 at a meeting of top U.S. officials including President Johnson, Dean Acheson stated that a stalemate was reached in the Cyprus question because of Makarios’s adamant attitude and that a violent and uncontrolled Turkish invasion of the island would be inevitable unless something was done. Acheson and Ball argued that the only solution to the problem was the *fait accompli* of a controlled Turkish invasion of the island. In their plan, the Turks would seize the part of Cyprus which they would have received under the first Acheson plan and then the Greek and Greek Cypriots would instantly proclaim the unification of the rest of Cyprus with Greece.<sup>964</sup>

In fact, Acheson had raised the issue with the Turks during the Geneva talks. On 4 August 1964 he told the Turkish delegation that he did not advise them to resort to military force but if they did so, America would not oppose them.<sup>965</sup> After the rejection of the second Acheson plan, Acheson said to the Turkish delegation again: “I am privately and friendly telling you: If you can invade the part of Cyprus which was reserved for you without causing too much bloodshed the Sixth Fleet does not obstruct your way but protects you.” Turkish commander General Turgut Sunalp took the proposal to İnönü the next day. İnönü rejected it by saying

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<sup>963</sup> Weintal and Bartlett, *op.cit.*, pp.34-35.

<sup>964</sup> Brands, *op.cit.*, pp. 358-359.

<sup>965</sup> Erim, *op.cit.*, p.369.



that he could not initiate such an adventure without the official approval of the American administration.<sup>966</sup>

In the September meeting, Acheson and Ball told President Johnson that the Turks liked their scheme and all that was required to put the plan into motion was a signal from Washington. When Johnson summed up the scheme by saying that a resort to force was inevitable and that the only question was "whether it should be messy and destructive or controlled and eventually productive, in accordance with a plan," Acheson agreed that this was a fair summary. Initially Johnson seemed interested in the proposal but in the end he rejected it. The Vietnam war was already a major trouble for him, he could not consent to the outbreak of another one. He thought that Turkish invasion might not be as clean as Acheson and Ball expected and that it might escalate to a major war. At least the next few months would not be a good season for a war because of the approaching presidential election.<sup>967</sup>

American officials were generally of the opinion that the Greek side was primarily responsible for the failure of the Geneva talks. A few months later Dean Acheson wrote to the U.S. ambassador to Egypt:

We came to close an understanding which might have cropped the Archbishop's whiskers and solved the idiotic problem of Cyprus to your Mr Nasser's disappointment and chagrin. Our weakness was Papandreou's weakness... He gave away our plans at critical moments to Makarios... A little money, which we had, the Greek 7th Division in Cyprus, which the Greeks had, and some sense of purpose in Athens, which did not exist, might have permitted a different result. The Turks could not have been more willing to cooperate.<sup>968</sup>

In his speech before the Chicago Bar Association on 24 March 1965, Dean Acheson said:

There was little doubt that from a legal point of view the treaties were binding upon the parties... Merely to restrain the Turks from intervention would be, in fact, to intervene against them... Time was running strongly against the Turks, due to the military build up on the island and the Archbishop's increasing pressure to crush Turkish Cypriot resistance to his imposed regime... The Turks were quite willing to pick up discussions at the point where the Kokkina fighting interrupted them. But they

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<sup>966</sup> Ibid., p.406.

<sup>967</sup> Brands, *op.cit.*, pp. 359-360.

<sup>968</sup> Ibid., p.358.

saw that in making any further concession to unresponding Greeks, they would merely be negotiating with themselves.<sup>969</sup>

President Johnson scolded the Greek ambassador to Washington harshly because of the Greek stubbornness on the problem.<sup>970</sup>

In September 1964 the U.N. Security Council, too, discussed the Cyprus question. U.S. ambassador Stevenson stated that the United States disapproved any air attacks on Cyprus launched from outside, hinting Turkish air attacks against the island. He also clarified that the United States had never agreed to the use of arms furnished under its military assistance for any purpose not specified in assistance agreements.<sup>971</sup>

## 6.7 U.S. Policy Toward the Cyprus Question

The main American concern on the Cyprus question was to contain the conflict and to prevent it from escalating to a greater war between Greece and Turkey. The deterioration of relations and outbreak of an armed combat between Turkey and Greece, which were strategically important allies of the USA,<sup>972</sup> contained the following dangers: Firstly, NATO could be destabilized and weakened in facing the enemy camp and its southeastern flank could collapse. Secondly, the political, military and economic co-operation between the United States, Greece and Turkey could be undermined and thus the presence of American bases and facilities in these countries could be threatened. Thirdly, the Soviet Union could have the opportunity to destabilize the Western camp by involving itself in a matter concerning NATO countries. Finally, the prestige of the Western alliance could be harmed since the hostility would be a great embarrassment to the Western bloc and a symbol of the Western disunity.

As a result of this thinking, American officials paid attention to the possibility

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<sup>969</sup> S. Tashan, "Turkish-US Relations and Cyprus", *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, Nos.2-3, February 1975, pp.168-169.

<sup>970</sup> Brands, op.cit., p.358.

<sup>971</sup> *International Organisation*, vol.19, 1965, p.87.

<sup>972</sup> H.J. Psomiades, "the United States and the Mediterranean Triangle; Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: a New Phase" in Attalides (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed*, op.cit., p.201, T.A. Couloumbis, *the United States, Greece and Turkey*, New York: Praeger, 1983, pp.24, 28.

that the Cyprus question could push Turkey and Greece to sever their ties with NATO and to seek better relations with the Soviet Union to the extent that they could fall under Soviet influence. Turkey's efforts in this direction led Americans to be more careful in not alienating her with their attitude on the Cyprus question. They sought assurances from Turkish leaders that these efforts would not weaken their ties with the Western alliance.

The United States had strategic concerns over Cyprus in the 1960s. The island is located at the cross-roads of the three continents and the major routes connecting the West with the East. It is 44 miles south of Turkey, 64 miles west of Syria, 130 miles northwest of Israel, and 240 miles north of Egypt and the Suez Canal.<sup>973</sup> Cyprus commanded the outlets of the pipelines on the coasts of Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt, the northern entrance of the Suez Canal and the line of containment of the Soviet Union along its southern borders.<sup>974</sup> Some developments in the 1960s seemed to increase the strategic importance of the island: "the growth of Soviet political and military missions in various Arab states, the growth of the Soviet fleet in the area; the continuing Arab-Israel crisis; the increasing American concern about Middle Eastern oil supplies and the protection of oil shipping routes; the prospect of a reopened Suez Canal and the loss of American bases and base rights in the area."<sup>975</sup> Cyprus could provide useful bases in the eastern Mediterranean for the West.

The British retained two sovereign Cyprus bases, Dhekelia and Akrotiri, and enjoyed the privileges of military use of Cypriot air space, transport and land. They could allow the United States to benefit from the same facilities whenever they wanted. Akrotiri especially was a very important RAF base and could be used by the United States and NATO to support operations in the Middle East and to defend NATO's southeastern flank.<sup>976</sup> Makarios had already allowed the United States to use communication facilities in Cyprus, including radio listening and broadcasting stations and the horizon radar installations for the detection of ICBM launches in the Soviet Union and communications between Middle Eastern

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<sup>973</sup> Joseph, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.119.

<sup>974</sup> A.G. Xydis, **Cyprus: What Kind of Problem** in Attalides (ed.), op.cit., p.28.

<sup>975</sup> Confoudakis, **"United States..."** in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.109.

<sup>976</sup> Attalides, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.158.

and Eastern bloc countries.<sup>977</sup> It was important for Americans to prevent Cyprus from falling into the hands of enemies. They would have preferred the island to come under NATO control (as a consequence of enosis or partition) than to remain under the Cypriot administration that pursued a policy of non-alignment. But their priority lay in having good relations with Greece and Turkey. The U.S. position in the eastern Mediterranean was much more dependent on Greek and Turkish bases than the Cypriot ones.<sup>978</sup>

In the minds of U.S. officials the first thing which should be done on the Cyprus question was to bring the violence and clashes in Cyprus to an end. This could open a way to negotiations between the interested parties to find a political settlement. Americans pressurised the parties to the conflict from time to time to *refrain from* taking any actions which would worsen the situation in Cyprus. They particularly put pressure on the Turks to deter them from invading the island. In order to maintain peace, the United States also supported the United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus diplomatically and materially. U.S. leaders preferred all attempts to seek a solution to be made through quiet diplomacy. They did not want a problem concerning Western states to be aired in international forums, thinking that it would *provide an opportunity to enemies to undermine and humiliate the* Western bloc.

American leaders were generally reluctant to put forward a proposal for the Cyprus question because they feared that their proposal would alienate at least one ally. They frequently announced that the United States was in favour of a settlement which would protect the interests of all the interested parties. They thought that only an agreed settlement between Greece and Turkey through bilateral talks could bring a permanent solution to the problem because the two states had the power to influence the Cypriot communities. For this purpose, the United States pressed Turkish and Greek officials especially in the summer of 1964 to come together to find a peaceful way of the Cyprus problem. During these bilateral talks, the United States came up with a proposal to be discussed by the two sides, which

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<sup>977</sup> Ibid., p.13, P. Oberling, *the Road to Bellapais*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, p.124.

<sup>978</sup> J.C. Campbell, **"the United States and the Cyprus Question, 1974-1975"** in V. Coufoudakis (ed.), *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict*, New York: Pella Publishing, 1976, p.14.

could be called enosis, partition or double enosis. It seemed that the present position of independent Cyprus did not suit Western and American interests because it was very likely that it could attract Soviet influence to the region and cause a war between Turkey and Greece. The unification of the island with Greece (enosis) with some concessions to Turkey could solve the problem in accordance with the Western interests. In this way, Cyprus would be put into NATO's ranks, a communist take over in the island would be prevented and Greece and Turkey would be kept happy. The Geneva talks and the Acheson plans were directed to achieving this aim. When it was understood that this scheme would not be successful, American policy shifted to the acceptance of a unitary independent Republic of Cyprus so long as the NATO alliance was not damaged by the situation in the island. But American politicians always kept the enosis scheme as an alternative in case other solutions failed and encouraged the Greek and Turkish governments to hold secret bilateral talks on the question.

Another American concern related to the Cyprus question was to prevent communist influence from advancing in the Mediterranean region. At that time it seemed that the Soviets had changed the balance of power and gained the upper hand in the Middle East by having a close relationship with non-aligned, anti-Western Arab regimes. If Cyprus fell under Soviet influence, the Western interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East could be damaged greatly. To restore the balance of power in the region it was vital to keep the Soviet influence away from Cyprus.

American officials had already been alerted by the policies of the Cypriot administration. The Makarios regime had appealed to the Soviet Union for support on the Cyprus question and showed readiness to rely on the Soviet support to protect its security. It signed trade agreements with the Soviet Union and made contacts to obtain Soviet weapons. The Cypriot government also pursued a non-aligned policy in its foreign relations and had close contacts with the non-aligned countries, especially with Nasser of Egypt, who seemed to pursue anti-Western policies. It rejected all Western designs for the Cyprus problem, gave communists a respectable political role in the state machinery, announced that it rejected all military alliances and declared that it would not allow the use of Cypriot bases

against the Arabs in case of fighting between Arabs and Israel.<sup>979</sup> The strength of the Cyprus communist party, AKEL, also worried Americans. The party was well-organised, had substantial popular support and was an influential factor in Cyprus politics. It was opposed to the presence of Western nuclear bases on the island and had tried to turn public opinion against Britain and the United States. If it gained political control, it could allow the Soviet fleet to use the Cyprus ports.

In order to prevent Cyprus from becoming a threat to Western interests, American policy was directed, to some extent, to the elimination or at least neutralisation of political capability of Makarios and the communist elements. American contacts with Greece and Cyprus aimed at finding a solution to the Cyprus problem, excluding Makarios and AKEL.

The overall U.S. policy on Cyprus mentioned above made it necessary to prevent any Turkish intervention in Cyprus and to pressure the Turks to act in a certain way when required. American authorities were not able to control the Greek Cypriots entirely to prevent their actions against Turkish Cypriots. But a Turkish intervention in Cyprus presented more dangers for them, i.e. a Greek-Turkish war and damage to NATO. It was therefore imperative for U.S. rulers to check Turkish actions on Cyprus. However, they failed to predict how the Turks would respond to their warnings, which were, maybe unnecessarily, too harsh for an independent state. U.S. officials might have been deceived by the fact that until that time the Turks always became the most loyal ally within NATO and always attributed great importance to pleasing their American ally with their actions. It seems that the Americans did not understand the pride of Turkish authorities. One reason for the severe U.S. warning to Turkey might be that as a result of being a superpower the United States expected that a small country such as Turkey should listen to its advice in a matter which could concern the whole Western camp. Scolding of the Greek ambassador by Johnson strengthens this view.<sup>980</sup> However, when U.S. officials realised that they could alienate the Turks and eventually lose their alliance, which was important for U.S. interests, they acted more cautiously.

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<sup>979</sup> Attalides, *op.cit.*, p.15.

<sup>980</sup> Johnson told the ambassador: "America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If those two fellows continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's tail. If your Prime Minister gives me talk about democracy, parliament and constitution, he, his government and his constitution may not last very long." Brands, *op.cit.*, p.358.

## 6.8 Turkish Policy on the Cyprus Question

The Cyprus question was a national cause for Turkey, concerning its national prestige, self-esteem and honour. The problem addressed deep-rooted feelings of the Turks. Since she gained her independence, Greece had expanded at the expense of Turkey's territories. The Turks had saved their mainland, Asia Minor, from the occupation of Greece but lost important Aegean islands to her. The island of Crete had been gradually weaned away from them under the pretext of self-government and finally surrendered to Greece. The Turks were determined not to allow the same thing happen again. In their minds, modern Turkey was no longer a sick man whose just claims could be ignored.<sup>981</sup> Turkish P.M. İnönü said in Parliament: "Cyprus is a national cause for us, concerning each home and each individual in this country. We are right and we are determined to find a just solution for this problem. It will be solved in conformity with the honour and dignity of the Turkish nation. Any solution contrary to this will be beyond the capacity of any power to force us to accept."<sup>982</sup>

In the eyes of Turkish leaders, Cyprus had a great strategic importance to Turkey.<sup>983</sup> It is located in a position overlooking the southern ports of Turkey, lying just over forty miles from the Turkish coast, and therefore it controlled Turkey's vital strategic approaches and consequently had fundamental importance to her defence. The Turks argued that if Cyprus was controlled by an enemy power or a weak state such as Greece, in case of war Turkey would be in a dangerous situation, isolated from the outside world. If Cyprus passed to Greece, Turkey's entire Aegean and Mediterranean coastlines would be controlled by an unfriendly Greece, which was a traditional enemy.

In their dealings with the Cyprus question, Turkish officials always stated that their main aim was to protect the lives and rights of Turkish Cypriots. They claimed that this responsibility had been given to Turkey by the international agreements on Cyprus. In their view, Turkey had to act as protector of Turkish

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<sup>981</sup> Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus*, op.cit., p.242.

<sup>982</sup> *MMTD*, 5 5.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.30, p.210.

<sup>983</sup> M.A. Ramady, "the Role of Turkey in Greek-Turkish Cypriot Communal Relations" in Coufoudakis (ed.), *Essays...*, op.cit., p.2, Psomiades in Attalides(ed.). op.cit., p.203, Vali, op.cit., p.242, Bilge, "the Cyprus Conflict and Turkey" in Karpat(ed.), op.cit., pp.142, 183.

Cypriots who had the same ethnic origin, cultural and religious background and who had nobody else to rely on in saving them from discrimination by the Greek majority.

For the Turks, the most suitable solution to the Cyprus problem was the partition of the island between the Turks and the Greeks and the separation of the two ethnic communities in Cyprus. In their view, the hatred between the two communities, which stemmed from having absolutely different national identities with different cultural, political and religious values, was so great that it would be dangerous and unreasonable not to separate them. The harrowing experiences which Turkish Cypriots suffered at the hands of Greek Cypriots in 1963 and the following years had shown that the Greek majority rule in Cyprus would not protect rights of the Turkish community. That was why Turkey accepted the first Acheson plan as the basis of negotiating a solution for Cyprus. The plan would have also satisfied Turkey's security concerns. The Turks were convinced that short of partition only federal government could give Turkish Cypriots security.<sup>984</sup>

Turkish leaders believed that their Cyprus cause was just and that it was the Greek side which caused all the troubles and atrocities. They expected that their Western allies, especially the United States, which was the leader of the West, would show a decisive reaction to the Greek attacks against the Turkish Cypriots and pressurise Greece and Makarios to stop their violence.<sup>985</sup> Turkey had supported its Western allies in all situations even by putting its own security in danger and it was now the West's turn to support its faithful ally Turkey in her just cause. This kind of action would also be a requirement of Western principles such as justice and human rights. However, instead of pressuring the Greek side Americans demanded more concessions from Turkey each time Makarios rejected a new proposal and the violence in Cyprus continued. Consequently Turkish leaders grew impatient.<sup>986</sup> In

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<sup>984</sup> Prime Minister İnönü's speech in Parliament on 3 September 1964, *Keesing's...*, 1965-1966, vol.15, p.20267, Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla...*, op.cit., p.400, Foreign Minister İ. Sabri Çağlayangil, *Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi (CSTD)*, 1.2.1967, term 1, sess.6, vol.38-3, p.376.

<sup>985</sup> Turkish P.M. İnönü's statement to AP agency correspondent: "The USA should know all facts about the Cyprus question and undertake its responsibilities." *Cumhuriyet*, 26.1.1964, p.1. Turkish radio's broadcast: "The United States, which is the spokesman of peace cause in the world should have warned her ally Greece on her illegal actions in Cyprus." *Cumhuriyet*, 9.6.1964, p.7.

<sup>986</sup> M. Toker, "Türkiye Yol Ağzında", *Akis*, 4 April 1964, p.7, M. Toker, "İsmet Paşa ile...", *Milliyet*, 19.2.1969, p.5. Statements of President C. Gürsel, Defence Minister İ. Sancar



their view, this was an abandonment of Western principles by the West itself since the victims were non-Christian Turks.

Turkish rulers began to hint of changes in Turkey's traditional Western-oriented foreign policy. In his interview with *Time* magazine in mid-April 1964, P.M. İnönü stated that while Turkey had done her best to preserve its alliance with the West, her allies had been competing with enemies in destroying the Western alliance and warned that "if our allies do not change their attitude, the Western alliance will break up and then a new kind of world order will be established under new conditions, and in this world Turkey will find itself a place. I had faith in the leadership of America, which has responsibility within the Western alliance, I am suffering now as a result of this attitude."<sup>987</sup>

Turks began to think that the monolithic pro-U.S. and pro-Western foreign policy did not meet Turkey's national interests entirely. They realised that the interests of Turkey and the Western powers would not always be identical and that they could clash with each other in some situations. The Cyprus question created a conflict between Turkey's interests and her commitment to the NATO alliance and manifested that NATO could restrict Turkey's freedom of action in matters that concerned her. It also became apparent to Turkish leaders that Turkey was isolated in the international arena and had no support in her national causes. Consequently, Turkish policy-makers began to reassess Turkey's foreign policy, her relations with the United States and her position within NATO. Knowing that the ties between the West and Turkey were based on complementary interests rather than identical ones, they tried to be more flexible in their dealings with the West, the Warsaw Pact and the Third World.<sup>988</sup>

It would be wrong to conclude that Turks really considered making radical changes in their traditional pro-Western foreign policy and in their relations with the USA. When such an interpretation circulated among Turkish political circles, Turkish leaders were quick to deny it. Prime Minister İnönü said in Parliament:

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and the Turkish radio in *Cumhuriyet*, 17, 18 and 22 April 1964, the author's interview with Turkish columnist Fahir Armaoğlu.

<sup>987</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 17.4.1964, *Milliyet*, 16.4.1964, Sarıca et. al, op.cit., p.67, the statement of Turkish journalist M. Ali Kışlalı, who was present at the meeting as *Times*' Turkish representative, to a Turkish TV documentary, Birand et al., op.cit., p.104.

<sup>988</sup> The author's interview with F. Armaoğlu.

In their dealings in connection with the Cyprus question our allies have from time to time created the impression that they are not interested in the problem or have no influence on it. In complaining about these actions of our allies we have been obliged from time to time to use such expressions as would indicate the psychological mood of a sincere and sorrowful friend. Beyond this, the interpretation to the effect that we are to depart from the main course of our foreign policy which we have followed and that we are to abrogate our treaties are untrue... We sincerely hope that our allies will take a stance which distinguishes the guilty from the innocent and show their loyalty to the [Western] alliance, legal principles and justice.<sup>989</sup>

During his visit to Washington in June 1964, İnönü also stated that “our allies in NATO have neither left nor betrayed us. They only insist that Turkey and Greece should agree on a solution. We want our allies help us. Any change in Turkey’s foreign policy is out of the question.”<sup>990</sup> Opposition MPs expressed doubts about the implications of İnönü’s statement to *Time*. Faruk Sükan and Gökhan Evliyaoğlu warned that any changes in foreign policy would bring fatal results.<sup>991</sup>

## 6.9 Turkish Public Opinion on the Cyprus Question

The Cyprus question had a great impact on Turkish public opinion. For the first time, Turkey’s foreign policy became a subject of public discussion, and anti-Americanism gained popularity among Turkish people. Leftist circles, university students, intellectuals and the press loudly criticised the United States. Mass demonstrations were arranged.<sup>992</sup> U.S. personnel and buildings in Turkey were attacked and the shouting of “Yankee, go home!” was heard in Turkish streets for the first time.

The following criticism was common among Turkish critics: While the United States herself was bombing North Vietnam under no international agreement, she was preventing Turkey from using her legal intervention right to save lives of Turkish Cypriots and to stop bloodshed in Cyprus.<sup>993</sup> The tone of American dissuasion

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<sup>989</sup> *MMTD*, vol.30, term 1, sess.3, 5.5.1964, p.210.

<sup>990</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 26.6.1964, p.7, Erim, op.cit., pp.335-336.

<sup>991</sup> *MMTD*, 5.5.1964, vol.30, term 1, sess.3, pp.231-232, 295-297. Former Turkish foreign minister Osman Olcay shared the concerns of Evliyaoğlu and Sükan.

<sup>992</sup> *Keesing’s...*, vol.15, p.20627.

<sup>993</sup> M.F. Fenik, “Nazi Kampından Beter”, *Son Havadis*, 31.3.1964 quoted by D. Sezer, *Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika*, Ankara: SBF Yayını, No. 339, 1972, p.184, A.R. Alp, “Haçlı Zihniyetinin Yaşadığı Devirdeyiz”, *Tercüman*, 21.9.1964, O.Z. Dorman, *MMTD*,

was reminiscent of the tactics of eastern bloc countries and colonial powers.<sup>994</sup> American attitude tilted to the Greek side and encouraged them in their violence against Turkish Cypriots. The Second Acheson plan proposed pure enosis (unification of the whole Cyprus with Greece). While threatening Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus, Americans did not warn Greeks over their shipment of arms and men to Cyprus and their use of U.S.-supplied arms against Turks.<sup>995</sup> The United States, which was opposed to communism all over the world, did not care about the increase of the strength of Cypriot communists under Makarios's political protection because the victims were Muslim Turks.<sup>996</sup>

Turkey had given steadfast support to the United States in international crises such as Korea, Cuba and Vietnam and always been a faithful ally of the West, but the USA did not show the same sensitivity toward Turkey's just cause.<sup>997</sup> The U.S. attitude was not compatible with Western principles to which Turkish leaders attributed great importance. Americans tolerated violation of basic human rights by the Greek side and only watched the massacre of Turkish Cypriots.<sup>998</sup>

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7.9.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.32, p.306, A. Bilgin, *MMTD*, 25.5.1965, term 1, sess.4, vol.40, p.559, C. Odyakmaz, *Ibid.*, p.561, A. Yıldız, *CSTD*, 6.1.1966, term 1, sess.5, vol.31, p.423.

<sup>994</sup> C. Talas, "Kıbrıs, Avrupa, NATO, Amerika", *Forum*, 15.9.1964, p.9, F. Armaoğlu, "Dış Politikada Değişiklik Zorunludur", *Cumhuriyet*, 2.9.1964, p.2, A. Kabaklı, "Zararlı Faaliyetler", *Tercüman*, 29.9.1964.

<sup>995</sup> "Başyazı", *Forum*, 15.9.1964, p.3, O. Okyar, "Dış Politikada Revizyon", *Forum*, 15.9.1964, p.10, Talas, *op.cit.*, p.9, M. Toker, "İsmet Paşa ile...", *op.cit.*, 9.2.1969, p.5, A. Artus, "Kıbrıs ve Amerika'nın Tutumu", *Milliyet*, 4.9.1964, "Durum", *Milliyet*, 2.9.1964, p.1, N. Erim *MMTD*, 25.5.1965, term 1, sess.4, vol.40, p.550, Yıldız, *op.cit.*, p.411, H. Uysal, "Tehlikeli Alakalar", *Akis*, 15.1.1966, p.5, S. Ural, *CSTD*, 4.2.1968, term 1, sess.7, vol.45-3, pp.452-453, A.R. Alp, "Kıbrıs Meselesinde Johnson'ın Hesabı", *Tercüman*, 4.9.1964, M. Gönlübol and H. Ulman, "Türk Dış Politikasının Yirmi Yılı, 1945-1965", *SBF Dergisi*, vol.21, No.1, March 1966, p.177.

<sup>996</sup> M.F. Fenik, "Bu Gafletin Cezasını Bütün Dünya Çeker" *Son Havadis*, 31.3.1964, Fenik, "Amerikan Nasihati", *Ibid.*, 9.5.1964, O.S. Orhon, "Kıbrıs ve Ötesi", *ibid.*, 6.1.1964 quoted by Sezer, *op.cit.*, pp.182-185, Dorman, *MMTD*, term 1, sess.3, vol.30, p.278, Kabaklı, "Bakışlar", *Tercüman*, 4.1.1964.

<sup>997</sup> Okyar, *op.cit.*, p.10, M. Toker, "Kral Kadar Kralcı", *Akis*, 9.9.1964, p.7, Kabaklı, "Cepheler", *Tercüman*, 19.4.1964, Dorman, *MMTD*, 6.5.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.30, p.278, R. Aşçıoğlu, "Böyle Oyun Olur mu?", *Tercüman*, 15.1.1965, E. Güresin "Amerika'nın Tutumu", *Cumhuriyet*, 6.6.1964, İ. Baran, *MMTD*, 5.5.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.30, p.244.

<sup>998</sup> Erim, *MMTD*, 5.5.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.30, p.223, C. Baban, *ibid.*, p.236, Dorman, 6.5.1964, *ibid.*, p.278, Erim, *MMTD*, 25.5.1965, term 1, sess.4, vol.40, pp.549-550, "Başyazı", *Forum*, 1.5.1964, p.4, Talas, *op.cit.*, p.9, K. Sağlamer, "Dünyada Bugün", *Cumhuriyet*, 30.4.1964, p.3, B. Savcı, "Amerika'nın Kısır, Haksız Politikası", *Cumhuriyet*, 8.9.1964, p.2, the author's interview with F. Armaoğlu.

Turkey should stop consulting with the Western powers and intervene in Cyprus militarily to solve the problem permanently.<sup>999</sup> It was also high time for Turkey to reconsider its friendship, alliance and agreements with the West, which did not protect Turkish interests adequately.<sup>1000</sup>

It should be noted that there were also some Turkish critics who warned that Turkey should not alienate the West by criticising it harshly on the problems which stemmed from her own mistakes.<sup>1001</sup>

## 6.10 Epilogue

The barrage of criticism at home and the U.S. attitude toward the Cyprus question led Turkish rulers to initiate some actions such as the bombing of Cyprus in August 1964 to demonstrate that they were not under the influence of the United States in their actions on the Cyprus issue. However, Turkish authorities did not want to cause the deep resentment in the USA because they needed the alliance. They tried to limit the damage done by public criticism to the alliance with the United States and NATO. While explaining the Acheson talks and the American attitude toward the Cyprus question to the Turkish Parliament on 3 September 1964, Turkish Prime Minister İnönü preserved a calm and detached tone:

The United States has reconfirmed that it has tried sincerely to find a way of settlement for the Cyprus question, which could be accepted by both sides... We have wanted the United States to play an active role in finding a solution to the problem, not to be indifferent to it... The main American concern has been to prevent a war between two NATO allies... She believed that the problem would be solved through cooperating with the leaders of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus... The main reason for the failure of American efforts is that the United States misjudged the characteristics of the Greek and Cypriot administrations... and that the two governments misled the American leaders.<sup>1002</sup>

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<sup>999</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.112, Couloumbis, *the United States...*, op.cit., p.61, A. Oğuz, *MMTD*, 7.9.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.32, p.309.

<sup>1000</sup> Erim, *MMTD*, 5.5.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.30, p.223, M. Karmca, *ibid.*, 24.2.1966, term 2, sess.1, vol.4, p.469, S. Karaman, *CSTD*, 7.5.1965, term 1, sess.5, vol.27-2, p.185, H. Tunçkanat, *ibid.*, 3.2.1967, term 1, sess.6, vol.38-3, pp. 568-570, *Forum*, 15.9.1964, p.7, Dorman, *MMTD*, 7.9.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.32, p.307, Bilgin, *MMTD*, 25.5.1965, term 1, sess.4, vol.40, p.559, “Durum”, *Milliyet*, 21.4.1964, p.1, Oğuz, op.cit., p.312, E. Alican, *MMTD*, 7.9.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.32, p.314, S. Koçuş, *CSTD*, 8.5.1965, term 1, sess.5, vol.27-2, p.261.

<sup>1001</sup> F. Armaoğlu, “Batı İttifakından Ayrılamayız”, *Cumhuriyet*, 29.4.1964, F. Sükan, *MMTD*, 5.5.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.30, pp. 231-232, G. Evliyaoğlu, *ibid.*, pp.295-297, S. Bilgiç, *ibid.*, 7.9.1964, term 1, sess.3, vol.32, pp. 321-322.

<sup>1002</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 4.9.1964, p.7, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, October 1964, pp.53-56.

U.S. rulers, too, did not want to alienate the Turks and lose the alliance with Turkey, since the alliance served U.S. interests. They tried to heal the wounds with Turkey and to appease the angry Turkish public opinion. The U.S. administration issued public statements renewing its commitment to protect Turkey's security, and promising continuity of economic and military assistance.<sup>1003</sup> When the Turkish government rejected U.N. mediator Galo Plaza's plan on Cyprus and Galo Plaza himself as mediator<sup>1004</sup> the United States did not raise any objection to Turkey. She tacitly agreed with Turkey that the U.N. mediation would bring no solution to the problem.

In December 1965, the United States voted against the U.N. General Assembly resolution which appeared to support Makarios's claim for the independence of Cyprus and to discount the Turkish claim to the right of intervention in Cyprus based on the Treaty of Guarantee. The resolution recognised that "the Republic of Cyprus, as an equal member of the United Nations, is, in accordance with the Charter, entitled to and should enjoy full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference."<sup>1005</sup> The resolution was passed by 47 votes to 5 with 54 abstentions. The Western and Eastern bloc countries abstained, while the Third World countries of Africa, Asia and South America voted in favour of the resolution. The countries who voted against it were Turkey, the United States, Albania, Iran, and Pakistan.<sup>1006</sup>

The American opposition to the resolution was justified by American officials on the ground that it seemed to violate the existing treaties on Cyprus and to favour only one side of the problem. But the main American concern was to restore the prestige of the United States in Turkey, which was shaken by the Johnson letter. During the U.N. General Assembly talks on Cyprus between 11 and 17 December 1965, American representative Charles W. Yost made the following points:

The Security Council had recognised that a solution to the Cyprus problem could not be imposed but should be reached by negotiation, accommodation and mediation. The Assembly should therefore refrain from any action inconsistent with the measures already taken by the Security Council, and it should in particular refrain from passing

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<sup>1003</sup> Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.120.

<sup>1004</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.16, p.20989.

<sup>1005</sup> Ibid., p.21237, *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, Nos.2-3, February 1975, p.217.

<sup>1006</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.15, p.21237, Sarica et al. *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, op.cit., pp. 109-112.

judgement on the positions of the parties or on the issues in dispute. The United States had no preferred formula for a settlement of the Cyprus problem. It merely hoped that the parties would move toward the agreed solution envisaged in the Council's resolution of March 4, 1964.<sup>1007</sup>

In his speech to the U.N. Security Council in August 1965, Yost had reconfirmed the American consideration that the London-Zurich agreements were still valid. His main points were as follows:

The government of Cyprus had not been content with extending the mandate of its House of Representatives but had gone one step further and amended the electoral law. This was inconsistent with the London-Zurich agreements and the constitution of Cyprus. However, whatever legal rights any of the parties might claim, his delegation joined the Secretary General in urging all those concerned to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus or to endanger international peace.<sup>1008</sup>

The American vote against the U.N. General Assembly resolution did not undo the negative impression of the USA in Turkey. Some Turkish critics claimed that America could have influenced other states to vote against the resolution if she had wished, but American representatives in the U.N. did not make any effort in this direction.<sup>1009</sup> In fact, during the U.N. General Assembly talks the exercise of American influence on behalf of Turkey was not out of the question. The Greek and Greek Cypriot representatives feared that such an American initiative would be disastrous for their attempt to pass a resolution supporting their cause. Hence, they made strong representations to the U.S. mission twice, when they thought that the United States was attempting to persuade Latin American states to support Turkey. These Greek actions were generally successful because the United States did not engage actively in the struggle to pass a resolution on Cyprus.<sup>1010</sup>

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<sup>1007</sup> *International Organisation*, vol.20, 1966, pp. 308-309.

<sup>1008</sup> *Ibid.*, vol.19, 1965, p.987.

<sup>1009</sup> H. Uysal, *op.cit.*, p.5, *Cumhuriyet*, 28.12.1965, p.7.

<sup>1010</sup> R.O. Keohane, "the Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly", *International Organisation*, vol.21, 1967, p.232.

## Chapter VII

### THE CYPRUS QUESTION BETWEEN 1965 AND 1975 AND ITS EFFECT UPON TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

This chapter covers serious developments such as the Turkish intervention in Cyprus and the U.S. embargo on Turkey and concludes with an assessment of their effect upon the relationship and the theoretical implications.

#### 7.1 U.S. Efforts to Promote Talks Between Turkey and Greece

American rulers hoped that a small concession (probably a military base) by the Greeks to Turkey could solve the Cyprus problem to the advantage of all Western powers, including Greece and Turkey, with unification of the island with Greece. Therefore, they encouraged Greek and Turkish officials to have bilateral talks. The Americans certainly disliked the excessive Greek Cypriot opposition to such plans and Greek support for this opposition. This was probably the reason for apparent U.S. pressures on the Greek side after 1965.

Allegedly, U.S. authorities put enormous pressure on Greek governments between 1965 and 1967 and on the Greek junta after 1967 to have secret bilateral talks with Turkey to find a solution to the Cyprus problem along the Acheson plan lines. It was also claimed that their dislike for George Papandreou's attitude toward the Cyprus question led the Americans to play a role in ousting his government in July 1965 and the Greek military coup in April 1967.

Among other reasons,<sup>1011</sup> U.S. officials disliked Andreas Papandreou, son of Greek P.M. Papandreou and minister in the cabinet, because of his open support

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<sup>1011</sup> T.A. Couloumbis, *the United States, Greece and Turkey*, New York: Praeger, 1983, p.49, H.I. Salih, *Cyprus; the Impact of a Diverse Nationalism on a State*, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1978, p.54, M. Goldbloom, "United States Policy in Post-War Greece" in R. Clogg and G. Yannopoulos (eds.), *Greece Under Military Rule*, London: Secker and Warburg, 1972, pp.234, 237.

for Greek Cypriot President Makarios's policies.<sup>1012</sup> The Greek right wing press had attacked A. Papandreou over his alleged role in the Greek rejection of one version of the Acheson plan which would bring the union of at least the major portion of Cyprus with Greece.<sup>1013</sup> He had told Eric Rouleou of *Le Monde*: "Certain Western powers have attempted to create a rift between President Makarios and our government by asking us to condemn his policies... An agreement based on enosis and a Turkish military base must be excluded as long as the Cyprus government is against it." The statement further deepened the friction between the U.S. and Greek governments. American diplomats loudly protested against it and consequently A. Papandreou resigned from his post.<sup>1014</sup>

In March 1965 the U.S. embassy in Athens was alarmed by the news that a ship carrying Soviet ground-to-air missiles had left Egypt and was on its way for delivery to Cyprus. Upon American protests, Greek Defence Minister Garoufalias went to Cyprus to discuss the matter.<sup>1015</sup> Greek Cypriot leader Makarios declared that Garoufalias's action was ordered directly by U.S. Secretary of Defence McNamara. He claimed that obeying the Pentagon's instructions, Garoufalias prevented the delivery of Soviet missiles to Cyprus and withdrew from Cyprus all Greek officers who could have trained their Cypriot counterparts to handle the missiles.<sup>1016</sup>

As a result of American pressures, Greek Foreign Minister Stavros Costopoulos and his Turkish counterpart Işık held talks on the Cyprus question at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in London in May 1965.<sup>1017</sup> Makarios condemned the talks, stating that they could lead to the partition of Cyprus. In July 1965 Greek Prime Minister Papandreou resigned because of his disagreement with the King over his undertaking the defence minister post. It was claimed that the USA took part in this development by supporting the King mainly because of its dislike for Papandreou's Cyprus policy.<sup>1018</sup> Given the general U.S. suspicion that leftist

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<sup>1012</sup> M.A. Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, Edinburgh: Q Press Ltd., 1979, p.72.

<sup>1013</sup> L. Stern, *the Wrong Horse*, New York: Times Books, 1977, p.33.

<sup>1014</sup> A. Papandreou, *Democracy At Gunpoint*, London: Andre Deutsch, 1970, pp. 105-106.

<sup>1015</sup> Ibid., p.108.

<sup>1016</sup> Ibid., p.206.

<sup>1017</sup> Ibid., p.109, Salih, op.cit., p.54, R. Stephens, *Cyprus*, London: Pall Mall Press, 1966, p.203, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1965-1966, vol.15, p.20809.

<sup>1018</sup> Papandreou, op.cit., pp. 137-138, Goldbloom in Clogg and Yannopoulos(eds.), op.cit., p.237.



powers, including Papandreou's party, would harm American interests, this claim needs to be taken cautiously.

The next Greek minority government under the premiership of Stephanopoulos seemed to attribute more importance to its ties with NATO. Hence it was inclined to solving the Cyprus problem through talks with Turkey for the sake of NATO's interests. Encouraged by the Americans, Greek rulers sought union of Cyprus with Greece with some compensation to Turkey.<sup>1019</sup> On these lines the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers had contacts in May,<sup>1020</sup> June and December 1966. Since the Greeks did not give consent to Turkey's having full sovereignty over a Cypriot territory, no agreement was achieved.<sup>1021</sup>

It was claimed that the United States, if not involved directly, at least gave consent to the Greek military coup on 21 April 1967 which forestalled the inevitable election victory of George Papandreou's Centre Union Party disliked by Americans, among other reasons, because of its Cyprus policy.<sup>1022</sup> According to Stern, CIA station chief Maury in the American Embassy in Athens disclosed that "senior members of the CIA country team met in January 1967... We concluded that a victory by the Papandreous would seriously damage vital U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean area, weaken the southern flank of NATO and seriously destabilize Greek-Turkish relations then severely strained by the Cyprus situation."<sup>1023</sup> The new Greek junta regime, too, supported by Americans, was in favour of having bilateral talks with Turks to solve the Cyprus problem in a way which would be compatible with NATO interests.<sup>1024</sup>

On 9 and 10 September 1967, the prime ministers of Turkey and Greece, Süleyman Demirel and Kollies, met in the Turkish and Greek border towns, Keşan and Alexandroupolis (Dedeagatch). Kollies's proposal was the union of Cyprus

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<sup>1019</sup> Papandreou, op.cit., pp.205-207.

<sup>1020</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.15, p.21540.

<sup>1021</sup> Salih, op.cit., pp.55-56, S. Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers and the Third World*, New York: University Press of America, 1988, p.132, Attalides, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.71, *Keesing's...*, 1967-1968, vol.16, p.21947.

<sup>1022</sup> Goldbloom, op.cit., p.238, Attalides, op.cit., pp.146-147, Couloumbis, op.cit., pp.50-51, Papandreou, op.cit., pp.187, 191-192.

<sup>1023</sup> Stern, *the Wrong Horse*, op.cit., p.37.

<sup>1024</sup> Papandreou, op.cit., pp.200, 201, 208.

to Greece (enosis) and territorial adjustments on the Greco-Turkish border in favour of Turkey. The Turks rejected enosis and demanded either a return to the 1960 regime or double enosis (secession of some Cypriot territory to Turkey).<sup>1025</sup> After returning to Turkey, Demirel declared in his press conference that Turkey rejected enosis and insisted on the validity of the London-Zurich agreements on Cyprus.<sup>1026</sup> In Andreas Papandreou's words, "Demirel's statement fell like a bomb-shell in Greece. Papadopoulos and the junta government had had a resounding defeat."<sup>1027</sup> In Turkey, opposition MPs criticised the Kesan-Alexandroupolis talks on the ground that they were held under the influence of foreign powers and sought union of Cyprus with Greece.<sup>1028</sup>

## 7.2 1967 Cyprus Crisis

### 7.2.1 The November 1967 Fighting in Cyprus

On 15 November 1967 Greek Cypriot forces under the command of General Grivas attacked and occupied the Turkish Cypriot villages of Ayios Theodoros (Boğaziçi) and Kophinou (Geçitkale).<sup>1029</sup> The Turkish side believed that Greek attacks were organised attempts to achieve the enosis recently rejected by Demirel.<sup>1030</sup> Reportedly, the Greek Cypriot offensive was arranged by Grivas on orders from the Greek junta.<sup>1031</sup>

The Turkish government issued a public statement condemning the attacks strongly and warning that the crisis might go beyond the borders of Cyprus.<sup>1032</sup>

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<sup>1025</sup> V. Confoudakis, "United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question" in M.A. Attalides (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed, Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977*, p.142n, *Keesing's...*, vol.16, p.22282.

<sup>1026</sup> Salih, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.57, M. Sarica et al., *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, No.2071, 1975, p.139.

<sup>1027</sup> Papandreou, op.cit., p.209.

<sup>1028</sup> Sarica et al., op.cit., pp.138-140.

<sup>1029</sup> Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, op.cit., pp.209-210, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp. 133-134, R.R. Denktash, *the Cyprus Triangle*, London: K. Rustem and Brother, 1988, p.50, T. Ehrlich *Cyprus: 1958-1967*, London: Oxford University Press, 1974, p.98, N. Crawshaw, *the Cyprus Revolt*, London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1978, p.377.

<sup>1030</sup> Denktash, op.cit., p.50, Crawshaw, op.cit., p.373, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.134. U.N. Secretary-General U Thant's report confirmed the Turkish belief. *Keesing's...*, vol.16, p.22435.

<sup>1031</sup> Attalides, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.98, Papandreou, op.cit., p.211.

<sup>1032</sup> Ehrlich, op.cit., pp.98, 105.

The Turkish ultimatum to Makarios, which threatened aerial bombardment brought about withdrawal of the Greek forces from the two Turkish villages.<sup>1033</sup> By the end of November 17, the U.N. force in Cyprus had achieved a cease-fire.<sup>1034</sup> However, staying under strong public pressure, especially from the press, military commanders and parliament, to intervene in Cyprus,<sup>1035</sup> on November 17, Turkish P.M. Süleyman Demirel sent an ultimatum-like note to Greece, making certain demands.<sup>1036</sup>

It seemed that Turkey was poised to invade Cyprus if Greece did not accept its demands. Between November 17 and 22, a war atmosphere rapidly developed.<sup>1037</sup> The Turkish armed forces lacking enough equipment and trained personnel were not ready for a landing in Cyprus and Turkish rulers were not willing to launch a military intervention. However, they seemed determined to resort to military option if necessary to save Turkey's prestige.<sup>1038</sup>

### 7.2.2 The Vance Mission

The main American concern was to restore peace in Cyprus and thus to prevent an outbreak of a Greco-Turkish war. American officials tried to restrain both sides from taking any action which would worsen the situation. U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Parker Hart, told Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil that President Johnson requested Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus but chose not to send a written message because of the Turkish public's reaction to the Johnson letter in 1964.<sup>1039</sup> A task force of the U.S. Sixth fleet was deployed close to the shores of Cyprus, apparently to deter the Turkish invasion.<sup>1040</sup> On 22 November, the United States joined Britain and Canada in proposing a settlement formula.<sup>1041</sup>

<sup>1033</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.135, Sarıca et al., op.cit., p.143.

<sup>1034</sup> Ehlich, op.cit., p.105.

<sup>1035</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.136. E. Mütercimler, *Kıbrıs Barış Harekatının Bilinmeyen Yönleri*, İstanbul: Yaprak Yayınevi, 1990, p.117, *Keesing's...*, vol.16, p.22435.

<sup>1036</sup> Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.142n, Papandreou, op.cit., pp. 211-212.

<sup>1037</sup> Quotations from *Washington Post* and *The Daily Telegraph* in Papandreou, op.cit., pp.211-212.

<sup>1038</sup> Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers...*, op.cit., p.135, Mütercimler, op.cit., pp.120, 137.

<sup>1039</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.137.

<sup>1040</sup> Ibid., p.137, Sarıca et al., *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, op.cit., p.144.

<sup>1041</sup> Ehlich, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.110.

When the Greek government rejected the Turkish demands on 22 November, President Johnson dispatched Cyrus Vance, the former deputy secretary of defence, as his special envoy to mediate between the sides of the conflict. Cyrus Vance "was told that Turkish troops were already at the embarkation port and were expected, according to intelligence, to invade Cyprus the next morning. This would mean war between Greece and Turkey." President Johnson instructed Vance: "Do what you have to to stop the war. If you need anything, let me know."<sup>1042</sup>

As a first step, Cyrus Vance manoeuvred to gain time to be able to mediate between the sides. In his meeting with Turkish P.M. Demirel on November 23, Vance obtained the Turkish government's promise that it would not invade Cyprus in the next few days.<sup>1043</sup> Then Vance shuttled between Athens and Ankara to find a settlement formula agreed by both sides. Subsequently, Makarios could be put in the position of either accepting the settlement or being the isolated cause of a continuing crisis. Although Vance pressed the Turkish side as well as the Greeks, this time there would be no repetition of the Johnson letter in 1964. A Johnson letter-like threat could cause total alienation of Turkey from the United States. This time, it was the Greek side which caused the crisis and thus threatened the cohesion of NATO, therefore it should make major concessions to end the crisis. Nevertheless, Greece should be approached properly to provide her with a ladder she could climb down.<sup>1044</sup>

The official American position was that Vance acted only as a mediator and did not threaten sanctions against either side. But there were some rumours that the United States would cut off its military aid to both sides. Ehlich rightly suggests that "even if Vance did not directly discuss future military assistance for Greece and Turkey, the issue must have been very much in the minds of leaders in those countries, for both depended on American assistance to maintain their armed forces."<sup>1045</sup> In Ankara, reportedly, Vance reminded Turkish officials of the American view that the use of U.S.-supplied military equipment by Turkey in its operation against Cyprus was not compatible with the assistance agreements

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<sup>1042</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.139.

<sup>1043</sup> Ehlich, op.cit., pp.111-112.

<sup>1044</sup> T.W. Adams and A.J. Cottrel, *Cyprus Between East and West*, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968, p.72.

<sup>1045</sup> Ehlich, op.cit., pp. 111-112.

between the two countries.<sup>1046</sup> In Athens, he pressured the Greeks by saying that the United States was unwilling to continue deterring the Turks from invading Cyprus.<sup>1047</sup>

The Greek colonels seemed prepared to compromise because they did not want to worsen their already uneasy position in NATO by a conflict with Turkey.<sup>1048</sup> By 30 November Cyrus Vance had persuaded the Greek junta to agree with the Turks on the following points: 1- The demobilisation of Turkish armed forces that had been poised for war. 2- The gradual withdrawal of Turkish and Greek forces over the number authorised by the 1959 London-Zurich agreements. 3- Compensation to the Turkish Cypriots in Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou for their losses resulting from the Greek Cypriot attacks. 4- Expansion of the size and powers of the U.N. force in Cyprus to prevent repetition of fighting. 5- The disbandment of the 20,000 member Greek Cypriot National Guard. 6- The recall of Greek General Grivas to Athens. 7- The authorisation for Turkish Cypriots to form their own local governments and police forces in their enclaves. 8- Disengagement where the fighting was taking place.<sup>1049</sup>

On the same day Cyrus Vance took his plan to Makarios. But he was unable to overcome Makarios's refusal to dismantle the National Guard.<sup>1050</sup> The crisis was over when both Greece and Turkey announced on 3 December 1967 that they would comply with the appeal of U.N. Secretary General U Thant, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops illegally introduced into Cyprus and the dismantling of paramilitary forces on the island.<sup>1051</sup>

Concerns, aims and tactics of the Americans during the 1967 Cyprus crisis were almost same as those in 1964 when Turkey threatened to resort to military force. The only difference was that U.S. rulers acted more cautiously this time in order

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<sup>1046</sup> Sarica et al., op.cit., pp. 146-147, Mütercimler, op.cit., p.124.

<sup>1047</sup> Salih, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.59.

<sup>1048</sup> G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p.123.

<sup>1049</sup> Salih, op.cit., p.59, Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, op.cit., pp. 212-213, M. Tamkoç, *the Turkish Cypriot State*, London: K. Rustem and Brother, 1988, p.94, *Keesing's...*, vol.16, p.22436.

<sup>1050</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp. 140-141, J.S. Joseph, *Cyprus; Ethnic Conflict and International Concern*, New York: Peter Lang, 1985, pp. 141-142.

<sup>1051</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.141, Ehrlich, *Cyprus*, op.cit., pp. 114-115, *Keesing's...*, vol.16, p.22437.

not to alienate Turkey. They succeeded in preventing Turkish intervention in 1967 without causing deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations but their mediation effort increased the Turks' determination to solve the Cyprus question in their own way because U.S. intervention brought no important change in the Cyprus situation from their own point of view. The Turkish intervention in 1974 was the eventual outcome.

### 7.2.3 Reaction of Turkish Public to U.S. Mediation

Since the memory of the American prevention of Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1964 had not yet faded from the minds of Turkish people, when the United States became involved in the November 1967 crisis, Turks, especially leftist circles, assumed that the United States would block Turkish action again. During the crisis, leftist university students organised anti-American demonstrations. U.S. mediator Vance could not land on the civilian Esenboğa airport in Ankara because of demonstrations but had to land on the military Mürted airport.<sup>1052</sup> Leftists claimed that Americans forced Turkish rulers not to launch military intervention for which a real opportunity was created by the Greek Cypriot attacks and thus prevented a permanent solution of the Cyprus problem.<sup>1053</sup>

The majority of Turkish critics thought that this time the American attitude was totally different from its stance during the 1964 Cyprus crisis. They believed that the Americans now distinguished the guilty from the innocent and pressed Athens to accept Turkish demands and thus favoured the Turkish position.<sup>1054</sup> Turkish authorities claimed that they acted independently during the crisis and did not come under American pressure. They denied the claim that the decision not to intervene was a result of U.S. pressures<sup>1055</sup> and proudly announced that they

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<sup>1052</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.140.

<sup>1053</sup> İ. Selçuk, "Pencere", 26-28 November 1967, *Cumhuriyet*, p.2, B. Boran, *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (MMTD)*, 4.12.1967, term 2, sess.2, vol.22, pp.330-331, ibid., 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, p.468.

<sup>1054</sup> E. Güresin, "Günün Notları", *Cumhuriyet*, 23.11.1967, p.1, "Durum", *Milliyet*, 11.12.1967, p.1, Coşkun Kırca, *MMTD*, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, p.454, T. Feyzioğlu, *MMTD*, 23.1.1969, term 2, sess.4, vol.31, p.425, A.H. Ulman and R.H. Dekmejian, "Changing Partners in Turkey's Foreign Policy 1959-1967", *ORBIS*, vol.11, Fall 1967, p.784.

<sup>1055</sup> Foreign Minister İ.S. Çağlayangil, *MMTD*, 20.2.1968, term 2, sess.3, vol.25, pp.482, 487.

used Turkish forces and bases assigned to NATO for Turkish interests during the crisis.<sup>1056</sup>

### 7.3 Greek-Turkish Secret Talks on Cyprus (1967-1974)

After the November 1967 crisis, both the Turkish and Greek governments were still willing to have secret bilateral talks to find a political settlement to the Cyprus problem. The Greek junta, which was largely dependent on the United States for its survival, seemed to attribute more importance to its membership of NATO. The Greek colonels were willing to find a solution to the Cyprus question, based on the lines of the Acheson plan, i.e. enosis in return for some compensation to Turkey. This kind of solution would satisfy their traditional aim of unifying Cyprus with Greece and please their American allies. They made public statements to this effect.<sup>1057</sup> By late 1969 Greece and Turkey had resumed their secret talks on the Cyprus question.<sup>1058</sup> The talks between the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers, Olcay and Palamas, during the Lisbon meeting of NATO foreign ministers on 3-4 July 1971 seemed rather promising.<sup>1059</sup> Reportedly the two sides had moved closer to a consensus on some form of double enosis.<sup>1060</sup> However, extreme pro-enosis elements in Greece and Cyprus resorted to terrorist acts at this time, and prevented the achievement of a solution<sup>1061</sup> because their activities soured relations between the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments and also between the Turkish government and the Greek regime.

Greek contacts with the Turks did not please the Greek Cypriots. In fact, there was a strong enmity between the Makarios regime and the Greek junta between 1967 and 1974 because of their different approaches to the Cyprus question. While

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<sup>1056</sup> Defence Minister A. Topaloğlu, *Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi*, 4.2.1968, term 1, sess.7, vol.45-3, p.489.

<sup>1057</sup> Greek Premier Caramanlis' interview with *Le Monde* and *The Times* in Papandreou, op.cit., pp. 219-220, Greek P.M. Papadopoulos' statement to *Milliyet* in Attalides, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.132, A.G. Xydis, "The Military Regime's Foreign Policy" in Clogg and Yannopoulos (eds.), op.cit., p.203.

<sup>1058</sup> Coufoudakis, "United States..." in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.125.

<sup>1059</sup> Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers...*, op.cit., pp. 172-173. M. Stearns, former U.S. ambassador to Greece, describes the Lisbon meeting as "the closest the two communities have come to an agreement." M. Stearns, *Entangled Allies*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, pp.113-115.

<sup>1060</sup> Stern, *the Wrong Horse*, op.cit., p.90, Couloumbis, *the United States...*, op.cit., p.78, Coufoudakis, op.cit., p.126, Attalides, op.cit., pp.132, 153-154.

<sup>1061</sup> Stearns, op.cit., pp.113-115.

the Greek junta tried to achieve enosis with some compensation to Turks in order not to harm its ties with the Western alliance,<sup>1062</sup> Makarios was in favour of pure enosis, strongly opposing any Turkish involvement.<sup>1063</sup> Makarios's non-aligned policy and good relations with the eastern bloc was also an important reason for Greek dislike for him.<sup>1064</sup> Allegedly, in order to achieve enosis Greece tried to overthrow the Makarios regime by actively supporting the pro-enosis terrorist organisations in Cyprus and taking part in many assassination attempts against Makarios.<sup>1065</sup> In September 1971 George Grivas escaped from his house arrest in Athens and secretly entered Cyprus to head the fight for enosis, allegedly with the knowledge of Greek rulers. He reactivated the terrorist organisation EOKA in the form of EOKA-B and assumed its leadership.<sup>1066</sup>

#### 7.4 Turkey's Cyprus Policy (1967-1974)

As was understood from the statements of Turkish officials, their Cyprus policy between 1967 and 1974 contained the following elements: 1- Turkey's security concerns had to be considered. 2- Cyprus could not be unified with another state unilaterally. 3- The international agreements on Cyprus could not be abrogated or changed by one side unilaterally. 4- One community in Cyprus could not impose its own regime over the other. 5- The power balance in the Mediterranean and the Aegean region which was established by the Lausanne treaty could not be changed in favour of one side.<sup>1067</sup> In this period the Turkish government paid little attention to developments in Cyprus since it was preoccupied with domestic

<sup>1062</sup> Couloumbis, op.cit., p.78, P.N. Vanezis, *Cyprus: the Unfinished Agony*, Cyprus: Abelard-Schuman, 1977, p.46, V. Coufoudakis, "the Dynamics of Political Partition and Division in Multiethnic and Multireligious Societies; the Cyprus Case" in V. Coufoudakis (ed.), *Essays on the Cyprus Conflict*, New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1976, p.46.

<sup>1063</sup> Denktash, *the Cyprus Triangle*, op.cit., p.55. Makarios's address to a mass rally in Nicosia on 8.2.1973 in *Keesing's...*, 1973, vol.19, p.25778.

<sup>1064</sup> Stern, op.cit., p.86, Couloumbis, op.cit., p.77.

<sup>1065</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.168, Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., pp. 125-126, Attalides, op.cit., p.131.

<sup>1066</sup> Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.126, Denktash, *the Cyprus Triangle*, op.cit., pp.60-61, Stearns, op.cit., pp.115-116, *Keesing's...*, 1971-1972, vol.18, p.25033. On the EOKA terror see *Keesing's...*, vol.19, pp. 25778, 25979-25980, 26115, *ibid.*, 1974, vol.20, p.26603.

<sup>1067</sup> Sarıca et al., *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, op.cit., pp.129, 139, 150, Demirel's press conference, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, April 1967, p.85.



problems. Turkish rulers gave the impression that they were happy with intercommunal talks and preferred the solution of the problem in a way acceptable to the Greek side as well.<sup>1068</sup> The Ecevit-Erbakan coalition government, which came to power at the beginning of 1974, considered that the most suitable solution for the Cyprus question was federation giving autonomy to Turkish Cypriot enclaves but excluding territorial separation of the two ethnic communities in Cyprus.<sup>1069</sup>

## 7.5 U.S. Policy Toward Cyprus (1967-1974)

After the November 1967 Cyprus crisis, the United States stopped its diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. The negotiations between the representatives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash, which began on 24 June 1968,<sup>1070</sup> seemed to suit American interests since they brought a relative calm to the Cyprus issue. Thanks to the intercommunal talks whose main aim was to make the 1960 constitution work in a way that would protect Turkish minority rights and also permit the Cyprus government to function, an international conflict would disappear from the agenda of the American administration at least for the time being. Therefore, the United States endorsed and gave support to these talks.<sup>1071</sup> American policy turned to support for the Makarios regime and the independence of Cyprus.<sup>1072</sup> The long-held anti-Makarios American view seemed to be replaced with a favourable attitude to the Archbishop.<sup>1073</sup>

The United States also seemed to favour the Turkish side's position. During Turkish President Cevdet Sunay's visit to Washington in April 1967, President Johnson officially supported the two community concept of the Turkish side, rejecting the terms of "majority" and "minority" for Cypriot groups.<sup>1074</sup> The joint

<sup>1068</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp.147, 171.

<sup>1069</sup> Sarica et al., op.cit., p.173, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.178.

<sup>1070</sup> On the intercommunal talks see *Keesing's...*, vol.16, p.22883, ibid., 1969-1970, vol.17, pp.23635, 24041, 24117, ibid., vol.18, pp.24398, 24673-24674, 25032-25033, 25367, ibid., vol.19, pp.25700, 25979, ibid., 1974, vol.20, pp.26310, 26603.

<sup>1071</sup> Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., pp. 119-120, 123, Attalides, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.153, Stern, op.cit., p.91.

<sup>1072</sup> Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.127.

<sup>1073</sup> E.B. Laipson, "**Cyprus: A Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy**" in J.T.A. Koumoulides (ed.), *Cyprus in Transition 1960-1985*, London: Trigraph, 1986, p.67.

<sup>1074</sup> Attalides, op.cit., p.153, Adams and Cottrell, *Cyprus Between...*, op.cit., p.68.

Turkish-American communique which was issued at the end of this visit stated that the two Presidents agreed that the existing treaties on Cyprus had binding effects and would continue to be an essential element in seeking a settlement formula.<sup>1075</sup>

American rulers also supported bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey on the Cyprus question. These talks would reduce American involvement in the conflict, put greater responsibility on the regional powers<sup>1076</sup> and make it easier to reach a settlement since Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities were dependent on Greece and Turkey. While the intercommunal talks and Greek-Turkish bilateral talks continued but reached nowhere, American officials became more worried about the situation in Cyprus. In 1973 there were reports that the United States pressurised the parties to the conflict to reach a quick solution.<sup>1077</sup>

In spite of their policy mentioned above, the Americans continued to prefer the unification of Cyprus with Greece in return for compensation to Turks and the overthrow of the Makarios regime. They believed that Makarios would accept double enosis if confronted with something worse as an alternative. A consensus was reached among these officials that the Makarios problem must be left to Greece.<sup>1078</sup> Some Greek critics accused the United States of taking part in anti-Makarios activities in Cyprus.<sup>1079</sup> U.S. intelligence services in Cyprus were particularly condemned because of their alleged role in the assassination attempt against Makarios in March 1970.<sup>1080</sup> It was claimed that American officials at least were well-informed of anti-Makarios terrorist activities supported by the Greek junta but chose to do nothing about it.<sup>1081</sup> The U.S. ambassador to Cyprus appealed to the State Department to condemn the assassination attempts against Makarios

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<sup>1075</sup> *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, April 1967, p.61, *Amerika'da Onbir Gün*, Ankara: Yarı Yayınları, 1967, p.32. During Turkish P.M. Erim's visit to the USA in March 1972 U.S. authorities reiterated the same opinion. *Resmî Temaslar, Sayın Başbakan ve Bn. Erim'in Amerika'ya Ziyareti*, 18-23 March 1972 (no publisher, place and date), p.63.

<sup>1076</sup> Laipson, op.cit., p.66.

<sup>1077</sup> Attalides, op.cit., p.103.

<sup>1078</sup> Attalides, op.cit., p.154, Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., p.126.

<sup>1079</sup> Attalides, op.cit., pp.155, 156-157, Coufoudakis in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., pp.128, 144n, P.M. Kitromilides, **"From Coexistence to Confrontation: the Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus"** in Attalides (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed*, op.cit., pp.58-59. As early as March 1965 Greek Cypriot newspaper *Agon* alleged that U.S. intelligence agents and certain Greek Cypriots had plotted to overthrow Makarios. *Keesing's...*, vol.15, pp. 20630-20631.

<sup>1080</sup> Sarica et al., *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, op.cit., pp.165-166.

<sup>1081</sup> Attalides, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.133.

but the appeal was ignored by Secretary of State Kissinger and was opposed by the American ambassador to Greece.<sup>1082</sup>

It should be noted that there was a special relationship between the Greek junta and the U.S. administration in the 1967-1974 period. While the United States became the main source of support for the increasingly isolated Greek junta in the international arena,<sup>1083</sup> Athens provided important bases and facilities to the USA.<sup>1084</sup> Consequently, the Greek regime became more open to pressures from Americans, who wanted solution of the Cyprus problem without alienating the Turks.<sup>1085</sup>

## 7.6 The Military Coup in Cyprus

### 7.6.1 The Cypriot Coup and the United States

In 1974 the enmity between the Greek and Greek Cypriot administrations reached its peak. Makarios began to take actions against terrorist organisations and Greek elements in Cyprus.<sup>1086</sup> On 2 July he sent a letter to Greek President Gizikis, asking for the withdrawal of Greek officers staffing the National Guard in Cyprus.<sup>1087</sup> On 15 July the National Guard, led by Greek officers and aided by EOKA-B units attacked the Cypriot presidential palace. Makarios escaped death and left the island with British help.<sup>1088</sup> Nikos Sampson, a rightist journalist and a leading figure in EOKA-B, was declared president.

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<sup>1082</sup> Ibid., p.131.

<sup>1083</sup> Xydis, op.cit., pp. 195-196, 200, Couloumbis, op.cit., p.52, Attalides, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.130, Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint*, op.cit., p.294.

<sup>1084</sup> J.C. Campbell, "the United States and the Cyprus Question 1974-1975" in Coufoudakis (ed.), *Essays...*, op.cit., pp.16-17, Salih, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.71, Papandreou, op.cit., p.295, Xydis, op.cit., p.204, Couloumbis, *the United States, Greece and Turkey*, op.cit., p.54.

<sup>1085</sup> P.G. Polyviou, *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980*, London: Duckworth, 1980, p.127, Attalides, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.99.

<sup>1086</sup> Sarica et al., *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, op.cit., pp.178-179.

<sup>1087</sup> Quoted in R. Denktash, *the Cyprus Triangle*, op.cit., pp. 174-179, *Keessing's...*, vol.20, pp. 26661-26662.

<sup>1088</sup> Couloumbis, *the United States, Greece and Turkey*, op.cit., p.88, P.G. Polyviou, *Cyprus: the Tragedy and the Challenge*, Washington D.C.: American Hellenic Institute, 1975, p.55, *Keessing's...*, vol.20, p.26662. Makarios told the U.N. Security Council on 19 July that the coup was organised by the Greek junta. Ibid., pp. 26664-26665.

Allegedly the United States had enough information to predict the coup against the Makarios regime. The American intelligence service, the CIA, had close and constant contact with the Greek intelligence and therefore had known what was going on in Athens. Makarios himself and the Cypriot press publicised the fact that a coup against the Cypriot administration was being prepared. In March 1974 the Cypriot ambassador to the United States, Nikos Dimitriou, informed State Department officials Rodger Davies and Thomas Boyatt that an assassination attempt would be made against Makarios.<sup>1089</sup> Subsequently, some working level State Department officials appealed to the higher level officials to express their opposition to assassination attempts against Makarios. But their appeals were ignored.<sup>1090</sup>

On 20 June General Ioannides, the head of the Greek junta, informed a CIA officer in Athens that his administration decided to overthrow the Makarios regime and asked U.S. opinion about it.<sup>1091</sup> Subsequently, a CIA report mentioning this serious development was dispatched to Washington. The State Department instructed U.S. ambassador to Greece, Henry Tasca, to convey Washington's opposition to the use of violence in Cyprus to Ioannides personally.<sup>1092</sup> Since he did not regard the situation as critical Tasca chose not to see Ioannides personally but to pass the message through government channels.<sup>1093</sup> On 3 July the CIA passed a message to Washington from a new and untested source that Greek General Ioannides decided to abandon his coup action against the Cypriot administration.<sup>1094</sup> The resignation of Greek Foreign Minister Tetenes on 8 July because of his opposition to a coup in Cyprus did not attract attention of U.S. officials.<sup>1095</sup> On 14 July, the CIA reported again that Ioannides had been dissuaded from attempting a coup in Cyprus. British military intelligence also believed that Ioannides had been

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<sup>1089</sup> Stern, *the Wrong Horse*, op.cit., p.94, Attalides, *Cyprus*, op.cit., p.166.

<sup>1090</sup> Laipson, "Cyprus: a Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy" in Koumoulides (ed.), op.cit., p.68, Attalides, op.cit., pp.166-167.

<sup>1091</sup> Attalides, op.cit., p.163.

<sup>1092</sup> Couloubis, op.cit., p.86, Stern, op.cit., pp.99-100.

<sup>1093</sup> Attalides, op.cit., p.167, Couloubis, op.cit., p.86, Campbell, op.cit., p.18, Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers...*, op.cit., p.182.

<sup>1094</sup> Attalides, op.cit., pp.167-168, Stern, op.cit., pp. 101-102.

<sup>1095</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.183, P.Y. Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress and American Foreign Policy*, London: Greenwood Press, 1984, p.88.

forced to back off by diplomatic pressures.<sup>1096</sup> Under these circumstances, Bell rightly suggests that “the CIA was deceived rather than deceiving, and that Ioannides believed himself to have enough diplomatic leverage to induce Washington to restrain the Turks, just as they had done in the crises of 1964 and 1967.”<sup>1097</sup>

Some Greek critics accused American officials of encouraging Ioannides in his coup plot by assuring him that they would not oppose the overthrow of Makarios and would prevent a Turkish invasion of Cyprus.<sup>1098</sup> It was argued that the USA could prevent the Cyprus coup if it took a strong action against the Greek junta in the early stages when rumours erupted.<sup>1099</sup> Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was particularly criticised because of his failure to register a strong disapproval of the Greek junta’s actions.<sup>1100</sup> Allegedly he rejected Senator William Fulbright’s suggestion to prevent the Greek plot.<sup>1101</sup> Kissinger denied these accusations in his press conference on 22 July 1974: “The information concerning an impending coup was not exactly lying around the streets.”<sup>1102</sup> The Cyprus Country Director in the State Department, Thomas Boyatt, said in this subject in a conference on 22 February 1975:

I am prepared to accept that U.S. policy was inadequate... and that there have been mistakes made... [But] I absolutely reject the devil theory, the proposition that this government, through any of its arms, somehow bluntly and clandestinely developed a situation with General Ioannides that he would take an action which in the last analysis would have the result which is so totally disastrous for the United States.<sup>1103</sup>

It seems that U.S. rulers had continued their policy of leaving the Makarios problem to the Greeks. In spite of enough warnings on the Greek junta’s action, they did not want to get involved in disagreements between the Greek and the

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<sup>1096</sup> C. Bell, *Diplomacy of Detente*, London: Martin Robertson, 1977, pp. 146-147, Stern, op.cit., p.102.

<sup>1097</sup> Bell, op.cit., pp. 146-147, see also K.H. Karpat, “War on Cyprus: the Tragedy of Enosis” in K.H. Karpat (ed.), *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, p.195.

<sup>1098</sup> Attalides, op.cit., pp.170-171, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.185.

<sup>1099</sup> Couloumbis, op.cit., p.88, Polyviou, 1975, op.cit., p.85.

<sup>1100</sup> Stern, op.cit., p.101, Attalides, op.cit., p.167, Watanabe, op.cit., p.88.

<sup>1101</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp. 183-184.

<sup>1102</sup> Watanabe, op.cit., p.87.

<sup>1103</sup> “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Greece: Panel Discussions” in T.A. Couloumbis and S.M. Hicks (eds.), *U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Greece and Cyprus*, Washington D.C.: Center for Mediterranean Studies, 1975, p.140.

Greek Cypriot administrations by condemning the one side. The Americans would pay more attention to not alienating the Greek junta because of U.S. interests in Greece. However, they might have failed to predict the exact time of the Cypriot coup to take effective action to prevent it.

### 7.6.2 U.S. Attitude in the Aftermath of the Cyprus Coup

In the first few days of the Cypriot coup, the United States followed a wait-and-see policy, and avoided showing any reaction to the developments in Cyprus. She did not condemn the coup and its organisers, did not criticise the Athens junta for its alleged involvement in the coup, did not call for the withdrawal of Greek officers from Cyprus and did not make clear her position on who represented official authority in Cyprus.<sup>1104</sup> It seemed that the United States was ready to accept the new situation in Cyprus. It was reported that U.S. officials felt great relief when they learned of the removal of Makarios.<sup>1105</sup>

State Department Spokesman Robert Anderson refused to comment on the recognition of legal Cypriot regime and avoided criticising any side in the conflict. His statements were far from making the U.S. position clear.<sup>1106</sup> In his meeting with Turkish P.M. Ecevit on 17 July, U.S. ambassador William B. Macomber had the same attitude and concentrated mainly on the possibility of a Greco-Turkish war.<sup>1107</sup> In the United Nations and NATO, U.S. representatives worked rather for softening criticism against the Greek regime and blocking harsh resolutions condemning the coup organisers.<sup>1108</sup> On 18 July the U.S. ambassador to Cyprus, Rodger Davies, received the foreign minister of the new regime, Dimis Dimitrou,

<sup>1104</sup> Campbell, op.cit., p.19, Nikolas A. Stavrou, "Kissinger's Tilt on Cyprus, the New Style of Crisis Diplomacy" in Couloumbis and Hicks (eds.), op.cit., 1975, p.100, Laipson, op.cit., p.69, Polyviou, *Cyprus*, 1980, op.cit., p.156, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.88, K.C. Markides, *the Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*, New Haven, Conn. and London: Yale University Press, 1977, p.180.

<sup>1105</sup> Watanabe, op.cit., pp.90-91, H. Ulman, "Geneva Conferences", *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, Nos.2-3, February 1975, p.50, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., pp.88-89.

<sup>1106</sup> C. Hackett, "Ethnic Politics in Congress: the Turkish Embargo Experience" in A.A. Said (ed.), *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977, p.21, Stern, op.cit., p.112, Polyviou, 1980, op.cit., p.156, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.186.

<sup>1107</sup> Sarica et al., op.cit., p.186.

<sup>1108</sup> Attalides, op.cit., p.171, Stavrou, op.cit., p.101.

at the latter's request. Thus the United States became the only state which established official contact with the short-lived Sampson regime.<sup>1109</sup>

It seems that the main American concern after the Cyprus coup was to prevent the outbreak of a war between Turkey and Greece rather than to restore the status quo in Cyprus.<sup>1110</sup> Americans particularly feared that if they took a stance against the Cyprus coup, the Greek junta regime could be alienated, anti-Western young Greek officers could be encouraged to overthrow it and that thus U.S. strategic interests in Greece including bases could be jeopardised.<sup>1111</sup>

As Kissinger notes in his memoir, many American officials in the State Department and the Secretary of Defence wanted the United States to adopt a stance against the Greek junta and thus accelerate its fall.<sup>1112</sup> But in Kissinger's view, "Turkey's demands left little doubt that it was planning to intervene... the Greek government was unlikely to survive its follies. That made it all the more necessary that the United States not to be seen in Greece as the agent of its humiliation."<sup>1113</sup> Such an American action also could be used by Turks to justify their intervention in Cyprus.<sup>1114</sup> It is difficult to say under these circumstances that U.S. attitude aimed to encourage a Turkish intervention which could cause the loss of Greece for America and could bring unpredicted grave dangers for U.S. interests.

Anyway, the U.S. attitude pleased neither Turks nor Greeks. Turks claimed that if they did not act quickly the United States would recognise the Sampson regime and the fait accompli in Cyprus would be legalised.<sup>1115</sup> The Greek side was of the opinion that the U.S. inactivity against the Cyprus coup gave Turkey a good

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<sup>1109</sup> Stavrou, op.cit., p.101, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.89, Laipson, op.cit., p.69.

<sup>1110</sup> Karpát, "War on Cyprus...", op.cit., p.197.

<sup>1111</sup> J. Reyton's article in *International Herald Tribune* on 18 July 1974 quoted by S. Taşhan, "Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus", *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, Nos.2-3, February 1975, p.172, Markides, *the Rise...*, op.cit., p.180, P. Oberling, *the Road to Bellapais*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, p.161, Stern, op.cit., p.113.

<sup>1112</sup> H. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, London: Weidenfield and Nicolson and Micheal Joseph, 1982, p.1190.

<sup>1113</sup> Ibid., pp. 1190-1191.

<sup>1114</sup> Oberling, op.cit., p.162, Stern, op.cit., p.113.

<sup>1115</sup> Oberling, op.cit., p.162, M.A. Birand, *30 Sıcak Gün*, 4th Edition, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976, p.30.

pretext for its invasion of Cyprus.<sup>1116</sup>

## 7.7 The Turkish Military Intervention in Cyprus

### 7.7.1 The Sisco Mission

The Turkish government publicly announced and informed the USA that the Cyprus coup was an intervention by Greece in Cyprus and that Turkey would not tolerate it.<sup>1117</sup> In its meeting on 15 July, the Turkish National Security Council secretly decided to land armed forces in Cyprus on 20 July.<sup>1118</sup> In order to complete the legal procedure under the Treaty of Guarantee before intervention, Turkish P.M. Bülent Ecevit went to Britain for consultations and proposed to the British a joint military intervention in Cyprus.<sup>1119</sup> The British were of the opinion that peaceful alternatives had not yet been exhausted.

On the night of 17 July 1974, when Ecevit and the British authorities were having talks, U.S. Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco was dispatched by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to defuse the crisis. In Kissinger's words, "Sisco's mission was to help Britain start a negotiating process that might delay a Turkish invasion and enable the structure under Sampson in Cyprus to fall of its own weight."<sup>1120</sup> However, this American move was too little and too late to prevent a Turkish intervention in Cyprus. The Turks at that stage were virtually unstoppable.<sup>1121</sup> The U.S. decision not to condemn the Greek junta's actions and the Cypriot coup had robbed Sisco of much needed leverage in dealing with the Turkish leaders.<sup>1122</sup>

During their meeting in London on 18 July 1974 Sisco assured Ecevit that U.S. military assistance to Turkey, which was reduced during the last weeks as a

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<sup>1116</sup> Stavrou, op.cit., p.101, Polyviou, 1980, op.cit., pp.156-157, Polyviou, 1975, op.cit., p.85, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.89.

<sup>1117</sup> Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.90, Sarica et al., op.cit., pp.180-181.

<sup>1118</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp.188-190, B. Ecevit's statement to Kurtul Altuğ's programme, *Bunalımlı Yıllar*, on Turkish TV, 1993.

<sup>1119</sup> Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.90, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.191, Ü.H. Bayülken, "The Cyprus Question and the United Nations", *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, Nos.2-3, February 1975, pp.119-120, Sarica et al., op.cit., p.186, *Keesing's...*, vol.20, p.26663.

<sup>1120</sup> Kissinger, op.cit., p.1191.

<sup>1121</sup> Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.91.

<sup>1122</sup> Watanabe, op.cit., p.94.



result of American displeasure over Turkey's decision to resume poppy cultivation, would be resumed in full.<sup>1123</sup> But he also warned that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus might cause a bigger war involving Greece and the Soviet Union and that consequently Turkish-American relations might be damaged.<sup>1124</sup> Ecevit reminded Sisco that U.S. prevention of Turkish interventions in the past harmed the U.S. image in Turkey.<sup>1125</sup>

The next day Sisco was in Athens, pressurising the Greek colonels to replace Sampson with a more moderate Greek Cypriot and to withdraw Greek officers from Cyprus.<sup>1126</sup> The Greek authorities offered only to replace rather than withdraw the Greek officers on a phased timetable.<sup>1127</sup> Sisco then flew to Ankara on the same day to inform Ecevit of the Greek answer. Ecevit was determined to initiate the military intervention. He rejected Sisco's demand for a forty-eight hour delay in Turkish operation. Ecevit said: "The United States and Turkey both have made mistakes - the United States by preventing Turkish military action and Turkey by accepting. We should not make the same mistakes again."<sup>1128</sup> At 3.00 a.m. on 20 July 1974 Ecevit informed Sisco of the Turkish intervention: "We have done it your way for ten years, and now we are going to do it our way."<sup>1129</sup>

### 7.7.2 U.S. Ineffectiveness to Prevent the Turkish Intervention

Some critics accused the United States of not being sincere in trying to prevent the Turkish intervention in Cyprus.<sup>1130</sup> They showed statements of Turkish officials as proofs of their claim.<sup>1131</sup> In his press conference on 16 August 1974 Turkish P.M. Ecevit praised the American attitude as being less emotional than Britain's and refraining from taking sides and putting pressures on the parties to the problem.<sup>1132</sup>

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<sup>1123</sup> Birand, op.cit., p.48, Stavrou, op.cit., p.102.

<sup>1124</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.192.

<sup>1125</sup> Birand, op.cit., p.48.

<sup>1126</sup> Salih, *Cyprus*, 1978, op.cit., p.91, H. Şahin, *Gece Gelen Mektup*, İstanbul: Cep Kitapları, 1987, pp.57-59.

<sup>1127</sup> Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.92, Stern, op.cit., pp. 118-119.

<sup>1128</sup> Birand, op.cit., p.64, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.92, Stern, op.cit., p.119.

<sup>1129</sup> Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.93, Stern, op.cit., p.120.

<sup>1130</sup> Polyviou, 1975, op.cit., pp.83, 84, 85, Watanabe, op.cit., p.93.

<sup>1131</sup> Attalides, 1979, op.cit., p.172.

<sup>1132</sup> Watanabe, op.cit., p.119, for another statement of Ecevit see *Cumhuriyet*, 8.9.1974, p.7.

Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş later acknowledged that the United States resorted to diplomatic methods to persuade Turkish rulers not to intervene but did not use any threats because she knew that if she acted on this way she would lose Turkey completely.<sup>1133</sup>

American officials themselves declared that they did not threaten Turkey to deter her from intervening in Cyprus. In his press conference on 22 July 1974, Kissinger said:

I made clear on Saturday in San Clemente [at a July 20 news briefing] that no war would be fought between NATO allies with an open American supply line so this put a limit to the escalation that could be conducted. As to the other steps that were taken, there were no specific threats made. It was very clear that we would consider a continuation of a military confrontation between NATO allies as a very grave matter.

While answering a question he stated that they did not threaten Turkey with cutting off military aid.<sup>1134</sup> On 19 August 1974 Kissinger explained the reasons for this attitude:

We are giving economic and military aid as a reflection of our common interest in the defence of the eastern Mediterranean. Once such a decision is taken, it will have the most dramatic consequences... It was judged that the United States would be both ineffective and counterproductive to threaten the cut off aid. Short of this, however, we made the most repeated and urgent representations to Turkey in order to prevent the military action that happened.<sup>1135</sup>

Allegedly, U.S. officials including Sisco did threaten Turkey with cutting off aid,<sup>1136</sup> but as some authors rightly put it, this was not a sufficient weapon because the flow of aid to Turkey had been reduced to the minimum as a result of budgetary adjustments and Congress's displeasure with the Turkish decision to resume poppy cultivation. Moreover, the Turks were determined not to listen the advice of the United States unlike the 1964 and 1967 crises.<sup>1137</sup> Preventing a

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<sup>1133</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 25.7.1975. In his interview with the author, former Turkish foreign minister Osman Olcay made almost the same comment.

<sup>1134</sup> A.A. Fatouros, "How to Resolve Problems by Refusing to Acknowledge They Exist -Some Legal Parameters of Recent U.S. Policy Toward Greece and Cyprus" in Couloumbis and Hicks (eds.), 1975, op.cit., p.46n, *Milliyet*, 24.7.1974.

<sup>1135</sup> Fatouros, op.cit., pp.34-35, for State Department spokesman Anderson's statement in the same meaning see *Cumhuriyet*, 19.9.1974, p.1.

<sup>1136</sup> Ulman, op.cit., p.50, Salih, 1978, op.cit., p.92.

<sup>1137</sup> Watanabe, op.cit., p.95, Bell, op.cit., p.149, the author's interview with Osman Olcay.

Turkish intervention with threats only would have caused an irreparable damage to U.S.-Turkish relations.<sup>1138</sup>

It was reported that U.S. Ambassador in Athens Henry Tasca urged the Pentagon to deploy the Sixth Fleet to the Mediterranean to discourage Turkey. Secretary of State Kissinger intercepted the message and cabled Tasca that the idea was "hysterical." This would have undermined Turkish-American relations and would have made the United States the supporter of the Sampson regime.<sup>1139</sup> It seems that Kissinger was sure about a Turkish invasion and therefore believed that any American pressure which was brought on the Turks would be counter-productive in terms of wider American strategic interests.<sup>1140</sup> In his own words,

it had become since an article of faith in Turkish politics that this submission to American preferences [in 1964 and 1967] had been unwise and would never be repeated. I thought it was most unlikely that Turkey would tolerate the union of Cyprus with Greece. That Turkey was driving toward a showdown was obvious... We could not without cost resist a Turkish invasion because that would be considered as objectively supporting the Greek junta. In any case, only the threat of American military action could have prevented a Turkish landing on the island; this was an impossibility. My consultations with Congressional leaders produced the unanimous advice that we should not get involved at all. We could not avoid diplomatic engagement in a NATO crisis, but in the last three weeks of Nixon's Presidency we were in no position to make credible threats or credible promises.<sup>1141</sup>

U.S. failure to prevent the Turkish intervention in Cyprus seems to be the most important example of the United States' inability to influence Turkey to act in a certain way. The Americans had not opposed secession of a Cypriot territory (a base) to Turkey and even thought about a controlled invasion of a part of Cyprus by the Turks. However, they certainly did not want an uncontrolled Turkish intervention in Cyprus, which was very likely to lead to a Greco-Turkish war. Therefore, U.S. rulers applied diplomatic pressures, which were eventually unsuccessful, to stop the Turks. But, as was apparent from the events, the Americans were not altogether determined to prevent the Turkish intervention. They had shown the same attitude toward the Greek coup, which weakens the claim that the Turks effectively defied the U.S. influence. The U.S. regime at that time

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<sup>1138</sup> Taslan, op.cit., p.173. Karpas, "War on Cyprus...", op.cit., p.198.

<sup>1139</sup> Markides, 1977, op.cit., p.181, Birand, op.cit., p.58. Karpas, op.cit., pp. 198-199.

<sup>1140</sup> Polyvion, 1980, op.cit., p.156. Stern, op.cit., p.113.

<sup>1141</sup> Kissinger, op.cit., pp. 1190-1191.

was preoccupied with the Watergate scandal and impeachment of the president, so it was not in a powerful position to deter the Turks. Moreover, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus was likely to bring less damage to general U.S. interests than the Turkish alienation by U.S. intervention provided that the USA could prevent a Greco-Turkish war whose possibility was reduced by the Greek unpreparedness.

### 7.7.3 The Turkish Military Intervention In Cyprus

The Turkish naval and aerial landing on Cyprus started at 5.30 a.m. on 20 July 1974.<sup>1142</sup> Turkish authorities announced that they took this action as their legal right under the Cyprus treaties to restore the independence and constitutional order of Cyprus.<sup>1143</sup> On the same day, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 353, which demanded an immediate end to foreign military intervention in Cyprus.<sup>1144</sup>

At that stage the danger of a major war between Greece and Turkey was so acute that American officials concentrated all their efforts on averting this possibility. Joseph Sisco continued his shuttle diplomacy between Athens and Ankara. He and Ambassador Tasca took a very strong stance against the Greek junta's decision to declare war on Turkey.<sup>1145</sup> Secretary of State Kissinger established continuous telephone contact with European leaders and Turkish P.M. Ecevit, urging him to cease fire immediately.<sup>1146</sup> Meanwhile, the Greek army chiefs opposed a war with Turkey, thinking that it would be against interests of Greece, causing the loss of the Aegean islands to Turkey. Their initiative caused the replacement of the Greek junta with a civilian government under the premiership of Constantine Caramanlis on 22 July.<sup>1147</sup> In the evening the Turkish government announced its decision to

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<sup>1142</sup> *Keesing's...* vol.20, pp. 26663-26664.

<sup>1143</sup> Statements of Ecevit and the Turkish government in *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, Nos.2-3, February 1975, pp. 224-227. For opinions defending the Turkish action see also Kamran İnan, "Cyprus, 1974 Crisis", *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, op.cit., p.67, Bayülken, op.cit., p.119. Tanıkoç, *the Turkish Cypriot State*, op.cit., pp.99, 105, Denktash, op.cit., p.68.

<sup>1144</sup> For full text see *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, op.cit., pp. 218-219, *Keesing's...*, vol.20, p.26665.

<sup>1145</sup> Salih, 1978, op.cit., p.93, Stern, op.cit., pp.120-122, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.94, Sarica et al., op.cit., p.198, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.198.

<sup>1146</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.199, Campbell, op.cit., p.20.

<sup>1147</sup> Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.94, Campbell, op.cit., pp.20-21, Salih, op.cit., p.93, Stern, op.cit., p.124, *Keesing's...* vol.20, pp.26666-26668.

agree to a cease-fire.<sup>1148</sup> Subsequently, the puppet Sampson regime in Cyprus collapsed and Glafkos Clerides, the President of the Cyprus House of Representatives, assumed the duties of president.<sup>1149</sup> Clerides was viewed by American officials in Nicosia “as a satisfactory alternative to Makarios, whose political fortunes they thought and/or hoped were finished.”<sup>1150</sup>

There are different views on why Turkey accepted the cease-fire on 22 July. Kissinger claimed in his memoirs: “During the night of July 21-22, we forced a cease-fire by threatening Turkey that we would move nuclear weapons from forward positions - especially where they might be involved in a war with Greece. It stopped Turkish military operations while Turkey was occupying only a small enclave on the island.”<sup>1151</sup> Bölükbaşı disagrees with this claim by noting that the Turkish government accepted the cease-fire only after it secured a bridgehead in Cyprus.<sup>1152</sup> In Birand’s opinion, the main reason for the Turkish decision was the fear that the two superpowers could act together in stopping the Turkish intervention.<sup>1153</sup> In his press conference on 22 July 1974 Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit denied that U.S. pressures brought about the cease-fire: “There has been no pressure from any country. Pressure tactics are and should be out of the question between friendly countries. I had a friendly conversation with Kissinger, whom I have known for a long time. We made joint effort for peace and agreed on the necessity of establishing peace in the region.”<sup>1154</sup> It is, however, almost certain that Turkey stopped its operations before achieving its real aims because of international opposition, especially U.S. opposition.

#### 7.7.4 U.S. Attitude Toward the Turkish Intervention

As U.S. authorities did not condemn the Cyprus coup not to alienate the Greek junta, they showed almost the same attitude toward the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. They did not issue any statement openly denouncing the Turkish

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<sup>1148</sup> Ecevit’s statement quoted by *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, op.cit., pp.228-229.

<sup>1149</sup> Polyviou, 1975, op.cit., p.56, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.95, *Keesing’s*....vol.20, p.26666.

<sup>1150</sup> Laipson, op.cit., p.70.

<sup>1151</sup> Kissinger, op.cit., p.1192.

<sup>1152</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp. 199-200.

<sup>1153</sup> M.A. Birand, *Diyet*, İstanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayınevi, 1979, p.28.

<sup>1154</sup> *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, op.cit., p.229, Sarica et al., op.cit., p.197.

intervention and did not press the Turks to reverse their action.<sup>1155</sup> It was clear that the Turks would not leave Cyprus under any conditions. Given the alienation of Greeks from the USA, pressing the Turks would cause only the loss of another strategic ally in the eastern Mediterranean. The only thing which could be done was to contain the Turkish action within limits acceptable to Greeks.<sup>1156</sup>

Kissinger was opposed to taking forceful actions against Turkey because the crisis had been started by Greece, taking a one-sided position would prevent the USA from easing the conflict between two strategic allies in the eastern Mediterranean and the U.S. government which was on the verge of the collapse was not in a position to take such actions. "The preoccupation with Watergate had reached a point where we were losing even the ability to transmit papers bearing on vital foreign policy matters... between the president and the White House."<sup>1157</sup>

## 7.8 The Geneva Conferences

The first Geneva conference on the Cyprus crisis was held between 25 and 30 July 1974 and was attended by the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and Britain; Turan Güneş, George Mavros and James Callaghan. The United States sent to the conference a special representative, Assistant Secretary of State William Baffum.<sup>1158</sup> The joint declaration issued at the end of the conference, on 30 July 1974,<sup>1159</sup> was seen by the Turks as supporting their viewpoint.<sup>1160</sup>

The Second Geneva conference was held between 8 and 14 August and was also attended by Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and Greek Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides. The Turkish side proposed a federal system based on the geographical separation of the two ethnic communities in Cyprus.<sup>1161</sup> When the Greek

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<sup>1155</sup> Polyviou, 1975, op.cit., p.86, Watanabe, op.cit., p.97.

<sup>1156</sup> Oberling, op.cit., pp. 169-170, Ulman, op.cit., p.50. Kamran İnan (former Turkish MP and diplomat) and Seyfi Taşhan (Turkish academic) told the author that America's position favoured the Turkish side.

<sup>1157</sup> Kissinger, op.cit., pp. 1191-1192.

<sup>1158</sup> For a detailed account of the conference see Ulman, op.cit., pp.52-59.

<sup>1159</sup> For the text of the declaration see *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, op.cit., pp. 230-232, *Keesing's...* vol.20, p.26709.

<sup>1160</sup> Ulman, op.cit., p.47, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.201.

<sup>1161</sup> Ulman, op.cit., pp.60-61. Former Turkish foreign minister Ü.H. Bayülken told the author that new conditions compelled Turkey not to bring the former regime which was required by the treaties on

delegation rejected the proposal, Kissinger persuaded Turkish P.M. Ecevit to put a cantonal system proposal on the table.<sup>1162</sup> The new Turkish proposal which suggested establishment of six autonomous Turkish region covering 34 percent of Cyprus, too, was rejected by Greeks.<sup>1163</sup> Allegedly, on 13 August, Callaghan informed the Greek delegation that Kissinger could not exert any further pressure on Turkey to prevent a further Turkish expansion in Cyprus unless the Greeks accepted the Turkish proposal as the basis of negotiations.<sup>1164</sup> Believing that the Greeks were employing delaying tactics and their position in Cyprus was deteriorating, on 13 August, the Turks demanded an immediate yes-or-no answer to their proposals. With the Turkish rejection of the Greek demand of 36 hours to answer, the negotiations broke down.<sup>1165</sup>

Toward the end of the second Geneva conference the American attitude seemed increasingly favouring the Turkish position. The Turkish cantonal proposal contained heavy inputs from the Americans and apparently gained their support. The State Department's statement on 13 August also implied the U.S. support for Turkish position:

U.S. position is as follows: we recognise that the position of the Turkish community in Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them. The parties are negotiating on one or more Turkish autonomous areas. The avenues of diplomacy have not been exhausted and therefore the United States would consider a resort to military action unjustified. We have made this clear to all parties.<sup>1166</sup>

Turkey's strategic importance for U.S. interests played a crucial role in this U.S. attitude.<sup>1167</sup>

In Ecevit's account, the Turkish side made a further interim proposal to prevent the breakdown of the conference: If the Greeks would agree in principle to the Turks' basic demand for a cantonal or bizonal system, and to the establishment

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Cyprus.

<sup>1162</sup> Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., p.27, Ulman, op.cit., p.62.

<sup>1163</sup> Ulman, op.cit., p.63, Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., p.29, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.205.

<sup>1164</sup> Polyviou, 1980, op.cit., pp. 175-176.

<sup>1165</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp. 206-207, Ulman, op.cit., pp.59-60, 64, Denktash, op.cit., p.73, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.97, *Keesing's*.... vol.20, pp. 26709-26710.

<sup>1166</sup> Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., pp.96-97, Polyviou, 1980, op.cit., p.181.

<sup>1167</sup> Campbell, op.cit., p.22, Stern, op.cit., p.130.

of a buffer zone around the area held by the Turkish Armed Forces (the area to include a line from Nicosia to Kyrenia and to the Turkish part of Famagusta), and to the immediate withdrawal of their forces in 17-18 percent area of the island to be handed over to Turkish Cypriot administration, Turkey would not place troops there while negotiations were in progress and she would wait for the boundaries of other cantons to be fixed. If the Greeks had accepted this proposal and evacuated their troops from the region Turkish rulers would have been prepared to wait not 36 hours but 36 days before taking further action. Kissinger liked the idea and tried to sell it to the other side. But Callaghan's negative attitude prevented the success of the plan.<sup>1168</sup>

Apart from Callaghan's attitude and the U.S. failure to exert heavy pressure on the Turks,<sup>1169</sup> the incompatibility of Turkish and Greek demands and the Turkish determination to strengthen their position in Cyprus with further military operations<sup>1170</sup> played a role in the breakdown of the Geneva talks. By the end of 13 August, the Turks had realised that the negotiations would bring no favourable results and that if they did not act swiftly international public opinion would totally turn against them and they would have to be content with the seven percent of Cyprus.

## 7.9 The Second Turkish Intervention and U.S. Attitude

Accusing the Greek side of intentionally obstructing a peaceful solution and violating security of Turkish Cypriot people, the Turkish government resumed its military operations in Cyprus on 14 August.<sup>1171</sup> By 16 August, the Turkish forces had captured 36 percent of the territory of Cyprus, displacing thousands of Cypriot people.<sup>1172</sup>

As a reaction to the new development, the United States announced that if Turkey and Greece fought with each other it would cut off its military aid and arms

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<sup>1168</sup> Ecevit's letter to Denktash quoted in Denktash, op.cit., pp. 369-373.

<sup>1169</sup> Campbell, op.cit., pp.21-22. Polyviou, 1980, op.cit., p.199.

<sup>1170</sup> Campbell, op.cit., p.21. Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.207.

<sup>1171</sup> Sarica et al., op.cit., pp. 207-208, Ecevit's statement in Bayülken, op.cit., p.122, the Turkish government's statement in *Foreign Policy*, vol.4, op.cit., pp. 233-234, *Keesing's...*, vol.20, p.26710.

<sup>1172</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.211.



sales to both countries,<sup>1173</sup> but did not explicitly condemn the Turkish action.<sup>1174</sup> It seemed to be happy with the geographical separation of Cypriot communities with the Turkish action.<sup>1175</sup> Kissinger reportedly stated that the United States would not resort to forceful actions to intervene in the matter because she was not the policeman of the world.<sup>1176</sup> Only Secretary of Defence Schlesinger criticised the Turks by saying that their action went beyond what any of its friends would have accepted. He raised the possibility of an aid cut-off and the return of some of the Cyprus territory which the Turks had captured.<sup>1177</sup>

It should be noted that at that time American officials were preoccupied with the resignation of President Nixon and the change of the administration. The only thing which Kissinger could do was to recommend immediate resumption of talks between the concerned parties and to offer his services as mediator.<sup>1178</sup> U.S. strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean led American officials to try to remove Cyprus as a source of friction in the region by forcing both sides to compromise rather than condemning only one side.<sup>1179</sup>

Meanwhile, the U.S. failure to stop the Turkish intervention alienated the Greeks greatly.<sup>1180</sup> On 14 August 1974 the Greek government withdrew from the military area of NATO.<sup>1181</sup> In the anti-American demonstration in Nicosia on 19 August, U.S. Ambassador Rodger Davies was killed.<sup>1182</sup> Greek Americans arranged large demonstrations in front of the White House.<sup>1183</sup>

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<sup>1173</sup> Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., p.39.

<sup>1174</sup> Polyviou, 1980, op.cit., p.201, Polyviou, 1975, op.cit., p.87.

<sup>1175</sup> Attalides, 1979, op.cit., p.176, Polyviou, 1975, op.cit., pp.195-196n.

<sup>1176</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 22 August 1974, p.1.

<sup>1177</sup> Ibid., 19 August 1974. T.M. Franck and E. Weisband, *Foreign Policy by Congress*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, p.36, Attalides, 1979, op.cit., p.177.

<sup>1178</sup> Salih, 1978, op.cit., pp.97-98.

<sup>1179</sup> V. Confoudakis, "United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question" in Attalides (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed*, op.cit., p.131, Bell, *Diplomacy of Detente*, op.cit., p.153.

<sup>1180</sup> Oberling, op.cit., p.182, Z. Stavrinides, *the Cyprus Conflict*, Loris Stavrinides Press, 1976, p.92.

<sup>1181</sup> Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.97, Salih, 1978, op.cit., p.98, *Keesing's...*, vol.20, p.26710.

<sup>1182</sup> Salih, 1978, op.cit., p.98, *Keesing's...*, vol.20, p.26753.

<sup>1183</sup> Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.98.

## 7.10 The Arms Embargo and Turkish-American Relations

### 7.10.1 Imposition of the Arms Embargo

On 15 August 1974, a delegation of Greek-American congressmen led by Representative John Brademas visited Secretary of State Kissinger. They blamed him for the U.S. failure to stop the Turkish intervention and requested that the administration cut off its military assistance to Turkey until its troops were withdrawn from Cyprus.<sup>1184</sup> In Kissinger's eyes, the intervention of the Greek-American Congressmen who were merely instruments of the Greek foreign office in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy could not be accepted.<sup>1185</sup> He largely blamed Callaghan for the failure of the second Geneva conference and claimed that the USA was doing enough to restrain the Turks.<sup>1186</sup>

At a news conference on 19 August 1974 Kissinger promised to get expert opinion about the legality of Turkish use of U.S.-supplied military equipment in Cyprus.<sup>1187</sup> Although the administration kept the result of a legal team's study on the matter secret from the public,<sup>1188</sup> it leaked it to Senator Thomas Eagleton through his aide Brian Adwood. The legal memo concluded that by no stretch of the statutes or the legal imagination of the State Department's attorneys could military aid to Turkey be continued.<sup>1189</sup> Subsequently, some congressmen decided to plunge into battle with the administration on the issue of law and order in the context of the legality of U.S. aid to Turkey.

In spite of Kissinger's warnings that cutting off aid to Turkey could jeopardise U.S. interests and bases in Turkey,<sup>1190</sup> the U.S. Congress passed a series of resolu-

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<sup>1184</sup> Stern, op.cit., pp.140-141. Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., pp.42-43.

<sup>1185</sup> K.R. Legg, "Congress as Trojan Horse, the Turkish Embargo Problem, 1974-1978" in J. Spanier and J. Hogee (eds.), *Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign Policy*, New York: Pergaman Press, 1981, p.117, Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., p.41.

<sup>1186</sup> Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., p.42. Stern, op.cit., p.141.

<sup>1187</sup> Hackett, op.cit., p.23. Legg, op.cit., p.117.

<sup>1188</sup> E.B. Laipson, *Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1981, p.14, Fatouros, op.cit., p.35.

<sup>1189</sup> Stern, op.cit., pp. 143-144. Laipson, 1981, op.cit., p.14.

<sup>1190</sup> Kissinger's meeting with some congressmen on 19 September 1974 in Stern, op.cit., p.145. Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., p.56, Laipson, 1981, op.cit., p.19, Hackett, op.cit., pp.22-23.

tions requesting the President to stop arms sales to Turkey.<sup>1191</sup> Initially President Ford vetoed such bills but the strong support for the embargo in Congress forced him to sign a resolution banning U.S. assistance to Turkey from 5 February 1975 if she did not make concessions in the Cyprus issue. Turks seemed to be willing to soften their attitude in Cyprus. They accepted the U.N. General Assembly resolution on 1 November 1974 and decided to reduce the number of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus. But the disagreement between the coalition partners on the Cyprus issue resulted in resignation of the government on 19 September 1974.<sup>1192</sup> After both Bülent Ecevit and Süleyman Demirel had been unable to form a new government, President Korutürk asked Sadi Irmak to do so. Irmak's cabinet of mostly independent senators and technocrats was announced on 17 November but failed to gain a vote of confidence. Nevertheless, at this difficult time Irmak remained Prime Minister until 31 March 1975 when he was succeeded by Demirel, who led a "national front" coalition.

On 5 February 1975 the Congress's embargo action came into effect. Deliveries for over 200 million dollars in arms purchases and grants which had been scheduled for transfer to Turkey was frozen.<sup>1193</sup> The ban included 78 million dollars worth of equipment already paid for.<sup>1194</sup> Turks harshly condemned the action and declared that U.S. pressures would not affect their Cyprus policy.<sup>1195</sup>

In the aftermath of the embargo resolution, U.S. authorities stated that they supported political negotiations between the sides of the Cyprus conflict<sup>1196</sup> and pressed Turks to make territorial concessions in Cyprus if they wanted to reverse the embargo.<sup>1197</sup> When the House of Representatives defeated the partial lifting of the embargo on 24 July 1975, the Turkish government announced that the Defence Cooperation Agreement of 1969 and all other related agreements between the

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<sup>1191</sup> For the Congress actions on the Turkish arms embargo see T.A. Couloumbis and S.M. Hicks, "the Impact of Greek Americans Upon United States Foreign Policy" in Attalides(ed.), op.cit., pp. 165-171, *Keesing's*..., 1975, vol.21, p.26886.

<sup>1192</sup> Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., pp.79, 81-82, *Keesing's*..., vol.21, pp. 26885-26886.

<sup>1193</sup> Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.105.

<sup>1194</sup> Legg, op.cit., p.121.

<sup>1195</sup> Statements of the Turkish Prime Minister and NSC in Polyviou, 1975, op.cit., pp.210-211, Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., p.100.

<sup>1196</sup> The State Department's statement in Salih, *Cyprus*, 1978, op.cit., p.186n.

<sup>1197</sup> Kissinger's meetings with Turkish rulers in the first half of 1975 in Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., pp. 118-128.

United States and Turkey had lost their legal validity.<sup>1198</sup> The Congress decision to lift the embargo partially in October 1975<sup>1199</sup> did not impress Turks. They did not terminate suspension measures in bases until the complete lifting of the embargo in September 1978.<sup>1200</sup>

#### 7.10.2 Arguments of the U.S. Congress on the Arms Embargo

In the eyes of U.S. congressmen, the second Turkish military operation in Cyprus was an unacceptable aggressive act whereas its first action could be justified as a defensive act aimed at protecting lives of Turkish Cypriots and restoring the status quo in the island.<sup>1201</sup> Their main argument for imposing an embargo on Turkey was that Turkey used in its military operations in Cyprus U.S. arms and military equipment contrary to the American law and the provisions of the agreements under which these arms had been granted or sold to it.<sup>1202</sup> They also reasoned that an arms embargo was necessary to force Turkey to make concessions to the Greek side and thus to accelerate the process of finding a peaceful settlement to the Cyprus question. Failing to do so would mean rewarding the Turkish aggression and allowing the Turks to dictate their solution of the Cyprus problem by the force of arms.<sup>1203</sup> Even George Ball and Cyrus Vance, the former American mediators on the Cyprus question, testified in favour of retaining the linkage between Turkey's security assistance program and demonstrated progress on Cyprus.<sup>1204</sup> The pro-embargo forces also claimed that failing to impose the embargo would alienate Greece, a strategically vital ally of the United States.<sup>1205</sup>

However, the main reasons of congressmen for opposing the American admin-

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<sup>1198</sup> Ibid., p.175, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.151, *Cumhuriyet*, 26 July 1975, *Keesing's...*, vol.21, p.27337.

<sup>1199</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.21, p.27450.

<sup>1200</sup> Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.106.

<sup>1201</sup> Congressman D. Riegle's statement quoted by Watanabe, op.cit., p.100, see also Hackett, op.cit., p.25.

<sup>1202</sup> Couloumbis and Hicks, "the Impact of Greek Americans...", op.cit., p.146, Couloumbis, 1983, op.cit., p.104.

<sup>1203</sup> R.F. Grimmett, *Turkish-U.S. Defense Relationship: the Arms Embargo Issue*, the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1978, p.4, Representative B. Rosenthal's statement in Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp.216-217.

<sup>1204</sup> Laipson, "Cyprus; a Quarter Century of U.S. Diplomacy", op.cit., p.73.

<sup>1205</sup> Rosenthal's statement in Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.217.

istration on the embargo issue stemmed from the uneasy relationship between the legislative and executive branches. The American policies toward Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, the Soviet Union and Pakistan had caused the gradual loss of Congressional confidence in the practices of the administration. As the years passed, Congress became more and more suspicious of the motives and practices of the executive branch. Finally the Watergate scandal resulted in an almost complete breakdown of Congressional trust in the Presidency. In the eyes of congressmen, the American administration had become a body which did not care about the rule of law and the power of Congress. Congressmen believed that they had to give a lesson to the executive branch to break its arrogance. The Cyprus issue simply provided this opportunity.<sup>1206</sup> The opposition to Kissinger as a former member of the now discredited Nixon administration, too, played an important role in the Congress's insistence on the arms embargo.<sup>1207</sup> The Turkish embargo issue offered an opportunity for Kissinger's congressional critics to question some major tenets of his domestic and foreign policies, his methods and his style of careful manipulation of Congress and public opinion.

For many congressmen, to work for imposing an arms embargo on Turkey was a part of the struggle to have a greater voice and control in foreign affairs. In reality what Congress challenged was the strong executive dominance over the foreign policy process.<sup>1208</sup> For some Congressmen who were highly critical of the Turkish government's decision to resume poppy cultivation, the arms embargo was a good opportunity to express their disapproval over the Turkish decision and punish Turkey.

### 7.10.3 Arguments of the U.S. Administration on the Embargo

The arguments of anti-embargo forces, the American administration and some congressmen, could be summarised as follows:<sup>1209</sup> Firstly, putting pressure on only

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<sup>1206</sup> R.E. Campany. *Turkey and the United States*, New York: Praeger, 1986, p.78, Laipson, "Cyprus...", op.cit., p.71, Laipson, *Congressional-Executive Relations...*, op.cit., p.30.

<sup>1207</sup> Laipson. *Congressional-Executive...*, op.cit., p.29.

<sup>1208</sup> Campany. op.cit., p.78.

<sup>1209</sup> Statements of President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger, the Senate majority leader and State Department spokesman Anderson in Watanabe, op.cit., pp.107, 109, Salih, 1978, op.cit., pp.100-101, 187n, Polyviou. *Cyprus*, 1975. op.cit., p.211, Kissinger, op.cit., p.1192, Stern, *the Wrong*

one side in a complicated problem would not help its solution. Imposing an arms embargo on Turkey would be destructive to U.S. efforts to bring about a peaceful solution the Cyprus question by rendering the proud and independent-minded Turks less flexible on future Cyprus negotiations.<sup>1210</sup> Secondly, the embargo would cause alienation of Turkey, whose strategic importance was vital to NATO and Western security designs. The United States might lose its strategic military and communication facilities in Turkey and the American position in the strategic eastern Mediterranean region might weaken.

Thirdly, the arms embargo was an act of Congress which represented an abuse of congressional authority in foreign policy and violated the principle of separation of power in the state structure. Foreign policy making and its tactical (day-to-day) applications were largely the prerogative of the administration. Congress's excessive involvement in the example of the arms embargo restricted the administration's executive capabilities in protecting U.S. interests. While imposing an arms embargo against Turkey, congressmen could not take a responsible, statesmanlike posture in an important issue because they were influenced and manipulated by an agitated group of politically active Greek Americans.<sup>1211</sup>

Finally, apparently to prompt the opposition of the mighty Israeli lobby, the American administration claimed that an arms embargo against Turkey could also hurt Israel. Israel, too, might be caught by a strict interpretation of the non-defensive use provisions of the law because Israel had used American weapons in its struggle against the Arabs.<sup>1212</sup> Moreover, the U.S. bases in Turkey, which were threatened by the arms embargo, were important for Israel's defence.<sup>1213</sup>

#### 7.10.4 Role of Greek Americans in the Imposition of the Embargo

The Greek Orthodox Church in North America was very active in communicating a deep concern over Cyprus to its members and in activating Greek American

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*Horse*, op.cit., p.152, Grinnett, op.cit., p.4, *Keesing's...*, vol.21, pp.27035. 27337.

<sup>1210</sup> Coulombis, 1983, op.cit., p.105.

<sup>1211</sup> Laipson, *Congressional-Executive Relations...*, op.cit., p.30.

<sup>1212</sup> Hackett, op.cit., p.26, Legg, op.cit., p.118, Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., p.70.

<sup>1213</sup> Hackett, op.cit., p.26.

population to force American officials and legislators for anti-Turkish actions.<sup>1214</sup> The expected role of the Orthodox Church on the arms embargo was so great that in October 1974 Ford and Kissinger met with Archbishop Iakovos in the Oval Office in order to persuade him to calm his community.<sup>1215</sup> Greek American lobby groups, too, played a crucial role in activating the Greek-American population and putting pressure on congressmen and the American administration on the arms embargo issue.<sup>1216</sup>

It seems that congressmen were influenced by the efforts of Greek Americans in their votes on the embargo issue because they wanted to secure the support of Greek Americans in the approaching congressional elections in November 1974.<sup>1217</sup> No congressmen would like the agitated Greek-American groups, which constituted a politically and socially activated segment of the U.S. population, lobbying against him. Many congressmen would incline toward accommodating such an important ethnic group in a symbolic vote.<sup>1218</sup> But it should be noted that in the embargo issue congressmen were also affected by other factors which were mentioned above and they used efforts of Greek-Americans for their own political aims.<sup>1219</sup>

Whatever its reasons were, the arms embargo was the most important action of the United States after the Johnson letter to force Turkey to act in a certain way. The Turks felt the negative consequences of the embargo but they did not change their policies toward Cyprus. The U.S. administration's opposition to the embargo might have played a role in this Turkish attitude. But it is also a fact that U.S. officials asked the Turks to make concessions in Cyprus to help the lifting of the embargo. The Turkish reaction was to suspend U.S. activities in military bases in Turkey rather than yield to U.S. pressures.

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<sup>1214</sup> Couloumbis and Hicks, **"the Impact of Greek Americans Upon United States Foreign Policy"**, op.cit., p.152, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.214.

<sup>1215</sup> Couloumbis and Hicks, op.cit., p.155.

<sup>1216</sup> Ibid., pp.162-163, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp.214-215, Legg, op.cit., pp.117, 120, Hackett, op.cit., p.29.

<sup>1217</sup> Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp. 215-216, Legg, op.cit., p.118.

<sup>1218</sup> Hackett, op.cit., p.29.

<sup>1219</sup> Couloumbis and Hicks, op.cit., p.174, Laipson, *Congressional-Executive Relations...*, op.cit., p.5.

### 7.10.5 Arguments of Turkish Rulers Against the Embargo

Firstly, Turkish authorities claimed that their military operations in Cyprus were just and in conformity with international law and agreements and that therefore the arms embargo which aimed at punishing Turkey for its Cyprus action was unjust. Secondly, Turkish authorities argued that the arms embargo was an obstacle to the negotiation process on Cyprus in many ways: 1- It encouraged the uncompromising attitude of the Greek side. 2- It brought Turkey under psychological pressure. If she made concessions in this situation she would seem yielding under U.S. pressure.<sup>1220</sup> 3- The embargo changed the balance between the positions of the two sides by putting pressure on only one side and thus it undermined the peace negotiations from the outset.<sup>1221</sup>

Thirdly, Turkish rulers always stressed that the Cyprus question and the bilateral defence cooperation between Turkey and the United States were separate issues and could not be linked with each other.<sup>1222</sup> Fourthly, they pointed out that the supply of American arms to Turkey was not a favour but an essential obligation under a military defence alliance.<sup>1223</sup> Fifthly, Turkish authorities argued that the arms embargo would harm the NATO defence system by causing the destruction of its southeastern flank and the weakening one of its members.<sup>1224</sup> Sixthly, they warned that the arms embargo could cause the total breakdown of U.S.-Turkish relations. Finally, Turkish officials claimed that the arms embargo was a discriminatory act of the United State toward Turkey because she did not apply the same U.S. laws against other countries such as Greece and Cyprus, which used U.S.-supplied military equipment for non-defensive purposes.<sup>1225</sup>

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<sup>1220</sup> Speeches of the Turkish foreign ministers, Turan Güneş and Melih Esenbel, in Turkish Parliament in *Cumhuriyet*, 26.10.1974, p.1, 18.12.1974, p.7.

<sup>1221</sup> Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel, *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi (MMTD)*, 21.2.1975, term 4, sess.2, vol.9, pp.459-460, the author's interview with Osman Olcay.

<sup>1222</sup> Turkish P.M. Demirel's talk to Kissinger in Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., p.124, Grimmett, op.cit., p.2, M. Esenbel, *MMTD*, 21.2.1975, op.cit., pp.459-460, Foreign Minister İ.S. Çağlayangil, *MMTD*, 12.6.1975, term 4, sess.2, vol.12, p.579.

<sup>1223</sup> Esenbel, *MMTD*, 21.2.1975, op.cit., p.460, Turkish P.M. Sadi Irmak's statement to journalists in *Cumhuriyet*, 4.2.1975, p.7, Turkey's National Security Council's statement in *Cumhuriyet*, 17.6.1975, p.9.

<sup>1224</sup> Turkish P.M. Demirel's talk with President Ford in Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., p.126.

<sup>1225</sup> Turkish Defence Minister Hasan Işık's statement on the Turkish TV in *Cumhuriyet*, 27.9.1974, Turkish P.M. Demirel's talk with Kissinger in Birand, *Diyet*, op.cit., p.182.



#### 7.10.6 Turkish Public's Reaction to the Intervention and Embargo

Some Turkish people, especially leftist ones, believed that the Cyprus coup was a plot organised under the auspices of the United States.<sup>1226</sup> In their opinion, the United States expected that the Cyprus coup would solve the chronic Cyprus problem to her advantage by removing anti-American Makarios and unifying Cyprus with pro-American Greece. They also alleged that the Americans predicted that Turkish P.M. Bülent Ecevit with anti-American and leftist inclinations would not be able to resist the Cyprus coup, and thus he would lose his credibility at home and would be replaced by a more pro-American politician.

The Turkish military intervention in Cyprus received unanimous support from Turkish public opinion. There was no other issue, domestic or foreign, on which there was such unanimity in Turkey. All Turkish major parties and the domestic press supported the Turkish military action. There were no MPs and no editorials in any major newspapers and magazines criticising the move and calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. Turkish public opinion unanimously condemned the arms embargo as an anti-Turkish move and deplored the use of arms supplies as a tool to exert influence on Turkish policy. Nobody suggested withdrawing from Cyprus or making any compromise.<sup>1227</sup> Even the Turkish armed forces, which were the most affected element of the Turkish political structure by the arms embargo, did not favour any concessions under the American pressure. Only a small group of leftist radicals, intellectual Marxists, opposed Turkey's military intervention because they felt that Turkey was acting as an imperialist state.<sup>1228</sup>

#### 7.11 Conclusion

The Cyprus question was a test of the U.S.-Turkish alliance in a matter which did not the concern common security interests that constituted the basis of the alliance. The problem mainly concerned Turkish national interests and foreign

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<sup>1226</sup> Birand, *30 Sıcak Gün*, op.cit., pp.30, 80, in *Cumhuriyet*: Oktay Akbal, "Paylaşmaya Doğru mu?", 20.7.1974, İlhan Selçuk, "Pencere", 24.7.1974 p.2, Ali Sirmen "Dünyada Bugün", 26.7.1974, p.3.

<sup>1227</sup> Discussions in Parliament, *MMTD*, 20.2.1975, term 4, sess.2, vol.9. pp.367-372, 21.2.1975. ibid., pp.444-457.

<sup>1228</sup> Campany, op.cit., pp.52-53.

policy. The United States interested in the development of the matter because of global, strategic interests and policies, stemmed from being a superpower. This proves that the U.S.-Turkish relationship was a small-big state relationship. Turkey would not advise or try to influence the United States in its policy toward Vietnam.

The Johnson letter in 1964 had claimed that Turkish rulers had the commitment to consult with the U.S. administration before taking any action in Cyprus. In fact, Turkish authorities always complied with this advice by informing the Americans on their action on Cyprus before initiating them. This situation gives the impression that the U.S.-Turkish alliance bore some characteristics of the patron-client relationship. But it is also related to the Turkish perception that close allies should consult with each other in every matter concerning each state. Another reason for this attitude might be Turkish rulers' intention to use U.S. opposition to appease agitated public opinion.

It is not true, as some Turks had claimed, that the United States was particularly opposed to the Turkish cause on Cyprus and supported the Greek side. She was mainly concerned with her own interests while reacting to developments in the Cyprus question. When she thought that pressuring Turkey was necessary she did not hesitate to act in this way. U.S. pressures on Turkey before 1965 were really heavy and forced the Turks to abandon their proposed intervention in Cyprus. However, the Americans also had to consider the possibility of losing Turkey's alliance. Therefore, they did not take direct forceful actions such as the active involvement of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in stopping Turkish ships. They also acted more cautiously after 1964 not to alienate the Turks, seeing the severe official Turkish response and the anti-Americanism among Turkish people. Turkey could threaten to leave NATO in the face U.S. pressures, but had to consider the consequences of her action. She certainly did not wish to be left alone against the Soviet threat; she needed U.S. and NATO support for her security, and she did not want to weaken her position on Cyprus by losing all Western sympathy and understanding.

The U.S. attitude toward the Cyprus problem before 1965 led Turkish rulers to be more cautious in their relations with the USA, suspecting that their interests could be adversely affected by U.S. actions. It also inspired the Turks to have

a more independent and flexible foreign policy by improving relations with the Eastern bloc, the Third World and neighbouring countries. So both the U.S.-Turkish alliance and Turkish foreign policy were affected by developments in the Cyprus question.

The Americans managed to prevent Turkish intervention in Cyprus in November 1967. However, this time they took great care not to antagonise the Turks. Their influence was not too heavy at that time. But at the end the Americans achieved their objective of preventing Turkish intervention.

In 1974 the United States failed to prevent the Turkish intervention in Cyprus. Its influence apparently did not work this time. But the Americans were not too determined in this direction. Turkey's strategic importance for U.S. interests played a role in this attitude. The weakness of the U.S. government because of Watergate was another factor. The Turks were not entirely free in their actions in Cyprus because of U.S. pressures and opposition. They stopped their first intervention before achieving their original aims and after capturing 36 percent of Cyprus faced the punishment of the U.S. congress (the embargo and later conditioning of U.S. assistance) whose effects have continued up to now. The embargo did not succeed in forcing the Turks to change their Cyprus policies radically but affected their future defence policies and increased their isolation in the international arena. The suspension of U.S. activities in Turkish bases was Turkey's proof that she was not a satellite of the USA.

## **Chapter VIII**

### **THE OPIUM ISSUE AND TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS**

The opium controversy between the United States and Turkey broke out as a result of the American administration's campaign against the drug addiction problem among American youth. U.S. rulers made great efforts to persuade Turkey to decrease its opium production and even to ban it completely. Turkey's failure to fulfil American demands satisfactorily because of domestic reasons made the issue one of the most important matters of Turkish-American relations at the end of the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s. The opium question was a matter outside the formal defence alliance between the two countries but touched the feelings of both American and Turkish people. Like the Cyprus question, it would have been a test of the Turkish-American alliance in a matter which did not concern common strategic interests. However, the issue was forestalled by the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 and ceased to be an important matter after the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey because of her actions in Cyprus and the Turkish government took effective measures preventing Turkish opium from falling into illicit hands.

#### **8.1 The Opium Issue Before the Nixon Administration**

##### **8.1.1 The Period Before 1960**

Opium had been grown by Turkish peasants in Anatolia for centuries. Turkey had long been a major exporter of opium for the licit medicinal market. The first contact between Turkey and the United States involving opium occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century. When the British East India Company forbade its ships to carry opium to China in 1805, American ships moved into the opium trade from Turkey to China and held a monopoly of it for fifteen years to

the extent that one Chinese official in Canton thought that Turkey was a part of the United States.<sup>1229</sup>

In the early 1900s the growing concern for drug addiction at home and the dislike for the dirty trade abroad led American officials to take up the opium issue in the international arena. The United States played a leading role in convening an international opium commission in Shanghai in 1909<sup>1230</sup> and in drawing up The Hague International Opium Convention in 1912.<sup>1231</sup> In 1923 the American Consul General in Istanbul suggested that Turkey could be persuaded to eliminate opium production if a suitable crop such as silk could be substituted for poppy.<sup>1232</sup> The memorandum of the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Joseph C. Grew, on his farewell conversation with the Turkish foreign minister on 29 February 1932 stated: "I observed that there was still one unfortunate element which could exact an adverse effect on relations; namely the continued clandestine traffic in narcotics from Turkey to the United States."<sup>1233</sup>

In spite of her dislike for the League of Nations, the United States cooperated with the League's Advisory Committee on the Traffic of Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs and participated actively in preparation of a draft convention focusing primarily on controlling opium at its source.<sup>1234</sup> The American Congress's Joint Resolution No. 241 which was approved by the President on 1 July 1944 (Public Law 400, 78th Congress) urged all poppy-growing nations to enter into an international agreement to reduce the production of opium to the medical and scientific needs of the world.<sup>1235</sup>

Turkey adhered to the League of Nations convention to control the production and sale of narcotics in 1932 and made the production and marketing of opium a

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<sup>1229</sup> J.W. Spain. "the United States, Turkey and the Poppy", *Middle East Journal*. Summer 1975, vol.29, No.3, p.295.

<sup>1230</sup> Ibid., p.296. H.R. Wellman, "Drug Abuse: A Challenge to U.S.-Turkish Cooperation in the Seventies", *Department of State Bulletin*. vol.64, 1 February 1971, p.142.

<sup>1231</sup> Spain, op.cit., p.296, Wellman, op.cit., p.143.

<sup>1232</sup> Spain, op.cit., pp. 296-297.

<sup>1233</sup> Ibid., p.297.

<sup>1234</sup> Ibid., p.297.

<sup>1235</sup> J.L. Zentner. "The 1972 Turkish Opium Ban: Needle in the Haystack Diplomacy". *World Affairs*, vol.136, Summer 1973, p.37.

state monopoly in 1933.<sup>1236</sup> According to the information which was given by a Turkish official to Harvey R. Wellman, the Special Assistant for Narcotic Matters to the U.S. Secretary of State in 1971, Turkish President Kemal Atatürk as early as 1937 advocated the replacement of the cultivation of opium by sugarbeets because he was concerned that Turkish opium was circulating as a poison in the world.<sup>1237</sup> On 14 May 1945 the İnönü government explained Turkey's position that opium production should be restricted to a few countries including Turkey. It also gave assurances that Turkey would consent to every limitation of production which might be contemplated under equal conditions for all producers.<sup>1238</sup>

After the Second World War the United States played the leading role in international efforts to control production and marketing of narcotic drugs. In 1953 the Opium Protocol was signed under United Nations auspices, limiting the authorisation to produce opium for export to seven named producers, including Turkey.<sup>1239</sup> Both Turkey and the United States signed and ratified the protocol. In the same year Turkey licensed the opium-growing farmers for the first time and made the opium production and exportation the responsibility of the Turkish Soil Products Office.<sup>1240</sup>

In 1958 42 of Turkey's 67 provinces were growing opium which contained the highest raw morphine in the world. U.S. Secretary of State Christian B. Herter was informed at that time that too much Turkish opium was entering the illicit traffic and that therefore Turkey should begin seriously to control its production.<sup>1241</sup> During a CENTO meeting in Washington in 1959, reportedly Herter and CIA Director Dulles asked Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to prohibit opium cultivation in Turkey but Menderes strongly rejected their demand and proposed that Turkey and the USA should establish an opium industry in Turkey together and build a joint opium factory whose products would be sold to Europe.<sup>1242</sup>

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<sup>1236</sup> Ibid., p.38, G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p.191.

<sup>1237</sup> Wellman, op.cit., p.144.

<sup>1238</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.191.

<sup>1239</sup> Wellman, op.cit., p.143, Zentner, op.cit., p.37.

<sup>1240</sup> Zentner, op.cit., p.38.

<sup>1241</sup> Ibid., p.39.

<sup>1242</sup> C. Arcayürek, *Çankaya'ya Giden Yol 1971-1973*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985, p.146. Özgen Acar, "Afyon Raporu", *Cumhuriyet*, 20 July 1970.

### 8.1.2 The Opium Issue in the 1960s

In 1961 the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was signed under United Nations auspices. The Convention, which came into force in 1964, aimed at consolidating existing treaties and bringing all narcotic substances under control. Under the Single Convention, the International Narcotics Control Board was authorised to administer the system of estimates and statistical control of all transactions concerning narcotic substances. As for the prevention of the illicit drug traffic, the Board's authority was limited to surveillance, investigation, publicity and recommendations. The responsibility for preventing opium from falling into illicit channels lay mainly with the treaty members.<sup>1243</sup> The United States attributed great importance to the Single Convention and always drew attention to this treaty while pressurising Turkey on opium.

In the mid-1960s U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson began to stress the opium issue in the U.S. relations with Turkey and thus linked the domestic issue of drug abuse with the foreign policy objective of controlling opium production in producer nations.<sup>1244</sup> In Spain's words, Johnson was "hoping to salvage part of his dream of "the Great Society" from the inroads of the Vietnam War" by achieving success in the increasing heroin addiction problem.<sup>1245</sup>

Turkey initially showed no enthusiasm toward American demands. The İnönü government officially rejected the American demand to prohibit opium cultivation.<sup>1246</sup> In 1963 the Turkish Parliament passed Law No.245, which reiterated Turkey's promise to fight against illicit opium traffic and to maintain strict control on opium.<sup>1247</sup> The Demirel government, which came to power in November 1965, showed more willingness to cooperate with the United States in fighting against the illegal opium trade.<sup>1248</sup> The Turkish Parliament ratified the Single Convention

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<sup>1243</sup> Wellman, op.cit., p.143.

<sup>1244</sup> M.A. Turner, *the International Politics of Narcotics*, Ph.D. Thesis, Kent State University, 1975, p.106.

<sup>1245</sup> Spain, op.cit., p.297.

<sup>1246</sup> Arcayürek, op.cit., p.147.

<sup>1247</sup> Turkish Agriculture Minister İlhami Ertem, *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi(MMTD)*, 24.7.1970, term 3. sess.1, vol.8, p.631.

<sup>1248</sup> Harris, op.cit., p.192, Turner, op.cit., pp. 122-123.

on Narcotics in December 1966 and Turkey formally acceded to this treaty on 22 June 1967.<sup>1249</sup>

## 8.2 U.S. Pressures on Turkey on Opium 1969-1971

### 8.2.1 Views of the Americans on Turkey's Opium Production

The following section is largely based on opinions of American officials and American public opinion:

Drug addiction was a serious problem in the United States at the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s.<sup>1250</sup> It was threatening the whole of American society in cities and suburbs. The number of drug addicts was increasing threateningly. The Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), John E. Ingersoll, gave some figures in his statement on 26 October 1970: "Ten years ago we estimated there were 60,000 narcotic addicts in the United States; today we believe there are two to three times that amount. Ninety-seven percent of the addicts are addicted to heroin. Our list of addicts is growing by several thousand each year, and in 1969 the number of new addicts doubled from the previous year."<sup>1251</sup> It was estimated in 1973 that there were about 600,000 heroin addicts in the United States and that half of them lived in New York.<sup>1252</sup>

American law enforcement officials believed that there was a direct link between heroin addiction and increase of crime.<sup>1253</sup> They claimed that at least half of all street crimes and burglaries in New York City were committed by addicts who stole to maintain their habits.<sup>1254</sup> The BNDD estimated that a typical male addict needed 50 milligrams of heroin a day to maintain his habit and that this cost him about 29 dollars a day and 10,556 dollars a year. Thus heroin was a huge industry pushing people to crime.<sup>1255</sup> John Ingersoll's figures on crime related to heroin

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<sup>1249</sup> Harris, op.cit., pp. 192-193.

<sup>1250</sup> Wellman, op.cit., p.141.

<sup>1251</sup> Ibid., p.141.

<sup>1252</sup> The Staff and Editors of Newsday; *the Heroin Trail*, London: Souvenir Press, 1975, pp.xi, 186, Özcan Köknel, "Haşhaş Ekimi ve ABD", *Milliyet*, 4 November 1975, Zentner, op.cit., p.47n.

<sup>1253</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.9, 11-12.

<sup>1254</sup> *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., pp.xi-xii.

<sup>1255</sup> Ibid., p.187.



addiction was as follows: "In 1965 there were less than 50,000 arrests in the United States for drug-related offences; in 1969 there were 233,690 such arrests. Almost 20 percent of these arrests were in suburban areas, where drug problems had not existed in previous years. Arrest trends for all drug-law violations increased nearly 500 percent during the last ten years. During the same period the arrest trends for persons under 18 years of age increased nearly 2500 percent."<sup>1256</sup>

Deaths caused by heroin addiction also increased in the United States. In New York City alone three or four persons were dying because of drug-related causes per day.<sup>1257</sup> According to one estimate, in the whole of America people were dying of drug addiction at the rate of 8 to 10 per day.<sup>1258</sup>

The number of families who were affected by drug addiction problems, too, was increasing greatly. Statistical figures showed that almost one third of American families complained about heroin addiction of their children.<sup>1259</sup> The rise of heroin addiction among the sons and daughters of the American elite led the American administration to attribute the utmost importance to the matter.<sup>1260</sup> Ingersoll voiced the complaint of American families in his statement:

I speak for over 200 million human beings who are alarmed, distressed, and even outraged about a calamitous problem they did not create and which they cannot solve alone. They do not understand why the nations of the world cannot bring an end to the waste and devastation that drug abuse, particularly opiate addiction, is causing our people. There is growing unity of opinion among the various and diverse segments of our population: Illicit narcotics must go.<sup>1261</sup>

The Americans believed that the real cause of their sufferings was the availability of heroin which was derived from illegally supplied foreign opium.<sup>1262</sup> Source countries, and not the United States, were considered the real cause of the American drug disease. Among the producer countries Turkey was the most notorious for the Americans. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs alleged that 80

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<sup>1256</sup> Wellman, op.cit., p.141.

<sup>1257</sup> Ingersoll's statement, ibid., p.141, Spain, op.cit., p.298.

<sup>1258</sup> Ragıp Üner. "Afyon Sorunu ve Amerika", *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1971.

<sup>1259</sup> Arcayürek, op.cit., p.146.

<sup>1260</sup> G. Harris. "Turkey Between Alliance and Alienation", *Foreign Policy*, vol.8, Nos.3-4, 1980, p.121.

<sup>1261</sup> Wellman, op.cit., p.140.

<sup>1262</sup> Ibid., p.141.

percent of heroin illegally consumed in the United States was derived from Turkish opium.<sup>1263</sup> American drug officers claimed that they reached this conclusion because they could identify Turkish opium with its high percentage of morphine.<sup>1264</sup>

According to American sources, Turkish opium reached the United States in the following way: Turkish villagers, who had very low incomes, were tempted to sell opium gum to illegal buyers because, while the government paid about 10 dollars for a kilogram of opium gum, illegal drug smugglers paid three times more for the same amount.<sup>1265</sup> Collectors who were usually well known to villagers collected opium gum and took it to secret depots.<sup>1266</sup> It was changed to morphine base easily by a simple chemical process before leaving Turkey.<sup>1267</sup> Changing 10 kilograms of opium worth 300 dollars into 1 kilogram of morphine increased its value to 500 dollars.<sup>1268</sup> Turkish patrons smuggled morphine base abroad through custom points like Kapıkule<sup>1269</sup> and passed it through Bulgaria in return for a price. They were expected to occasionally reciprocate by providing the smuggling of guns and ammunition from Bulgaria to Turkish revolutionaries and supplying intelligence information to the Bulgarian secret police.<sup>1270</sup> After morphine was converted to heroin in Marseilles laboratories in southern France through a more complicated chemical process which required sophisticated techniques, modern equipment and

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<sup>1263</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.3, 106, Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.192, O.S. Ray, *Drugs, Society and Human Behaviour*, Saint Louis: the C.V. Mosby Company, 1972, p.193, *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., pp.xiii, 7. *ABD Dışişleri Bakanı William Rogers'ın Kongre'ye Sunduğu Rapordan Bölümler*, Ankara: Amerikan Basın ve Kültür Merkezi, 1972, p.4.

<sup>1264</sup> İsmail Cem's interview with former Turkish foreign minister İ.S. Çaglayangil in İ. Cem, *Tarih Açısından 12 Mart*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1980. pp. 311-312. Later some Turkish newspapers reported that American officials misled American people on the source of heroin used in the United States. Reportedly, in 1975 the former chairman of the Congress's commission on dangerous drugs, Walter Minnick, told congressmen that the U.S. Congress and people had been badly misled by American officials on the source of heroin and claimed that Turkey was chosen as scapegoat because she could be pressurised easily. Ali Sirimen "Dünyada Bugün: Afyonlama", *Cumhuriyet*, 8 March 1975. In another report it was claimed that John Ingersoll deliberately tried to present Turkey as the source of American drug addiction problem to divert public anger from the administration. Selahattin Güler, "ABD Kongresini Türkiye'de Görevli Ajanlar Yanılttı", *Cumhuriyet*, 24 March 1975.

<sup>1265</sup> Roy, op.cit., p.193, *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., p.2, Wellman, op.cit., p.44.

<sup>1266</sup> *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., p.11.

<sup>1267</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.xiii, 11, Roy, op.cit., p.194.

<sup>1268</sup> Roy, op.cit., p.194.

<sup>1269</sup> *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., pp.20-42.

<sup>1270</sup> *Ibid.*, p.53.

chemical expertise, the price of a kilogram heroin went up to 4000 to 6000 dollars.<sup>1271</sup>

Heroin was then smuggled into the United States by a number of routes, especially through Latin America.<sup>1272</sup> Professional smugglers easily passed heroin through the U.S. Bureau of Customs.<sup>1273</sup> A large portion of the smuggled heroin ended up in the New York metropolitan area, where it was either adulterated and sold wholesale to dealers throughout the eastern United States or was adulterated, put into bags or packages and sold to the numerous addicts in the area.<sup>1274</sup> While one kilogram of heroin was delivered in the United States for 15,000 dollars, it was then sold to distributors who might pay 30,000 to 40,000 dollars for the same amount. The dilution was so great that retail price of a kilogram of heroin might be a quarter of a million dollars at street level.<sup>1275</sup>

In the light of these facts, American officials were convinced that their fight against drug addiction at home would not be successful unless the source of heroin, Turkey, was shut off. In their opinion, Turkey had ratified the Single Convention and thus undertook the responsibility to implement the most effective measures in order to eliminate illegal production and sale of opium in Turkey.<sup>1276</sup> They further argued that Turkey should totally ban opium production<sup>1277</sup> because a country was obliged to eradicate its opium cultivation if it could not successfully prevent the diversion of opium into illegal channels.<sup>1278</sup>

### 8.2.2 The Nixon Administration's Fight Against Opium

After becoming president, Richard Nixon immediately launched an all-out war

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<sup>1271</sup> Ray, op.cit., p.194.

<sup>1272</sup> *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., p.167.

<sup>1273</sup> Ibid., p.156.

<sup>1274</sup> Ibid., p.xii.

<sup>1275</sup> Ray, op.cit., p.194, Wellman op.cit., p.144. *International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem*. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st Session. July 7,8,9, and 30, 1971, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971, p.5.

<sup>1276</sup> Wellman, op.cit., pp.143, 145.

<sup>1277</sup> Spain, op.cit., p.298.

<sup>1278</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.195, Turner, op.cit., p.128.

against drug addiction at home<sup>1279</sup> and opium production abroad. He had come to office with a strong commitment to ending violence in the street, which was growing as drug addicts turned to crime to finance their habits. As a part of this campaign, from 1969 onwards, the American administration pressured Turkey publicly to close down all of its opium fields,<sup>1280</sup> making the issue a high priority in relations between the two countries.<sup>1281</sup> It also made bilateral arrangements with other states such as France, Mexico and Canada to fight against the illicit drug traffic.<sup>1282</sup>

In his message to Congress on 17 June 1971, President Nixon said:

If we cannot destroy the drug menace in America, then it will surely in time destroy us. I am not prepared to accept this alternative... I am proposing appropriation of additional funds to meet the cost of rehabilitating drug abusers, and I will ask for additional funds to increase our enforcement efforts to further tighten the noose around the necks of drug peddlers, and thereby loosen the noose around the necks of drug users... I am proposing additional steps to strike at the supply side of the drug equation - to halt the drug traffic by striking at the illegal producers of drugs, the growing of those plants from which drugs are derived, and trafficking in these drugs beyond our borders.<sup>1283</sup>

In order to coordinate international efforts on illegal opium production and trafficking President Nixon created the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control in September 1971.<sup>1284</sup>

### 8.2.3 U.S. Efforts to Eradicate Turkey's Opium Production

It was reported that several times the United States approached Turkey to buy its whole opium crop. In mid-1969 President Nixon dispatched D. Patrick Moynihan to Turkey with a virtual blank cheque to buy the entire 1969 crop but the Turks rejected the offer flatly.<sup>1285</sup> Later the American ambassador to Turkey, William J. Handley, proposed to Foreign Minister Çağlayangil to pay for the whole

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<sup>1279</sup> For U.S. domestic measures against drug addiction see Wellman, op.cit., pp.141-142, *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., pp.xii, xiii. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1971-1972 vol.18, p.25227.

<sup>1280</sup> Harris. *Troubled Alliance*, op.cit., p.193.

<sup>1281</sup> Spain, op.cit., pp.298, 303.

<sup>1282</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.18, p.24693, *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., p.90, Ragıp Üner, op.cit., Wellman, op.cit. p.142.

<sup>1283</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.18, pp. 24692-24693.

<sup>1284</sup> Turner, op.cit., p.202.

<sup>1285</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.126, 139-140.

opium crop. The reply came from P.M. Demirel through Çağlayangil: Opium had been grown in Turkey for centuries, there was even a city which was named after opium. Turkey could not stop opium cultivation but could restrict it.<sup>1286</sup> Handley was not satisfied with the answer, he wanted to see Demirel personally.<sup>1287</sup> In their meeting Handley proposed to Demirel: Turkey would announce an end to opium production and plough up its 1970 crop in exchange for 5 million dollars to compensate the growers.<sup>1288</sup> Demirel rejected the offer and said that he could not find any Turk who would drive bulldozers to destroy poppy fields.<sup>1289</sup>

In April 1970, U.S. Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson visited Ankara. In his press conference at the Esenboğa airport on 23 April, Richardson praised the Turkish government for showing understanding toward the drug addiction problem of the United States. When a reporter asked whether Turkey would reduce its opium-growing provinces to seven in return for an additional three million dollars of U.S. aid, Richardson confirmed that among other things they negotiated measures which would prevent opium from falling into illicit channels and a further decrease in Turkey's opium production.<sup>1290</sup>

Richardson's visit to Ankara publicised the opium issue in Turkish domestic politics. The Turkish press reported that Richardson's talks with Turkish officials were aimed at forcing Turkey to eliminate both legal and illegal opium production. Fierce criticism of the United States appeared in opinion columns of leftist and rightist newspapers. Further criticism was heard when a story in the *New York Times* triggered the rumour that American narcotics officials advocated withholding the requested 40 million dollar economic aid to Turkey in order to force a ban on opium production.<sup>1291</sup>

Subsequently, U.S.-Turkish discussions on opium continued intensively. During the CENTO meeting in the United States in May 1970 Turkish Foreign Min-

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<sup>1286</sup> Demirel's statement to a Turkish TV documentary in M.A. Birand et al., *12 Mart*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994, p.169.

<sup>1287</sup> İ.S. Çağlayangil, *Anılarım*, İstanbul: Yılmaz Yayınları, August 1990, p.324.

<sup>1288</sup> Turner, op.cit., p.126, Arcayürek, op.cit., p.150, Çağlayangil's interview with İ. Cem in Cem, op.cit., p.312.

<sup>1289</sup> Arcayürek, op.cit., p.150.

<sup>1290</sup> *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, April 1970, p.133.

<sup>1291</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.194, Turner, op.cit., pp.126-127.

ister Çağlayangil told Richardson that Turkey could not undertake to ban opium cultivation.<sup>1292</sup> In May 1970 high-level BNDD officials, Andrew Tartaglino and John Cusack, visited Turkey.<sup>1293</sup> In June 1970 the U.S. President's special envoy Moynihan told Turkey's NATO representative Muharrem Nuri Birgi that Turkey should ban opium cultivation if she wanted to avoid harming Turkish-American cooperation in all areas.<sup>1294</sup>

The most important event which triggered an explosion of widespread Turkish anger toward the United States was U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell's testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee on 20 July 1970. In his testimony Mitchell gave approval to the concept of economic sanctions in order to shut off opium traffic from countries including Turkey. During the committee meeting Congressman Vanik proposed to impose economic and trade sanctions against the countries who did not cooperate with the United States on preventing illegal opium trafficking. Mitchell replied that his government, mainly the State Department, was negotiating with these countries and recently made an initiative in the framework of NATO and he added that if these initiatives were not successful the United States should take further measures. When the Director of BNDD, John Ingersoll, claimed that 80 percent of the opium illegally introduced to the United States came from Turkey, Vanik stated that economic sanctions might be the best tool to combat the problem. He suggested to Attorney General Mitchell that "we ought to set up a system that would provide for an embargo, or suspension of trade, or even suspension of relationships" until Turkey should "control the problems" of drug traffic. Thereupon Mitchell said that he quite agreed with the concept: "we are all for cutting off the source in any way that is in the best interest of this country." He mentioned some measures taken by Turkey to cut opium production and to prevent illegal trafficking but he said that he did not think these measures would be successful and that this situation did not prevent him from taking other forceful measures to stop the flow of opium. Mitchell finally added that "any legislation or administrative action that can cut down the production

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<sup>1292</sup> Arcayürek, op.cit., p.153.

<sup>1293</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 17 May 1970, p.1.

<sup>1294</sup> Arcayürek, op.cit., p.153.

and... the illicit traffic of opium... be the country Turkey or another, we, at the Justice Department, would be in favor of it..."<sup>1295</sup>

Mitchell's threat of economic sanctions was immediately denounced by the Turkish government. On 22 July 1970 the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing disappointment over Mitchell's remarks and declaring that those kinds of irresponsible statements would harm Turkish-American friendship and cast suspicion on the American attitude.<sup>1296</sup> Turkish P.M. Süleyman Demirel told reporters that if there was such a statement Turkey would feel sorry about it and added that statements which were not compatible with the sovereignty of states could not be tolerated.<sup>1297</sup> In the parliament Turkish Ministers Turhan Bilgin and İlhami Ertem declared that no country could punish Turkey and intervene in her affairs. They accused people who publicised Mitchell's statement of deliberately trying to show that Turkey was under the influence of the United States.<sup>1298</sup> MP Celal Kargılı said that the Turkish nation was in deep sorrow because it was scolded by the Attorney General of the U.S. government in a manner which was applied to colonies.<sup>1299</sup>

Turkish newspaper columnists voiced the following criticism of Mitchell's statement: The statement clearly showed that Turkey was dependent on the United States and was her satellite. The Americans considered Turkey their colony and therefore did not hesitate to pressurise Turkish rulers to stop opium cultivation. The United States herself failed to take drastic measures at and within her borders to stop heroin smuggling but tried to hide her incompetence by attacking Turkey. Mitchell's statement showed that the Americans cared only about their own interests. In this context it was reminiscent of the famous Johnson letter and demonstrated inequality in the U.S.-Turkish relationship.<sup>1300</sup>

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<sup>1295</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.194n, *Milliyet*, 23 July 1970, *Cumhuriyet*, 23 July 1970, p.7.

<sup>1296</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 23 July 1970, p.7.

<sup>1297</sup> Ibid.

<sup>1298</sup> *MMTD*, 24.7.1970, term 3, sess.1, vol.8, p.630-632.

<sup>1299</sup> Ibid., pp.626-629.

<sup>1300</sup> In *Cumhuriyet*: Oktay Akbal, "Amerikasız da Yaşanır", İlhan Selçuk, "Düşün" 24 July 1970, p.2. Cihad Baban, "Demirel Hakkı", 28 July 1970, p.2; Abdi İpekçi, "Türkiye Cezalandırılacakmış", *Milliyet*, 22 July 1970, pp.1 and 9.

As Harris stated, the Mitchell statement had not caused as sharp a dividing line in Turkish-American relations as the Johnson letter had. It further strained relations between the two countries but it did not bring about a dramatic change. "The opium issue had risen too suddenly to seriously affect Turkish public opinion and was not in any case the basic national issue that Cyprus had been." Unlike the reaction to the 1964 Cyprus crisis, Turkish people were no longer shocked by the realisation that even allies could have fundamental differences. In fact after Mitchell made his statement the American Department of State promptly denied any intention of applying economic sanctions against Turkey.<sup>1301</sup>

At the U.N. Narcotics Committee meeting in Geneva in September 1970 the Turkish representative explained that regulation, not eradication, of opium production was the Turkish government's aim and that Turkey would not accept any obligation outside the present treaties on opium.<sup>1302</sup> On 8 October 1970 John Ingersoll brought a personal letter of President Nixon to Turkish P.M. Demirel, urging the Turkish government to help the United States on the drug abuse problem. Demirel's letter to Nixon, which was dated 10 November 1970, stated that Turkey was aware of the gravity of the problem and would cooperate with the United States to fight against it. However, the letter did not make any promise to ban opium cultivation completely.<sup>1303</sup> In fact, President Nixon had sent another personal and secret letter to Demirel in January 1969. In this letter Nixon reminded Demirel that when the Soviet Union threatened Turkey after the Second World War, the United States had come to Turkey's rescue. It was now Turkey's turn to help the United States on the opium issue which posed a similar threat to American people.<sup>1304</sup>

Allegedly, the U.S. dislike for the Demirel government on the opium issue played a role in the Turkish military "coup by memorandum" on 12 March 1971.<sup>1305</sup> Turhan Bilgin, who was state minister in the Demirel government, later claimed that the CIA had prepared plans in the framework of NATO to topple the Turkish

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<sup>1301</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.195. Turner, op.cit., pp.141-142.

<sup>1302</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.195. *Cumhuriyet*, 4 October 1970, p.1.

<sup>1303</sup> Arcayürek, op.cit., pp.148-149.

<sup>1304</sup> Turhan Bilgin, "12 Mart", *Milliyet*, 24.3.1976 quoted by Cem, op.cit., pp.294-295. Turner, op.cit., pp.125-126.

<sup>1305</sup> Birand et al., op.cit., p.169.



government and that one high-level American official had said at that time that the American drug abuse problem could be solved only through the fall of the Demirel government.<sup>1306</sup> According to İsmail Cem, during their talk on 7 February 1974, Çağlayangil, foreign minister of the Demirel government, made the following remarks: The United States was not pleased with the Demirel government because of certain matters such as opium, flights of American U-2 planes and use of American bases in Turkey. The government had been weakened by its internal problems and was expected to fall in the near future. The United States correctly assessed the situation and accelerated the process of the Demirel government's fall. When it fell, Turkey's anti-NATO stance came to an end, leftists and the opposition to NATO were crushed and opium production was banned, thus the United States and NATO became happy.<sup>1307</sup>

It is not likely that the Turkish military would have halted the normal democratic process only or mainly to prohibit opium cultivation to please the Americans because it would be difficult to maintain agreement among top Turkish military officers in such an issue. It is even hard to prove the claim that U.S. displeasure with the Turkish government was one of reasons for the 12 March move because documents on both sides are classified. The only thing which could be said is that the United States had reasons for not being happy with the situation in Turkey at that time. One can easily see this fact by looking at widespread attacks against Americans in Turkey.<sup>1308</sup>

#### 8.2.4 U.S. Pressure upon Turkey on the Opium Issue

The Americans applied pressure tactics, for instance, they used the issue of economic and military assistance as leverage against Turkey to force her to comply with American demands on opium. Most authors agree with this conclusion.<sup>1309</sup>

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<sup>1306</sup> T. Bilgin, op.cit. quoted by Cem, op.cit., pp.295-296.

<sup>1307</sup> Cem, op.cit., pp.299-300, 313-314. Former Turkish MP and diplomat Kamran İnan told the author that the USA did not take part in the fall of the Turkish government. In Kurtul Altuğ's programme on Turkish TV, *Bunalımlı Yıllar*, a high-level RPP member, Besim Üstünel, claimed that in a dinner in the U.S. embassy in Ankara one week before the 12 March move a high-level U.S. official from the State Department told him that deputy chairman of RPP's parliamentary caucus, Nihat Erim, promised the Americans to prohibit opium cultivation if the RPP came to power.

<sup>1308</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.18, pp.24637-24639.

<sup>1309</sup> V. Coufoudakis, "Turkey and the United States: the Problems and Prospects of a Post-War Alliance", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol.9,

Turkish public opinion was convinced of the existence of U.S. pressure. Members of the then Turkish government admitted that they were subjected to strong pressures by the United States on the opium issue.<sup>1310</sup>

It seems that the U.S. administration did not openly and officially use threats against Turkey but advocated indirect pressures through prudent diplomacy. U.S. public officials, including BNDD members, called on the White House to use its leverage of military and economic aid on Turkey. They reasoned that the United States was subsidising its allies at the expense of the moral and physical health of American citizens.<sup>1311</sup> The Nixon administration, the Departments of State and Defence were opposed to such pressure diplomacy, claiming that it would harm the vital U.S.-Turkish alliance, and subsequently U.S. and NATO interests. They suggested that the United States should be helping the Turkish government rather than threatening it.<sup>1312</sup> However, in Turner's words,

American diplomats did not block the transmission of threatening messages to the Turks. Publicly, the administration objected to the holding of congressional hearings on some sixty bills calling for an end to military and economic aid to Turkey. Yet these same bills and the remarks of American legislators were indirectly utilised to emphasise the seriousness of the situation to the Turks. The Turks knew that the Americans would take some type of action if the opium crop were not brought under control... The Turks were aware that general reductions in American aid and personnel could have direct implications for them at a time of much needed improvement in their military hardware.<sup>1313</sup>

The reasons for the U.S. administration's pressure on Turkey might be explained with the publicity which the opium issue gained in domestic politics. The American government could not be indifferent to a matter which concerned almost the whole of American society and which was closely followed by the Congress, the media and other public opinion groups. Since Turkey was believed to be the source of the U.S. heroin and since she was a weaker ally of the United States, it was natural and easy for U.S. rulers to direct their efforts against Turkey.

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No.2, Fall 1981, p.187, R. Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, London: Quartet Books, 1977, p.272.

<sup>1310</sup> Çağlayangil's interview with Cem in Cem, op.cit., p.300, the author's interview with former Turkish Foreign Minister Osman Olcay.

<sup>1311</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.116-117, 197.

<sup>1312</sup> Ibid., pp.117, 120, 132-133, 138, 198. See comments of U.S. congressmen and officials in *International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem*, op.cit., pp.12, 17, 22, 75, 76.

<sup>1313</sup> Turner, op.cit., p.121.

U.S. Congressmen took the lead in calling for measures to force Turkey to abandon its opium cultivation. They argued: The United States had given considerable military and economic aid to Turkey since the Second World War. Turks surely owed the Americans a favour, therefore, they should be willing to give up the 5 million dollars a year they earned from legal opium production, which constituted less than one third of one percent of Turkey's total foreign trade.<sup>1314</sup> In 1970 and 1971 congressmen continuously threatened to terminate all aid to Turkey if she did not stop opium production. They argued that this threat would force Turkey to cooperate with the United States on the matter.<sup>1315</sup> Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, passed by Congress, read as follows: "The use of funds herein appropriated to assist any country shall be suspended by the President in whole or in part when the President determines that the government of such country has failed to take appropriate steps to prevent narcotic drugs..."<sup>1316</sup> It should be noted that congressmen were mainly trying to placate their home constituencies by indicating they were indeed doing something about the situation.<sup>1317</sup>

U.S. newspapers and magazines, too, contributed to the publicity of the opium issue by giving wide place to the matter in their columns. They featured articles on the theme, "Let's Halt Heroin at the Source", calling the administration to shut off the flow of Turkish opium.<sup>1318</sup> American public; parents, social workers, doctors, and police, put great pressure on the U.S. administration to deal firmly with Turkey's opium production. American people had been convinced that the real cause of the drug abuse problem was Turkish opium and that Turkey was not doing enough to prevent its opium from poisoning American youth.<sup>1319</sup>

Under the constant pressure from all sides President Nixon felt that he had to do something about the drug problem. At least he had to appear to be doing

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<sup>1314</sup> Harris, 1972. op.cit., p.196, Spain, op.cit., p.303, Arcayürek, op.cit., p.145, Zentner, op.cit., p.43, *Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations*, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, July 16, 1974, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, pp.3, 32, 33, 50, 59.

<sup>1315</sup> *International Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.13, 42.

<sup>1316</sup> Turner, op.cit., p.130.

<sup>1317</sup> Ibid., pp.277-278.

<sup>1318</sup> Arcayürek, op.cit., pp.149-150, Acar, op.cit., 19 July 1970.

<sup>1319</sup> In Ragıp Üner's opinion, American public came to this conclusion because of the intensive and effective propaganda of the Greek and Armenian Americans. R. Üner, "Afyon Sorunu", *Cumhuriyet*, 18 March 1971.

something. He was the candidate for the 1972 presidential elections and the most important and prominent matter for the American people at that time was the drug problem. If Nixon succeeded in forcing Turkey to stop its opium production, this would be a great victory for him and would increase his chance of winning the election.<sup>1320</sup>

The Americans were justified in asking the Turks to do more in controlling their opium production. However, they probably made a mistake by directing all their efforts to achieving the prohibition of Turkish opium cultivation and seeing the issue as a means to further their political gains at home. U.S. rulers should have known that only halting the flow of Turkish opium would not end the drug addiction problem and that the elected Turkish governments could not ban a traditional means of earning a living under public pressure of the USA.

## 8.3 The Opium Issue From Turkey's Point of View

### 8.3.1 Turkish Actions to Control Opium Production

Turkey's Justice Party government committed itself to reducing poppy acreage and the number of provinces where poppy cultivation was legal. While the number of opium-growing provinces was 42 in 1960, this number was reduced in the 1961-62 harvest year to 30, in 1963-64 to 25, in 1966-67 to 21, in 1967-68 to 18, in 1968-69 to 11 and in 1969-70 to 9. The government decree on 30 June 1970 permitted the cultivation of opium crop in 7 provinces for the 1970-71 year and announced a further reduction to 4 for 1971-72.<sup>1321</sup> On 20 and 24 July 1970 Turkish Agriculture Minister İlhami Ertem told the Turkish Parliament that the government's aim in reducing the number of poppy-growing provinces was to eliminate opium cultivation in the exterior, frontier provinces where control was difficult and diversion was easy and to concentrate production in a diminishing number of interior provinces for more effective supervision. He explained that this did not mean reducing opium production and that the government would continue to permit legal

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<sup>1320</sup> Cem, op.cit., p.293, Birand et al., op.cit., p.169, the author's interview with former Turkish foreign minister Osman Olcay.

<sup>1321</sup> Acar, op.cit., 6 July 1970, Arcayürek, op.cit., p.148, *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, Directorate General of Press and Information (of Turkey), p.6, *Cumhuriyet*, 1 July 1970, p.1, Wellman, op.cit., p.145, Zentner, op.cit., p.39.

production under certain conditions which would prevent illegal production and trafficking.<sup>1322</sup>

Turkish foreign minister Çağlayangil later stated that their ultimate aim was to permit opium cultivation only in the province of Afyon which took its name from opium.<sup>1323</sup> There was one report in 1967 that Turkish P.M. Demirel had agreed to end all poppy cultivation by 1971.<sup>1324</sup> According to another report, on 1 August 1970 Demirel stated that "Turkey cannot ignore [the fact] that humanity... is being destroyed by drugs" and that since it was unable to stop the smugglers it had no option other than replacing the opium poppy with substitute crops in the long run.<sup>1325</sup> U.S. official Wellman said in his speech to the American Turkish Society on 14 December 1970 that in Turkey "crop substitution, the development of alternative and more beneficial uses of land, labor, and capital, is still considered the fundamental solution to the problem of illicit opium production."<sup>1326</sup>

As the number of provinces with legal cultivation was reduced, it was anticipated that the Turkish government would also reduce the total area under production.<sup>1327</sup> However, it was claimed that Turkey's opium production was not being curtailed proportionately because the four grower provinces, Afyon, Burdur, Isparta and Kütahya, were the most productive provinces where more intensive cultivation and illegal planting were made.<sup>1328</sup> According to *Newsday* reporters, Turkey produced 60 metric tons of opium crop in the 1969-70 harvest year, 149 metric tons in 1970-71 and 75 tons in 1971-72.<sup>1329</sup> Reportedly even the total area under production was not reduced considerably. According to the figures given by Wellman, hectareage of the production area was reduced from 24,000 hectares in 1966 to 20,000 hectares in 1967, and to 13,000 hectares in 1968. The estimated

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<sup>1322</sup> *MMTD*, term 3, sess.1, vol.8, pp.566, 630-632.

<sup>1323</sup> Cem, op.cit., p.312.

<sup>1324</sup> Harris, "Turkey and the United States" in K.H. Karpat (ed.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975, p.68, Turner, op.cit., p.124.

<sup>1325</sup> S. Bölükbaşı, *Super Powers and the Third World*, New York: University Press of America, 1988, p.173.

<sup>1326</sup> Wellman, op.cit., p.144.

<sup>1327</sup> Ibid., p.145.

<sup>1328</sup> Ray, op.cit., p.193.

<sup>1329</sup> *The Heroin Trail*, op.cit., p.15.

land area was 13,000 hectares in 1969 and 15,300 hectares in 1971. The explanation for this apparent increase in land use for the opium poppy was that in the absence of a licensing and control law, existing controls did not limit land use for poppy cultivation in the provinces where opium production was legal.<sup>1330</sup>

In fact the Turkish government had long been criticised because of its failure to enact a licensing and control law on the opium production. In a meeting of the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs Turkey gave a pledge that it would enact a strict licensing and control law in accordance with the Single Convention. When the Demirel government was forced out of office by the Turkish military on 21 March 1971, such a law had been prepared and was before the Grand National Assembly for approval.<sup>1331</sup>

Among other measures taken to deal with illegal opium production and trafficking, the Turkish administration increased the government price for legal opium and expanded the official collection organisation in order to improve control.<sup>1332</sup> It established heavy punishments for use and smuggling of heroin, reportedly heavier than U.S. and European punishments for the same crimes. In spite of its limited equipment and resources the Turkish police showed considerable success in capturing heroin smugglers.<sup>1333</sup> To fight against illicit opium production the Turkish government stationed over 1,000 Turkish national police and gendarmes in the opium growing areas from 1967. In 1969 narcotics police sections and bureaus were organised, trained and equipped.<sup>1334</sup>

In Spain's words, "the [Turkish] government [also] had from the beginning co-operated with American narcotics agencies, even subordinating national pride and permitting the stationing in Turkey of more American Drug Enforcement Agency personnel than in any other countries except Mexico and Thailand."<sup>1335</sup> American narcotics agents worked closely with the Turkish control authorities to facilitate

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<sup>1330</sup> Wellman, op.cit., p.145, *International Aspects...*, op.cit., p.119.

<sup>1331</sup> Wellman, op.cit., p.144, Spain, op.cit., pp.298, 305.

<sup>1332</sup> Spain, op.cit., p.305.

<sup>1333</sup> Acar, op.cit., 16 July 1970.

<sup>1334</sup> Wellman, op.cit., p.145, R.F. Nyrop (ed.), *Turkey; A Country Study*, Third Edition, Washington D.C.: American University, 1980, p.285, Zentner, op.cit., p.43, Acar, op.cit., 16 July 1970.

<sup>1335</sup> Spain, op.cit., p.305.

the exchange of information, experience and techniques, and organisational expertise.<sup>1336</sup> They had joined Turkish police in tracking down opium diverted into illicit channels as early as the autumn of 1966.<sup>1337</sup> In 1968 the United States gave "a 3 million dollar loan to the Turkish government to defray the foreign exchange costs for research into substitute crops and for vehicles and other equipment needed to implement the restrictions on the opium trade."<sup>1338</sup> In Çağlayangil's account, the interior minister was anxious to accept the offer because he saw it as an important opportunity to make good shortages of Turkish police.<sup>1339</sup>

In the international arena Turkey signed all the treaties on opium and other dangerous drugs and joined all organisations established to deal with narcotic drugs.<sup>1340</sup> She gave support to any proposals by the United States, which would strengthen the Single Convention and cooperated with her in the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs.<sup>1341</sup>

In spite of its willingness to cooperate with the United States on the opium issue, the Demirel government did not comply with the American demand to ban poppy cultivation completely for the following reasons: Drug addiction was not a problem for the Turkish nation. Therefore, there was no domestic pressure at all on the Turkish government to end poppy production.<sup>1342</sup> Indeed, the situation in Turkey was quite the reverse: the poppy crop was the primary source of living for a section of Turkish population. If the Demirel government had banned opium cultivation, it would have brought adverse social and economic results for traditional producers.<sup>1343</sup> At that time the Demirel government had a very thin margin of support in Parliament because the conservative wing had left the Justice Party<sup>1344</sup> and formed the Democratic Party in early 1970. Demirel was understandably reluctant to initiate measures totally eliminating opium cultivation, especially as the

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<sup>1336</sup> Wellman, op.cit., p.145.

<sup>1337</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.193, Turner, op.cit., p.124.

<sup>1338</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.193, Acar, op.cit., 16 July 1970, *ABD Dışişleri Bakanı...*, op.cit., p.4, *International Aspects...*, op.cit., p.119.

<sup>1339</sup> Cem, op.cit., p.312.

<sup>1340</sup> Özcan Köknel, "Haşhaş Ekimi ve ABD", *Milliyet*, 4 November 1975.

<sup>1341</sup> Wellman, op.cit., pp.145-146.

<sup>1342</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.192.

<sup>1343</sup> Ibid., p.192, Spain, op.cit., p.298.

<sup>1344</sup> *Keessing's...*, 1969-1970, vol.17, p.23956, *ibid.*, vol.18, p.24640.

votes of the opium-producing provinces were essential to the survival of his party's parliamentary majority.<sup>1345</sup> Furthermore, "constant U.S. pressure... made the issue public and therefore increased Demirel's difficulties in handling the question of concessions."<sup>1346</sup> If Demirel had banned opium cultivation he would have seemed to be yielding to U.S. pressures.

The unwillingness of Turkish rulers to prohibit opium production can be understood. But it was a fact that their measures were not effective to prevent the diversion of opium into illicit channels and therefore Turkey's reputation in the international arena was damaged. They did not appreciate the fact that the continuity of illicit opium production and trafficking gave the Americans opportunity to pressurise Turkey.

### 8.3.2 Turkey's Arguments on the Opium Issue

Turkish officials believed that Turkish opium was not the only or even the primary cause of the U.S. drug addiction problem. They thought that if the supply of heroin was the real cause of drug addiction it would be Turkey which suffered most from this problem. If Turkey banned opium cultivation the drug abuse problem of the United States would not come to an end. As long as there was a strong demand for narcotic drugs, they would be supplied somehow.<sup>1347</sup> There were already other opium producer countries whose opium had reached the United States: India, Pakistan, China, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Thailand, Laos, etc. Marseilles was the centre point of the heroin traffic, but the United States did not press France as much as she did Turkey.<sup>1348</sup> Figures showed that even if all opium produced in Turkey in a year found its way to the United States it would meet the needs of American addicts only for a few weeks.<sup>1349</sup> In spite of all these facts, Turkey would do its best and cooperate with any country in this matter out of its humanitarian concerns.<sup>1350</sup> However, the United States should stop its pressure

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<sup>1345</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., pp.195-196, Turner, op.cit., pp.143, 204-205, F. Ahmad, *the Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, London: C. Hurst and Company, 1977, p.418.

<sup>1346</sup> Ahmad, op.cit., p.418.

<sup>1347</sup> Cem, op.cit., pp.292-293.

<sup>1348</sup> Çağlayangil's interview with Cem in Cem, op.cit., p.312, Arcayürek, op.cit., p.147, Köknel, op.cit..

<sup>1349</sup> Köknel, op.cit., Çağlayangil's interview in Cem op.cit., p.311.

<sup>1350</sup> İ. Ertem, *MMTD*, 20 and 24 July 1970, op.cit., pp.566, 630-632.



tactics against Turkey, which constituted interference in her internal affairs,<sup>1351</sup> while she herself failed to stop heroin smuggling at home.<sup>1352</sup> Turkey could hardly be blamed for drug addiction of U.S. citizens while the same U.S. addicts even brought their disease to Turkey. In the 1960s and the 1970s a little restaurant near the Blue Mosque in İstanbul, the Pudding Shop, had become a major stop for U.S. hippies who consumed cheap opium from the underground world. "U.S. citizens were on the one hand threatening to cut off the livelihood of Turkish peasants and on the other pouring into İstanbul to disrupt and corrupt local society."<sup>1353</sup>

One of Turkish officials' arguments for not banning opium cultivation completely was the importance of opium for Turkey. In 1971 some 100,000 Turkish farmers in Afyon and the surrounding provinces relied on the poppy crop for their survival. The poppy was an integral part of the way of life in the area.<sup>1354</sup> In Spain's words,

it provided the main cash crop. Opium gum, which lasts almost indefinitely, was stored from year to year toward a daughter's dowry or other anticipated essential expenditure. Apart from the profits to be had from the narcotic gum, the young leaves were a favorite salad ingredient. The seeds flavored the local bread. When pressed they made the oil in which food was cooked. The stalks of the plant provided cattle fodder and fuel for the household [and the roofing material]. During the brief harvest period for the gum, otherwise excess skilled labor, much of it female, was utilised profitably in incising and scrapping the poppy pods. In some remote and impoverished mountain villages, the poppy was the only crop that made a subsistence existence possible. To Afyon (the very name means opium in Turkish) and the other hardcore provinces, the poppy meant at least as much as tobacco to Kentucky.<sup>1355</sup>

### 8.3.3 Turkish Public's Reaction to U.S. Pressures on Opium

The United States was subjected to heavy criticism by Turkish public opinion for pressing Turkey to abandon poppy cultivation. In parliament deputies such as Süleyman Mutlu and Celal Kargılı and senator and former prime minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü criticised the United States for its unfair pressure tactics and accused the Turkish government of yielding to U.S. pressures. Pressure groups such

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<sup>1351</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.122, 139.

<sup>1352</sup> T. Bilgin, "12 Mart", *Milliyet*, 24.3.1976, quoted by Cem, op.cit., p.294.

<sup>1353</sup> J.W. Spain, *American Diplomacy in Turkey*, New York: Praeger, 1984, p.136.

<sup>1354</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.305, Turner, op.cit., p.32.

<sup>1355</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.305, see also *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, op.cit., p.7.

as university students,<sup>1356</sup> the leftist Dev-Genç organisation,<sup>1357</sup> the union of agriculture engineers,<sup>1358</sup> and the union of agriculture chambers<sup>1359</sup> issued statements condemning the Turkish government's actions to restrict opium production under U.S. influence. Leftist groups and peasants arranged demonstrations<sup>1360</sup> and newspaper columnists continuously wrote articles for the same purpose.

Some points voiced by Turkish critics were as follows:<sup>1361</sup> The United States was right in wishing to find a solution to the serious drug addiction problem among its citizens. However, the U.S. pressure tactics aimed at forcing Turkey to ban its opium cultivation were not the right way to deal with the problem. U.S.-Turkish cooperation on the opium issue was reminiscent of the organisation of Duyunu Umumiyye during the Ottoman Empire period, which made Turkish gendarmes shoot their own people who produced and used tobacco outside the permission of this organisation. The drug addiction was a disease of the American society which was caused by sociological and psychological problems of the American people. It was unfair to impose the price of the American people's disease on Turkish farmers who had nothing to do with it. The United States herself was subsidising, advertising and selling harmful goods such as tobacco and destructive war weapons. Illegal American goods were sold in Turkish markets but nobody was complaining about it. Automobile accidents were the leading cause of deaths in Turkey and most automobiles in Turkey were American-made but no Turks were demanding that the United States shut down its automobile factories.<sup>1362</sup> It was strange that while demanding an end to opium cultivation in Turkey, American officials and journalists were constantly pressing for a reduction in the stiff sentences which were applied to American narcotics offenders convicted in Turkey.

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<sup>1356</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 4 July 1970, p.1.

<sup>1357</sup> *Ibid.*, 25 July 1970, p.7.

<sup>1358</sup> *Ibid.*, 31 July 1970, p.1.

<sup>1359</sup> Acar, *op.cit.*, 20 July 1970.

<sup>1360</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 11 August 1970, p.7, Turner, *op.cit.*, p.142.

<sup>1361</sup> Süleyman Mutlu (20.7.1970) and Celal Kargılı (24.7.1970), *MMTD*, term 3, sess.1, vol.8, pp.564-565, 626-629; in *Cumhuriyet*: S.H. Ürgüplü's speeches, 3 and 10 July 1970, p.1, Ö. Acar, "Afyon Raporu", 5-20 July 1970, O. Akbal, "Amerikasız da Yaşanır", 24 July 1970, C. Baban, "Demirel Haklı", 28 July 1970, R. Üner, "Afyon Sorunu ve Amerika", 18 March 1971; in *Milliyet*: A. İpekçi, "Türkiye Cezalandırılacakmış", 22 July 1970, İ. Cem "Afyon mu Silah mı?", 23 and 24 July 1970; Spain, *op.cit.*, pp.305-306.

<sup>1362</sup> *International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem*, *op.cit.*, p.22.

## 8.4 The Opium Issue in the 1971-1974 Period

### 8.4.1 Erim Government Decision to Ban Opium Cultivation

After the Demirel government was forced out of office by the Turkish military on 12 March 1971, a non-party government under Nihat Erim's premiership came to power. The new government made the opium issue one of its first priorities.<sup>1363</sup> A licensing decree which was prepared by the Demirel government on the basis of existing legislation was issued on 19 March 1971.<sup>1364</sup> However, the long-awaited bill providing strict licensing procedures with severe penalties for those who violated the terms of act was passed by Turkish parliament as late as 18 August 1971.<sup>1365</sup> In his statement on the government's program before Turkish Parliament, Nihat Erim declared: "Believing that contraband trade in opium - which has assumed the aspect of an overwhelming blight for the youth of the whole world - is offensive on humanitarian grounds in the first place, the government will pay serious attention to this problem. Turkish opium growers will be shown a way to earn a better-living."<sup>1366</sup>

Immediately after the Erim government won the vote of confidence in Parliament, U.S. officials started an intensive campaign to achieve the prohibition of Turkish opium cultivation. In Spain's words, "every American official in Turkey became a walking encyclopaedia on the subject and both socially and professionally their Turkish contacts heard about little else."<sup>1367</sup> After U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers visited Ankara in April 1971 to discuss the opium question, U.S. and Turkish officials began discussions on the technical aspects of the problem.<sup>1368</sup> In May 1971 the Erim government announced that it was going to move against the illicit opium production by purchasing the entire 1971 crop, licensing poppy growers, and encouraging the cultivation of other crops by poppy farmers.<sup>1369</sup> On

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<sup>1363</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.298.

<sup>1364</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.196.

<sup>1365</sup> Ibid., p.197, for detailed information see *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, op.cit., pp.13-14.

<sup>1366</sup> Ahmad, op.cit., p.417.

<sup>1367</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.299.

<sup>1368</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.196, Turner, op.cit., p.135, Arcayürek, op.cit., pp.153-154.

<sup>1369</sup> Ray, op.cit., p. 193.

16 May the government's purchasing price of opium was raised by two-thirds in order to increase sales to the authorities.<sup>1370</sup>

In their meeting on 17 May U.S. Ambassador Handley presented to Erim a document stating the U.S. aid to the Turkish government and poppy farmers in the case of the prohibition of opium cultivation.<sup>1371</sup> On 11 June Handley informed Erim that President Nixon was waiting for the Turkish government's reply to the American proposals. Erim said to Handley that his government could ban opium cultivation in the three provinces immediately instead of the next year.<sup>1372</sup>

On 14 June 1971 President Nixon summoned the American ambassadors in France, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam and the United Nations to a White House conference. Reportedly Nixon told the ambassadors that "the interdiction of narcotics was to be a first order priority of U.S. foreign policy" and he instructed them "to make clear to their host governments that their actions to suppress narcotics trafficking would have a definite bearing on U.S. economic and military support."<sup>1373</sup> In the meeting, William Handley explained the peculiar nature of the Turkish opium problem and came away with a Presidential commitment to provide assistance in establishing alternative sources of income if the Turks would stop opium cultivation immediately. He was given a maximum of 35 million dollars to offer the Turks for their cooperation.<sup>1374</sup>

Eventually, the Turkish government's opium decree on 30 June 1971 announced that the planting and production of poppies within the borders of Turkey was forbidden beginning from the autumn of 1972.<sup>1375</sup> On the same day Erim and U.S. President Nixon explained the Turkish government's decision to their people.<sup>1376</sup>

Some points mentioned by Erim in his speech are as follows:

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<sup>1370</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 17 May 1971, p.1.

<sup>1371</sup> Arcayürek, op.cit., p.154.

<sup>1372</sup> Ibid., p.154.

<sup>1373</sup> Turner, op.cit., p.131.

<sup>1374</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.299.

<sup>1375</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 30 June 1971, p.1, Zentner, op.cit., p.39, *Keesing's...*, vol.18, p.24717.

<sup>1376</sup> For the statements of the two premiers in Turkish see *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, June 1971, pp.137-142.

Smuggling from our country in recent years has become very distressing for us... Now planting has been decreased to four provinces. In this way it was hoped to prevent smuggling. However, unfortunately, this system did not give results... It is certain that a smugglers' gang organised on an international scale, constitutes an economic and political problem for Turkey... In countries where health is endangered through this opium, because smuggling cannot be prevented in Turkey, anti-Turkish opinions are created. The measures to be applied to control smuggling are extremely expensive... Our nation, which is known for its honesty and integrity, is now under grave accusation. The time when we must end the placing of blame for deaths in other countries on Turkey is so long overdue. We cannot allow Turkey's supreme interests and the prestige of our nation to be further shaken... Our government forbids completely the planting of poppies... The agreement ratified in 1966 [the Single Convention] also stipulates this arrangement.. In order to make up for the income farmers who are planting in seven provinces at present will lose, they will be given compensation beginning from the coming year... In the long term investments will be made in the region to compensate the lost income of farmers through other ways and to provide new income sources for them...<sup>1377</sup>

President Nixon's speech contained the following points:

... Today, Erim declared that the Republic of Turkey, our friend and staunch ally within NATO, would abandon a traditional agricultural practice in order to make a significant contribution to the well-being of the world... This farsighted step will provide an example which we trust will soon be followed by other nations... We know well the importance of the agricultural sector of Turkey's economy and we are prepared to put at the disposal of the Turkish government our best technical brains to assist Turkey's program to bring about a better life for the Turkish farmer. We are proud to assist in a program from which we will all benefit... We in the United States are obligated to a friend and ally whose firm military and political commitment to the welfare and defense of the Atlantic Community is well known... I pledge continued cooperation with Turkey in its efforts to increase the well-being of its people and to maintain its independence and security.<sup>1378</sup>

On the same day President Nixon also joined a press conference together with the U.S. Secretary of State and the Turkish Ambassador to Washington. He told journalists that the Turkish government's decision was the most important initiative in the struggle to eradicate the source of heroin. Nixon explained that the Turkish decision was a result of negotiations between U.S. and Turkish officials.<sup>1379</sup>

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<sup>1377</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.311-315. For Erim's ideas on the opium ban see also *Resmî Temaslar, Sayın Başbakan ve Bn. Erim'in Birleşik Amerika'ya Ziyareti*, 18-23 March 1972, no date, publisher and place, pp.37, 50-51, 63. Erim stated that he was happy for doing something for the USA in return for U.S. economic and military aid to Turkey.

<sup>1378</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.316-317.

<sup>1379</sup> *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, June 1971, pp.141-142.

#### 8.4.2 Motivations of the Turkish Government in Banning Opium

Turkish officials always claimed that they decided to stop poppy cultivation for two reasons: (a) to serve humanity and (b) to save the prestige of Turkey in the eyes of international community.<sup>1380</sup> In their opinion, Turkey, as a country which wanted to be a part of the Western civilisation, could not be indifferent to a matter threatening the Western societies and other nations. Turkey also could not afford being seen as a country which poisoned other nations with its opium. According to Haluk Bayülken, who served as foreign minister for some time during the military-supported governments, the elected governments before 12 March 1971 were responsible for Turkey's bad reputation on the opium issue because they ignored the criticism by other countries and did not take effective measures because of electoral concerns.<sup>1381</sup>

It seems that the most important reason which pushed the Erim government to ban poppy cultivation was the desire of Turkish rulers to strengthen relations with the United States.<sup>1382</sup> The U.S. was really taking the opium issue very seriously. The Erim regime, which did not enjoy parliamentary and popular support at home, did not want to lose the American support as well. Turkish authorities and "their bosses", Turkish generals, were determined to prevent deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations because they needed U.S. economic and military aid and political support. In Mango's opinion the total ban on opium cultivation "symbolised the desire of Turkish generals and their proteges to do business with the United States."<sup>1383</sup> Mango also claims: "With a Marxist insurgency on their hands, the authorities took care not to antagonise the United States. The cultivation of opium was thus banned; and in economic policy, military-backed governments became noticeably more accommodating after the resignation of eleven radical ministers."<sup>1384</sup>

It is clear that constant U.S. pressures played a role in the Turkish decision.

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<sup>1380</sup> See Nihat Erim's speech, Turner, op.cit., p.311-315.

<sup>1381</sup> Bayülken told the author that these governments either should have proved that Turkey was not the source of the world's narcotic problem or should have taken really effective measures.

<sup>1382</sup> Osman Olcay, who served as foreign minister for some time during the Erim government, told the author that Turkish authorities had to consider the fact that the United States was the main military and economic aid supplier of Turkey.

<sup>1383</sup> A. Mango, *Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally*, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976, p.37.

<sup>1384</sup> Ibid., p.42.

The presentation of the decision to American public by U.S. rulers as their success strengthens this point. However, U.S. officials publicly claimed that it was persuasion and not coercion which brought about the Turkish opium ban and that if they had threatened to cut off aid Turkey would not have complied with their demand.<sup>1385</sup> On the other hand, many congressmen were of the opinion that Congress's threats to cut off aid played a role in the Turkish decision and that if the United States had pressurised Turkey previously, the opium ban would have been achieved much earlier.<sup>1386</sup>

Another reason for Turkish poppy prohibition was to prevent leftist radicals from getting weapons from abroad.<sup>1387</sup> Turkish political and military authorities believed that leftist terrorists were obtaining large amounts of weapons illegally from opium smugglers. When opium production was halted, drug traffickers would not be able to smuggle weapons into the country.

#### 8.4.3 The Implementation of the Opium Prohibition

In return for the prohibition of opium cultivation the United States undertook to provide Turkey with 35 million dollars in loans over a three-year period. Of this amount, 20 million dollars would be devoted to development programs and projects which could provide alternative sources of income and employment opportunities for poppy farmers. 15 million dollars would be for compensation to the Turkish government for its loss of foreign exchange earnings from legal export of opium and would be used to compensate the losses of opium growers.<sup>1388</sup> The United States also promised to provide 300,000 dollars for controlling the 1972 crop and 400,000 dollars for covering miscellaneous expenses.<sup>1389</sup>

Arrangements to determine a U.S. loan to Turkey on the opium issue were made secretly between Turkish and U.S. officials. As Spain stated, "due to Turkish political sensitivities, these arrangements were never welded into a single formal

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<sup>1385</sup> *International Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.17, 22, 28, 75, 76, 163, 164.

<sup>1386</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.21, 48.

<sup>1387</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.152, 156, 159-160, 278.

<sup>1388</sup> Zentner, op.cit., p.40, Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.299, Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.197, Nihat Erim's statements, *Cumhuriyet*, 25 February 1972, 23 March 1972.

<sup>1389</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.149-150.

document but were incorporated into various exchanges of letters.”<sup>1390</sup> Later Prime Minister Erim and other Turkish officials claimed that they banned opium cultivation unilaterally for humanitarian concerns without an agreement between the United States and Turkey on the matter. If the Turkish government felt that the ban was harming interests of poppy farmers, then it could resume poppy production. In their opinion, after Turkey took the decision, the United States offered aid to help them.<sup>1391</sup> However, American officials expressed the view that the Turkish action was primarily the result of an agreement between the two countries. They pointed out that the 35 million-dollar U.S. loan was an integral part of the negotiations and the agreement between U.S. and Turkish officials.<sup>1392</sup>

The United States transferred 20 million dollars of 35 millions by July 1974.<sup>1393</sup> In mid-1972 the United States gave 300,000 dollars to the Turkish Soil Products Office to assist its campaign to control and collect the opium harvest during the final growing season.<sup>1394</sup>

Turkish officials and public opinion argued that the U.S. aid was not enough to compensate losses of Turkish farmers and Turkey generally.<sup>1395</sup> They maintained that the amount envisaged would cover only one-twelfth of the total loss which was estimated as more than 6 billion Turkish liras or 400 million U.S. dollars.<sup>1396</sup> The Turkish government had declared that it would pay compensation to farmers who chose not to grow the poppy in 1971-1972 and to all who had formerly grown it in the four provinces but were forbidden to do so in 1972-1973 and the succeeding years. The basis for payment under the government’s formula would be the value on the international market of the whole produce, such as opium, seeds and stems

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<sup>1390</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.299.

<sup>1391</sup> Erim’s statements, *Cumhuriyet*, 25 February 1972, 21 March 1972, *Resmi Temaslar*, op.cit., p.50.

<sup>1392</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.146-147, 148, 150, 217. Kamran İnan told the author that opium cultivation was banned as a result of U.S. request and compensation. U.S. Congressman Lester L. Wolff told a House committee that he had “a statement from the U.S. State Department, which puts on paper the exact agreement that was made with” Turkey. *Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations*, op.cit., p.2.

<sup>1393</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.215-216, 241.

<sup>1394</sup> Zentner, op.cit., p.41.

<sup>1395</sup> Aytunç Altındal, “**Haşhaş Politikası**”, *Cumhuriyet*, 11 September 1973, K. Cemal Güven, “**Haşhaş Sorunu**”, *Cumhuriyet*, 23 March 1974.

<sup>1396</sup> G. Lewis, *Modern Turkey*, New York: Praeger, 1974, p.218, Zentner, op.cit., p.47n, *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., p.3.



that the growers would sell to the Soil Products Office in 1972.<sup>1397</sup> But the compensation envisaged did not include all losses of growers.<sup>1398</sup> For example, for the relatively high illegal revenue the farmers were earning before there would be no compensation.<sup>1399</sup> The individual farmer also had other indirect benefits that were harder to compensate.<sup>1400</sup> Moreover, former poppy farmers and small businessmen involved indirectly with opium production were kept outside the compensation.<sup>1401</sup> Allegedly, the Turkish government transferred only 2 million dollars of the 10 million dollars which it received from the U.S. to Turkish farmers. The rest of it went either into planning at the top levels of the government or was reserved for other purposes.<sup>1402</sup>

When Turkey announced the prohibition of poppy cultivation, U.S. President Nixon had promised to send American technical experts to Turkey to assist the Turkish government's projects of helping poppy farmers to survive in the face of economic hardship.<sup>1403</sup> As a part of this promise, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Clifford Hardin, and a team of American agricultural experts visited Turkey in November 1971.<sup>1404</sup> The Turks generally thought that Hardin had brought offers of substantial aid. During his visit, the Turkish press carried estimates evaluating Turkey's real losses caused by the poppy prohibition. At one point Turkish Agriculture Minister Orhan Dikmen found it necessary to issue a formal statement denying a widely circulated report that the Turkish government would resume opium production if the United States failed to provide sufficient compensation.<sup>1405</sup> In fact, Hardin had come to Turkey to explore with Turkish experts agricultural plans for substitute crops and sources of income and to provide technical advice on the

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<sup>1397</sup> Agriculture Minister Orhan Dikmen, *MMTD*, 24 February 1972, term 3, sess.3, vol.22, p.137.

<sup>1398</sup> See the report of some U.S. congressmen, expressing doubts about the compensation formula, in *Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations*, op.cit., p.67.

<sup>1399</sup> *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., p.4.

<sup>1400</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.305, Zentner, op.cit., p.41.

<sup>1401</sup> Turner, op.cit., p.217.

<sup>1402</sup> Ibid., pp.217, 220. See also statements of U.S. congressmen in *Turkish Opium Ban...*, op.cit., pp.2-3, 18, 55, 61, 62.

<sup>1403</sup> See also U.S.-Turkish joint statement at the end of Erim's visit to the USA, *Resmi Temaslar*, op.cit., p.63.

<sup>1404</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 3,7 November 1971, pp. 1 and 7.

<sup>1405</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.198.

transition from poppy cultivation.<sup>1406</sup>

As a result of the Hardin mission, a task force was established "to study the agricultural situation in the seven-province region, to assess the potential for improved agricultural output and associated agri-industries and to provide specific programs and policy recommendations for consideration by the Turkish government." In February 1972, the task force issued a report which was called "Improving Farm Income in the Poppy Region -A Program for Action, Recommendations of the Joint Turkish-American Agricultural Team."<sup>1407</sup> The U.S.-Turkish joint declaration on 15 February 1972 stated that research and experiments would be started to find substitute crops for opium and specified the actions which would be implemented immediately: irrigation; animal feeding; cultivation of sunflower, various fruits, and wheat; marketing; and the establishment of a sugar factory.<sup>1408</sup>

Turkish officials continuously reiterated their commitment to developing the poppy region and explained that they took necessary measures, and prepared plans and projects for this purpose.<sup>1409</sup> On 29 February 1972 the Turkish government issued a decree stating long-term projects for the economic and social development of the poppy region.<sup>1410</sup> In March the Poppy Region Development Organisation was established.<sup>1411</sup>

In spite of all these initiatives, the program of crop substitution never brought any positive results. It was realised that there was simply no single substitute crop which could replace poppy and yield as high a return per unit of land as does opium.<sup>1412</sup> The poppy was the only autumn-sown crop. It was not easily replaceable by spring crops such as cotton, maize, sugar beets or tobacco. It was harvested before the grain and thereby provided expense money for the main

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<sup>1406</sup> Ibid., p.198, Spain, 1975, op.cit., pp.299-300.

<sup>1407</sup> Zentner, op.cit., pp.40, 47n.

<sup>1408</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 16 February 1972.

<sup>1409</sup> Agriculture Minister Orhan Dikmen, *MMTD*, 24 February 1972, term 3. sess.3, vol.22, p.137, P.M. Nihat Erim's statements, *Cumhuriyet*, 25 February and 23 March 1972, P.M. Ferit Melen's statement, *Cumhuriyet*, 18 September 1972.

<sup>1410</sup> Melen's statement, op.cit.

<sup>1411</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.300.

<sup>1412</sup> Turner, op.cit., p.237, Ahmet Kerse, "Afyon Savaşı", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 January 1972, Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.300. See also the report of U.S. congressmen in *Turkish Opium Ban...*, op.cit., pp.62, 67.

harvest. Some of the areas where opium had been grown had extremely limited soil and water resources, and therefore were not suitable for a viable alternative agriculture.<sup>1413</sup>

Meanwhile, the United States decided that it did not want to get deeply and directly involved in the development program for the poppy region.<sup>1414</sup> It “made it clear to Turkey that it expected the Turks themselves to devise and implement it with only limited numbers of U.S. Department of Agriculture personnel being available under contract to advise.”<sup>1415</sup> Both the Turkish and the American sides grew pessimistic. The Turkish press was criticising the opium ban and interviewing discontented farmers and pointing to mistakes. Villagers did not see substantial progress in their situation and were becoming impatient to resume poppy growing.<sup>1416</sup> Seeing development projects as unbearable burdens Turkish officials were thinking that U.S. funds would not be sufficient to carry them out.<sup>1417</sup> American journalists who visited Turkey were emphasising the tremendous financial losses to those in the illegal trade and warning that total suppression would not work under any circumstances. U.S. diplomats and officials who played a part in bringing about the ban had the feeling that the 1971 arrangement could not last forever.<sup>1418</sup>

During the poppy prohibition period Turkish narcotics officers were trained and helped by U.S. narcotic agents in capturing illegal opium and smugglers.<sup>1419</sup> Turkish authorities established a Central Police Drugs Bureau to direct and coordinate the activities of thirty-three provincial narcotics offices. The Turks also arranged commissions to conduct regular inspection missions in the provinces where poppy cultivation was forbidden.<sup>1420</sup>

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<sup>1413</sup> Zentner, op.cit., p.41, *The Heroin Trail*, op.cit., pp.16-17.

<sup>1414</sup> During a committee discussion, some U.S. congressmen admitted that the USA did not do enough to help the Turks in the development program. *Turkish Opium Ban...*, op.cit., pp.33, 39, 40.

<sup>1415</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.301.

<sup>1416</sup> *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., pp.7, 17.

<sup>1417</sup> *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, op.cit., p.7.

<sup>1418</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., pp.301, 303.

<sup>1419</sup> *Ibid.*, p.300.

<sup>1420</sup> Zentner, op.cit., p.42.

#### 8.4.4 Turkish Public's Reaction to the Opium Ban

The opium prohibition really hurt the pride and honour of the Turkish nation. In their eyes, the interests of Turkish people had been bargained with a foreign country. The government had accepted that Turkish farmers had been poisoning the American people.<sup>1421</sup> The opium prohibition also symbolised Turkish subservience to U.S. interests and showed the humiliating dependence of Turkey on the United States.

However, the opium prohibition did not attract public criticism at that time because the military-backed regime did not allow free expression of ideas. Only some MPs dared to express opposition to the ban<sup>1422</sup> and in December 1971 21 deputies and in September 1972 111 deputies introduced bills to authorise resumption of opium production under strict control.<sup>1423</sup>

#### 8.4.5 U.S. Attitude Toward the Opium Ban

The Americans praised the Turkish decision to prohibit opium cultivation as a major step in fighting against the drug abuse problem of the USA.<sup>1424</sup> However, some Americans expressed the following doubts: It was highly likely that the Turkish ban would increase the cost of heroin in the American street market by causing a temporary shortage. This would result in more crime being committed and would only make the social consequences of addiction even greater.<sup>1425</sup> Even the stoppage of Turkish opium was not certain. The Turkish police and gendarmes were vulnerable to corruption and bribery by heroin smugglers because they had very low salaries. The Turks also lacked the logistical equipment and sophisticated enforcement capability that was necessary to enforce the opium ban adequately.<sup>1426</sup> As a tradition Turkish farmers would hide and had already hidden the opium crop

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<sup>1421</sup> Arcayürek, op.cit., pp.139, 144, 149, Özer Ölçmen and Süleyman Mutlu, *MMTD*, 24.2.1972, term 3, sess.3, vol.22, pp.133-135.

<sup>1422</sup> See speeches of Ö. Ölçmen and S. Mutlu, op.cit..

<sup>1423</sup> Harris, 1972, op.cit., p.198, *Cumhuriyet*, 18.9.1972, p.1, *Keesing's...*, 1974, vol.20, p.26722.

<sup>1424</sup> President Nixon's statements, *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, June 1971, pp.140-142, the State Department's statement quoted by Turner, op.cit., p.148, Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal's statement to Turkish journalists, *Cumhuriyet*, 14 January 1972, p.7, Secretary of State Roger's report to Congress mentioned by *Cumhuriyet*, 21 April 1973, p.3.

<sup>1425</sup> Ray, op.cit., p 194, Zentner, op.cit., p.44.

<sup>1426</sup> Zentner, op.cit., p.43, *Turkish Opium Ban...*, op.cit., pp.66, 67.

from the past harvest, which would continue to reach the American market for several years.<sup>1427</sup>

American critics also pointed out that when the Turkish opium ceased to be a supply source drug traffickers would shift their operations to somewhere else.<sup>1428</sup> It was estimated at that time that Turkey produced only 5 to 8 percent of the illicit opium available throughout the world.<sup>1429</sup> Some countries were already replacing Turkey as supply source. According to one estimate, in 1972 Mexico supplied 15 percent of American heroin.<sup>1430</sup> Burma, Thailand and Laos, which were called the Golden Triangle countries, produced more than half of the world's opium supply. In Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, illegal opium production was increasing rapidly.<sup>1431</sup> It was stated in the House Select Committee of the U.S. Congress on 2 January 1971: "Our hope for international control and, or eradication of the opium poppy becomes increasingly more difficult when we are dealing with opium-producing countries that do not have control over the areas within their borders where substantial quantities of opium poppies are cultivated and ultimately processed into morphine base. Several Southeast Asian countries fall clearly within this category."<sup>1432</sup> Allegedly the United States did not press high-level officials in some Southeast Asian countries, who directed opium smuggling, because they protected U.S. interests in the region.<sup>1433</sup>

Zentner reached the following conclusion, which was written in italics, in his article in 1973: "It seems probable that attempts to control or abolish opium production in Turkey will have little long-range effect on the American opiate problem as illicit marketeers turn to new and readily available sources of supply. This is the key element in understanding the futility of the present Turkish endeavour."<sup>1434</sup>

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<sup>1427</sup> Zentner, op.cit., p.44, *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., pp.8-9, *Turkish Opium Ban...*, op.cit., pp.66, 67.

<sup>1428</sup> See comments of U.S. congressmen in *International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem*, op.cit., pp.3, 25, 34, 49, 54, 61, 148, 149.

<sup>1429</sup> Zentner, op.cit., p.45, *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, op.cit., p.21.

<sup>1430</sup> Ray, op.cit., p.194, *International Aspects...*, op.cit., p.25.

<sup>1431</sup> Ray, op.cit., pp.194, 196, Zentner, op.cit., pp.45-46.

<sup>1432</sup> Zentner, op.cit., p.47n. See also *International Aspects...*, op.cit., pp.54, 119, 148.

<sup>1433</sup> "Afyon, CIA ve Türkiye", *Le Monde's* article translated by *Cumhuriyet*, 26 August 1972.

<sup>1434</sup> Zentner, op.cit., p.46.

On 27 June 1972 the U.S. Undersecretary of the Treasury Department, Eugene T. Rossides, went so far to say: "Stopping the source, the idea of putting in the amount of money that would be required for crop substitution is ludicrous. It was a misguided thought in the past and has led us to most of the problems we have today because less than 2 percent of the total production of opium would easily supply all the U.S. markets."<sup>1435</sup>

Unfortunately, after achieving the Turkish opium ban U.S. authorities ignored internal aspects of the drug trafficking and paid little attention to the availability of other sources. They did not even show enough determination to ensure the success of the Turkish ban. They failed to give enough help to the Turks and while high-level U.S. officials visited the neighbouring Arab countries for other reasons they did not stop in Turkey to talk to Turkish authorities on the opium problem.

#### 8.4.6 The Effect of the Opium Ban

American officials generally claimed that the prohibition of poppy cultivation in Turkey had the desired effect in the United States. According to them, the international illegal drug network was disrupted. Big drug traffickers needed new sources and when they got to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, they found American agents and local enforcement officials already organised to make life difficult for them. In the United States the rate of new drug addiction decreased and more and more addicts turned themselves in for treatment since they could not find the drug and could not afford to buy it.<sup>1436</sup>

According to the investigation of *Newsday* reporters, law enforcement officials first reported a heroin shortage in New York during the presidential campaign in August 1972. However, in the following years the availability of drugs was a disputed issue between U.S. officials. Some claimed that the shortage continued, others argued that the supply was still as plentiful as ever, although perhaps more adulterated than in the past. The survey which was released by the federal government's Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control in the summer

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<sup>1435</sup> Ibid., p.47n.

<sup>1436</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.304, *Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations*, op.cit., pp.10, 20, 31, 49, 59, 62, 71, 76, 77.

of 1972 acknowledged increased seizures of illegal heroin but it said that “the rising level of seizures still represents only a small fraction of the illicit flow... The international heroin market almost certainly continues to have adequate supplies to meet the demand in the consuming countries.”<sup>1437</sup>

During the meeting of the U.N. narcotics and dangerous drugs committee in 1974, U.S. official Robert Dupont said that for the first time deaths and crimes in the U.S., which were caused by drug addiction, decreased. He stated that the amount and quality of U.S. heroin decreased whereas its price increased and that the number of U.S. drug addicts reduced from 700,000 to 200,000. Another high level U.S. official, John R. Bartels, pointed that the heroin trafficking in North and South America fell considerably because of the Turkish opium prohibition. The chief of the French narcotics police, Francois Le Moel, claimed that the Turkish ban caused shortage of morphine base in Europe and this cut the amount of heroin smuggled into the U.S.<sup>1438</sup>

The Turks generally believed that the American drug addiction problem did not ease because of their opium ban. In their opinion, the apparent shortage of heroin and the increase in heroin prices was a result of the intensive U.S. and French police campaign against drug traffickers.<sup>1439</sup> In fact, it seems that both the ban and the increased police activities contributed to the heroin shortage and hence to the increased heroin prices, but the Turkish ban on its own proved an inadequate solution to the American drug abuse problem.

## 8.5 The Turkish Decision to Resume Opium Cultivation

### 8.5.1 The Period Before the Decision

When normal party politics returned in Turkey with the 1973 elections, the opium issue became one of the most important subjects of the election campaign. Since the people of the poppy region strongly demanded restoration of opium cultivation, almost all the parties competed with each other in trying to increase their votes by condemning the 1971 poppy ban and promising to resume opium

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<sup>1437</sup> *the Heroin Trail*, op.cit., p.xiii.

<sup>1438</sup> *Milliyet*, 14 March 1974.

<sup>1439</sup> Ö. Köknel, “Haşhaş Ekimi ve ABD”, *Milliyet*, 4 November 1975.

production under strict controls if they came to power. The election manifestos of all parties made the withdrawal of the ban a primary target.<sup>1440</sup>

During the elections and after Bülent Ecevit assumed the premiership in January 1974 by establishing a coalition with the National Salvation Party, Turkish public opinion, especially the press, continuously encouraged the authorities to fulfil their promises by legalising opium production.<sup>1441</sup> The resumption of poppy cultivation had become a matter of national honour and prestige. The Turks urged their prime minister to resist all kinds of U.S. pressures and to restore their honour sullied by the Erim regime. In their opinion, objective facts supported the Turkish government's stance for resumption of opium production. Turkey had been the world's largest legal exporter of opium and its opium had been the most valuable of all from a medicinal standpoint. Now, since Turkey stopped its production, a world shortage of medicinal opium was developing rapidly. Turkey itself was finding it increasingly difficult and expensive to acquire its own requirements of opium for medicinal use.<sup>1442</sup> International and American pharmaceutical companies were complaining of opium shortages and were pressurising Congress and the administration to meet their demands.<sup>1443</sup> The United States itself announced plans to go into poppy cultivation in the areas selected in the Far West, Walla Walla and Phoenix.<sup>1444</sup> She was also allowing the production of synthetic drugs which were available to drug addicts. Moreover, the United States encouraged India to increase its opium production and decided to meet needs of the medicinal sector from strategic stockpiles.<sup>1445</sup>

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<sup>1440</sup> N. Eren, *Turkey, NATO and Europe*, Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977, p.24, Turner, op.cit., p.251, Ahmad, op.cit., pp.419, 429n, Spain, 1975, op.cit., pp.301-302, *Cumhuriyet*, 9.10.1973.

<sup>1441</sup> In *Cumhuriyet*: Aytunç Altındal, "Haşhaş Politikası", 11.9.1973, İlhan Selçuk, "Haşhaş", 21.2.1974, Hasan Sever, "Haşhaş Sorunu ve Çözümü", 15.3.1974, Oktay Akbal, "Afyon Savaşı", 16.3.1974, İ. Selçuk, "Onurumuzu Koruyalım", 16.3.1974, İ. Selçuk, "Afyonu Afyon Söker", 17.3.1974, K. Cemal Güven, "Haşhaş Sorunu", 23.3.1974.

<sup>1442</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.307.

<sup>1443</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 14.6.1973, the article of New England Journal of Medicine quoted by *Cumhuriyet*, 27.1.1975, Turner, op.cit., pp.203-204, 229, *Cumhuriyet*, 14.3.1974, *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, op.cit., pp.7-8, 11.

<sup>1444</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.307, Eren, op.cit., p.24.

<sup>1445</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 14 and 20 March 1974, Spain, op.cit., p.307, Turner, op.cit., p.228.



### 8.5.2 The Ecevit Government's Actions on Opium

The Ecevit government had come to office by promising dynamic policies in every area, which would protect Turkish interests more effectively. Its program proclaimed the independence of Turkey as the aim of foreign policy.<sup>1446</sup> It soon became clear that Ecevit and his ministers had every intention of cancelling the opium ban and were not after more money from the United States as compensation. They continuously made public statements for this end.<sup>1447</sup> In March the Turkish government officially informed Washington that it would resume poppy production soon and asked U.S. authorities to join in re-examination of the opium ban.<sup>1448</sup> In the same month the Ecevit regime allowed opium production in state farms and agricultural institutions to protect the opium crop's genetic value<sup>1449</sup> and the Ministry of Agriculture started work on cultivation plans for 1974-75. Farmers were authorised to germinate poppy seeds in state farms for the next year's cultivation.<sup>1450</sup> Meanwhile, repeated strong approaches by U.S. Ambassador Macomber and other American officials received a negative response from Turkish authorities. Visiting U.S. congressmen and journalists were told that the opium ban would come to an end soon.<sup>1451</sup>

Eventually on 1 July 1974 the Turkish government announced that poppy cultivation would resume in the autumn of 1974 in seven provinces; Afyon, Burdur, Denizli, Isparta, Kütahya, Uşak and four towns of Konya. P.M. Bülent Ecevit explained the government's decision in his speech to the Turkish National Assembly on 2 July 1974.<sup>1452</sup> The prohibition of poppy cultivation by an unelected government had been a mistake because it created an unfillable gap in the poppy farmers' life in the absence of a viable alternative. The previous governments took some measures to compensate the losses of growers but these measures were insufficient and met with the understandable resistance of people. The eradication of Turkish

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<sup>1446</sup> Mango, op.cit., pp.42-43.

<sup>1447</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 16,17 February 1974, 14, 16, 17, 20 March 1974.

<sup>1448</sup> Turner, op.cit., pp.252-253, *Keesing's...*, vol.20, p.26722.

<sup>1449</sup> Ecevit's statement, *Cumhuriyet*, 17.3.1974, B. Ecevit, *MMTD*, 2.7.1974, term 4, sess.1, vol.6, p.347, *Keesing's...*, vol.20, p.26722.

<sup>1450</sup> Spain, op.cit, p.302, Turner, op.cit., p.252.

<sup>1451</sup> Spain, op.cit., p.302.

<sup>1452</sup> *MMTD*, term 4, sess.1, vol.6, pp.347-349. For reasons for the decision from Turkish point of view see also *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, op.cit., pp.8,10.

opium production caused a serious opium shortage in the world pharmaceutical industry and did not help the drug abuse problem in other countries. In the light of these facts the Turkish government decided to resume limited poppy cultivation under strict state control. It would take every kind of measure to prevent Turkish opium from harming other nations and would be willing to listen to the advice of any interested international organisations and friendly countries for this purpose. If the envisaged measures proved ineffective, the government would seek authority from parliament to implement more forceful methods. It would also continue to explore substitute crops and new sources of income in the poppy region. The Turkish government believed that it followed the will of the people by allowing opium cultivation. No democratic regime could tell its people to change their way of life and to give up a traditional way of earning which had been practised for centuries.

As elected rulers, the Ecevit government could justify resumption of opium cultivation in response to the will of people. But publicization of the matter, its presentation as an act of independence against the USA and ignoring protests of the Americans were mistakes made by Turkish authorities. U.S. rulers, too, failed in the matter by not responding to Turkish suggestions to review the opium ban.

### 8.5.3 Turkish Public's Reaction to the Lifting of the Opium Ban

The Ecevit government's decision to resume poppy cultivation received popular and political support at home.<sup>1453</sup> Some saw it as restoring Turkey's dignity and independence and some supported it in principle but expressed doubts about its long-term consequences. In his speech to the Turkish Parliament on 3 July 1974, Reliance Party leader Turhan Feyzioğlu expressed support for the decision as an act fulfilling people's demands but warned that the opium issue should not be exploited by the government for political purposes in a manner which would harm Turkey's alliance relations with the U.S. and the West.<sup>1454</sup> Justice Party leader Demirel saw the lifting of the opium ban as an act of an independent country but stated

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<sup>1453</sup> In *Tercüman*: A. Kabaklı, "Haşhaş Mutluluğu", 6.7.1974, H. Erkmén, "Ambargo ve Ötesi", 1.8.1975; in *Cumhuriyet*: A. Sirmen, "Amerikan Bombaları", 11.7.1974, A. Sirmen, "Alavere Dalavere", 15.7.1974; "Durum: Haşhaş Kararı ve Amerika", *Milliyet*, 3.7.1974.

<sup>1454</sup> *MMTD*, term 4, sess.1, vol.6, p.398.

that the government should consider advantages and disadvantages of its decision carefully.<sup>1455</sup> Nationalist Movement Party leader Alparslan Türkeş later claimed that the Ecevit government acted on the matter in pursuit of political gains rather than interests of poppy farmers and thus caused the isolation of Turkey in the Western camp and damaged its interests in the Cyprus question.<sup>1456</sup> Faruk Sükan, the secretary general of the Democrat Party, argued that the government's opium policy harmed Turkey's friendly relations with the United States and Europe.<sup>1457</sup>

The opinions expressed by İsmet Giritli and Metin Toker constitute good examples of the criticism directed against the resumption of poppy cultivation.<sup>1458</sup> The lifting of the opium ban was not related to Turkey's interests, pride and independence. The Ecevit government made a grave mistake by not demanding funds from the United States but allowing opium production without consulting with Americans. As a response to Turkey's hostile decision, the United States would not care any more about Turkey's security and economic interests. Turkey would face the danger of being isolated against its enemies such as Greece and the Soviet Union. The decision would please only three groups: anti-Americans, opium and arms smugglers. The best solution might be the implementation of the development projects which were considered by the previous governments with the help of the Americans.

## 8.6 U.S. Reaction to Resumption of Turkish Opium Production

### 8.6.1 Reaction of the Congress

When the Ecevit government made clear its intention to resume poppy production, U.S. congressmen threatened Turkey with cutting off aid. During their visit to Turkey on 15 and 16 March U.S. congressmen Wolff and Rangel warned Turkish officials and journalists that the cancellation of the opium ban would cause a severe

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<sup>1455</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 19.3.1974, p.7, A. Öymen, "Ecevit Başbakanlık Dönemini Anlatıyor", op.cit..

<sup>1456</sup> Öymen, op.cit. Turkish academic Seyfi Taşhan agreed with Türkeş's point.

<sup>1457</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 14 July 1974, p.1.

<sup>1458</sup> İ. Giritli, "Haşhaş ve Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri", *Tercüman*, 15.7.1975; M. Toker, "Haşhaş Ötesi ve Berisi", 24.3.1974, "Haşhaşın Sonrası", 14.7.1974, *Milliyet*.

reaction among American congressmen and people.<sup>1459</sup> As reported by Turner, in the wake of the Turkish decision on 1 July 1974, more than 250 bills suggesting cutting off aid to Turkey were pending in Congress.<sup>1460</sup> On 12 July the Senate passed a resolution by 81 to 8, which required stopping economic and military aid to Turkey if she did not take effective measures on the opium issue.<sup>1461</sup>

Discussions of U.S. congressmen during a committee meeting on 16 July 1974 give their ideas on the Turkish decision to resume poppy production.<sup>1462</sup> The Turkish decision was taken because of political concerns rather than economic ones. The Turkish government failed to use the U.S.-supplied funds to ease difficulties of poppy farmers. Poppy production contributed very little to the Turkish economy and provided income for a very small percentage of the Turkish population. The Turkish opium ban between 1971 and 1974 did not cause great economic and social hardship in Turkey. Ignoring economic aspects of the problem, some "demagogic" Turkish politicians used the issue as a symbol of Turkish nationalism to gain political support. Organised crime in Turkey, too, inspired the opium campaign. Turkish authorities decided to resume poppy cultivation unilaterally without consulting with U.S. officials in spite of the existence of an agreement on the matter between the two countries. As the past experiences had shown, Turkey could not prevent the diversion of opium into illicit channels because of ineffectiveness of its bureaucracy. The Turkish government recently released from jail charged narcotic traffickers who would go back to business.

U.S. congressmen further argued: The Turkish opium ban had substantially contributed to the reduction of the number of heroin addicts and heroin-related problems in the USA. With the new Turkish decision, there would be a big increase in heroin supply in America and all the success achieved in the drug abuse problem would be reversed. Therefore, this decision constituted a direct attack upon the people of the USA. As *Washington Post*'s article stated, "if the Turkish government had announced that it intended to land secret agents at night on American shores to poison and kill thousands of Americans, and to subvert the foundations of

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<sup>1459</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 16 and 17 March 1974.

<sup>1460</sup> Turner, op.cit., p.201.

<sup>1461</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 13 July 1974, pp.1, 7, *Keesing's...*, vol.20, p.26722.

<sup>1462</sup> *Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations*, op.cit., pp.1-77.

American society - which is, of course, exactly what heroin does - then that would be regarded as an act of war and handled accordingly." The threat of Turkish opium to U.S. people was much greater than the Turkish contribution to NATO. In fact, U.S. facilities in Turkey and Turkey's cooperation in the defence field was no longer important for the USA. In any case, congressmen had the commitment to their constituents rather than to Turkey. The Congress should authorise the President to cut off aid to Turkey, showing its seriousness on the matter. This could exert pressure upon Turkey and change its decision.

There were also some congressmen who claimed that such a decision would not force the Turks to change their policies. They also argued: As other states could do, Turkey, too, could develop a strict control program on opium production. It was a fact that the U.S. administration, too, failed in this matter. It did not give enough help to the Turks in their development projects in the poppy region and did not take action to persuade Turkish rulers to change their decision after they expressed their intention. The United States itself should take effective measures at home rather than expecting the others to solve its problem.

At the end of July the Congress forbade the Export-Import Bank to grant further credit to Turkey because of its resumed poppy cultivation.<sup>1463</sup> On 6 August 1974 House Concurrent Resolution 507, sponsored by 239 Congressmen, was passed by the House. The resolution urged the president to "1- immediately initiate negotiations at the highest level of the Turkish government to prevent the resumption of opium production; and 2- if such negotiations prove unfruitful, exercise the authority provided by the Congress under the Foreign Assistance Act [of 1971], to terminate all assistance to the Government of Turkey."<sup>1464</sup> The Senate passed an amendment to the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970, which required the president to terminate all aid by 1 January 1975 to any government that failed to ban opium production.<sup>1465</sup> After the second Turkish military intervention in Cyprus on 14 August 1974, an initiative was launched by

<sup>1463</sup> Turner, op.cit., p.261, *Cumhuriyet*, 2 August 1974, p.1.

<sup>1464</sup> *Turkish Opium Ban...*, op.cit., p.1, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., pp.180-181, *Cumhuriyet*, 7.8.1974, p.1, K.R. Legg, "Congress as Trojan Horse?" in J. Spanier and J. Noguee (eds.), *Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign Policy*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1981, pp.118-119, Turner, op.cit., p.257.

<sup>1465</sup> Turner, op.cit., p.258.

the U.S. Congress to impose an arms embargo on Turkey because of its actions in Cyprus. Thus opium became a secondary issue. Opponents of the Turkish opium cultivation supported the arms embargo and supporters of the embargo exploited the opium issue for their purposes.<sup>1466</sup>

### 8.6.2 The U.S. Administration's Reaction

The U.S. administration was not happy with the Ecevit government's intention to resume poppy production. In their opinion, the ban should not be lifted because it had proved a success. On 6 May 1974 U.S. officials privately warned that U.S.-Turkish relations would worsen if poppy cultivation was resumed.<sup>1467</sup> On 8 May 1974 U.S. narcotics official Sheldon B. Vance told the Senate that 20 million dollars of aid intended for Turkey had been held because Turkey's decision on the opium issue was not clear yet.<sup>1468</sup>

When Turkey decided to resume opium production, the U.S. administration attacked the Turkish action as a breach of an agreement.<sup>1469</sup> The State Department commented that "we deeply regret the decision of the Turkish government... It was taken without any official Turkish notification to U.S. Ambassador William B. Macomber."<sup>1470</sup> State Department spokesman John King expressed the American worry about the Turkish action but he said that economic and military aid to Turkey would not be stopped though the 20 million dollar promised loan would not be paid.<sup>1471</sup> As a means of displaying its displeasure, on 7 July 1974 the U.S. administration recalled its ambassador to Turkey for consultations and to review the situation arising from the Turkish government's decision.<sup>1472</sup>

In the aftermath of the Turkish decision, U.S. officials reportedly opposed the actions of Congress to cut off aid to Turkey because they believed that these kinds

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<sup>1466</sup> Bülent Ecevit claimed in Kurtul Altuğ's programme on Turkish TV, *Bunalımlı Yıllar*, 1993, that contrary to the general belief the arms embargo was imposed on Turkey because of its decision to lift the opium ban, not its intervention in Cyprus.

<sup>1467</sup> R.C. Company, *Turkey and the United States*, New York: Praeger, 1986, p.26.

<sup>1468</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 9 May 1974, p.1.

<sup>1469</sup> *Keesing's...*, vol.20, p.26722.

<sup>1470</sup> Turner, op.cit., p.256.

<sup>1471</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 4 July 1974, p.1.

<sup>1472</sup> *Ibid.*, 6 July 1974, p.1, Company, op.cit., p.26, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.180, Turner, op.cit., p.256.

of threats would not reverse the Turkish action but would harm strategic interests of the United States.<sup>1473</sup> Before the Cyprus issue overtook the opium question, the administration managed to fight off a flat cut-off of aid and to introduce consideration of control into the handling of the matter.<sup>1474</sup>

American public opinion showed great anger toward the Turkish decision to resume poppy cultivation. Parents, doctors, law enforcement officials believed that Turkish opium would resume poisoning the youth of American at a high rate. American newspapers carried articles severely criticising the Turkish decision. The most extreme of these was Pete Hamill's article in *New York Post* on 8 July 1974, "Act of War".<sup>1475</sup> Seeing the Turkish action as an act of war against American people, Hamill suggested the bombing of Turkish poppy fields by the U.S. Air Force.

## 8.7 The Aftermath of the Opium Issue

While allowing the opium production in seven provinces under state licensing, the Ecevit government took the strictest measures to prevent illicit drug traffic.<sup>1476</sup> The most important of them was the introduction of a new method of harvesting poppies, the "poppy straw process". Formerly, raw opium had been scraped by poppy farmers from the incised poppy pod, and therefore, given high prices for illicit sales, it had been impossible to control opium supply in thousands of hands. The straw process method completely bypassed the production of gum opium by farmers through incision. The government forbade farmers to incise poppy pods. The entire plant would be cut in the field and taken to a government factory employing the straw process, which would use a sophisticated technique to extract maximum narcotic from the plant. Thus the government monopoly would purchase the whole product and process it into morphine, which would be marketed to meet legitimate world medicinal needs for codeine and other opium derivatives. For a few

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<sup>1473</sup> *Cumhuriyet*, 13 July 1974, p.7.

<sup>1474</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.304.

<sup>1475</sup> Quoted by *Turkish Opium Ban...*, op.cit., pp.73-75. See also Spain, op.cit., p.302, Bölükbaşı, op.cit., p.181; in *Cumhuriyet*, O. Akbal, "**Haşhaş Soğuk Savaşı**", 15.7.1974, A. Sirmen, "**Amerikan Bombaları**", 11.7.1974.

<sup>1476</sup> For detailed information see *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, op.cit., pp.12-13.

years, until Turkey built such an opium factory, the harvested, unincised poppies would be exported to Western Europe.<sup>1477</sup>

These Turkish actions were generally praised by the international community. On 19 September 1974 the United Nations issued an official statement welcoming Turkey's decision to implement a new method as an act of strict compliance with international obligations.<sup>1478</sup> In another statement on 16 October, the United Nations presented the Turkish action to other states as an example to be carried out in opium production and stated that the new method would prevent illegal opium traffic and increase earnings of poppy farmers.<sup>1479</sup> A U.N. narcotics mission that visited Turkey in July 1975 reported that it was greatly impressed by the success of the Turkish control system.<sup>1480</sup> The investigation of the International Narcotics Control Board and the U.N. Secretariat, which was completed on 13 July 1976, indicated that Turkish controls were fully effective and that there had not been any diversion or leakage to the illicit market.<sup>1481</sup> After receiving complaints of illegal opium trafficking another U.N. mission went to Turkey in early 1977 but found "no evidence that there have been any leaks since poppy cultivation was resumed in 1975."<sup>1482</sup>

The United States, too, praised the Turkish actions as effective ways of preventing opium smuggling. On 20 September 1974 the State Department expressed the American pleasure with the Turkish decision to apply the straw process.<sup>1483</sup> In a message to Congress President Ford praised the effectiveness of the Turkish controls.<sup>1484</sup> In fact, the U.S. government financed the straw process plant built by Turkey.<sup>1485</sup>

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<sup>1477</sup> Spain, 1975, op.cit., p.308, Spain, *American Diplomacy in Turkey*, op.cit., p.83, Harris, "Turkey and the United States" in Karpas(ed.), op.cit., p.70, Turner, op.cit., p.253, *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, op.cit., pp.15,17.

<sup>1478</sup> Ü. Gürtuna, "Diplomaside Kulis", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 September 1974, Öymen, "Ecevit Başbakanlık Dönemini Anlatıyor", op.cit..

<sup>1479</sup> Öymen, op.cit..

<sup>1480</sup> Eren, op.cit., p.25, *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, op.cit., pp.15-16.

<sup>1481</sup> S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, *History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol.II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, p.432.

<sup>1482</sup> Eren, op.cit., p.25.

<sup>1483</sup> Öymen, op.cit..

<sup>1484</sup> Eren, op.cit., p.25, *Facts on Turkish Poppy*, op.cit., p.18.

<sup>1485</sup> Spain, *American Diplomacy in Turkey*, op.cit., p.83.



In the mid and late 1970s the most important problem for Turkey on the opium issue was narcotics originating outside the country and passing through it on the way to Western Europe.<sup>1486</sup> Developments concerning opium in the 1980s were mentioned by former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, James W. Spain, in his book: At the beginning of the 1980s, "there was an enormous stock [in Turkey] from the poppy fields waiting for completion of the straw process plant so that processing could be taken. The key to the success of the whole venture was the U.S. medical market for which the major pharmaceutical companies made large purchases. In July 1981 a team of company representatives and officials from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration arrived in Turkey to try to put the whole operation together." After the plant started working in good condition, another question emerged: whether the United States would buy the Turkish opium. "The General Services Administration, which is responsible for maintaining U.S. strategic stock-piles, was contemplating a large replenishment of its holdings, which could sop up all the backlog of the Turkish plant. However, no one was eager to assign Turkey a specific quota - which would limit freedom in the market. After much haggling it was agreed not to set individual country quotas, but to allocate 80 percent of the market to Turkey and India together and 20 percent to all other producers."<sup>1487</sup>

Another problem that concerned the U.S. and Turkey on opium was a number of U.S. travellers serving long-term sentences in Turkish prisons for narcotic offences. There was an antipathy among the American people toward Turkey on this issue, which stemmed from a famous film, "Midnight Express". U.S. ambassadors "Spiers and Macomber had negotiated a U.S.-Turkey treaty on the Enforcement of Judicial Judgements, which provided the long-term prisoners in each country of the opposite nationality could opt to serve their remaining sentences in their country." When Ambassador Spain left Turkey in August 1981, "the prisoners had gone home, and they were released soon on parole since the parole system is provided for in the U.S. legal structure and not in the Turkish. At my departure, we did not have a single U.S. long-term prisoner in Turkey."<sup>1488</sup>

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<sup>1486</sup> R.F. Nyrop (ed.), *Turkey*, op.cit., p.295.

<sup>1487</sup> Spain, *American Diplomacy in Turkey*, op.cit., pp.83-84.

<sup>1488</sup> Ibid., pp.137-138.

## 8.8 Conclusion

Up to 1971 U.S. pressures led Turkish rulers to take some measures to control illegal opium production and trafficking but failed to force Turkish authorities to ban opium cultivation completely. Internal concerns prevented the Turkish government from falling under the influence of the USA in this regard. The non-party Erim government, not bound by electoral considerations, easily gave in to U.S. pressures but also maintained that the ban was in Turkey's interests too. The Ecevit government in 1974 resumed poppy cultivation as proof of its independence from the USA but faced threats from Congress. It would have certainly been subjected to heavy U.S. pressures if the Cyprus crisis had not forestalled the issue.

Like the Cyprus question, the opium issue was a matter which did not concern the basis of the Turkish-American alliance, i.e. maintaining security in the context of the East-West confrontation. Although it was not originally serious or fundamental enough to strain relations between the two countries, the opium question would have shaken the alliance dramatically if the Cyprus issue had not emerged. If the two governments tried, they could have found a mutually satisfactory solution because the essence of the problem was not the production of opium but the leaking of the product into illicit channels. Other producer countries had been able to establish effective controls, and Turkey could have easily followed their example. However, the two states mainly tried to appeal to their domestic opinion with their policies. By propagating that halting the flow of Turkish opium at the source would ease the drug abuse problem, the Americans disregarded the importance of relations with Turkey, misjudged the true nature of Turkey's domestic politics, and ignored the realities of heroin supply and demand. While using forceful tactics against Turkey with heavy Congressional and press involvement, they neglected the possible damage to the reputation of the Turkish government in the eyes of international community and Turkish people. Turkish authorities first did not take effective measures to prevent illegal production and selling of opium and allowed their country to gain a bad reputation on the matter. Then they saw the resumption of poppy cultivation as a gesture against the United States and more specifically as a challenge to the U.S. Congress. Presenting the action as an act of independence, they aimed to increase their popular support but ignored the possible alienation of the American people from the presentation of the decision.

## Chapter IX

### CONCLUSION

#### 9.1 General Evaluation of U.S.-Turkish Relations

The only shadow over close relations between Turkey and the United States in the 1950s had been U.S. unwillingness to supply a stabilisation fund to Turkey to help its balance of payments problems. After a four-year debate, the Turkish government had to accept strict U.S. conditions in 1958 to be able to obtain the fund.<sup>1489</sup> After the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact as a result of a military coup, the United States assured Turkish rulers of U.S. commitment to Turkish security by signing a bilateral agreement in 1959. In the eyes of opposition Republican People's Party's members this American act was aimed at saving the rightist Democrat Party government. While RPP leaders warmly welcomed the overthrow of the DP regime by the military coup of 27 May 1960, which could be seen by them as an anti-American act in those circumstances, DP supporters believed that the Americans abandoned them and cite as proof growing U.S. displeasure with their government toward the end of the 1950s.

Hence both the U.S. attitude toward the coup and the military junta's actions in Turkey's alliance relations with the United States and NATO became particularly sensitive matters. In fact, in their first public announcement, Turkish officers expressed their loyalty to their existing alliances and NATO, showing their intention not to make any changes in the traditional direction of Turkish foreign policy. The quick recognition of the new regime and the promise of economic and military aid to it by the United States proved that there would be no changes in U.S.-Turkish relations. In fact, the Turkish military junta soon became more dependent on the USA because of its need for U.S. financial assistance to achieve economic development and to improve the welfare of Turkish military officers. Therefore, it did not hesitate to sign bilateral agreements with the United States,

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<sup>1489</sup> G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.74-75, T.A. Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey*, New York: Praeger, 1983, p.19.

to station the U.S.-supplied Jupiter missiles on Turkish territory and even to facilitate the legislation of bilateral agreements with the USA by introducing a new constitutional procedure. Military rulers wanted to make some changes in rules applied to U.S. personnel in Turkey but when the Americans seemed unwilling to give up their existing privileges, they did not pursue the matter.

When the Cuban missile crisis broke in October 1962, the Turks still had warm feelings toward the United States. Turkish rulers and MPs proudly supported the U.S. stance to expel the Soviet missiles from the Caribbean. There was no criticism in the Turkish press directed toward the firm U.S. stance against the Soviet Union, which could cause a global nuclear war. When the possibility of trading Soviet missiles in Cuba with the Jupiters in Turkey was discussed in Western states and when it was proposed by Soviet Premier Khrushchev, the Turks did not make any comment about it and sincerely believed that their close ally America would not bargain the interests of a NATO member with the enemy camp.

Meanwhile, the pluralist 1960 constitution began to have its effects in Turkish politics. Using means provided by the constitution, marginal groups were able to voice their opinions and criticise basic tenets of the regime, including the traditional foreign policy line which was considered a taboo. Newspaper columns became the main platform of such discussions and criticism. As a start, the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles were criticised on the ground that it decreased Turkey's strategic importance for the West and created a security gap for Turkish defence. During parliamentary discussions in 1963 the inadequacy of U.S. military aid was subjected to criticism.

The most important thing which triggered the widespread anti-Americanism in Turkey was the Turkish belief that the United States did not work enough to stop atrocities against Turkish Cypriots, which began at the end of December 1963, but continuously prevented the Turkish government from intervening in Cyprus to protect lives and rights of Turkish people on the island. President Johnson's letter to Turkish P.M. İnönü in June 1964 further fuelled the anti-Americanism among Turkish people and brought radical changes in the thinking of Turkish rulers. Johnson had threatened that NATO might not come to Turkey's help if the Soviet Union attacked Turkey because of her intervention in Cyprus and he had

reminded the Turks that they could not use U.S.-supplied weapons in their actions in Cyprus. While mainly leftist groups and university students arranged mass demonstrations against the USA and attacked American buildings in major Turkish cities, Turkish authorities showed their disappointment over the U.S. attitude with their statements. In one point Turkish P.M. İnönü hinted that Turkey could leave the Western camp. Nevertheless, frictions between the USA and Turkey on the official level did not last long. To change the unpleasant image of the United States among Turkish people, U.S. leaders reiterated their commitment to Turkish security, offered more financial assistance and voted against the U.N. decision in December 1965, which supported the Greek cause. Turkish rulers announced that it was not their intention to change their foreign policy line and leave the Western camp.

After the rightist Justice Party came to power at the end of 1965, Turkish leftist groups increased their attacks against the United States and Turkey's alliance with this state and NATO. Columnists of Turkish newspapers except rightist ones joined leftists in criticising all aspects of Turkish-American relations, especially military contacts. Under public pressure and to prove their independence Turkish rulers took the following major actions which could be interpreted as anti-American: the withdrawal from the Multilateral Force, banning U-2 flights using Turkish territory, changing the duty status formula applied to U.S. personnel, not allowing the use of the İncirlik base for non-NATO purposes, reviewing all bilateral military agreements with the USA and forcing this state to sign a new general military agreement. Turkish leaders also tried to improve relations with Eastern bloc countries through intensive state visits and economic agreements and to gain the sympathy of Third World and Arab countries by supporting their causes in the United Nations.

The Americans were not happy about the Turkish actions but they did not show resentment because these actions did not harm their fundamental interests which were fulfilled by the strong Turkish commitment to NATO and the U.S. use of military facilities and bases on Turkish territory. The apparent pro-Turkish attitude of the United States during the November 1967 Cyprus crisis also ensured the closeness of U.S.-Turkish relations on the official level until 1969.

After 1969 Turkish rulers were subjected to U.S. pressure on their opium production. The Americans had believed that Turkish opium provided 80 percent of heroin at U.S. streets and thus made great contribution to the harrowing drug addiction problem among the youth of the USA. Turkish authorities did not fulfil the U.S. demand to prohibit opium cultivation because they did not want to lose the votes of poppy growers. Meanwhile, increasing terrorist actions against U.S. personnel by Turkish leftists, who lost representation in the parliament to voice their opinion, posed another problem for the Americans.

The removal of the Turkish government from power by the military on 12 March 1971 and the subsequent rule by non-party, technocrat governments served mostly U.S. interests. Under the martial law, extreme leftist groups were suppressed and thus anti-American criticism in newspaper columns and terrorist acts against U.S. personnel stopped. More importantly, opium cultivation in Turkey was completely prohibited. However, the return of normal party politics at the end of 1973 brought problems for U.S.-Turkish relations again. After an election period in which heavy criticism was directed against the opium ban, the coalition government of leftist Republicans and Islamist Salvationists decided to resume poppy production in June 1974 as an act of independence in spite of American protests. While the U.S. Congress was busy with trying to cut off economic and military assistance to Turkey because of the new Turkish decision, the military coup in Cyprus and the subsequent Turkish intervention in Cyprus forestalled them.

The Turkish government was not unhappy with the U.S. attitude toward its action, which resulted in capturing 36 percent of Cyprus, because the United States had not taken direct action to prevent or later to reverse the Turkish action. In fact, Turkish rulers were of the opinion that they had proved that their government was not under the U.S. influence and was able to pursue Turkey's national interests effectively. However, the U.S. Congress's action to impose an arms embargo on Turkey because of its intervention in Cyprus, starting from 5 February 1975, caused a new wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Turkish authorities were angry because they believed that the Congress action unilaterally violated principles of the U.S.-Turkish alliance and undermined its basis. As a response, in July 1975 the coalition government of rightist parties, "the nationalist front", announced invalidity of U.S.-Turkish bilateral agreements and closed down U.S. facilities and bases in Turkey.

Thus, relations between Turkey and the United States hit their lowest level though the alliance of the two states continued within the NATO framework.

## 9.2 Evaluation of Validity of Theories

Alliance theories studied in Chapter II proved to be a great help to explain Turkish-American relations between 1960 and 1975. It became clear in the course of the study that reasons adumbrated in those theories for alliance formation and continuation were also valid for the U.S.-Turkish relationship. Although they had serious disputes with the USA on some matters, the Turks remained very keen to continue their alliance with America because they saw it as a warranty of Turkish security against the Soviet threat and other possible threats, as a source of considerable military and economic assistance and as a guarantee for westernising Turkey and making her a part of the Western world. Turkey's strategic importance for U.S. interests, which were explained in Chapter IV, and the desire to keep Turkey within the Western camp so as not to lose prestige vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc were the main reasons for the USA continuing the alliance with Turkey.

Both sides clearly believed that the alliance brought far more benefits than costs for their national interests.<sup>1490</sup> However, the implications of the Cuban missile crisis and the Johnson letter caused doubts in the Turkish side on the security provided by the alliance and thus decreased the value of the alliance for Turkey. Technological developments in intelligence collecting and nuclear missiles, withdrawal of the Jupiters from Turkey and unavailability of Turkish bases for operations in the Middle East led American leaders to attribute less importance to their alliance with Turkey.

In the 1960s and the 1970s, the goals and expectations of Turkey and the United States from their alliance were not so similar as they had been during the 1950s. Turkey wanted the alliance help its Cyprus cause whereas the United States expected that the close alliance relationship would induce the Turks to do a favour for America by prohibiting opium cultivation. This situation caused problems in the two states' relations.

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<sup>1490</sup> Turkish rulers' opinions in this regard were mentioned in the section of NATO discussion in Chapter IV and U.S. officials' opinions in the section of Turkey's strategic importance in the same chapter and in the section of the arms embargo in Chapter VIII.

In the 1960-1975 period, the U.S.-Turkish alliance was considerably affected by developments in the international arena. The decrease of tension and conflict between the Eastern and Western blocs (detente) allowed both states to act more independently from restrictions of their alliance. The apparent decrease in the Soviet threat particularly let Turkish rulers improve their relations with Eastern bloc and Third World countries and give more emphasis to their national causes, especially the Cyprus problem. The Americans became less anxious about providing military and economic assistance to Turkey and went so far as to threaten Turkey with not protecting her against the Soviet camp.

The thesis has showed that U.S.-Turkish contacts between 1960 and 1975 did not amount to a patron-client relationship though some individual events implied the opposite result. Generally, until 1964 Turkey acted as if it was under close and strong American influence. The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 supported this conclusion. Turkish rulers proudly announced their support for the U.S. stance during the crisis without thinking that Turkey's interests and even its survival could be put under threat because of their attitude and they expected only U.S. praise in return, nothing else. On the other side, the Americans bargained the Jupiter missiles belonging to Turkey with the Soviet Union without informing the Turks and they did not tell the Turks how Turkey's survival was under threat. Before 1964, Turkey's voting patterns in the United Nations very largely coincided with those of the United States.

In 1964, heavy U.S. pressures on Turkish rulers prevented them from taking a major action in Cyprus, including military intervention. The Johnson letter in June 1964 in particular resembled an ultimatum sent by a colonial power to its vassal. However, the severe reaction of Turkish rulers and people induced the Americans to be more careful in their dealings with the Turks and avoid alienating them because they certainly did not want to lose benefits of their alliance with Turkey. Turkish actions after 1964 implied more independence from U.S. influence. Turkey improved relations with states outside the Western camp, took some actions in military relations with the USA and supported causes of Arab and Third World countries in U.N. votings. However, she also remained strictly loyal to her commitment toward NATO, allowed the use of military bases on her territory by the United States and followed the U.S. lead in U.N. votings on cold-war matters.



Before 1971 Turkish rulers complied with most of the U.S. demands on the opium question and showed sincere efforts to help the United States in this issue. However, in order not to lose electoral support and not to be seen as acting under the U.S. influence, they did not fulfil the main American demand, prohibiting opium cultivation completely. The military-backed governments after March 1971 proved to be more receptive to U.S. influences. They banned opium cultivation to prevent deterioration of relations with the United States.

The Ecevit government of 1974 was seen by many as the most independent of Turkish governments, pursuing Turkish interests without staying under U.S. influence. In fact, it resumed poppy production and intervened in Cyprus militarily in spite of U.S. opposition. But at the same time it was anxious not to destroy the alliance with the USA nor to allow a serious deterioration of U.S.-Turkish relations. Therefore, the Ecevit government was very careful in taking these decisions not to alienate the Americans. Moreover, the U.S. administration was not altogether determined to prevent the Turkish intervention in Cyprus and on the opium question the Congress was doing enough to punish Turkey. The U.S. arms embargo in February 1975 and the closure of bases by Turkey in July 1975 clearly showed that the Turkish-American alliance was not a patron-client relationship. However, Turkey's economic and military dependence on the USA was always a continuing fact in relations.

### **9.3 Other Results of the Study**

It will now be appropriate to answer the questions which are set forth in the Introduction though they are dealt with partially in different parts of the thesis. It has become clear from the study that a superpower inevitably gets involved in a matter which mainly concerns its small ally if this issue seems to have the potential to affect the alliance established by the superpower and the balance of power in a strategic region. As the leader of the Western camp, which had global interests, the United States got involved in the Cyprus question, which mainly concerned Turkey and Greece, and tried to influence its development to prevent any possible damage to NATO and her interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

Superpowers certainly have the potential to influence decisions and actions of their small allies and even to force them to act in a certain way through threats of

punishment. But they are restricted by certain factors such as their own interests while acting in this way. While they tried to prevent a proposed Turkish intervention in Cyprus, the Americans did not want to alienate the Turks totally and lose their alliance which brought considerable benefits for U.S. interests. Moreover, Turkey was an independent state which could resist American demands especially on her vital national causes. Turkey's membership of NATO also diminished the possibility of any U.S. armed action against Turkey such as had been applied to many Central American countries.

Open threats generally fail to force a small state to act in a certain way because they arouse public emotions. Public consensus on a matter which touches national feelings plays a great role in the determination of the small state's government in not yielding to pressures of its big ally. Turkey's adamant position on the Cyprus question and its military intervention in Cyprus could be explained by the tremendous support given by all segments of the Turkish population including the military.

Pressures from a superpower may lead its small ally to seek alternative sources of support for her security and national interests but the decision of this small ally to change sides or to opt for neutrality depends on her military and economic capabilities and the character of the international system. The small state may improve her relations with members of other blocs with the help of detente but she does not enter into defence contacts with these states if she does not want to lose her existing alliance. Turkish authorities had economic and cultural contacts with the Eastern bloc and the Third World and supported some of their causes in international forums but they did not buy a single weapon from these states in order not to loosen their defence cooperation with the West. In their eyes, the Western alliance provided the vital guarantee for Turkey's security.

Having alliance relations with a superpower may always bring difficulties for a small state. It may attract the threat of another superpower and may cause the involvement of the small state in superpower conflicts. The big ally's interference in internal affairs and its influence on domestic and foreign policy decisions are also possibilities. If the small power's elites are not careful in their dealings with the superpower and follow its lead with full trust, dangers for the small state increase.

The Cuban crisis demonstrated all these dangers for Turkey, as was explained in Chapter V. Turkey had to stop its opium production because of its alliance relationship with the USA. This incident also proved that military regimes which are militarily dependent on a superpower are more responsive to demands of the superpower.

One important conclusion of the thesis is that internal conditions and public opinion on both sides played an important role in relations between the United States and Turkey. Turkish policies on the opium and Cyprus questions and the U.S. attitude on the opium and arms embargo issues were strongly influenced by internal public opinion. The sensitiveness of Turkish rulers to foreign influence and intervention, their long-pursued aim of integrating Turkey into the Western world, their evaluation of Turkey's strategic importance, their seeing the Cyprus issue as a vital national cause and the continuity of Turkey's traditional foreign policy line, too, had effects on U.S.-Turkish relations. On the American side, anti-communism, the world leadership concept, realism during the Nixon administration, the Vietnam issue, the president's wide powers in formulating foreign policy, and the Congress's actions to curb the presidential power and to have a voice in foreign policy decisions were general elements of U.S. foreign policy which also had repercussions on the U.S.-Turkish alliance.

Chapter IV showed that the following factors played role in Turkish actions in the military field, which appeared as anti-American: intensive public criticism of Turkey's military relations with the USA, misconduct in signing of bilateral military agreements, untidiness of these agreements, U.S. personnel's actions antagonising the Turkish public, and the humiliation of Turkey by U-2 flights which took place without her knowledge. The Turks succeeded in banning U-2 flights, rearranging bilateral agreements under a new general treaty, in changing the duty status formula and in not allowing the use of the İncirlik base by the Americans for their operations in the Middle East. However, other facts show that these Turkish actions were not so successful as they appeared. Turkish withdrawal from the MLF would not achieve a radical result because most NATO members were opposed to it. The use of the İncirlik base for Middle East operations was not required by the NATO alliance. In the duty status issue the Americans kept their right to have the last word. Turkey had to accept NATO's flexible response strategy though

she did not like it entirely. Her efforts to gain a voice in the control of nuclear weapons on her territory did not bring any positive result. Bilateral agreements with the USA remained secret and the public did not know their contents. The amount and allocation of U.S. military aid, too, did not make the Turks happy. Chapter IV also showed that considerable U.S. economic and military assistance to Turkey and Turkey's importance for U.S. strategic interests constituted the most important factor in the continuity of the two states' alliance.

Chapter V demonstrated that the stationing of the Jupiter missiles on Turkish territory inspired the Soviet decision to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba and made Turkey a part of the Cuban crisis. The chapter also showed that a trade off between Turkish and Cuban missiles was considered by U.S. officials and that the Americans at the end made a secret deal with the Russians in this direction. Another result was that because of its alliance relations with America Turkey came close to being one of first targets of a nuclear war which could have broken out between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Some conclusions of the chapters on the Cyprus question may be summarised as follows: the United States reluctantly became involved in the matter and reluctantly supported the scheme to station NATO soldiers in Cyprus. U.S. officials believed that unification of Cyprus with Greece (enosis) or enosis with some concessions to Turkey would be the best solution of the Cyprus problem and worked for such schemes. While threatening to intervene in Cyprus militarily, Turkish rulers, especially P.M. İnönü, were not altogether determined to initiate such an action because of unpreparedness of the Turkish army. In any case, in 1964 American authorities were determined to stop a Turkish intervention in Cyprus. In the same period, Turkish authorities' hints on making changes in Turkey's traditional Western-oriented foreign policy were not genuine but were aimed at showing their disappointment over the Western attitude toward the Cyprus question. During the Cyprus crisis of November 1967, U.S. rulers did not show the same harsh attitude toward Turkish intervention threats but seemed to give more support to the Turkish position by working for the acceptance of Turkish demands. U.S. officials ignored assassination and coup attempts against Greek Cypriot President Makarios between 1967 and 1974 but failed to predict the Cyprus coup on 15 July 1974. The U.S. attitude after the coup showed that it was willing to accept the

new situation and this forced and also gave a green light to Turks to intervene in Cyprus. U.S. efforts to stop the Turkish action were not adequate and effective but also the Turks were unstoppable at that stage. The U.S. attitude after the Turkish intervention tended to accept the new situation. The U.S. arms embargo against Turkey in 1975 was mainly as a result of power competition between the Congress and the administration. But efforts of Greek-American lobbies and Congress dislike for the Turkish decision to resume poppy production also played a role in the embargo.

Chapter VIII showed that U.S. officials and especially the U.S. Congress used pressure tactics against Turkey on the opium issue and that they were considerably influenced in their efforts by the desire to placate American voters. Before 1971 Turkish rulers were willing to comply with U.S. demands on the matter but did not prohibit opium production in order not to lose their thin majority in parliament. The chapter also proved that the Turkish government's opium ban decision, which was reached as a result of negotiations with the Americans to please them, was not an adequate arrangement to provide a permanent solution to the problem and that both the United States and Turkey made mistakes in its implementation. It further became clear from the chapter that public emotions considerably motivated the Turkish decision to resume poppy production and the reaction of the U.S. Congress to it. Finally, the chapter showed that, contrary to U.S. predictions, the Turkish control over opium production proved a success.

## 9.4 Areas for Further Study

As was noted earlier, the material available for this research was limited because some of the primary documents are still classified and some of the individuals involved in the events concerned have not yet been able or willing to disclose all they know. If and when those limitations are removed, the important topics for further study and possible reassessment include:

the U.S. role in Turkish politics, e.g. in the overthrow of the Menderes government on 27 May 1960, in the fall of the İnönü government after losing a vote of confidence in February 1965, in the Justice Party's 1965 election victory, in the military "coup by memorandum" on 12 March 1971, in the July 1971 ban on opium production and in the

decision to recognise the People's Republic of China in August 1971. (Related to these topics, the relationship between the United States and Justice Party between 1965 and 1971 - especially the latter part of this period - deserves particular attention to discover whether or not the U.S. authorities held hostile views towards Justice Party rulers, especially with regard to their foreign policies.)

the U.S. role in Cyprus, especially with regard to assassination and coup attempts against Greek Cypriot President Makarios, the July 1974 Sampson-led Cyprus coup, and the subsequent Turkish intervention.

the U.S.-Soviet deal on Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Soviet missiles in Cuba and the significance of Turkey as a factor in the negotiations that led to this settlement of the Cuban missiles crisis.

the power competition in the United States between Congress and the administration in the foreign policy arena from 1969 onwards.

the real intentions of Turkish rulers when they threatened to intervene in Cyprus in 1964 and whether they would have had the military capacity to implement their threats.

Naturally, the research should also be carried forward into the more recent past to examine developments since 1975. In particular U.S.-Turkish military relations as well as the influence of the Cyprus question on U.S.-Turkish relations would provide rewarding topics.

Although this list of subjects for further research points to inevitable shortcomings in the present work, it is hoped that this thesis nevertheless provides a sound foundation upon which future scholars can continue to build.

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A AID TO TURKEY AGREEMENT

**Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey** (signed at Ankara July 12, 1947; entered into force July 12, 1947)<sup>1491</sup>

The Government of Turkey having requested the Government of the United States for assistance which will enable Turkey to strengthen the security forces which Turkey requires for the protection of her freedom and independence and at the same time to continue to maintain the stability of her economy; and

The Congress of the United States, in the Act approved May 22, 1947, having authorized the President of the United States to furnish such assistance to Turkey, on terms consonant with the sovereign independence and security of the two countries; and

The Government of the United States and the Government of Turkey believing that the furnishing of such assistance will help to achieve the basic objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and by inaugurating an auspicious chapter in their relations will further strengthen the ties of friendship between the American and Turkish peoples;

The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

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<sup>1491</sup> G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.213-215, R.C. Campany, *Turkey and the United States*, New York: Praeger, 1986, pp.96-99.

## **Article I**

The Government of the United States will furnish the Government of Turkey such assistance as the President of the United States may authorize to be provided in accordance with the Act of Congress approved May 22, 1947, and any acts amendatory or supplementary thereto. The Government of Turkey will make effective use of any such assistance in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.

## **Article II**

The Chief of Mission to Turkey designated by the President of the United States for the purpose will represent the Government of the United States on matters relating to the assistance furnished under this agreement. The Chief of Mission will determine, in consultation with representatives of the Government of Turkey, the terms and conditions upon which specified assistance shall from time to time be furnished under this agreement, except that the financial terms upon which specified assistance shall be furnished shall be determined from time to time in advance by agreement of the two governments. The Chief of Mission will furnish the Government of Turkey such information and technical assistance as may be appropriate to help in achieving the objectives of the assistance furnished under this agreement.

The Government of Turkey will make use of the assistance furnished for the purposes for which it has been accorded. In order to permit the Chief of Mission to fulfil freely his functions in the exercise of his responsibilities, it will furnish him as well as his representatives every facility and every assistance which he may request in the way of reports, information and observation concerning the utilization and progress of assistance furnished.

## **Article III**

The Government of Turkey and the Government of the United States will cooperate in assuring the peoples of the United States and Turkey full information concerning the assistance furnished pursuant to this agreement. To this end, in so far as may be consistent with the security of the two countries:



1. Representatives of the Press and Radio of the United States will be permitted to observe freely and to report fully regarding the utilisation of such assistance; and

2. The Government of Turkey will give full and continuous publicity within Turkey as to the purpose, source, character, scope, amounts, and progress of such assistance.

#### **Article IV**

Determined and equally interested to assure the security of any article, service, or information received by the Government of Turkey pursuant to this agreement, the Governments of the United States and Turkey will respectively take after consultation, such measures as the other government may judge necessary for this purpose. The Government of Turkey will not transfer, without the consent of the Government of the United States, title to or possession of any such article or information nor permit, without such consent, the use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of Turkey or for any purpose other than that for which the article or information is furnished.

#### **Article V**

The Government of Turkey will not use any part of the proceeds of any loan, credit, grant, or other form of aid rendered pursuant to this agreement for the making of any payment on account of the principal or interest on any loan made to it by any other foreign government.

#### **Article VI**

Any or all assistance authorised to be provided pursuant to this agreement will be withdrawn:

1. If requested by the Government of Turkey;

2. If the Security Council of the United Nations finds (with respect to which finding the United States waives the exercise of any veto) or the General Assembly of the United Nations finds that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continuance of assistance by the Government of the United States pursuant to this agreement unnecessary or undesirable; and

3. Under any of the other circumstances specified in section 5 of the aforesaid Act of Congress or if the President of the United States determines that such withdrawal is in the interest of the United States.

#### **Article VII**

This agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two governments.

#### **Article VIII**

This agreement shall be registered with the United Nations.

Done in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, at Ankara, this 12th day of July, 1947.

Edwin C. Wilson for the Government of the United States

Hasan Saka for the Government of the Republic of Turkey

## APPENDIX B

### AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTING NATO STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

**Agreement, with Minutes of Understanding, between the United States of America and Turkey Implementing Status of Forces Agreement of June 19, 1951, between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (signed at Ankara June 23, 1954; entered into force June 23, 1954)<sup>1492</sup>**

For the implementation of the “Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, Regarding the Status of their Forces,” dated June 19, 1951, the two Governments have agreed as follows:

1. All persons who are relatives of, and in accordance with United States laws or regulations, depending for support upon and actually residing with any member of a United States force or the civilian component, except those who are not United States citizens, shall also be considered dependants and will be treated in all respects as those persons defined in Article I, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph c, of the aforesaid NATO Agreement.

2. For the purpose of the application of the aforesaid NATO Agreement and of the provisions of this Agreement, persons “who are in the employ of” the United States armed services, within the meaning of Article I-1 (b) of the aforesaid NATO Agreement, and without prejudice to the other requirements of that Article, shall include employees of United States military organizations, employees of United States Government departments, Post Exchanges, and recreational organizations for military personnel, Red Cross and United Services Organization personnel, and technical representatives of contractors with the United States forces who are assigned to United States military organizations in Turkey. All of these persons are subject to United States military law. Should any other specific categories become involved, the United States Government would wish to discuss their inclusion in this paragraph with the authorities of the Turkish Government.

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<sup>1492</sup> G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.217-220, R.C. Campany, *Turkey and the United States*, New York: Praeger, 1986, pp.100-102.

3. Residence documents to the members of the civilian component and the dependants described in paragraph 1 of this Agreement, as well as the dependants described in Article I, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph c, of the Agreement regarding the Status of NATO Forces, will be issued without fees, except for administrative expenses incurred in issuing the documents.

4. It is the agreed understanding of the Parties that reasonable quantities of provisions, supplies and other goods imported for the exclusive use of United States personnel, directly by special military agencies of the United States, such as post exchanges, commissaries, and officers' clubs, shall be accorded duty-free entry under the terms of Article XI, paragraph 4, of the aforesaid NATO Agreement in accordance with arrangements to be agreed with the appropriate Turkish authorities. It is understood that such provisions, supplies and other goods will be subject to agreed certification by an authorized United States official, and to inspection by Turkish customs for conformance with the certificates which shall be drawn up in accordance with the agreed arrangements mentioned above. It is further agreed that such special military agencies as post exchanges, commissaries, and officers' clubs will be permitted to operate at agreed locations without licenses, inspections or taxes and other charges. Categories of articles to be agreed between appropriate United States and Turkish authorities may be sold by these official United States military agencies only to authorized United States personnel. Administrative measures shall be taken by United States military authorities, in cooperation with the appropriate Turkish authorities, to prevent the resale or transfer in any way of merchandise sold under the provisions of this paragraph to persons not entitled to purchase items from such agencies, and generally to prevent the abuse of the facilities provided for in this paragraph.

5. In the implementation of Article XI of the aforesaid NATO Agreement, with respect to the duty-free entry of personal and household effects, it is understood that the free importation of such effects will be permitted from two months prior to six months after the arrival of the individual concerned or of any of his dependencies.

6. It is understood that sales of personal and household effects and automobiles, taking place between individuals entitled to customs-free entry, are not

subject to Turkish taxes.

7. It is understood that in the case of any damages in Turkey, caused by persons referred to in paragraph 2 above who are not paid from appropriations made to the United States Department of Defense, which require, under the provisions of Article VIII of the aforesaid NATO Agreement, the payment of an amount in order to satisfy the claimant with respect to such damages, the Turkish Government shall pay such amount. Procedures with respect to the reimbursement to the Turkish Government of such amounts shall be the subject of special arrangements agreed between the two Governments.

In witness whereof the respective representatives, duly authorised for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

Done at Ankara, Turkey, in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, each of which shall be of equal authenticity, this twenty-third day of June, 1954.

For the Government of the United States of America: Avra M. Warren

For the Government of the Republic of Turkey: Fuat Köprülü

**Minute of Understanding with Respect to Paragraph Four of the “Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey Relative to the Implementation of the ‘Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, Regarding the Status of Their Forces’”**

It is not the intention of the Turkish Government to prohibit the sale of articles normally sold through United States special military agencies. A.M.W. and F.K.

**Minute of Understanding Regarding Paragraph Seven of the Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the United States of America Relative to the Implementation of the “Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces”**

It is understood that the United States Government is able to accept responsibility for repayment only with respect to claims arising from the acts of

employees paid from appropriated funds of the Department of Defense. With respect to claims arising from the acts of all other members of the civilian component it is understood that the United States will exercise its good offices to make satisfactory arrangements with the responsible entities for reimbursing the Turkish Government. However, the United States Government under existing laws can accept no financial liability with respect to the latter category of claims. A.M.W. and F.K.

APPENDIX C  
AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION, MARCH 5, 1959

**Agreement of Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Turkey**  
(signed at Ankara March 5, 1959; entered into force March 5, 1959)<sup>1493</sup>

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey,

Desiring to implement the Declaration in which they associated themselves at London on July 28, 1958;

Considering that under Article I of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, the parties signatory thereto agreed to cooperate for their security and defence, and that, similarly, as stated in the above-mentioned Declaration, the Government of the United States of America, in the interest of world peace, agreed to cooperate with the Governments making that Declaration for their security and defence;

Recalling that, in the above-mentioned Declaration, the members of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation making that Declaration affirmed their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression, direct or indirect;

Considering further that the Government of the United States of America is associated with the work of the major committees of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955;

Desiring to strengthen peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Affirming their right to cooperate for their security and defense in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Considering that the Government of the United States of America regards as

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<sup>1493</sup> G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.221-223.

vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of Turkey;

Recognizing the authorization to furnish appropriate assistance granted to the President of the United States of America by the Congress of the United States of America in the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East; and

Considering that similar agreements are being entered into by the Government of the United States of America and the Governments of Iran and Pakistan, respectively,

Have agreed as follows:

### **Article I**

The Government of Turkey is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Turkey, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Turkey at its request.

### **Article II**

The Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and related laws of the United States of America, and with applicable agreements heretofore or hereafter entered into between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey, reaffirms that it will continue to furnish the Government of Turkey such military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey, in order to assist the Government of Turkey in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective promotion of its economic development.

### **Article III**

The Government of Turkey undertakes to utilise such military and economic assistance as may be provided by the Government of the United States of America



in a manner consonant with the aims and purposes set forth by the Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, and for the purpose of effectively promoting the economic development of Turkey and of preserving its national independence and integrity.

#### **Article IV**

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Turkey will cooperate with the other Governments associated in the Declaration signed at London on July 28, 1958, in order to prepare and participate in such defensive arrangements as may be mutually agreed to be desirable, subject to the other applicable provisions of this agreement.

#### **Article V**

The provisions of the present agreement do not affect the cooperation between the two Governments as envisaged in other international agreements or arrangements.

#### **Article VI**

This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of its signature and shall continue in force until one year after the receipt by either Government of written notice of the intention of the other Government to terminate the agreement.

Done in duplicate at Ankara, this fifth day of March, 1959.

For the Government of the United States of America: Fletcher Warren

For the Government of the Republic of Turkey: Fatin Rüştü Zorlu

## APPENDIX D

### CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN U.S. PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND TURKISH PRIME MINISTER İNÖNÜ

#### LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO TURKISH PRIME MINISTER İNÖNÜ JUNE 5, 1964<sup>1494</sup>

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your government to consult fully in advance with us. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you postponed your decision for a few hours in order to obtain my views. I put to you personally whether you really believe that it is appropriate for your government, in effect, to present an ultimatum to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch support over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, first urge you to accept the responsibility for complete consultation with the United States before any such action is taken.

It is my impression that you believe that such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. I must call your attention, however, to our understanding that the proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of effecting a form of partition of the Island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of Guarantee. Further, that treaty requires consultation among the Guarantor Powers. It is the view of the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in this situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable.

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<sup>1494</sup> *the Middle East Journal*, vol.20, Summer 1966, pp.386-388, M. Stearns, *Entangled Allies*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992, pp.156-159.

I must call to your attention also, Mr. Prime Minister, the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at a recent meeting of the ministerial council of NATO in The Hague that war between Turkey and Greece must be considered as "literally unthinkable." Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO allies; nothing less can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.

Further, Mr. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the island to keep the peace. Their task has been difficult but, during the past several weeks, they have been progressively successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that island. The United Nations Mediator has not yet completed his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the United Nations would react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the United Nations and destroy any prospect that the United Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and peaceful settlement of this difficult problem.

I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.

Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus. Such an action on your part would unleash the furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those whom you are trying to protect. The presence of United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe.

You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are disregarding Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you feel in Ankara that the United States has not been sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentment in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed against us) and has led to a basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our relations with Turkey. We have considered you as a great ally with fundamental common interests. Your security and prosperity have been a deep concern of the American people and we have expressed that concern in the most practical terms. You and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of the communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would hope that it means a great deal to your government and to your people. We have no intention of lending any support to any solution of Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not been able to find a final solution because this is, admittedly, one of the most complex problems on earth. But I wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and of the Turkish Cypriots and will remain so.

Finally, Mr. Prime Minister, I must tell you that you have posed the gravest issues of war and peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. They not only will certainly

involve war between Turkey and Greece but could involve wider hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus could produce. You have your responsibilities as chief of the government of Turkey; I also have mine as President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that unless I can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask for emergency meetings of the NATO Council and of the United Nations Security Council.

I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. Unfortunately, because of the special circumstances of our present constitutional position, I am not able to leave the United States. If you could come here for a full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you and your colleagues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

PRIME MINISTER İNÖNÜ'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON, JUNE 13, 1964.<sup>1495</sup>

Dear Mr. President,

I have received your message of June 5, 1964 through Ambassador Hare. We have, upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of unilateral action in Cyprus conferred to us by the Treaty of Guarantee. With due regard to the spirit of candour and friendship in which your message is meant to be written, I will, in my reply, try also explain to you in full frankness my views about the situation.

Mr. President,

Your message, both in wording and content, has been disappointing for an ally like Turkey who has always been giving the most serious attention to its relations of alliance with the United States and has brought to the fore substantial divergences of opinion in various fundamental matters pertaining to these relations.

It is my sincere hope that both these divergences and the general tone of your message are due to the haste in which a representation made in good-will was, under pressure of time, based on data hurriedly collected.

In the first place, it is being emphasized in your message that we have failed to consult with the United States when a military intervention in Cyprus was deemed indispensable by virtue of the Treaty of Guarantee. The necessity of a military intervention in Cyprus has been felt four times since the closing days of 1963. From the outset we have taken a special care to consult the United States on this matter. Soon after the outbreak of the crisis, on December 25, 1963, we have immediately informed the United States of our contacts with the other guaranteeing powers only to be answered that the United States was not a party to this issue. We then negotiated with the United Kingdom and Greece for intervention and, as you know, a tri-partite military administration under British command was set-up on December 26, 1963. Upon the failure of the London

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<sup>1495</sup> *The Middle East Journal*, vol.20, Summer 1966, pp.388-393.

conference and of the joint Anglo-American proposals, due to the attitude of Makarios and in the face of continuing assaults in the island against the Turkish Cypriots, we lived through very critical days in February and taking advantage of the visit of Mr. George Ball to Ankara, we informed again the United States of the gravity of the situation. We tried to explain to you that the necessity of intervention to restore order in the island might arise in view of the vacuum caused by the rejection of the Anglo-American proposals and we informed you that we might have to intervene at any time. We even requested guarantees from you on specific issues and your answers were in the affirmative. However, you asked us not to intervene and assured us that Makarios would get at the United Nations a severe lesson while all the Turkish rights and interests would be preserved.

We complied with your request without any satisfactory result being secured at the United Nations. Moreover the creation of the United Nations force, decided upon by the Security Council, became a problem. The necessity for intervention was felt for the third time to protect Turkish community against the assaults of the terrorists in Cyprus who were encouraged by the doubts as to whether the United Nations forces would be set up immediately after the adoption of the Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964. But assuring us that the force would be set up very shortly, you insisted again that we refrain from intervening. Thereupon we postponed our intervention once again, awaiting the United Nations forces to assume their duty.

Dear Mr. President,

The era of terror in Cyprus has a particular character which rendered ineffective all measures taken so far. From the very outset, the negotiations held to restore security and the temporary set-ups have all helped only to increase the aggressiveness and the destructiveness of the Makarios administration. The Greek Cypriots have lately started to arm themselves overtly and considered the United Nations as an additional instrument to back up their ruthless and unconstitutional rule. It has become quite obvious that the United Nations have neither the authority nor the intent to intervene for the restoration of constitutional order and to put an end to aggression. You are well aware of the instigative

attitude of the Greek Government towards the Greek Cypriots. During the talks held in your office, in the United States, we informed you that under the circumstances we would eventually be compelled to intervene in order to put an end to the atrocities in Cyprus. We also asked your Secretary of State at The Hague whether the United States would support us in such an eventuality and we received no answer. I think, I have thus reminded you how many times and under what circumstances we informed you of the necessity for intervention in Cyprus. I do remember having emphasised to your high level officials our due appreciation of the special responsibilities incumbent upon the United States within the alliance and of the necessity to be particularly careful and helpful to enable her to maintain solidarity within the alliance. As you see, we never had the intention to confront you with a unilateral decision on our part. Our grievance stems from our inability to explain to you a problem which caused us for months utmost distress and from your refusal to take a frank and firm stand on the issue as to which party is on the right side in the dispute between two allies, namely, Turkey and Greece.

Mr. President,

In your message you further emphasize the obligation of Turkey, under the provisions of the Treaty, to consult with the other two guaranteeing powers, before taking any unilateral action. Turkey is fully aware of this obligation. For the past six months we have indeed complied with the requirements of this obligation. But Greece has, not only thwarted all the attempts made by Turkey to seek jointly the ways and means to stop Greek Cypriots from repudiating international treaties, but has also supported their unlawful and inhuman acts and has even encouraged them.

The Greek Government itself has not hesitated to declare publicly that the international agreements it signed with us were no longer in force. Various examples to that effect were, in due course, communicated in detail, orally and in writing, to your State Department.

We have likewise fulfilled our obligation of constant consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom, the other guaranteeing power.



In several instances we have, jointly with the Government of the United Kingdom, made representations to the Greek Cypriots with a view to restoring constitutional order. But unfortunately, these representations were of no avail due to the negative attitude of the Greek Cypriot authorities.

As you see, Turkey has earnestly explored every avenue of consulting continuously and acting jointly with the other two guaranteeing powers. This being the fact, it can not be asserted that Turkey has failed to abide by her obligation of consulting with the other two guaranteeing powers before taking unilateral action.

I put it to you, Mr. President, whether the United States Government which has felt the need to draw the attention of Turkey to her obligation of consultation, yet earnestly and faithfully fulfilled by the latter, should not have reminded Greece, who repudiates treaties signed by herself, of the necessity to abide by the precept "*pacta sunt servanda*" which is the fundamental rule of international law. This precept which, only a fortnight ago, was most eloquently characterised as "the basis of survival" by your Secretary of State himself in his speech at the "American Law Institute," is now being completely and contemptuously ignored by Greece, our NATO ally and by the Greek Cypriots.

Dear Mr. President,

As implied in your message, by virtue of the provisions of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, the three guaranteeing powers have, in the event of a breach of the provisions of that Treaty, the right to take concerted action and, if that proves impossible, unilateral action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the said Treaty. The Treaty of Guarantee was signed with this understanding being shared by all parties thereto. The "Gentleman's Agreement" signed on February 19, 1959 by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, is an evidence of that common understanding.

On the other hand, at the time of the admission of the Republic of Cyprus to the United Nations, the members of the organisation were fully acquainted with all the international commitments and obligations of the said Republic and no objections were raised in this respect.

Furthermore, in the course of the discussions on Cyprus leading to the resolution adopted on March 4, 1964 by the Security Council, the United States Delegate, among others, explicitly declared that the United Nations had no power to annul or amend international treaties.

The understanding expressed in your message that the intervention by Turkey in Cyprus would be for the purposes of effecting the partition of the island has caused me great surprise and profound sorrow. My surprise stems from the fact that the data furnished to you about the intentions of Turkey could be so remote from the realities repeatedly proclaimed by us. The reason of my sorrow is that our ally, the Government of the United States, could think that Turkey might lay aside the principle constituting the foundation of her foreign policy, i.e., absolute loyalty to international law, commitments and obligations, as factually evidenced in many circumstances well known to the United States.

I would like to assure you most categorically and most sincerely that if ever Turkey finds herself forced to intervene militarily in Cyprus this will be done in full conformity with the provisions and aims of international agreements.

In this connection, allow me to stress, Mr. President, that the postponement of our decision does naturally, in no way affect the rights conferred to Turkey by Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee.

Mr. President,

Referring to NATO obligations, you state in your message that the very essence of NATO requires that allies should not wage war on each other and that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces.

I am in full agreement with the first part of your statement, but the obligation for the NATO allies to respect international agreements concluded among themselves as well as their mutual treaty rights and commitments is an equally vital requisite of the alliance. An alliance among states which ignore their mutual contractual obligations and commitments is unthinkable.

As to the concern you expressed over the outbreak of a Turco-Greek war

in case of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in conformity with her rights and obligations stipulated in international agreements, I would like to stress that Turkey would undertake a "military operation" in Cyprus exclusively under the conditions and for the purpose set forth in the agreements. Therefore, a Turco-Greek war so properly described as "literally unthinkable" by the Honorable Dean Rusk could only occur in case of Greece's aggression against Turkey. Our view, in case of such an intervention, is to invite to an effective collaboration, with the aim of restoring the constitutional order in Cyprus, both Greece and the United Kingdom in their capacity as guaranteeing powers. If despite this invitation and its contractual obligations Greece were to attack Turkey, we could in no way be held responsible of the consequences of such an action. I would like to hope that you have already seriously drawn the Greek Government's attention on these matters.

The part of your message expressing doubts as to the obligation of the NATO allies to protect Turkey in case she becomes directly involved with the USSR as a result of an action initiated in Cyprus, gives me the impression that there are as between us wide divergence of views as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance. I must confess that this has been to us the source of great sorrow and grave concern. Any aggression against a member of NATO will naturally call from the aggressor an effort of justification. If NATO's structure is so weak as to give credit to the aggressor's allegations, then it means that this defect of NATO needs really to be remedied. Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is to carry any weight, should come into being immediately upon the observance of aggression. That is why Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty considers an attack against one of the member states as an attack against them all and makes it imperative for them to assist the

party so attacked by taking forthwith such action as they deem necessary. In this connection I would like to further point out that the agreements on Cyprus have met with the approval of the North Atlantic Council, as early as the stage of the United Nations debate on the problem, i.e., even prior to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, hence long before the occurrence of the events of December 1963.

As you will recall, at the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council held three weeks ago at The Hague, it was acknowledged that the treaties continued to be the basis for legality as regards the situation in the island and the status of Cyprus. The fact that these agreements have been violated as a result of the flagrantly unlawful acts of one of the parties on the island should in no way mean that the said agreements are no longer in force and that the rights and obligations of Turkey by virtue of those agreements should be ignored. Such an understanding would mean that as long as no difficulties arise, the agreements are considered as valid and they are no longer in force when difficulties occur. I am sure you will agree with me that such an understanding of law cannot be accepted. I am equally convinced that there could be no shadow of doubt about the obligation to protect Turkey within the NATO Alliance in a situation that can, by no means, be attributed to an arbitrary act of Turkey. An opposite way of thinking would lead to the repudiation and denial of the concept of law and of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

In your message, concern has been expressed about the commitments of Turkey as a member of the United Nations. I am sure, Mr. President you will agree with me if I say that such a concern, which I do not share, is groundless especially for the following reasons: Turkey has distinguished herself as one of the most loyal members of the United Nations ever since its foundation. The Turkish people has spared no effort to safeguard the principles of the United Nations Charter, and has even sacrificed her sons for this cause. Turkey has never failed in supporting this organisation and, in order to secure its proper functioning, has borne great moral and material sacrifices even when she had most pressing financial difficulties. Despite the explicit rights conferred to Turkey by the Treaty of Guarantee, my Government's respect for and adherence to the United Nations have recently been demonstrated once more by its acceptance of the Security

Council resolution of March 4, 1964 as well as by the priority it has given to the said resolution.

Should the United Nations have been progressively successful in carrying out their task as pointed out in your message, a situation which is of such grave concern for both you and I, would never have arisen. It is a fact that the United Nations operations in the island have proved unable to put an end to the oppression.

The relative calm which has apparently prevailed in the island for the past few weeks marks the beginning of preparations of the Greek Cypriots for further tyranny. Villages are still under siege. The United Nations forces, assuaging Turkish Cypriots, enable the Greeks to gather their crops; but they do not try to stop the Greeks when the crops of Turks are at stake and they act as mere spectators to Greek assaults. These vitally important details may not well reach you, whereas we live in the atmosphere created by the daily reports of such tragic events.

The report of the Secretary-General will be submitted to the United Nations on June 15, 1964. I am seriously concerned that we may face yet another defeat similar to the one we all suffered on March 4, 1964. The session of March 4th had further convinced Makarios that the Treaty of Guarantee did not exist for him and thereupon he took the liberty of actually placing the United Nations forces under his control and direction. From then on the assassination of hostages and the besieging of villages have considerably increased.

Dear Mr. President,

Our allies who are in a position to arbitrate in the Cyprus issue and to orient it in the right direction have so far been unable to disentangle the problem from a substantial error. The Cyprus tragedy has been engendered by the deliberate policy of the Republic of Cyprus aimed at annulling the treaties and abrogating the constitution. Security can be established in the island only through the proper functioning of an authority above the Government of Cyprus. Yet only the measures acceptable to the Cypriot Government are being sought to restore security in Cyprus. The British administration set up following the December

events, the Anglo-American proposals and finally the United Nations command have all been founded on this unsound basis and consequently every measure acceptable to Makarios has proved futile and has, in general, encouraged oppression and aggression.

Dear Mr. President,

You put forward in your message the resentment caused in Greece by the policy pursued by your Government. Within the content of the Cyprus issues, the nature of the Greek policy and the course of action undertaken by Greece indicate that she is apt to resort to every means within her power to secure the complete annulment of the existing treaties. We are at pains to make our allies understand the sufferings we bear in our rightful cause and the irretrievable plight in which the Turkish Cypriots are living. On the other hand, it is not the character of our nation to exploit demonstrations of resentment. I assure you that our distress is deeply rooted since we can not make you understand our rightful position and convince you of the necessity of spending every effort and making use of all your authority to avert the perils inherent in the Cyprus problem by attaching to it the importance it well deserves.

That France and Germany have buried their animosity is indeed a good example. However, our nation had already given such an example forty years ago by establishing friendly relations with Greece, right after the ruthless devastation of the whole Anatolia by the armies of that country.

Dear Mr. President,

As a member of the Alliance our nation is fully conscious of her duties and rights. We do not pursue any aim other than the settlement of the Cyprus problem in compliance with the provisions of the existing treaties. Such a settlement is likely to be reached if you lend your support and give effect with your supreme authority to the sense of justice inherent in the character of the American nation.

Mr. President,

I thank you for your statement emphasising the value attached by the United States to the relations of alliance with Turkey and for your kind words about the

Turkish nation. I shall be happy to come to the United States to talk the Cyprus problem with you. The United Nations Security Council will meet on June the 17th. In the meantime, Mr. Dirk Stikker, Secretary General of NATO, will have paid a visit to Turkey. Furthermore, the United Nations mediator Mr. Tuomioja will have submitted his report to the Secretary-General. These developments may lead to the emergence of a new situation. It will be possible for me to go abroad to join you, at a date convenient for you, immediately after June 20th.

It will be most helpful for me if you would let me know of any defined views and designs you may have on the Cyprus question so that I may be able to study them thoroughly before my departure for Washington.

Finally, I would like to express my satisfaction for the frank, fruitful and promising talks we had with Mr. G. Ball in Ankara just before forwarding this message to you.

Sincerely,

İSMET İNÖNÜ,

Prime Minister of Turkey.

## APPENDIX E

### DUTY STATUS AGREEMENT

**Duty Status Agreement** (entered into force September 24, 1968)<sup>1496</sup>

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note No: 6302/5399, Ankara, September 24, 1968

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Note of September 24, 1968 which reads as follows:

“Excellency:

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of our two Governments concerning duty certificates in implementation of Article VII, paragraph 3 (a) (ii) of the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces and have the honour to propose the following:

#### Article I

In case of offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty, the duty certificates will, in conformity with the spirit and the letter of the Agreement between the Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces and according to the practices in the other NATO countries, be issued by the authorities of the Sending State and will be put into effect by the authorities of the Government of Turkey in conformity with the spirit and the letter of the Agreement between the Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces, and according to the practices in the other NATO countries.

#### Article II

In implementation of Article I, the following procedures shall apply:

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<sup>1496</sup> G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.225-228.



A. Upon being informed that the accused is entitled to benefit from the provisions of the aforesaid Agreement, the Public Prosecutor of the locality where the offense has been committed shall inquire of the Turkish General Staff, through the Ministry of Justice, whether the offense arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty. The Turkish General Staff shall then inquire of the concerned authorities of the Sending State about this matter. (If the Sending State is the United States, the concerned authority will be the highest ranking commanding officer of the United States Forces in Turkey.)

B. If after investigation, the concerned authorities of the Sending State deem that a certificate, attesting that the alleged offense arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty, should be issued in conformity with the provisions of Article I above, one copy of that certificate shall be forwarded immediately to the Turkish General Staff and another to the commander of the unit to which the accused is assigned or attached.

C. If accepted by the TGS the duty certificate will be sent through the Ministry of Justice, to the Public Prosecutor of the locality where the offense has been committed. Upon receipt of the duty certificate from the Ministry of Justice, the action against the accused shall be suspended by the competent judicial authorities, and the file of the accused shall be sent to the TGS. The TGS will then, except in cases covered by paragraphs (D) and (E) below, forward the file to the concerned authorities of the Sending State. The case against the accused will then be dismissed. The concerned authorities of the Sending State will officially inform the TGS of the outcome of the case.

D. If not found acceptable by the TGS and withdrawn by the concerned authorities of the Sending State, the TGS will, through [the] Ministry of Justice, so notify the Public Prosecutor of the locality where the offense has been committed. The Public Prosecutor of the said locality will, through the Ministry of Justice, inform the Turkish General Staff of the outcome of the case. The latter will in turn transmit this information to the concerned authorities of the Sending State.

E. If the duty certificate is not found acceptable by the TGS and not withdrawn by the concerned authorities of the Sending State, the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs will be informed with a view to reaching an agreement through negotiations with the diplomatic representative of the Sending State with the participation of TGS and a military representative of the Sending State and in consultation with other concerned Turkish authorities. In the meantime the duty certificate, as well as the legal action against the accused, will be suspended without affecting the availability of the accused for trial by Turkish courts if the duty certificate is not found acceptable. The outcome of these negotiations such as the acceptance of the duty certificate or its withdrawal by the concerned military authorities of the Sending State will be communicated to the Public Prosecutor of the locality where the offense has been committed, in the same manner as foreseen in paragraphs (C) and (D) above, for appropriate action."

I have the honor to propose that, if the foregoing is acceptable to the Government of Turkey, this note and Your Excellency's reply concurring therein shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of Your Excellency's reply. It is the understanding of my Government that the agreement concerning duty certificates contained in the aides-memoire which were exchanged on July 28, 1956, will be considered terminated on that same date.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara

His Excellency Parker Thompson Hart, Ambassador of the United States of America

### **Minute of Understanding**

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Note No: 6302/5400, Ankara, September 24, 1968

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Note of September 24, 1968, which reads as follows:

“Excellency:

I have the honour to refer to my note to you of this date, referring to discussion between representatives of our two Governments, concerning duty certificates in implementation of Article VII, paragraph 3 (a) (ii) of the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces and wish to propose the following agreed minute:

The United States negotiators have indicated that the practices in other NATO countries are to accept the U.S.-issued duty certificate with provision for discussion of exceptional cases.

The Turkish negotiators have indicated that the phrase ‘put into effect’ corresponds to ‘işlem görecektir’ in Turkish.

In the interest of fulfilling the provisions of the NATO SOFA, which require than an accused person of the Sending State shall receive prompt and speedy trial, and in the interest of the proper and effective administration of justice, the Government of Turkey will permit the Sending State to take appropriate action under its own laws in the case at hand when negotiations have not resulted in an agreement within two months. The TGS will forward the duty certificate through the Ministry of Justice to the Public Prosecutor concerned. The case against the accused will then be dismissed. The file of the accused will be forwarded to the concerned authorities of this Sending State. The Government of Turkey will take the necessary steps with the appropriate authorities to give effect to this provision. The issues upon which agreement had not been reached shall continue to be the subject of discussion with a view to achieving a resolution to be applied in future cases involving similar issues.

I would appreciate being informed of the concurrence of Your Excellency’s Government in the foregoing agreed minute.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.”

In reply, I have the honor to inform You that my Government is in concurrence with the foregoing agreed minute.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency Parker Thompson Hart, Ambassador of the United States of America, Ankara

His Excellency İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs

## APPENDIX F

### **TURKISH GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASE July 3, 1969<sup>1497</sup>**

Upon proposal by The Government of the Republic of Turkey to the Government of the United States of America on April 7, 1966, to the effect that negotiations be started with a view to amending the military facilities Agreement entered into between the two Governments on June 23, 1954 and acceptance by the Government of the United States of America of this proposal on April 18, 1966, both Governments have initiated preparatory work on this subject at the level of national authorities.

Following careful studies carried out by the national authorities, the representatives of the two Governments officially started negotiations to this effect. After two years and four months of extensive and detailed negotiations which took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and cordial relationship that has always characterised the bonds of friendship between Turkey and the United States of America, the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the United States of America have today concluded an Agreement relating to the collective security measures to be taken by the two Governments pursuant to Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Agreement signed today within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, designed to lay down the basic principles of the defence cooperation between the two Governments, as well as to codify and clarify current arrangements in accordance with these basic principles and to determine the conditions of the United States participation in the Turkish defence measures under the North Atlantic Treaty constitutes a milestone in the history of close bonds of friendship and alliance between the two countries.

The North Atlantic Treaty in its Article III provides that "the parties, separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." It is under this Article of the North Atlantic Treaty that the United

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<sup>1497</sup> *the Middle East Journal*, vol.24, Winter 1970, pp.72-73.

States has participated in Turkey's defence measures, since her entry into NATO in 1952 in pursuit of this objective.

As was made public by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of budget debates early this year at the Grand National Assembly, the principles laid down and mutually agreed upon in the Agreement signed today are universally recognized as governing the relations between sovereign and equal partners.

This Agreement, further sustained by the inherent rights for individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, reflects the earnest intention of both Governments, while they continue in the search for peace, to maintain each nation's respective obligations with regard to the security and defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area. As it is conceived within NATO, this Agreement does not provide for additional commitments.

The mutual cooperation between the two parties envisaged in this Agreement is based on reciprocal respect for each other's equal rights and sovereignty.

Any measures for the common defense in which the Government of the United States of America may participate in Turkey may be initiated after the complete and detailed approval of the Government of Turkey.

The Government of the Republic of Turkey retains the ownership of the land areas made available to common defence installations as well as all non-removable property, including property incorporated in the soil, constructed or installed on the land areas allocated by the Government of the Republic of Turkey for the purposes of this Agreement. No rent is envisaged in the Agreement for the allocation of such land areas for common defence installations.

Turkey also retains the right to assign a suitable number of Turkish military and civilian personnel to all facilities.

The nature, purpose and duration of each common defence installation must be approved by the Government of the Republic of Turkey.

Turkey has the right of inspection of all facilities to verify that the nature and purpose of the common defence effort under this Agreement conforms to mutual goals of both nations as specified in implementing Agreements.

Within the terms of this Agreement, it is clear that the Government of the United States of America holds no secrets from the Government of the Republic of Turkey.

Both Governments are bound to the terms of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement signed on June 19, 1951 and approved by the Grand National Assembly under Law No. 6375, which delineates the treatment to be accorded to the personnel sent by one NATO state to serve in the territory of another. Administrative matters covering the sending of such personnel are covered in full detail in this Agreement.

The Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the United States of America have agreed that the principle of joint operation and use should be applied to all common defence installations permitted to function by the Government of the Republic of Turkey for the realisation of the purposes of this Agreement.

This Agreement also provides for certain measures from which the Turkish economy will benefit. For instance, local civilian labor will be used in the construction, operation and maintenance of common defence installations, and materials, equipment and supplies required by the United States for the purposes of this Agreement will be procured in Turkey to the maximum practicable extent.

American military personnel and civilian employees of the military personnel and their dependents assigned to common defence installations in Turkey are bound to respect the legislation of the Republic of Turkey.

There will be a special regulation for display of national flags respecting the legislation of the Republic of Turkey.

The Agreement states that the Government of the United States of America will provide support to the Turkish defence effort at a level to be determined through mutual consultations, subject to congressional action.

The Government of the Republic of Turkey has the right in cases of national emergency to take the required restrictive measures for the safeguarding of national existence all through the emergency period.

The provisions of the Montreux Convention are reserved.

Both nations are dedicated to common goals, and in the spirit of partners everywhere, are prepared to consult jointly to give effect to this Agreement and to overcome any differences which may arise.

Under this Agreement, which shall remain valid as long as the parties are members of, and bound by, the North Atlantic Treaty, either party may, when necessary, ask that negotiations be entered into to amend or end the Agreement.

Both Governments believe that the Agreement, the basic features of which are given above, will regularise the defence cooperation between the two countries and prevent misunderstandings and criticisms.

The two Governments look forward to the continued close cooperation and harmony that has marked relations between the two countries for many years.



## APPENDIX G

### REPORT OF TURKISH PRIME MINISTER SÜLEYMAN DEMİREL'S PRESS CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 7, 1970

#### Prime Minister Explains Bilateral Treaties and NATO<sup>1498</sup>

ANKARA- On Saturday at his 17th press conference the Prime Minister explained the bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and the U.S.A. under article 3 of the NATO Pact and the new NATO strategy. He said that over the 25 years of the alliance, 91 bilateral agreements had been signed and 54 of them had been in force when the JP had come to power in October 1965. Of these agreements 13 had been signed under the 1954 Military Facilities Agreement and were the most important.

"Above all I should like to point out that no bilateral agreement against the national interests has been signed in the JP period. On the contrary, intelligence flights, which were conducted on the basis of an agreement signed previously, were stopped on 28 December 1965, shortly after the JP came to office when an American intelligence aircraft was lost in the Black Sea. This incident was made the excuse to revise the agreements concerning bilateral defence setups.

"It is observed that while criticisms are made about bilateral agreements, points concerning multilateral setups are confused with bilateral agreements.

"At the talks we conducted with the U.S.A. we did not discuss the subjects concerning multilateral cooperation. As is known, multilateral defence setups in NATO are infrastructural, atomic support and communication arrangements. Under the infrastructural arrangements installations totalling TL 4,000 m., such as airfields, communication installations, war headquarters, fuel pipelines, early detection radar systems, have all been turned over to the Turkish Armed Forces.

"The subject to which our Government has given priority has been the Military Facilities Agreement signed on 23 June 1954 and the agreements concluded in connection with it."

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<sup>1498</sup> *Pulse* (Ankara), No.1661, February 9, 1970 quoted by G.S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp.229-238.

Explaining the nature of the 13 agreements signed under the 1954 Military Facilities Agreement, Demirel said, "Some of these agreements concern the radar installations needed both for the defence of our country and that of our NATO allies. Because some of these have been taken over by the Turkish Armed Forces, at present only the Karamürsel, Sinop and Diyarbakır bases have a joint defence installation nature. Other of the agreements concern the cooperation between the Turkish and American Ground, Naval and Air Forces. The rest concern airfields. Of these only the İncirlik airfield in Adana is now in existence as a joint defence force.

"The aircraft in İncirlik which are located there in accordance with the NATO joint defence plans constitute part of NATO's general deterrent force. They come under the Supreme Allied Command for Europe (SACEUR) and this Command is attached to the NATO Council. As is known, Turkey is represented in the NATO Council. The NATO Council cannot take a decision without the participation of Turkey. And without the decision of the Council SACEUR cannot order the NATO-assigned aircraft in İncirlik to take action. It is out of the question for these aircraft to be used for any purpose other than NATO defence. For these reasons, it is impossible for these aircraft to drag Turkey into a war against her will, without any reason.

"The radar stations are passive defence installations. They are needed for both Turkey's and other NATO members' defence. They help to detect dangers against Turkey and NATO members. It is the most natural sovereignty right for every country to take measures concerning its defence. As is seen, there is nothing against sovereignty or provocative in these agreements.

"The NATO Armies, the Turkish Armed Forces among them, are equipped with nuclear arms in accordance with NATO resolutions. These arms menace no one. They are entirely defensive and short-range. They make deterrence more effective. They can be used in no way without Turkey's consent. They constitute no added menace or threat for Turkey. On the contrary, they gain for her an additional defence power."

Passing on to a comparison of what the situation was when the Justice Party came to power and what it was when it signed the Joint Defence Cooperation

Agreement on 3 July 1969, Demirel said, "I have explained above the nature and content of the 13 agreements. What did we do with the Joint Defence Cooperation Agreement of 3 July 1969?

"First we abrogated the Military Facilities Agreement of 23 June 1954. Secondly under the light of the past practice we introduced a discipline with a series of principles. We made a model covering all the agreements. This model will be applied to all 13 agreements and the adjustments that will be needed will be made....

"At the end of 1965 there were airfields and installations, electronic intelligence centres, communications posts and support installations active in Turkey under the 1954 Military Facilities Agreement and other bilateral agreements signed within it. In these installations they used to run flight, periodic training, electronic intelligence, communications and scientific activities. In an area of 35,000 dönüms (one 'dönüm'= 1,000 sq. meters) in more than ten places in our country, there were about 23,000 military and civilian Americans with their relatives.

"This was the actual situation when we took up office at the end of 1965. As for the legal situation: In the over ten years preceding 1965 there were scattered agreements concluded by several authorities not based on any principles. Besides, we were up against a practice whose legal grounds and content was not known and which led to great difficulty and complaints.

"What have we done in the question of the bilateral agreements? We stopped such flights: as from 28 December 1965 after an American reconnaissance aircraft was lost in the Black Sea. We have not allowed these flights since.

"After long and meticulous preparations and two years, four months of negotiations we signed the 3 July 1969 agreement and abrogated the 1954 Military Facilities Agreement.

"The agreements based on the Military Facilities Agreement will also be reviewed quickly and those which do not conform to the principles of the 3 July 1969 agreement will also be abrogated. The talks on this topic are continuing between the military authorities of the two countries."

Demirel then said that the JP Government had signed 15 bilateral agreements with the U.S.A. since it had taken over on 27 October 1965. All these agreements concerned military aid to Turkey under which Turkey received over 600 million-dollar aid in five years. None of the agreements concerned the foundation of a new installation or the expansion of the activities in any existing one. And none contained any provision that would drag Turkey into a war against her will.

“Since 1965, among the installations set up under the Military Facilities Agreement, the joint defence installations in Anadolukavağı and in Gölbaşı near Ankara have been completely turned over to our Armed Forces. Agreement has been reached for the total delivery to the Turkish Armed Forces of the İzmir (Çiğli) airfield and the Trabzon and Samsun radar installations. The actual units have now left Çiğli and only maintenance personnel and the persons in charge of delivery remain. By 30 June 1970 the base will be totally taken over by the Turkish Armed Forces and their resources and ability will thus be increased by approximately 40-45 million dollars.

“At present there are joint defence installations run under the 3 July 1969 agreement in five places in our country. These are the radar installations in Kocaeli (Karamürsel), Diyarbakır (Pirinçlik) and Sinop, the airfield in Adana (İncirlik) and the headquarters and logistics installations in Ankara (Balgat). The total area they cover is 19,500 ‘dönüm’s. On 1 January 1970 the American military and civilian personnel, including the platoon-company size units in the transport terminals in İstanbul, İzmir and İskenderun, totalled about 7,000. When the Samsun, Trabzon and Çiğli installations are completely taken over by our Armed Forces by 1 July 1970 the number will be reduced to about 6,000.”

The Prime Minister also explained the principles which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff had established for the 3 July 1969 agreement. They had been approved by the National Security Council. The following were the highlights of the agreement which had been read in Parliament:

“1. All activities run in Turkey under joint defence cooperation will be based on the mutual cooperation foreseen in article 3 of the NATO Pact and will never exceed the limits of NATO commitments.

"2. The commitments in question will conform to the scope and principles of the U.N. Charter.

"3. The agreements and application of them will be run under the principles of mutual sovereignty and equality.

"4. No action can be taken for the foundation of a joint defence installation or its activities without Turkey's consent.

"5. The property rights of the areas where joint defence installations are set up belong to the Turkish Republic. The installations to be set up on them will also be the Turkish Republic's property. They are not even leased.

"6. The control of the Turkish Government over the joint defence installations and the activities from them will be full and absolute. Turkey will inspect all these installations as she finds it necessary to ensure that they are used in accordance with the agreements.

"7. Turkey will locate as many military and civilian personnel in these installations as she wishes.

"8. The foreign personnel in these installations will be subject to the NATO Forces' Status Convention signed on 19 June 1951 and the agreement signed on 23 June 1954.

"9. The Turkish Government will allow the U.S. Government to engage in any of the joint defence activities in Turkey only after it has full and detailed knowledge of them.

"10. The nature, scope and period of each of the joint defence installations have to be approved by the Turkish Government.

"11. The amount, arms and equipment and supply provisions of the American personnel to take up duty in the installations under the NATO Forces' Status Convention will be subject to the provisions which will enable the control of the Turkish Government.

"12. The Turkish Government will be able to take every restrictive measure for the maintenance of the national interests, throughout national emergency

cases.

“13 . The provisions of the Montreux Convention have been reserved.

“14. Joint defence installations are based on the principle of joint utilization.

“15. The principle in the construction, operation and maintenance of joint defence installations is to use a Turkish labour force.

“16. The material, equipment and supply goods to be required by the U.S. for the purposes of the agreement will be procured from Turkey, as much as possible.

“17. Foreign employees and their relatives to be employed by American personnel assigned to the joint defence installations will have to observe the legislation of the Turkish Republic.

“18. A special regulation conforming to the Turkish legislation will be in force in joint defence installations in connection with the hoisting of national flags.

“19. Disagreements concerning the application of the agreement will be solved through mutual negotiation and the Council of Ministers will be able to stop the practice pending the solution of the disagreement.

“20. Even though the agreement will be in force as long as the parties concerned are attached to the NATO Pact, each one of the parties will be able to ask for negotiations for the amendment or denunciation of the agreement.

“The U.S.A. has also pledged with the agreement to extend aid for Turkey’s defence efforts, in accordance with her constitution.”

Demirel also explained that the rules since 1956 about the trial of Americans committing crimes in Turkey had been changed and they now conformed to the rules of other NATO countries and further than this, still it was agreed through exchange of Notes on 24 September 1968 that the Turkish General Staff would have the last word on deciding whether or not the American concerned was on duty when the crime was committed.

“There is no provocative installation in Turkey that would attract lightning to Turkey. All joint defence installations are legitimate defence arrangements. They

have no provocative or aggressive characteristic. To oppose such arrangements is tantamount to wanting Turkey to be blind and deaf. For the maintenance of the deterrence power of the Alliance certain intelligence information is needed. There are no strategic missiles in Turkey. The installations in Turkey are passive installations. The squadron allotted to NATO in İncirlik cannot be used outside NATO plans which are totally defensive. Turkey has a say in the preparation of NATO plans. It is natural that the procedure foreseen in our Constitution will be observed in taking these decisions.”

Answering criticisms about the period of the 3 July 1969 agreement and the procedure concerning its denunciation, the Prime Minister said that it was normal and logical for the agreement to remain in force as long as the NATO Pact was in force. Yet Turkey had the possibility of denouncing the agreement even if NATO membership continued. “Also it was foreseen in the agreement that joint defence activities and installations have certain periods. These periods will be established by the application agreements concerned. The Government has the right to put an end to them before the periods stipulated in the application agreements, when necessary.

“The claim that putting an end to the 3 July 1969 agreement and other application agreements dealing with joint defence will take four and a half years is not true. It is understood that this conclusion is derived from adding together the maximum periods for the procedure involved in denunciation. When denunciation is found necessary first a six-month consultation period is accepted. If the situation necessitating the denunciation is not eliminated in this period, with a notification the denunciation will be made and then the liquidation period will begin. The durations of these periods will change in every special situation and will not in any case exceed two years. Under this the agreement will disappear in two years at the most, following the six-month consultation period. This is the maximum period and the term ‘within’ enables its realization before. Even under the maximum periods the denunciation is materialized in two and a half years, after which period all activities foreseen in the agreement stop. The liquidation period involves only activities about the liquidation.”

The Prime Minister then said that ratification of the 3 July 1969 agreement

by the Government was in conformity with article 65 of the constitution and Law 244.

Answering criticisms about NATO and the flexible response strategy, Demirel said that when a nuclear balance was struck between East and West the massive nuclear retaliation policy had necessarily been changed by the flexible response. "An aggression against Turkey will be of a nature to change the strategic balance of Europe. The geo-strategic characteristics of Turkey does not allow an aggression against our country to remain in a narrow area. Because an aggression against Turkey would change the strategic balance of Europe, the potential aggressor cannot risk an operation against her unless it risks engaging in a very extensive operation. When this is the case, aggressions against Turkey necessarily involve the general nuclear guarantee secured for Europe. Consequently it is impossible to envisage a local conventional or nuclear war against Turkey by any rational aggressor. There is no sign in the NATO strategy to indicate that Turkey or any other European country is considered a dispensable area."

Demirel then said that there was only one strategy in NATO and that there was no centre/wing differentiation in the new NATO strategy. The only difference being the existence of allied forces in the centre, in Germany and not in the wings. NATO had offered Turkey the same thing, by placing an allied division on the Soviet frontier but it had been rejected by Turkey.

He noted that Turkish forces had fought in Austria, Bulgaria and Rumania in 1916 in Ottoman times. "Under the NATO defence arrangements the Turkish forces are responsible exclusively for their own territory. It is out of the question for any of our units to take up duty outside Anatolia or Thrace.

"For the fulfillment of mutual aid commitments in the NATO alliance and for the execution of joint defence plans, infrastructural installations such as airfields, submarine shelters, oil pipelines and depots, early detection and warning systems, a joint communications network have been built in our country with NATO aid. Also passive land intelligence systems and logistics organizations are met with bilateral arrangements with the U.S.A. within the NATO Pact. Without such arrangements joint defence plans cannot possibly be executed effectively. There-



fore the claims that Turkey undertook unnecessary commitments which do not come under NATO are untrue.”

Turkey had been equipped with tactical nuclear arms according to NATO resolutions. “At present there are in Turkey ground launching devices and nuclear arms with limited ranges directed at the target from air and also the NIKE system against an air raid. All are to be used for tactical defence purposes...

“In accordance with the established rules of NATO, tactical nuclear arms in Turkey are subject to the double key system and it is impossible to use them without Turkey’s consent. The launching devices of tactical nuclear arms in Turkey are in the hands of the personnel of the Turkish Armed Forces and no other personnel has the right or possibility to use these arms. After NATO’s decision to use these tactical weapons, taking over the warheads; placing them in devices and aircraft; directing and firing them at the target or flying the aircraft are entirely in the authority of the Turkish personnel and pilots.”

Demirel said that in emergencies, NATO countries could use nuclear arms against a nuclear aggression without a decision of the NATO Council. The NATO Nuclear Planning Council had discussed the matter at its November 1969 meeting in Washington and taken very delicate and secret resolutions. NATO established the necessary procedure and certain criteria for the timely utilization of tactical nuclear arms by the members. “NATO countries are determined to further develop these procedures and criteria. It is our conviction that this stage attained in the alliance in this field is truly satisfactory under international realities today and they reinforce NATO’s deterrence.”

Answering the criticism that the U.S. could bomb Soviet targets from İncirlik and thus expose Turkey to a nuclear counter-blow, the Prime Minister noted that both the Soviet Union and the U.S. knew that even a limited nuclear aggression would soon lead to total nuclear retaliation by the other party, considering the importance of even seconds in such an eventuality. “When this is the case, the American desire to put Turkey in trouble would be tantamount to putting herself in trouble and it is inconceivable.”

About the criticisms that NATO commitments and aid were not automatic

under article 5 of the Pact, Demirel said that it was indeed so under article 5 but a necessary shortcoming. "In a collective security system formed by independent and sovereign States the agreement could not have been expected to have been otherwise. Like Turkey, other NATO countries are also tied by the provisions of their constitutions and the will of their parliaments." If it had been otherwise it would have been against article 110 of the Turkish constitution. However, there were certain measures to counter this shortcoming in NATO. These joint measures were: the NATO early detection and warning system; the communications and intelligence network; the joint defence plans; the Mobile Force of the European Allied Command.

He explained that under the Mobile Force arrangement light infantry battalions composed of German, U.S., Benelux, British, Italian and Canadian forces and NATO air support forces would come to the political tension area in NATO even before the outbreak of war. Thus the aggressor would find itself facing the forces of eight NATO countries in addition to the national forces of that country. This force was not very big, but it was a "live guarantee and assurance" that the countries concerned and NATO as a whole would be beside the member subjected to aggression.

Demirel said that the same was the case with the NATO naval "on-call force" which would be composed of U.S., British and Italian warships and would also be participated in by Turkey and Greece. The criticism that this would enlarge Turkey's responsibility area was not valid because Turkey was totally free about complying with each "call." Also, the mission of the Turkish participant would be established by Turkey herself. Therefore, there was no reason for anxiety. The matter was still under study, he added.

In conclusion, Demirel said, "Had Turkey felt secure enough outside NATO she would not have undertaken any commitment. It is also obvious that remaining outside NATO makes Turkey a more comfortable target for those who cherish aggressive ambitions. These calculations have been made today, as was done before, the answers have been given and the decision taken accordingly... The claims that Turkey will be subjected to an aggression if she remains neutral should be taken as considerations with ulterior motives rather than valid ones."

Answers to questions: Jupiter missiles had come to Turkey with the 30 June 1960 agreement and had been removed because they had become obsolete according to one rumour and because of the Soviet-American bargaining during the Cuban crisis, according to another. The news reports were wrong that the American aircraft in Libya had been brought to İncirlik. The number of aircraft in the İncirlik base depended on the table of organization established, he said.

The Prime Minister ruled out the possibility that tactical nuclear arms would mean the destruction of Turkey. "Even if this consideration had been the case, still we could not have given up tactical arms," he pointed out.

Turkey had taken no initiative about concluding a non-aggression pact with anyone.

On being told that a Mr. Max Stuart had said that Turkey would be exhausted within four or five days in the event of an aggression, Demirel said that Turkey was no easy mouthful to swallow, as everyone had admitted. "We cannot accept such a fate of four or five days. Turkey's defence strategy is based on the defence of Turkey house by house, tree by tree, hill by hill, town by town, village by village, inch by inch," he said.

*Milliyet* reported from Berlin on Saturday that the renowned Dr. Mansholt of the EEC had said that he saw in Turkey's entry into the Common Market a "black end and bankruptcy" for her. He had said that Turkey could sell the Community no agricultural goods, nor was it anything but a dream to imagine that Turkey could sell cars to the EEC. Asked to comment on these words, Demirel said, "It is not right to seek abroad the authorities who think of Turkey better than us. Let everyone deal with his own affairs. Why should Turkey enter into a setup which would make her go bankrupt? Have we lost all wisdom?"

He wound up by saying that Turkey could use NATO arms herself and had done so in Cyprus.

## APPENDIX H

### U.S.-TURKEY DEFENCE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT, March 29, 1980<sup>1499</sup>

Agreement for cooperation on defence and economy between the governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey in accordance with Articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Governments of the United States of America and of the Republic of Turkey,

Reaffirming their devotion to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter,

Recognizing that the relationship and cooperation between them rest on the principles of democracy, human rights, justice and social progress,

Expressing their desire to maintain the security and independence of their respective countries and to increase the standard of living of their peoples,

Recognizing that cooperation in the fields of economy and defence, as in all other fields, is based on full respect for the sovereignty of the Parties,

Expressing their willingness to continue their economic and related scientific and technological cooperation both bilaterally and as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to enhance their defence cooperation as partners within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty,

Reaffirming their determination to contribute to the strengthening of world peace,

Taking into account the principle that the maintenance of an adequate defence posture is an important element for the preservation of world peace and stability,

Expressing their faith in the acceleration of disarmament efforts and their mutual desire to contribute to this process,

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<sup>1499</sup> R.C. Campany, *Turkey and the United States*, New York: Praeger, 1986, pp.103-107.

Acting on the basis of their continuing friendship and in recognition of their obligations to the security and defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area and pursuant to Articles II and III of the North Atlantic Treaty,

Have entered into the following Agreement:

#### **ARTICLE I**

On the basis of sovereign equality and mutual interest, the Parties shall maintain cooperation so as to foster their economic and social development.

For this purpose, the Parties shall maintain and develop close cooperation between the comprising economic, defence and related scientific and technical fields.

The Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey shall continuously review their cooperation in all these fields and identify and implement appropriate measures for developing it.

For these purposes consultations shall be held, the level and date of which shall be as mutually agreed between the two Governments.

#### **ARTICLE II**

Recognizing the interrelationship of economic and defence matters and the fact that a sound defence rests on a sound economy and in order to assist each other to fulfil their mutual responsibilities as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Parties, as envisaged in Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, will exert maximum efforts to develop economic cooperation, including commercial, economic, industrial, scientific and technological relations, between the two Countries.

For this purpose, the Government of the United States will exert its best efforts to provide mutually agreed financial and technical assistance to Turkey's development efforts.

#### **ARTICLE III**

For the purpose of strengthening the mutual security cooperation between the two Governments within the framework of Article III of the North Atlantic

Treaty, the Government of the United States shall use its best efforts to provide the Government of the Republic of Turkey with defence equipment, services and training in accordance with programs to be mutually agreed upon. The cooperation in this field shall be carried out in accordance with Supplementary Agreement Number 1 on Defense Support.

#### **ARTICLE IV**

In the furtherance of the spirit of Article II of this Agreement and in recognition of the mutual benefits to be achieved by both Parties, the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Turkey shall seek opportunities to cooperate in the production and purchasing of appropriate defence material. Both Parties will undertake to encourage joint investment in the above areas of economic and defence cooperation.

For this purpose, the Government of the United States shall assist the Government of the Republic of Turkey in mutually agreed efforts aimed at enhancing the production, maintenance, repair and modernisation of defence material and equipment in Turkey and will encourage new defence production projects and two-way trade in defence material.

This cooperation shall be carried out in accordance with Supplementary Agreement Number 2 on Defense Industrial Cooperation.

#### **ARTICLE V**

1. The Government of the Republic of Turkey authorises the Government of the United States to participate in joint defence measures at specified Turkish Armed Forces installations.

2. The activities and technical operations of the installations shall be conducted in accordance with mutually agreed purposes and programs.

3. The "Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, Regarding the Status of Their Forces" dated June 19, 1951, shall apply to the force and civilian component of the United States of America and their dependents assigned or stationed in the territory of the Republic of Turkey for the purposes of this Agreement.

4. The extent of the defence cooperation envisaged in this Agreement shall be limited to obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty.

5. This cooperation shall be carried out in accordance with Supplementary Agreement Number 3 on Installations.

## ARTICLE VI

Taking into consideration the sovereign equality of the Parties and for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Agreement and its Supplementary Agreements on the basis of reciprocity, the Parties agree that:

A. The Government of the Republic of Turkey may maintain a military liaison office within its Embassy in the United States to carry out liaison with appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States on questions regarding the exchange of information, cooperation and other defence matters of mutual concern, including security assistance and other related subjects.

B. Likewise, the Government of the United States may maintain its organization in Turkey to carry out similar functions with appropriate authorities of the Government of the Republic of Turkey.

## ARTICLE VII

1. This Agreement and the Supplementary Agreements annexed to it shall be valid for a period of 5 years. Unless one of the Parties notifies the other Party of the termination of this Agreement 3 months in advance of the end of this initial 5-year period, it will continue to be in effect from year to year until terminated by agreement of the Parties or by either Party upon 3 months notice prior to the end of each subsequent year.

2. Should disagreement arise from the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement or of the Supplementary Agreements, the Parties shall begin consultations immediately in order to resolve the matter.

3. Either Party may propose, should it find necessary, in writing, the amendment or revision of this Agreement or any of the Supplementary Agreements. In this case, consultations shall begin immediately. If no result is reached in

three months, either Party may terminate the Agreement or the Supplementary Agreement in question upon notice in writing of 30 days.

4. In the event that one of the Parties concludes that the other Party is not complying or is unable to comply with the provisions of this Agreement or its Supplementary Agreements, it may propose, in writing, consultations, which will begin immediately. If no result is reached within 30 days, either Party may terminate upon notice in writing of 30 days this Agreement or any of the Supplementary Agreements without prejudicing the validity of this Agreement.

#### **ARTICLE VIII**

This Agreement and the Supplementary Agreements annexed to it shall come into effect on the date of exchange of notes in accordance with respective legal procedures.

#### **ARTICLE IX**

Done at Ankara in duplicate, in the English and Turkish languages, each of which shall be equally authentic, on this 29th day of March, 1980.

JAMES W. SPAIN, Ambassador of the United States of America, for the Government of The United States of America

HAYRETTIN ERKMEN, Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the Government of The Republic of Turkey



## APPENDIX I

### U.S.-TURKISH TRADE RELATIONS

Between 1960 and 1975 Turkey was trying to develop its economy through rapid industrialization under the five-year development plans which were prepared by the State Planning Organization. Therefore, Turkey's industry was heavily dependent on imports of machinery, spare parts and fuel. The first five-year plan (1963-1967) predicted that the export of traditional agricultural products would increase and that investment projects would cause an increase in the import of machinery and other investment products.<sup>1500</sup> Even the third five-year plan (1973-1977), which aimed at a considerable increase in the export of manufactured goods and in their share of the total exports, predicted that Turkey still would import manufactured and investment goods in large amounts.<sup>1501</sup> These predictions proved correct: major Turkish imports in 1960-75 comprised the following items: 1- Non-electric machinery. 2- Iron and steel products. 3- Means of transport (including motor vehicles). 4- Crude oil and petroleum products. 4- Electrical machinery. 5- Rubber and plastics products. 6- Agriculture-based processed products. 7- Cereal (including wheat). 8- Textiles. Turkey's exports were: 1- Cotton. 2- Tobacco. 3- Hazelnuts. 4- Raisins. 5- Minerals (including chromium). 6- Textiles. 7- Food beverages. 8- Industrial products.<sup>1502</sup>

In the period of our study, as an industrialized, developed country, the United States was one of the leading powers in the export of manufactured goods though manufactures also occupied the most important place in her imports. Major U.S. exports were: 1- Machinery. 2- Automobiles and parts. 3- Aircraft and parts. 4- Iron and steel products. 5- Chemicals. 6- Electrical, construction and agricultural machinery. 7- Fuels. 8- Wheat. Major U.S. imports were: 1- Machinery. 2- Transport equipment. 3- Petroleum products. 4- Forest products. 5- Iron and steel products. 6- Chemicals. 7- Coffee. The percentages of categories in U.S.

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<sup>1500</sup> *Kalkınma Planı; Birinci Beş Yıl 1963-1967*, T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Ankara: Başbakanlık Matbaası, January 1963, p.509.

<sup>1501</sup> *Yeni Strateji ve Kalkınma Planı; Üçüncü Beş Yıl*, T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Ankara, 1973, pp.187, 189-190.

<sup>1502</sup> Z.Y. Hershlag, *Turkey: the Challenge of Growth*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968, pp.370-371, Z. Hatiboğlu, *An Unconventional Analysis of Turkish Economy*, İstanbul: Aktif Büro Basım Organizasyon, 1978, pp.109-112, *Turkey: Prospects and Problems of an Expanding Economy*, Washington: the World Bank, 1975, pp.346-348.

exports and imports respectively were the following: 1- Finished manufactures: 60.2 and 44.6. 2- Semi-manufactures: 15.1 and 22.1. 3- Crude materials: 10.7 and 16.0. 4- Crude foodstuffs: 8.6 and 8.8. 5- Manufactured foodstuffs: 5.5 and 9.7.<sup>1503</sup>

Trade relations between the USA and Turkey in the 1960-1975 period fit trade patterns of both countries, which are mentioned above, and demonstrate that the U.S.-Turkish trade was complementary rather than competitive. Tables 4 and 5 show items of the U.S.-Turkish trade. In 1960-75, while Turkey exported to the United States agricultural products (mainly tobacco and various fruits, vegetables and nuts), some raw minerals and metals, animal products, textile and cereals, U.S. exports to Turkey included mainly manufactured goods: machinery (including electrical machinery), road vehicles and other transport equipment, cereals (mainly wheat), chemicals, petroleum and products, metal manufactures, iron and steel, textiles and rubber manufactures. The two countries had no competition in any trade products. Although Turkey was an agriculture country, its cereal (especially wheat) export was not considerable in 1960-75 and she had to import wheat in bad harvest seasons. As a wheat exporter, the United States met Turkey's this need under a special arrangement<sup>1504</sup> rather than being a competitor of Turkey in this field. Turkey's textile exports, too, were not great enough in this period to cause problems between the two countries.

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<sup>1503</sup> R.K. Vedder, *the American Economy in Historical Perspective*, Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Co. Inc., 1976, p.404, W. Woodruff, *America's Impact on the World*, London: Macmillan, 1975, pp.265-266, W.H. Branson, **Trends in United States International Trade and Investment Since World War II** in M. Feldstein (ed.), *The American Economy in Transition*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp.196, 200-201, 222-225.

<sup>1504</sup> See p.137 of this thesis.

**Table 4: TURKISH EXPORTS TO THE USA (monthly averages,  
000 dollars)**

Item	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Tobacco and manufactures	4,284	4,295	3,791	3,838	3,670	4,686	4,964	3,888
Fruits, vegetables, nuts	889	679	648	614	572	628	429	347
Metalliferous ores, scrap	286	262	378	137	174	261	102	234
Base metals, mainly copper	100	12	-	-	-	523	218	136
Wool and other animal hair	216	137	83	143	105	29	34	12
Animal and veg. oils, fats	-	-	-	-	31	75	10	60
Textile manufactures	10	8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cereals and products	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	9
Total	6,284	5,719	5,868	5,215	5,038	6,822	6,875	6,553

  

Item	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Tobacco and manufactures	6,355	3,815	3,569	2,846	6,717	5,993	6,701	7,896
Fruits, vegetables, nuts	844	702	643	708	1,449	1,488	1,097	1,221
Metalliferous ores, scrap	258	289	615	874	243	431	448	905
Base metals, mainly copper	66	103	22	34	240	56	69	175
Wool and other animal hair	11	3	2	-	37	3	1	-
Animal and veg. oils, fats	4	3	-	1	-	35	144	2
Textile manufactures	-	-	-	-	85	123	123	253
Cereals and products	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	8,283	5,631	5,096	7,551	8,836	10,767	11,766	12,064

**Table 5: TURKISH IMPORTS FROM USA (monthly averages, 000 dollars)**

Item	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Machinery, non-electric	3,334	1,896	3,134	5,265	2,649	2,985	4,162	3,345
Electric machinery	471	475	672	1,764	604	1,199	1,288	988
Road vehicles	2,783	884	1,213	1,165	900	1,473	2,025	2,071
Other transport equipment	-	-	18	72	489	723	60	137
Cereals and products	3,980	4,534	5,012	2,824	768	1,680	2,922	103
Chemicals	371	447	982	796	971	943	918	801
Petroleum and products	489	580	672	657	747	737	615	865
Metal manufactures	156	209	612	569	179	272	212	173
Iron and steel	264	257	572	775	1,139	659	505	147
Textiles	10	10	369	206	727	521	298	241
Rubber manufactures	374	283	350	260	165	93	90	120
Total	13,727	10,604	16,132	17,982	13,389	13,360	-	-
Item	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Machinery, non-electric	3,104	2,541	2,677	2,980	4,165	4,386	6,810	16,250
Electric machinery	999	1,288	1,676	1,180	1,478	1,479	1,908	2,810
Road vehicles	1,910	1,786	1,332	639	1,890	2,448	2,818	6,845
Other transport equipment	893	1,053	1,119	1,519	2,267	2,457	4,438	1,585
Cereals and products	148	2,141	2,938	2,598	264	3,089	7,783	5,139
Chemicals	967	789	691	695	631	1,235	1,450	3,195
Petroleum and products	704	510	700	466	549	249	380	523
Metal manufactures	166	186	438	401	211	204	236	924
Iron and steel	172	322	751	843	106	292	860	704
Textiles	105	16	68	38	27	29	31	84

Item	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Rubber manufactures	117	66	36	65	53	90	157	368
Total	25,058	24,861	23,228	22,378	25,021	28,920	38,547	50,617

Source: *Quarterly Economic Review, Turkey*, November 1961, No.40, p.15, June 1964, No.50, p.15, June 1966, No.2, p.18, June 1968, No.2, p.12, June 1970, No.2, p.17, June 1972, No.2, p.13, September 1972, No.3, p.12, June 1974, No.2, p.11, September 1976, No.3, p.16.

The total value of the U.S.-Turkish trade in U.S. dollars can be seen in Tables 4 and 5. Table 6 shows the value of this trade in Turkish liras. The trade with the USA held a considerable place in Turkey's total exports and imports. Although the USA's share in Turkey's exports and imports fell constantly in the 1960s and the 1970s (see Table 7), she, as a single trade partner, maintained her importance for Turkey's trade. On the other hand, Turkey was not a significant trade partner of the United States. In 1970 her share was 0.7 percent in U.S. export and 0.1 in U.S. import. (This figures became 0.2 and 0.1 in 1978).<sup>1505</sup> There was no significant disagreement in the economic field between the United States and Turkey in 1960-75 because there was no fierce competition between them in the trade of any products and Turkey's share in the U.S. was not important. Only the amount of U.S. economic and military aid to Turkey and the use of economic aid by U.S. authorities as a leverage against Turkey brought problems as explained in different parts of the thesis.

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<sup>1505</sup> J. Agnew, *the United States in the World Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p.144.

**Table 6: TURKEY'S TRADE WITH USA (000 TL)**

-	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Import	546342	1260835	1631137	1904630	1403371	1458606	1567188	1114406
Export	292556	586841	674069	448049	656885	740965	722156	836390
-	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Import	1095208	1152964	-	1951630	2494341	2545112	4813472	5980942
Export	652798	538962	-	914646	1374859	1797120	1997626	2104976

Source: *Dış Ticaret Yıllık İstatistik*, T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1961-1962, p.xxv, 1963-1964, p.xxi, 1965-1966, p.xxiii, 1967-1968, p.xxiii, 1969, p.xxv, 1975-1976, p.xxv.

**Table 7: US SHARE IN TURKISH TRADE (percent of total value)**

-	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Export	17.2	18.8	19.6	13.5	17.8	18	16	18
Import	25.8	27.5	29.1	30.6	28.7	28	24	26
-	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Export	15	12	12	10	12	10	9	10
Import	16	20	19	14	12	11	7	9

Source: *Quarterly Economic Review Annual Supplement, Turkey*, June 1961, p.9, June 1963, p.11, June 1965, p.15, 1967, p.16, 1969, p.19, 1971, p.23, 1973, p.23, 1975, p.24, 1976, p.24.

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